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Abstract 
Scientific progress is a fact of history. The instances of this fact can be 
traced from Ptolemy to Copernicus, Newton to Einstein, Wave theor}' of Hght 
to Corpuscular theory. Priestley to Lavoisier, etc. However, the fact of 
scientific progress entails an ^enquiry.--irtto the pattern of scientific progress 
vv'hich pattern further necessitates an examination of the position of truth in the 
onward march of history of science. For. understanding of the position of truth 
follows from the understanding of pattern of progress. The present topic : 
'Scientific Progress and the Problem of Realism" is an attempt to understand 
the pattern of scientific progress and the status of truth in the changing 
scientific or theoretical discourse. However, the pattern of progress depends on 
the nature of theories. In other words, nature of theories indicates the pattern of 
progress and, in its turn, the pattern of progress indicates the position of truth in 
it. 
Accordingly, the research embodied in this thesis is carried out on the 
views of five considerably different philosophers of science : Karl R. Popper, 
Thomas S. Kuhn, hnre Lakatos. Larry Laudan and Stephen Toulmin. The 
present work is comprised of the following eight chapters : 
1. Introduction 
2. Understanding Theory and Theory-change 
3. The Aim of Progress and the Falsifiable Hypothesis. 
4. The Status of Progress in Paradigm-shift 
5. The Research Programme and the Pattern of Progress 
6. The Research Tradition and the Character of Progress 
7. The Structure of Progress in Evolutionary Change. 
8. Critical Evaluation 
In chapter-1, Introduction, we have tried to show how 'truth" 
problematises scientific progress. Though science is usually deemed to be 
objective, it possesses, especially at its fundamental level, the human elements 
also. The historical study of scientific activities reveals a different picture of 
science than that of its popular and widely prevalent conception. 
In the second chapter, Understanding Theory and Theory-Change, 
we have discussed some elementary ideas about the nature of scientific theories 
and the different forms of scientific change. Here we have firstly dealt with the 
relation of truth to theory. A theory may be formulated with the aim of 
describing the natural world or predicting the future phenomena, or explaining 
natural facts and solving the problems arising thereof, etc. In this regard, there 
are two approaches to scientific theories : realism and anti-realism. According 
to realism the world is real and scientific theories have the capacity to exactly 
pinpoint its reality. In view of the same, different versions of realism have been 
brought out in this chapter to see the position of truth in scientific theories. On 
the other hand, various versions of anti-realism outlined in this chapter, hold 
that scientific theories do not aim at truth, but are rather conventions or fictions 
about nature. In essence they are instruments for predicting natural phenomena. 
Secondly, in this chapter, we have pointed out that there is a gulf between 
scientific rules and methods and the actual practice of science. Here the actual 
or historical way of doing science has convinced us that there does not exist 
any fact-independent theory or any such logic which necessarily culminates 
into a theory. This is a crucial finding about scientific theories entailing a 
foundational methodological shift. Thirdly, we have attempted to point out 
different terms and conditions of scientific progress. If T2 better explains the 
phenomena than T|, then it can be considered as progress. But there are 
instances of such revolutionary changes in the history of science when it is verv 
difficult to understand as to whether the rejection of T| by T2 is really progress 
or not. However, some elementary ideas of progress have been outlined in this 
chapter. 
The third chapter of this thesis is titled The Aim of Progress and the 
Falsifiable Hypothesis. In this chapter, we try to understand •Scientific 
progress and the problem of realism' on the basis of Popper's falsificationist 
view of scientific change. The core of Popper's view of scientific change is that 
a scientific theory is no more than a falsifiable hypothesis. Many a hypothesis 
are fielded in astronomy, physics or geology, or for that matter in sociology. 
economics, or political science. But only those hypotheses can be deemed to be 
scientific theories which are falsifiable. For Popper such a hypothesis can be 
produced from any source such as mythology, metaphysics, religion or 
folklore etc. If such a hypothesis is falsifiable. it is scientific. 
In Popper's view, science can make progress through such hypotheses, 
by recourse to the method of'trial and error'. Scientists put their hypothesis on 
trial and if any error is found out thereof the theory is refuted. Thereafter, the 
scientists do conjecture up another hypothesis. His book 'Conjectures and 
Refutations' is addressed to expound this method. A competing hypothesis or 
H2 proposes a crucial experiment to refute the earlier theory Hi. However, the 
falsifying hypothesis i.e. H2 which refutes the falsifiable hypothesis, i.e. H]. is 
deemed to be of greater relevance in the ongoing scientific inquirv. In this 
process of falsification science makes progress. For Popper, such a progress 
aims at truth. Through falsification we reduce falsity from science: and 
reduction of falsity logically means an increase in the truth-content. So ever}' 
step of falsification entails that we are proceeding towards truth. Popper says 
that falsification is a ceaseless process. In this process, we do not know when, 
where and how we arrive at the truth. However, what is assured is that our 
search is directed at the truth. Even if some steps sometimes go wrong, our 
direction towards the truth remains unchanging. 
In the fourth chapter. The Status of Progress in Paradigm-shift, we 
have discussed Kuhn's view of scientific change. For Kuhn, a fundamental 
scientific theory is no more than a paradigm. A paradigm is the construct of a 
scientist's imaginative mind. A paradigm is a grand theory which is first 
accepted by a scientific community and then every scientific activity of that 
community is determined by the accepted paradigm. Thus a paradigm is a 
closed framework whose change brings a total change in science. Theory2 
becomes acceptable on the rejection of Theoryi. Such a kind of radical change 
is christened as scientific revolution by Kuhn. For him, a revolution is just a 
replacement of one theory by another. So, in this transition, there is no increase 
of knowledge, it is only a shift of the outlook. Paradigms are incommensurable. 
So, the question of understanding progress through paradigm-shift does not 
arise at all. 
However, the efficacy of a paradigm depends on its followers. Kuhn 
exemplifies this with the tools of a carpenter. The tools may work well if a 
carpenter is skillful. Paradigms are, likewise, tools in scientists' hands by 
which they solve the puzzles about the natural world. It indicates that a 
paradigm does not aim at truth, rather it addresses itself to solving of scientific 
puzzles. 
In the fifth chapter. The Research Programme and the Pattern of 
Progress, we have taken up 'research programme' view of science advocated 
by Lakatos. The phrase 'research programme' indicates that fundamental 
scientific products are not isolated theories, but rather a series of theories which 
Lakatos calls a 'research programme'. This view is different from that of Kuhn 
and Popper. For Kuhn, there occurs a revolution and as a result the earlier 
theory is rejected. Popper holds that with falsifying hypothesis the earlier 
hypothesis is refuted and rejected. But Lakatos holds that there is no such 
instant rejection of the old theory. Every theory has its 'relative autonomy". A 
crucial experiment may declare anomalies of a theory, but the theory may not 
be rejected by the scientists. For Lakatos, auxiliary hypotheses make a 
protective belt which prevent the refutation of the core hypothesis. It is further 
strengthened by the heuristic power of a 'research programme". So. scientific 
change occurs not in the form of an instant revolution. It is rather a slow 
process. For Lakatos, the 'degenerating problem-shift' of the earlier theorv and 
•progressive problem-shift' of the later theory, constitute the real reason of or 
ground for scientific change. However, in this view, a theory may discover 
facts, but those facts are oriented under the influence of a particular 'research 
programme'. So, increase in discovering of facts does not necessarily mean the 
increase of truth-content. 
In the sixth chapter. The Research Tradition and the Character of 
Progress, we have deliberated upon research tradition view of scientitlc 
change. The phrase 'research tradition* indicates that our discussion is based 
here on Laudan's view that fundamental scientific theories are no more than 
'research traditions' which determine all our scientific activities including all 
the problems, even if they be metaphysical or worldview problems. According 
to Laudan, since science is a problem-oriented enterprise, scientific change 
occurs on the basis of 'problem-solving-effectiveness' of the traditions. A 
research tradition with greater 'problem-solving effectiveness' supersedes that 
tradition which is of less 'problem-solving-effectiveness". So. it is an ob\ious 
progress of science. But this progress is not committed to realism. For. a theor\' 
aims at 'problem-solving', not at truth; a research tradition is evolved for the 
purpose of solving the problems. In this regard, Laudan holds that the solution 
of the problems does not necessarily mean attainment of truth. A solution is a 
solution of our problem which is totally a human product. 
In the seventh chapter, The Structure of Progress in Evolutionary 
Change, we have worked out Toulmin's view that a theory-change is like an 
evolutionary change. Every theory is an organism and scientific discipline is a 
species. Every theory endeavours to survive in the intellectual environment. In 
evolutionary change, a theory changes in terms of development from lesser to 
greater perfection. So, there is a continuity in science - the new theor\' emerges 
out of the old. This kind of change is an obvious progress. The goal of this 
progress is not transcendental truth, but rather the truth that is conceived of in 
the process of evolution of concepts. This progress is directed at the inteilectua/ 
ideals which are again changeable in the course of conceptual evolution. 
In the eighth chapter. Critical Evaluation, we have made a critical 
evaluation and found that the ideas of science developed through the discussion 
of different views of five philosophers are quite unlike the traditional view of 
science. According to the traditional view of science, scientific theories are 
produced out of inductive generalizations. A hypothesis is formulated to 
account for the observed facts. From this general hypothesis we deduce a 
particular conclusion which is then tested through a crucial experiment. In this 
view, scientists are seen as piling up facts, generalizing them into laws, and 
again piling up more facts step by step in the laboratory. If you can infer the 
laws from the accumulated facts, you can deduce the facts again from the laws, 
and the content of the laws is nothing but the facts. For traditional view of 
science, science ultimately aims at discovering the truth. Successive 
generations of scientists have filled in more and more parts of the complete true 
story of the world. This is a cumulative process of progress. 
Our present study of the five philosophers of science leads us to doubt 
the traditional concept of scientific progress. Firstly, the new ideas oppose the 
concept of cumulafive progress. Popper, Kuhn, Laudan and Toulmin all 
recognize the phenomenon of scientific revolufion. Revolution, as opposed to 
accumulation, rejects the past achievements, and thus does not add to the piling 
up of facts. Secondly, scientific progress does not occur methodically, 
especially not in the way of inductive method. In Modern Physics, theories like 
quantum theory, relativity theory, theory of subatomic particles etc. are not 
formulated by way of inductive generalization. They are created by scientist's 
imaginative mind. History of actual science reveals that science makes progress 
through the violation of the prevailing methods. If scientists obeyed the 
absolutistic mechanism of Newton, they could not have had the relativistic one 
of Einstein. 
Another important part of scientific method is crucial experiment. As 
opposed to traditional concept of theory-change, our present understanding is 
that a crucial experiment cannot be decisive with regard to the acceptance or 
rejection of a theory. There are several historical examples to support the 
contention that theories were not given up by the scientists despite the fact that 
crucial experiments brought out their anomalous character. The so-called facts 
are given to us in the light of our theoretical orientation. This is so mainly 
because observational facts on the basis of which an experiment is undertaken 
have lost their objective status. The theory-ladenness of facts leads us to the 
incommensurability of theories. As a result, we are not in a position to make a 
rational or methodical judgment on theory-change. 
For the same reason, it is difficult to accept a realistic account of 
scientific change. Unlike scientific realism, it is quite untenable to maintain 
that the unobservable entities that theoretical terms indicate do exist. Many 
such theories were proved false and rejected by scientists. Even the most 
lenient version of realism asserting that science at least aims at truth though not 
achieving it. is also difficult to maintain in view of Kuhn's discovery of socio-
psychical elements in scientific activity. For him and others like Laudan. 
Lakatos and Toulmin, scientific theories are but instruments for predicting the 
natural phenomena or for solving the problems experienced by us. And 
therefore, better theory means a better instrument. Realism, on the other hand. 
maintains that a better theory leads us to better description of the world. 
From the discussion of different views of different philosophers we 
have concluded firstly that scientific progress is negotiated through the actual 
science of the past. Kuhn may not recognize 'better' theory, but his 'dominant' 
paradigm means some progress registered by the scientific community. He 
calls it sociological progress. Secondly, we see that in no version of scientific 
progress, are we bestowed with truth as such. Popper may show that reduction 
of falsity logically means progress towards truth. But until we understand the 
truth itself, it does not mean much. In falsification we can only know as to what 
is not true without knowing as to what is true. Thirdly, we see that scientific 
theories are the constructs of imaginative human minds. This account of 
science is radically unlike the popular conception of science, which maintains 
that scientific theories are discovered by some sacred methods. This stud\ 
helps us to realize that it is not scientific method, which guides men. but it is 
men who guide scientific research, i.e.. scientific research is guided according 
to human thought. Fourthly, we see that scientific theories are not ideology-
free. Kuhn's 'paradigm', Popper's 'falsifiable hypotheses', Lakatos's 'research 
programme', Laudan's 'research tradition' and Toulmin's 'intellectual ideals" -
all are but ideologies of scientific research. So, scientific theories are 
ideologically loaded constructs, not detached and neutral discoveries by 
rational calculations. Fifthly, we see that scientific progress occurs regardless 
of everything. Science dictates its won ways of change and progress. Standards 
of appraisal, logic of discovery; nothing is strictly obeyed by science in its 
onward march. Finally, when the theory changes, thereafter methodologists 
think over as to why and how the change has occurred. This postdictory 
thinking indicates that there is freedom in scientific research also. 
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Chapter - 1 
Introduction 
Traditional understanding of science as objective study of nature and 
traditional understanding of scientific progress in terms of better and better 
description of the natural world, are compatible with realism. But in this thesis 
entitled 'Scientific Progress and the Problem of Realism', an attempt is 
undertaken to show that such an understanding is not easily maintainable; 
rather it is quite problematic - there are subjective elements in scientific 
enterprise. 
This problem can be traced to the very character of science. On the 
simplest level, science is knowledge of the world of nature. This knowledge is 
constituted by recognizing the regularities in nature. Therefore, recognition of 
regularity in which, for example, the Sun and the Moon periodically repeat 
their movements, is a scientific knowledge. However, the mere recognition of 
regularities does not exhaust the full meaning of science. Regularities may be 
constructions of the human mind. Human mind normally likes to explore 
regularities and uniformities and does not like to see chaos in nature; so it may 
construct regularities even when none objectively exists. For instance, one of 
the astronomical laws of the Middle Ages was that the appearance of comets 
presaged a great upheaval, as the Norman Conquest of Britain followed the 
cometof 1066 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1993, vol. 27, p.32). 
Some insist that the genuine understanding of regularities demands 
explanations of the causes of the laws. However, in this realm where there is 
wide-spread disagreement. While Modem biology thrives on causal chains, 
modern quantum mechanics has given up the causal quest. Even if causation 
and explanation are admitted as necessary, there is little agreement on the kind 
of causes that are permissible, or possible in science. Causes once appealed to, 
have been rejected by modern scientists. If the entities which were once 
considered as real and now are considered as unreal, then the entities which are 
now considered as real may be considered as unreal in future. Therefore 
science is to be considered as knowledge of regularities that is subjected to 
some degree of skeptical reasoning (Encyclopedia Britannica. 1993, p.32). 
Consider the line of development from Aristotelian mechanics through 
Cartesian to Newtonian to Einsteinian one. The salient feature of Aristotelian 
mechanics is that the ultimate cause of all motion is a prime, or unmoved, 
mover (God) that stood outside the cosmos. In addition to this the 
understanding of Physics and biology posits teleology in the cosmos. However, 
the Cartesian. Cartesian 'matter" and 'motion' are ateleological. Nor did 
Descartes's system seem to need the active participation of a deity. The 
Cartesian cosmos was like a watch that had been wound up at the creation and 
continues ticking to eternity. This understanding of the world is also totally 
different from the Newtonian world. Newton's three laws of motion and the 
principle of universal gravitation suffice to regulate the cosmos. Absolute 
space, for Newton, was essential, because space was the "Sensorium of God" 
and the divine abode must necessarily be the ultimate coordinate system. This 
world is again different from Einstein's mechanics which redefines Physics as 
the study of relations between observers and events, rather than of the events 
themselves. What was observed, and therefore what happened, was now said to 
be a function of the observer's location and motion relative to the other events. 
Therefore, no longer could physicists speak with confidence of physical reality, 
but only of the probability. Now the question arises as to which of the 
understandings represent the reality of the world, Aristotelian, Cartesian, 
Newtonian or Einsteinian? 
The problem can be seen in another way. The understanding of physical 
science may be broadly divided into laws and theories. A law may be described 
as an empirical generalization that we accept as true. Each of these laws refers 
to single thing, property, process, etc.. that is observable under specified 
experimental conditions. On the other hand, a theory is not an empirical 
generalization. It contains theoretical terms such as 'electron', 'field', ether". 
etc. These theoretical terms do not refer to things, properties, processes that are 
directly observable. It is because of such terms that theories cannot be put to 
direct test in the ways that laws can. This accounts for the fact that individual 
laws may survive when one theory is discarded and replaced by another. 
Let us exemplify this distinction. The following statement is Boyle"s 
law ; Ai a constant temperature, the volume of a given quantity of any gas is 
inversely proportional to the pressure of the gas. This law is explained in terms 
of a theory of perfect gases. The theory of perfect gases postulates that an ideal 
gas would consist of perfectly elastic molecules. Moreover, it assume that the 
volume occupied by the actual molecules and the forces of attraction between 
them is zero or negligible. If we examine Boyle's law, we find that the terms 
refer to what is observable under specified experimental conditions. We can 
actually measure and therefore see the pressure of a gas. But if we examine the 
theory of perfect gases, we realize that we can not isolate a molecule in order to 
see if it is perfectly elastic. For this reason Boyle's law can be directly tested, 
but no such straightforward test exists for the theory about molecules. 
However, there are linking principles which serve to relate the 
theoretical terms to the observational laws. But such a relation is not one-to-
one. We do not necessarily have one, and only one, linking principle for each 
theoretical term. Sometimes there is one; sometimes there are many; sometimes 
there is none. For example, there is a linking principle for "mean kinetic energy 
of the totality of molecules", but there is no linking principle for "kinetic 
energy of an individual molecule" (Brody, 1968, pp. 5-6). At this point, the 
theoretical terms that do not refer to anything we can observe become so 
mysterious. Therefore, it can be asked whether or not the things referred to by 
the theoretical terms are real or mythical ? 
The nature and character of 'experiment' may also lead towards an 
understanding of problem of realism. Most people agree that knowledge is the 
aim of science; that all knowledge starts with experience. We know that 
observation and experiment furnishe the basis upon which all science is built. 
Experiment is the method of modem science. An experiment is designed 
according to hypothesis and carried out under some special conditions in a 
laboratory; it is more restricted and will organised than what we ordinarily call 
experience. But the mere collection of facts is not yet science; it is the 
systematic and ordered account of our experiments that represents science. We 
wish to connect various facts we have accumulated in a particular field, and so 
we need to create, theories to interpret our experiments. Thus theoretical 
language is intertwined with the experiment and we cannot separate what is the 
contribution of language and what is contribution of experiment. In this wa\ a 
situation may arise when a false theory may become quite successful. Hence. 
scientific progress consists not merely in new experiments, but also in the 
adoption of theoretical terms (Hutten, 1956, pp. 11-13). 
The problem lies also in the character of scientific theory. A physical 
theory consists of a formal calculus and of an interpretation. But the relation 
between calculus and interpretation is in fact not unique. A single calculus may 
be interpreted in terms of various concepts, moreover, we often have several 
calculi that may be interpreted by the same set of concepts. It follows that we 
may have various ways of speaking about our experiments. We can construct 
several theories covering the same field of experience. Nature allows us a 
wider latitude for its description than is usually believed. For example, the 
'wave-language' and the 'particle-language' represent equivalent descriptions 
of light. No possible test by experiment is satisfied by the one system which is 
not also satisfied by the other. Both are equally acceptable in physical science. 
This far-reaching freedom in the choice of the concepts by means of which we 
describe nature is characteristic of modem science (Hutten, 1956. pp. 170-171). 
Every description of nature is also an interpretation whenever we use 
language to describe our experience, whenever we take words to refer to some 
events or other, it is for us to decide what we want our words to mean. For, the 
events do not speak for themselves, and language is the instrument we have 
invented in order to describe them. The way we speak reflects our attitude 
towards the events described, and the language we adopt thus expresses a 
certain interpretation (Hutten, 1956, p. 176). For example 'Atom' may be 
interpreted according to the mechanical model in kinetic theory, or according to 
the planetary model or to the vector model in quantum theory; or in terms of 
energy states, of charge-clouds, and of probability distributions, in quantum 
mechanics. We have multiple interpretations for a given expression (Hutten. 
1956. p. 202). 
Interpretation has a role also with the experiment. An experiment may 
have been carried out correctly according to accepted procedures, but it does 
not say anything unless we make it speak. It is experiment only if it is designed 
to prove or disprove a hypothesis, we must formulate what we intend to do and 
what we mean to prove by so doing - otherwise the experiment says nothing. 
Experiment is controlled experience. Experience by itself is 'silent" and it 
requires a hypothesis to give it voice. Nature is not a book, and certainly not an 
open one, which we have merely to read when we do science. Things, events, 
and facts do not speak, the scientist does (Hutten, 1956, p. 223). Moreover, 
new theories may introduce new methods for experimentation. Also there are 
many psychological problems and questions which creep into any explanation 
of scientific method (Hutten, 1956, p. 222). These are among the conditions 
that ground the problem of realism. 
This problem of realism is related to scientific progress. Progress always 
presupposes a goal towards which it makes its forward march. What is that goal 
? Is that goal the reality of the world ? Or is that goal something other, for 
example, instrumental effectiveness? If the aim of the progress is reality, how 
does science through its theory-change get nearer to the reality? If theory 
change in science results in the rejection of the earlier theory then how do we 
conceive of the later theory. Is it better and therefore an advancement over the 
earlier one? If in some sense or the other, it makes such a progress, then how 
do we know that the progress has occurred towards reality at all? To 
understand progress, we need some regulative standard by which the merits of 
successive theories can be judged. In the philosophy of science the debate is 
not only about the kind of standard but also about the very possibility of 
finding any standard at all. According to Popper, truth content is such a 
standard by which successive theories can be judged. For him, if the later 
theory falsifies the earlier one, we have eliminated some falsity-content from 
our previous knowledge. Therefore, the later theory can be said to be nearer to 
truth. However, Popper is opposed by Kuhn. For him, there is no such 
regulative standard to judge the merits of successive paradigm, for they are all 
mutually incommensurable. Acceptance and rejection of successive theories 
are dictated by various socio-psychical factors, not by any logical 
considerations. So, through such a theory-succession even progress cannot be 
conceived, let alone the truth. Lakatos tries to reconcile between the 
standpoints taken by Popper and Kuhn. For him, scientific decision can not be 
irrational. The rationality of theory-change is "progressive vs degenerating 
problem-shift". However, rationality is maintained at the cost of truth as aim of 
science. In maintaining rationality he goes against Kuhn and favours Popper, 
but in rejecting truth he goes against Popper and favours Kuhn. For Laudan. the 
standard of measuring the merits of successive theories is 'problem-solving 
effectiveness', which again gives up truth as the goal of progress. For Toulmin, 
there is no such static or absolute unchangeable rationality. Rather reason too 
undergoes the process of evolution and the concept of truth as well. Rejection 
and acceptance of a theory is decided by 'the struggle for survival'. In this 
evolutionary process, progress is again conceived at the cost of truth. 
While propositions are deemed to be true or false, physical objects or 
metaphysical entities are deemed to be real or unreal. A proposition, such as, 
'this is a white pen' is true if an object, white pen, really exists out there. In 
other words, if the object 'white pen' is real, the proposition 'this is a white 
pen' is true; or if the proposition 'this is a white pen' is true, the object 'white 
pen' is real. Therefore, 'truth' and 'reality' are two sides of the same coin. 
'Reality' qualifies or characterizes an object or entity whereas truth qualifies or 
characterizes a proposition. Scientific theories are propositions or conjunctions 
of propositions. When we say that a scientific theory is true, it means that the 
entity that is described in this theory really exists. Realism about scientific 
theories asserts that the entity that is described by the theory really exists, and 
therefore the theory is true. However, realism in the content of present thesis is 
not merely concerned with the nature of scientific theories asserting that 
theoretical entifies really exist. Here we are primarily concerned with realism 
as linked to the phenomenon of 'scientific progress', a relation of successive 
scientific theories. Realism about scientific theories explores as to whether the 
theory aims at describing reality, or the entities described by the theory really 
exist or not. On the other hand, realism about scientific progress explores as to 
whether a better theory is really a better description of the world, or later theory 
is closer to reality than an earlier one i.e. whether theory2 is closer to reality 
than theory]. So, realism with regard to progress is concerned with theory 
change, when one theory is replaced or superseded by another theory and, both 
theories are presumably trying to describe the reality. 
We are not concerned with the realist stand with regard to external 
world which is challenged by idealism.. For realists the world is independent of 
human consciousness or subjectivity. For idealists the external world is 
somehow dependent on human consciousness. This philosophical or 
ontological disagreement is not germane to our thesis. Our concern here is with 
the status of scientific theories. Do the entities assumed by higher science 
really exist ? The realist responses here will be affirmative whereas the 
instruments will forward a negative response. Furthermore, we are dealing with 
the question of the status of progress in the ongoing march of theory-change. 
How is a later theory superior to or better than the earlier one ? In which sense 
is later theory an advancement over the earliest theory and advancement 
whereto, in which direction. The realists will maintain that long drawn-out 
theoretical succession is geared towards reality. The instrumentalist as against 
the realist will deny any such direction of the scientific progress. 
Realism about progress views the relation of the two theories where both 
describe reality and one is superseded by another. Realism about progress 
assumes that though theories describe reality, descriptions are not complete, 
and scientific progress through its gradual change tries to reach that complete 
description, which may be called complete theory, or absolute theory. So, 
scientific change aims at complete true theory, which will not, incourse of 
change at all. Such a scientific change is called real scientific progress. 
However, analysis of such progress depends on the analysis of theories and 
other scientific activities which are associated with successive theories leading 
towards progress. The present thesis is an attempt to analyse the nature of 
scientific theories and also nature of the relation of the successive theories with 
a view to understand scientific progress and its impact over realism. 
A question about the relation of the successive theories to be asked is : 
what makes a later theory better than an earlier one? The question can be 
answered in different ways. For example, it can be said that a later theory is 
better because it is a better description of the world. This answer presupposes 
that a scientific theory is nothing other than a description of the world, and 
therefore that description comprised of propositions (theory) can be either true 
or false. But how can one judge that a later theory is a better description of 
reality? We do not have any model or picture or map of reality to make a 
comparison between theory and reality. This can be done only by an analysis of 
the theory and theory-change. 
The question as to what makes later theory better than an earlier one has 
also been answered on the grounds of simplicity, elegance and economy. There 
are many philosophers of science who claim that any later theory can be better 
not for its greater truth-content, but for its greater simplicity or elegance or 
economy. Instead of being a better description of the world, a later theory may 
also be deemed to be having greater problem-solving effectiveness. However, 
these different perspectives on theory-change and scientific progress are 
assumed in a antirealistic framework may be called instrumentalism. 
There are some such higher level theories which do not have any 
such connection with the observable world. Such theories are composed of the 
propositions which are hypothetical; again such propositions are composed of 
the terms which are hypothetical; even the words which define those terms are 
also hypothetical. Moreover, to observe the empirical consequences, we require 
some other theories between those higher level theories and factual states of 
affairs. In this way, such theories remain so distant that any direct connection 
with the observable world becomes impossible of detection or articulation. 
Therefore, such theories belong to very different realm than those theories 
which have some direct connection with the observable world. The logic of 
such theories becomes entirely different - different in their mode of judgement, 
standard of appraisal, criterion of meaning, and their structure and nature. The 
most important feature of their nature is that they are metaphysical in their 
character. They are pure products of scientific imagination. Every assertion, at 
this level is a theoretical construct in the sense that one theory is considered by 
another theory, and that theory is considered again by another theory etc. The 
understanding is caught in a theoretical circle. Only after elaborate deductions 
are we able to establish a semblance of connection with the observable or 
empirical world. This level of theoretical science is called revolutionary 
science. Scientific theories at this level are designated by different philosophers 
in different terms, such as, conjecture, paradigm, research programme, research 
tradition etc. 
Regarding the theories at the level of revolutionary science, there is a 
widely accepted view that scientific change or progress is directed at goals and 
many such goals have been ever more successfully realized. Successive 
generations of scientists have been filling in more and more parts of the 
complete true story of the world. There may have been mistakes and false steps 
here and there, but there is an overall trend towards accumulation of truth, or. 
at the very least, of better and better approximations to truth. There is also a 
modest view that science is directed at discovering truth about those aspects of 
nature that impinge most directly upon us. According to this idea, all this is 
achieved by a sacred method - Scientific Method. There are objective canons 
of evaluation of scientific claims. Methodologists should articulate these 
canons, so that we can forestall possible misapplications and extend the scope 
of scientific method into areas where human inquiry typically falters (Kitcher, 
1993, p. 3). 
But, if history is viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or 
chronology, it could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science 
(Kuhn, 1977, p. 1). The practice of science, past and present, is seen as raising 
doubts about whether the aims have actually been attained. For, history shows 
that there are numerous historical phenomena which indicate that the new 
theory has been accepted on the ground of the rejection of the old. Not only old 
theories are rejected, but old mode of appraisal, the old way of looking at the 
world too are rejected. For instance, in 1905, special theory of relativity and 
quantum theory were developed in drastic violation of all existing philosophies 
of science (Suppe, 1977, p. 10). These then serve as the basis for wondering 
whether the aims are attainable or not. This concern is further reinforced by add 
perspectives of the biologist, the cognitive scientist, and the sociologist. If 
scientists, like other people, are recognized as biological entities, who have 
evolved under selection pressures; if scientists, like other people, are cognitive 
systems with identifiable limitations and deficiencies; and if scientists are 
embedded in complex networks of social relations; then the chances that their 
activities will result in the attainment of truth can seem to be decreasingly low 
(Kitcher, 1993, p. 6). 
This realization essentially comes from the study of history of science. 
There are two aspects of it : internal history and external history. Internal 
history is all the cognitive relations: methods, standards, rules, theoretical 
schemes or empirical investigations; and external history is all the external 
relations: sociology, psychology, ideology, etc. Marry Hesse says that internal 
history of science considers science a history of rational thought about nature 
evolving according to its own inner logic; and external history of science 
considers science a social and cultural phenomenon inseparable from the whole 
social life. The former searches for reasons admitted consciously by scientists 
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in their work, the latter for causes which affect the development of science and 
usually operate subterraneously. Both these approaches are historically 
significant, for science is a function of both reasons and causes (Krajewski, 
1977, pp. 115-118). The recognition of external-internal factors entails the 
recognition of two different approaches to science: history of science and 
philosophy of science. The historians deal with facts and data, seeking to 
arrange them into a convincing and coherent tale about how scientific ideas 
have evolved. Philosophy of science, by contrast, is commonly perceived as a 
normative, evaluative and largely a priori investigation of how we ought to 
proceed. On this view, the gap between history and philosophy of science is as 
broad as the divide between matters of facts and matters of value. However, 
although they are radically different approaches, they are complementary to 
each other. 
In his "Towards an Historiography of Science" J. Agassi shows how 
much the historical writings about science are laden with implicit philosophical 
assumptions - assumptions which decisively determine the character of the 
history that is produced. To take an overly simple example, if a historian is 
convinced that experiments can be the only decisive grounds for abandoning a 
theory, then history will tend to focus exclusively on so-called crucial 
experiments. The thesis is not merely that philosophical assumptions have 
influenced historical scholarship, but that they must do so. For, history has no 
neutral data, and treatment of any particular historical episode is influenced to 
some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in 
science. History and philosophy of science are thus correlative. The aim of 
philosophical inquiry is the production of a set of norms, but any philosophical 
theory of science, which fails completely to square with the history of science, 
would be deemed unacceptable. Moreover, confronted with a philosopher's 
account that entails that the whole of the history of science is irrational, we 
would tend to view that as a reductio ad absurdum of the theory of rationality 
rather than as a demonstration that science itself has been a sequence of 
entirely irrational preferences. Thus, history of science presupposes a 
philosophy of science, and philosophy of science is then to be authenticated by 
its capacity to lay bare the rationality implicit in the history of science (Laudan, 
1978, pp. 155-156). 
Despite being dependent upon each other. histor\' of science and 
philosophy of science have their independent nature. For this reason, we see 
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that all the available philosophies of science can do scant justice to history of 
science. There are multiple instances of disagreement amongst them. If history 
could evolve just according to a particular philosophy, then such a situation 
would not have arisen — history and philosophy of science would have only 
been in accord with each other. In this connection, we should maintain the 
distinction between two types of history of science: HOSi and HOS2. History 
of science, HOS| can, at a first approximation, be regarded as the 
chronologically ordered class of beliefs of formier scientists. Historians describe 
just discoveries and inventions and successive formulations of laws and 
theories. On the other hand, history of science, HOS2, is writing about the 
history of science - the descriptive statements which historians make about 
science. It tries to discover regularities in the growth of science and in the 
change in its methods. Ronald Giere argued that the philosopher must not 
become a slave to HOSi because one of his primary roles is to criticize the 
theories of the past. However, philosophical theses cannot be completely a 
priori; they must capture some of our pre-philosophical hunches about which 
theories are rational and which are not. If these hunches do not come from 
HOS], where do we obtain them? This position of history and philosophy of 
science raises the normative-descriptive paradox (Laudan, 1978, p. 158). 
According to Laudan, there is a possible way out of this paradox. For 
him, within HOSi, there is a subclass of cases of theory - acceptance and theory 
rejection, about which most scientifically educated persons have strong 
normative intuitions. For example, (1) It was rational to accept Newtonian 
mechanics and to reject Aristotelian mechanics by, say, 1800; (2) It was 
rational by 1890 to reject the view that heat was a fluid; (3) It was rational for 
physicians to reject homeopathy and to accept the tradition of pharmacological 
medicine by, say, 1900; (4) It was rational after 1920 to believe that the 
chemical atom had no parts; (5) it was irrational to believe after 1750 that light 
moved infinitely fast; (6) It was rational to accept the general theory of 
relativity after 1925; (7) It was irrational after 1830 to accept the biblical 
chronology as a literal account of earth's history. However, this sort of 
intuition Laudan calls pre-analytic intuition (PI) about scientific rationality. So, 
philosophy of science aims to explicate the criteria of rationality implicit in our 
pre-analytic intuition about certain cases within HOSi. And the authentication 
of any philosophical model requires careful research in HOS2 in order to assess 
the applicability of that model to the cases that constitute pre-analytic intuition. 
Thus, the normative-descriptive paradox is resolved (Laudan, 1978, pp. 160-
161). 
This position of inquiry about scientific change may be called the 
Rational reconstruction of history of science. This is a joint mode of history 
and philosophy that is thought to be capable of dealing with the fact that the 
norms of rational evaluation change through time. Any theory of norms, if it is 
to be applied historically, must take into account the fact that previous 
scientists had norms of their own that cannot be ignored while explaining their 
cognitive stances with respect to the theories of the day ((Laudan, 1978, p. 
168). This type of enterprise is, however, not science; it is a non-scientific, 
epistemological formulation. This enterprise seeks the solution of three 
questions here: One, how do the new theories emerge?, how do the scientists, 
who are brought up in the old theoretical framework, transcend the old and 
think of the new?, two, why do scientists become convinced to accept the new 
theory in the face of the old theory, whereas there is no such a historical 
standard to make a comparison between the old and the new?, and three, what 
is the status of this shift from the old theory to the new?, is it advancement 
towards reality? However, these three questions are the three aspects of one 
single issue - pattern of scientific progress that, in turn , lies in the process of 
scientific change. This issue will be discussed here on the basis of the views of 
Karl R. Popper, Thomas S. Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan and Stephen 
Toulmin. 
In chapter-1. Introduction, we have tried to show how 'truth' 
problematises scientific progress. Though science is usually deemed to be 
objective, it possesses, especially at its fundamental level, the human elements 
also. The historical study of scientific activities reveals a different picture of 
science than that of its popular and widely prevalent conception. 
In chapter-2 Understanding Theory and Theory-change we have 
outlined some essential preliminaries about the nature of scientific theories and 
scientific progress. In this chapter we will see two views : realism and 
antirealism. Realism holds that the entities assumed by a theory really exist, but 
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antirealism denies this. According to antirealist view such entities are mere 
conventions on fictions. Here we will also discuss the general outlook 
regarding the nature of progress. Progress is a relational term; which kind of 
relation of the successive theories is called progress, is discussed here. 
According to Popper, scientific theories are hypotheses only. He shows 
that scientific change is scientific progress. For Popper, as every new theory 
falsifies the old one, it means that the new theory is better than the old one. 
Although hypotheses in their nature are human constructions, they undergo 
severe tests, and therefore, the decision about them is objective. Such a 
decision about theory change may indicate an increasing approximation to 
reality. Nevertheless, when and at what point would we reach the truth we do 
not know. This position is discussed in chapter-3, The Aim of Progress and 
Falsifiable Hypothesis. The relation of 'truth' with 'progress' is discussed 
here in terms of the 'aim of progress' and the phrase 'falsifiable hypothesis' 
indicates that our analysis is carried out on the basis of Popper's view that 
fundamental scientific products are only hypothetical or conjectural. 
However, Kuhn's account is radically or altogether different from that of 
Popper. According to Kuhn, a scientific theory is a 'paradigm' in its nature. A 
paradigm is constructed by a scientific genius. Scientists accept the new and 
reject the old which makes a shift or replacement of paradigms. Therefore, such 
a change cannot be progress. He argues that since both the old theory and the 
new one are human products, such change cannot claim to have got nearer to 
reality. How Kuhn establishes such a skeptic position is discussed in chapter-4, 
The Status of Progress in Paradigm-shift. The relation of 'truth' with 
'progress' is discussed here in terms of the 'status of progress' and the phrase 
'paradigm-shift' indicates that our issues are debated on the basis of Kuhn's 
view that scientific theories are no more than paradigms. 
Lakatos tries to work out a reconciliation between these two positions. 
According to Lakatos, the fundamental scientific construct is not a single 
theory, but rather a series of theories which he calls Research programme. The 
advancement of research programme depends on how many facts are 
discovered and explained by the programme. But, in the final analysis, since 
these facts are human constructions, they cannot mirror the truth. This position 
is outlined in chapter-5. The Research Programme and the pattern of 
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Progress. The relation of 'truth' with 'progress' is discussed here in terms of 
the 'pattern of progress' and the phrase 'research programme' indicates that 
our issues are carried out on the basis of Lakatos' view that the fundamental 
scientific constructs are not isolated theories, but rather a research programme. 
However, Laudan goes one step ahead of Lakatos by holding that 
fundamental scientific theories are not a programme, but a tradition. This 
research tradition according to Laudan is rational. Laudan holds that science is 
a problem-solving activity. For him, 'Research tradition' rather than a single 
theory is the unit of scientific change. Research tradition determines which are 
the problems to be dealt with and what are the solutions to be accepted. 
Therefore, these are also human constructions. Moreover, he says, solutions do 
not necessarily mean truth. This position is discussed in the chapter-6. The 
Research Tradition and the Model of Progress. The relation of 'truth' with 
'progress' is discussed here in terms of the 'model of progress' and the phrase 
'research tradition' indicates that our issues are carried out on the basis of 
Laudan's view that scientific theories are research traditions. 
Toulmin goes yet another step farther from Laudan in maintaining that 
the standards of rationality too undergo the process of evolutionary change. 
Stephen Toulmin recognizes the time factor in scientific change. He holds that 
not only theory and concepts, but also their standards of appraisal and the 
concept of truth all are dynamic - nothing remains static. But at the same time, 
there is continuity in change. A scientific theory, like an organism, at every 
step of its development is quite different one, yet it remains the same. Such a 
pattern of progress is the process of evolution. Evolution is a sort of progress. 
But whether this progress is towards reality is difficult to say. For, even the 
concept of reality undergoes the process of evolution. This is shown in the 
chapter-7, The Structure of Progress in Evolutionary Change. The relation 
of 'truth' with 'progress' is discussed here in terms of the 'structure of 
progress' and the phrase 'evolutionary change' indicates that the analysis is 
carried out on the basis of Toulmin's view that scientific theories are like 
organisms whose development occurs in the process of evolution. 
In the chapter-8 Critical Evaluation we have shown that scientific 
progress does not occur in the traditional way of accumulation. And progress is 
not methodical, but creative. Finally we have shown that such a progress does 
not assure us with the attainment of truth. 
Chapter - 2 
Understanding Theory and Theory Change 
2.1. Nature of Scientific Theory 
What is theory ? 
Natural science deals with natural phenomena. A rational enquiry and 
explanation of these phenomena fructify into a theory. A theory is that which 
connects the observed phenomena and traces them back to a single pure 
phenomenon, thus bringing about logical arrangement. Physical theories 
provide patterns within which data appear intelligible. They constitute a 
conceptual gestalt. A theory is not pieced together from observed phenomena; 
rather it is what makes it possible to observe phenomena; they are built up 
retroductively. Theories put phenomena into systems. A theory is a cluster of 
conclusions in search of a premise.' 
However, a scientific theory is essentially a hypothesis. It is so because 
a theory is never conclusively or definitively proved. There is always the 
theoretical possibility that new evidence will be discovered which conflicts 
with some of the observational statements inferred from the hypothesis. Such 
an eventuality often leads to the rejection of the hypothesis. The history of 
science records many instances in which once accepted hypothesis was 
subsequently abandoned in the light of adverse evidence. 
According to O. Neil scientific theory is the supposition of the matters 
which have not yet been observed but which might have been observed if 
circumstances had been favorable. Take for example, Harvey's theory of the 
motion of the blood. If he had possessed a microscope as Malpighi did, (some 
thirty years after Harvey published his supposifion of the pores in the flesh 
linking the arteries and the veins, Malpighi using an early microscope saw 
them.), he would have been able to observe the fine capillaries joining the end 
branches of the arteries and of the veins. But as it happened, he was not 
favored by such circumstances and so his only resort was to suppose that 
there were such linking pores in the flesh.^ 
O'Neil says that he did this not simply because he was dissatisfied with 
the facts he had, and not at all because he was too impatient to wait for other 
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facts to come to him or too lazy to look for them. But rather he was puzzled 
by the incomplete set of facts he had. He thought that he could detect the 
general outline of the picture of which the known facts constituted some of 
the parts. He had some of the pieces of the jigsaw that are set in the right 
places, but he had no more pieces with which he would fill the remaining 
gaps. He proceeded then to imagine what the suspected missing pieces were 
like so that he could present a whole picture that made sense. Earlier he was 
in a puzzle because of the shortage of the facts, now he assumed additional 
items of 'information' in order to remove that puzzlement. Since this move is 
merely an act of imagination, acceptance of his known facts does not 
necessarily follow the acceptance of his suppositions. If his evidence had been 
inconsistent with the theory, the acceptance of the evidence would commit 
one to the rejection of the theory.'' Hempel says, scientific theory is 
essentially a hypothesis, for such a theory is never proved beyond any 
possible doubt. The possibility of new evidence dislodging a time-honoured 
theory can never be ruled out. The history of science is replete with examples 
of established theories being abandoned in the face of contradicting data.^ 
O'Niel says that different theories may imply the same observed facts. 
Therefore, there arises the problem of deciding which of the alternative 
theories should we adopt. At this point, several criteria of choice might be 
offered. Other things being equal, the simplest theory is to be preferred. This 
criterion is sometimes called the canon of parsimony and sometimes Occam's 
razor. William Occam is credited with dictum: theoretical entities should not 
be multiplied beyond necessity. Copernicus propounded a simpler theory 
than Ptolemy. His principal economy consisted in accounting for the whole of 
the sun's apparent motion and a component of the apparent motion of 
Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn by means of the single assumption 
that the earth was in motion around the sun. However, there is potentially no 
end to the alternative theories that would do equally well. Thus a theory is not 
necessarily the right one simply because it is the only one which one can think 
of to explain the facts relevant to it. There is always the possibility that some 
other theory will do as well or even better. Quite often alternative theories 
have been propounded differently from one another in ways other than 
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simplicity or economy of assumption. They may differ in respect of tiie range 
of the phenomena they explain or in the precision with which they explain the 
relevant phenomena. Furthermore, one may imply a state of affairs which is 
contrary to what observation reveals, whereas the other implies a state of 
affairs which is in accord with data supplied by observation. 
O'Neil mentions various types of theories: firstly, a theory that 
assumes the things that could be observed if circumstances were favorable; 
secondly, a theory that assumes the things that play a role like that played by 
any other important relevant fact; thirdly, theories which do not supply 
missing pieces of the jigsaw puzzle but which provide another sort of 
rationale for what has been observed. They perform this role by providing 
bases from which observed or observable situation may be inferred. Fourthly, 
there is another type of theory even better represented by Mendeleyev's 
periodic table. It is not much the assumption of any given observable fact.'' 
However theories could be judged from two angles: truth-value and validity. 
Truth is judged through the factual consequences and validity through 
implication. False theories may formally imply conclusions, which are true, 
and true theories may imply those which are false.* 
Description, Prediction and Explanation 
What is the function of a scientific theory ? There is no readymade 
response which is perfectly congruent to the full import and load of this 
crucial methodological/ideological question. There can be multiple responses 
to this foundational query. For O'Neil, scientific theories are trifunctional, 
viz., they either describe or predict or explain a situation or a given state of 
affairs under consideration. The meaning of these three terms may be 
expressed as follows: (1) a description says what an object or a situation is, 
(2) a prediction is a fore saying about its occurrence, its features, etc., in 
advance of its being observed to occur or to have such and such features etc. 
and (3) an explanation shows how, or why, it is so or has become so. 
Description of some object involves setting down its features and 
properties. Thus we may describe hydrogen as a gas at normal temperatures, 
as having an atomic mass of 1.008, a valance of 1, as being highly 
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inflammable and as having one proton in its nucleus and one electron in orbit 
around its nucleus. The first four items in this description of hydrogen have 
been derived from its observation whereas the fifth component is derived 
from theorizing aimed at a rationale for some observed properties of hydrogen 
and the other elements. Thus though descriptions are usually thought of as 
being statements about the observed characteristics of situations and objects, 
it may be necessary to recognize hypothetical descriptions. Adams and 
Leverreir offered some hypothetical descriptions of Neptune before its 
observation and Mendeleyev offered quite detailed hypothetical descriptions 
of scandium, gallium and germanium. Granted that a description is not 
confined to those statements derived directly from observations, descriptions 
may be explanations, and may be predictions also. Bohr's description of sub-
atomic structure of the elements explains Mendeleyev's periodic table, and 
Newton's description of the forces operating on particles of matter and of 
their modes of operation explains the planetary motions as conceived by 
Kepler.^ 
O'Neil says that the word 'explanation' is derived from the Latin verb 
'explanare' which means 'to spread out', 'to make clear'. There are two views 
of what constitutes explanation. One usage refers to giving the meaning of 
words or of the concepts signified by words. Thus, we explain 'mammal' by 
saying that it refers to an animal which suckles its young. This is sometimes 
providing better-understood words equivalent to less well-understood words. 
Though the process is carried out through the medium of words, it is more 
connected with what the words signify than with them as words in 
themselves.' It is like providing referential or dictional meaning. The second 
one refers to some state of affairs wherein we can show that it follows 
logically from premises which include some general rules, principles, laws; 
and which have not been shown to be untenable. That is, the explanatory 
premises should imply the facts to be explained and should not be 
contradicted by some facts other than those being explained. It may even be 
said that premises including a general rule, principle, or law do provide an 
explanation; whether it is tenable or not is another matter. The third stresses 
insight, intuition and even mystical revelation. It is illustrated by Kepler's 
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appeal to regular solids for an explanation of the spacing of the planets in the 
solar system and to a less degree by Newton's assimilation of the periodicity 
of the elements to the periodicity of the tonal scale." 
Finally, prediction in science for O'Neil, is a foresaying before the 
observation of the event - but not necessarily before the occurrence of it. 
There are three kinds of predictions in science. The first kind of predictions 
arises from the rounding out of a descriptive theory. An example of the case 
is Mendeleyev's anticipation of unobserved elements or the anticipation of the 
basis of Bode's law of planets between Mars and Jupiter. The second kind of 
predictions arises from the provision of additional premises needed to enable 
an explanatory theory to explain known facts. An example is the Adam's and 
Leverreir's anticipation of a planet roughly corresponding to Neptune later 
observed by Galle. The third arises as the implications of a theory formulated 
to explain other facts. Example is the implication of Slellar's parallaxes by the 
heliofocal theory.'^ 
Realist Approach to Science 
What is the aim with which a theory is formulated ? Does a theoretical 
formulation describe the reality of the world, on is it designed merely for 
predicting (or explaining) the natural phenomena ? In this regard, there are 
two different views : Realism and Anti-realism. 
According to realism the essential aim of a theory is to describe the 
reality, in other words, the theoretical formulation refers to the reality. 
However, this position of science depends on the question as to whether the 
world is real or not, and whether human scientific research is capable of 
knowing the reality or not. This position is summarized in the following lines: 
Metaphysical Realism: Metaphysical realism is a doctrine upholding 
that there are truths about the actual structures of the real world that do not 
depend on the cognitive capacities of human investigators.'^ This view 
asserts that there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the 
world is'. Giere says that metaphysical realism is not a thesis about any 
theory now known, it is a thesis about some possible theory. This possible 
theory could not consist of a family of related models. It would have to be 
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just one big model. Every aspect of this model would have to correspond to a 
feature of the world, and there could be no feature of the world left out. The 
model would have to be unique. No other model could do an equally good 
job—this model is not only unrestricted, but also complete and perfect.''* 
Commomense Realism: Commonsense realism asserts the existence of 
the observable entities of science and commonsense in the sense that our 
commonsense is able to observe the reality. This concerns not simply 
observed entities, but rather observable entities. Most observable entities 
have never been observed, yet in ordinary life and in science it is common to 
infer the existence of such entities. We observe the footprint in the sand, and 
infer the existence of a person. We observe the movements of Uranus, and 
infer the existence of Neptune. Commonsense realism does insist that such 
macroscopic objects, as Moon or Sun that we perceive do exist independently 
of our perceptions of them. All perceivers might perish without their 
perishing.'^ In the same way, it also asserts the existence of microscopic 
objects.'^ 
Epistemological Realism: Epistemological realism is a doctrine that 
asserts that all possible qualifications notwithstanding, the real structures of 
the world are cognitively accessible to scientific investigations. It claims that 
certain forms of evidence or empirical support are so epistemologically 
probative that any theory that exhibits them can legitimately be presumed to 
be true, or nearly so.'^ The epistemological realism deals with the relation 
between knowing subject and the object of knowledge. While the 
metaphysical realism deals with the ontological assumption about the 
existence of ultimate reality, i.e. things-in-themselves, the epistemological 
realism deals with the object of knowledge relating to subject. When reality 
is discussed in ontological language, then it is usually understood as 'thing-
in-itself and when it is discussed in epistemological language setting a 
relation with knowing subject, then it is understood as 'object of knowledge". 
However, these objects of knowledge are mind-independent according to 
epistemological realism. The world of our experience is real and we have the 
capacity to understand that reality. 
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Essentialism: According to this view a scientific theory is search for the 
truth and only the truth. Scientific enterprise in its continuous discoveries 
will once be able to achieve the ultimate truth. Karl Popper mentions its three 
basic doctrines: 
(1) The scientists aim at finding a true theory or description of the world, 
(especially of its regularities or laws) which shall also be an 
explanation of the observable facts. 
(2) The scientists can succeed in finally establishing the truth of such 
theories beyond all reasonable doubt. 
(3) The true scientific theories, describe the 'essence' or the 'essential 
nature' of things which lie behind the appearances. Such theories are 
neither in need of nor susceptible to further explanation. They are 
ultimate explanations, and finding them is the ultimate aim of the 
scientists.'^ 
Position of Truth in Scientific Theory 
Given that the world is real, the observation is real, and scientific 
theories are capable of arriving at what is real, what is the position of truth in 
any particular theory such as wave theory or corpuscular theory of light at 
any given time ? Hesse says that realism is a generic term for a number of 
views, all holding that theories consist of true or false statements referring to 
real or existing entities. This position is outlined in the following lines : 
Scientific Realism: Scientific realism asserts that the unobservable 
entities that the theoretical terms indicate do exist. By supposing their 
existence we can give good explanations of the behavior and characteristics of 
observable entities, otherwise they would remain completely inexplicable. 
Furthermore, such a supposition leads to predictions about observable entities 
that are well confirmed; the supposition is observationally successful. 
Abductive logic thus takes us from hypothesis about the observed world to 
hypothesis about the unobservable one. Scientific realism is committed to 
independence of unobservable. This view is called strong realism, because 
this view is powerfully committed in its claim that theories are correct 
transcriptions about their entities. This realism is also called theory-realism, 
22 
because this view claims that objects of theoretical terms are true. Observable 
phenomena are explained not by the mere existence of, say, electrons, but by 
electrons being the way, our theory says they are. However, this view should 
not be misconstrued to the effect that all unobservable are to be deemed to be 
real. Scientific realism is not committed to all the unobservable of modem 
science. It does take those commitments, for the most part, at face value.'^ 
According to Hacking experimental works provide the strongest evidence 
for scientific realism, because entities that in principle cannot be 'observed' 
are regularly manipulated to produce new phenomena and investigate other 
aspects of nature. The realistic argument is: If there were an unobservable 
entity U that would explain P, then such an explanation is not only good, but 
the best. So, probably U exists. Hacking has enriched this view by pointing 
out that such an explanation seems particularly good where P is not merely 
possibly observed but actively produced. Let us suppose that U exists. Now, if 
we do A, which should make U do something leading to P and we then go 
ahead, do A, and produce P, we have powerful evidence of existence of U.^ ° 
Another argument is given by G. Maxwell you are looking at an orange. Now 
let you make an inventory in the light of the best available scientific 
knowledge. Such an inventory will include all sorts of things like protons, 
neurons, atoms, and so on, but not the orange. The stimulation of the retina is 
accomplished solely by protons permitted from the atoms comprising the 
surface of the material object in question. The material object just is this 
collection of submicroscopic particles and the relations that subsist among 
them. In seeing an orange then you are seeing some thing that is not really 
there, an illusion generated by the interplay of submicroscopic particles which 
you do not see that are really there.^' All this means that the unobservable are 
real. 
Van Fraassen says that science aims at a literally true story of what the 
world is like; and acceptance of scientific theories involves the belief that it is 
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true. To suppose that a theory is literally true would imply, among other 
things, that no further anomaly could, in principle, arise from any quarter in 
this regard."' But no theory can guarantee that further anomaly will not arise. 
This is a big question against scientitlc realism. 
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Convergent Realism: Convergent realism consists in following claims: 
(1) Scientific theories are typically approximately true and theories that are 
more recent are closer to the truth than older theories in the same 
domain. 
(2) The observational and theoretical terms within the theories of a mature 
science are genuinely referential i.e. referring to extralinguistic entities. 
There are substances in the world that correspond to the ontology 
presumed by our best theories. 
(3) Successive theories in any mature science are such that they preserve 
the theoretical relations and the apparent referents of earlier theories. 
(4) Acceptable new theories do and should explain why their predecessors 
were successful insofar as they were successful. 
(5) The scientific theories should be successful (in problem solving). 
Empirical success of theories provides striking empirical confirmation 
for realism. 
Taking the success of present and past theories as given, proponents of 
convergent epistemological realism (CER) claim that if CER were true, it 
would follow that the progressive success of science would be a matter of 
course. Equally, if CER were false, the success of science would be 
miraculous and without explanation.^'' 
However, history of science goes opposite to CER. For instance, literally 
no one criticized the particle theory of light because it did not preserve the 
theoretical mechanisms of the earlier wave theory; no one faulted Lyell's 
uniformitarian geology on the ground that it dispensed with several causal 
processes prominently characterizing the earlier catastrophist geology. 
Darwin's theory was not criticized by most geologists for its failure to retain 
many of the mechanisms of Lamarckian evolutionary theory."^ 
Constructive Realism: This is a lenient version of realism. Constructive 
realism asserts that scientists construct theoretical models that they intend to 
be at least partial representations of systems in the real world. The primary 
relationship between models and the world is not truth or correspondence or 
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isomorphism, but similarity. But since anything is similar to anything else in 
some way or other, the claim of similarity must be limited to specific set of 
respects and degrees. The respects in which similarity may be claimed can 
only be those represented in the model. The term 'constructive' emphasizes 
the fact that models are deliberately created or socially constructed by 
scientists."^^ Einstein says that science is not just a collection of laws, a 
catalogue of unrelated facts. It is a creation of human mind, with its freely 
invented ideas and concepts. Physical theories try to form a picture of reality. 
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Nature does not reveal to us how best to represent her. So our best 
construction may fail to represent the world. This is why it is suggested that 
constructive realism does not claim a theory to be literally but only 
approximately true. This kind of interpretation of scientific theory sounds to 
be antirealistic. According to Giere, an approximate truth is not a kind of 
truth, indeed, it may be said to be a kind of falsehood; approximately implies 
'not exactly true', which means false. The similarity argument in constructive 
realism does not face the problem of 'independent access'. All one directly 
experiences are one's own sensations. How, then, could one compare one's 
sensations with the world to determine whether they correspond to it? Since 
all one could experience is another sensation, one could at best compare two 
different sensations. In short, there is no 'independent access' to the world.'^ ^ 
Naive Realism and Critical Realism: According to naive realism some 
apparent objects of knowledge exist. Human beings are naturally naive 
realists. In every practice, every person is like that we entertain a doubt only 
after some apparent error crops up. Therefore, naive realism holds that reality 
lies in the apparent objects. 
On the other hand, a popular example goes against naive realism; a 
pencil in a glass of water appears as broken at the water surface but unbroken 
to a descending finger. Repeated experience of apparent errors tends to 
generate some distrust about the entire phenomenal chair and furniture of the 
universe. This is why some persons and scientists have jumped to conclusion 
that no apparent reality should be trusted. This view is called 'critical 
realism'. For critical realists, an oversight of these errors leads to a 
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inexplicable metaphysical pluralism : speculating on what is real has 
generated several varieties of metaphysics. According to some, reality is 
changing, for others reality is unchanging, yet for others reality is eternal and 
again some hold reality to be evolving. However, the original doubts of 
critical realists remain unanswered as none of the metaphysical speculators or 
interpreters have been able to adverse clinching or conclusive evidence in 
support of their ontocosmological contentions. Whatever reality we are 
offered turns out to be only an interpretation of reality, say critical realists. 
Tentative Realism: This view is committed to accommodate the 
historical fact that various dominating theories which were entitled to be true 
at respective points of time, got discarded in the course of history. That is, up 
to certain time a theory was regarded as true and after certain time the same 
theory was regarded as false. 'The word 'tentative ' means 'holding on'; both 
'holding on tightly as long as an idea works' and 'holding on loosely enough 
to be willing to let it go whenever the idea fails to work'. This view accepts 
the fact that knowledge, including scientific knowledge, normally involves 
both some certainty and some uncertainty." We will go on the basis of best 
available scientific knowledge; if times deem a theory to be true then it is 
true, and if false then it is false. Unless we are not aware of the theory to be 
false we will continue to hold it to be a true theory. However, this view 
tantamounts to 'relativism'. The term itself is against realism as reality can 
never be tentative. 
Realism and Truth: According to realism, the statements of a theory 
are either true or false, and that many of the entities referred to in a theory do 
exist. There are as many true entities in the real world as there are human 
beings, houses, stones, stars, and so on. A realist does not maintain that every 
hypothetical entity exists, nor does he maintain that every statement in a 
theory is to come up for instant judgment as either true or false. All he needs 
to maintain is that some hypothetical entities are real and some theoretical 
statements are true. To make the realist position clear two important concepts 
need to be introduced. They are 'reference" and 'demonstration'. A proper 
name like 'Henry' can be used to make reference to some one whether or not 
he is present. Demonstration, and its close relative indication, is typically acts 
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performed with or by a gesture, in which any entity is pointed out or pointed 
to. An entity can be indicated not in its absence but only in its presence. Only 
a present thing or entity can be indicated. A thing or entity itself is the final, 
incontrovertible proof of its existence. It should be clear that we can refer to 
many things that we cannot indicate, but that if we can demonstrate anything 
to which we have previously made reference, on this or other occasions, then 
we have proved that thing exists."' 
In a theory, there are theoretical terms, and they can be used to make 
verbal reference to hypothetical entities, whether or not these entities can be 
observed or be present to our experience. Not all theoretical entities are what 
they seem. Some are really nothing but picturesque or shorthand forms of 
complex expressions whose meanings are different from that which at first 
hearing one might suppose them to have. Thus, there are three principles of 
realism: 
1. Some theoretical terms refer to hypothetical entities. 
2. Some hypothetical entities are candidates for existence. 
3. Some candidates for existence exist. 
However, truth can not become constitutive of realism. Devitt says that 
we cannot demonstrate any link between our theory and the state of the world. 
If truth means correspondence to reality, then truth threatens realism. Realism 
does not strictly entail any doctrine of truth at all. A person could, without 
inconsistency, be a realist without having any notion of truth in his theory. A 
realist may take a thoroughly skeptical view of the need for explanatory truth. 
On the contrary, a person who has an explanatory notion of truth in his theory 
may not be committed to realism; firstly, he may not apply his notion to the 
right statements and secondly, his notion may be an epistemic one like 
warranted assertibility, which involves no commitment to an objective 
independent reality.^ "' 
Devitt also says that realism cannot maintain the correspondence truth. 
Assume that we have established correspondence truth. So our commonsense 
statements are correspondence true or false in virtue of reference to 
observable like stones, trees, cats, and so on. Next, assume that we 
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established scientific realism, so unobservable like electrons, neurons, and 
curved space-time do exist. Then the most plausible view is that scientific 
statements are correspondence true or false in virtue of reference to those 
unobservable.^ "* In view of the same, if a theory is to correspond to reality, 
then there emerges a very strong argument against realism: 
(1) If the realist's independent reality exists, then our thought/ theories 
must mirror, picture, or represent that reality. 
(2) Our thought/theories cannot mirror, picture, or represent the realist's 
independent reality. 
(3) Therefore, the realist's independent reality does not exist."^ ^ 
This position conforms the view that no theory is entirely true or false. 
For Devitt , if we hold to correspondence truth, then our attempt to 
explain reference for scientific terms will force us back to a description 
theory. But we see that most of the terms of the past theories do not refer, 
because there is nothing that the associated descriptions pick out. Our past 
theories were mostly wrong. Therefore, it would be probable that the terms of 
our present theories did not refer as well. So scientific realism could be 
preserved only at the expense of correspondence truth.^^ It may be asked as to 
why do we need truth where we cannot set any link between truth and 
realism. Why not to by-pass the notion of truth. However, L.R. Baker says 
that to deny the need of truth is to commit 'cognitive suicide'. Therefore, we 
have truth in such a position where our theory merely has to aim at it."^ ^ 
Anti-realist Approach to Scientific Theory 
Constructivism: According to this view the actual methodology of 
science is profoundly theory-dependent. What scientists count as an 
acceptable theory, what they count as an observation, which experiment they 
take to be well designed, which measurement procedures they consider 
legitimate, what problems they seek to solve, and what sort of evidence they 
require before accepting a theory; all are in practice determined by the 
theoretical tradition within which scientists work. What of the world must be 
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there is determined by the theoretical tradition in which scientific community 
in question works. 
The problem is that scientists seem sometimes to be forced by new data 
to abandon important features of current theories and to adopt radically new 
theories in their place. These phenomena must be an example of scientific 
theories being brought into conformity with a theory - independent world, 
rather than an example of the construction of the reality within a theoretical 
tradition. In response to this problem, constructivism often asserts that 
successive theories in science that represent the sort of radical 'breaks' in 
tradition at issue are incommensurable. The idea here is that the standards of 
evidence, interpretation and understanding dictated by the old theory, on the 
one hand, and by the new theory, on the other, are so different that the 
transition between them cannot be interpreted as having been dictated by any 
common standards of rationality. It follows that the adoption of a wholly new 
conception of the world is completely within its own distinctive standards of 
rationality. There may be some common terms but they should not be thought 
of as having the same referents in the two theories.''^ 
Conventionalism: According to Poincare (1854-1912) ' every 
conclusion presumes premises. These premises are self-evident and need no 
demonstration, or can be established only if based on other propositions; and 
we cannot go back in this way to infinity, every deductive science and 
geometry in particular must rest upon a certain number of indemonstrable 
axioms'.^^ On this view he developed a positivistic and conventionalist 
interpretation of scientific theory. He holds that basic assumptions of the 
sciences are convenient definitions or conventions, which cannot be validated 
either by a priori methods or by inductive generalization from experience. Our 
choice among the possible conventions, though suggested and guided by 
experimental facts, is, in the last analysis, governed by considerations of 
simplicity and convenience. He draws a sharp distinction between two 
principal types of scientific hypothesis: (1) Hypotheses of the first type are 
essentially unverifiable. They are products of the free activity of the mind that 
are imposed by the scientific mind on our scientific schemes. They can 
neither be confirmed nor refuted by experience. (2) Hypotheses of the second 
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type are ordinary generalizations; they can be verified or falsified by 
experimental procedures. Poincare gives more attention to the first type. This 
is intrinsically unverifiable. He insists that a hypothesis of this kind, although 
not verifiable by experience, is suggested by experience, and derives its value 
from its fruitfulness in the scientific interpretation of experience. The facts 
given in experience may be assimilated to any one of indefinite' number of 
alternative hypothetical constructions. Each of these constructions is a product 
of the free activity of the mind, and the choice of among them is made in 
accordance with considerations of convenience. Thus unverifiable hypotheses 
are indeed conventional, but they are not arbitrary. Experience leaves us our 
freedom of choice but it guides us by aiding us to discern the easiest way. 
Conventionalism holds that hypotheses are each internally consistent and are 
not inconsistent with the facts, for, the facts can neither refute nor confirm 
them.^° 
Therefore, simplicity is the criterion of selection of one among the 
infinity of alternative hypotheses. We must choose and we can only choose 
the simplest. We are therefore led to act as if a simple law were, other things 
being equal, more probable than a complicated law. We choose the simplest 
law not because nature levels simplicity and thus the simplest is the 
objectively true, but solely in the interest of economy of thought. 
Assumptions are adopted not because they are true but because they are 
convenient. Experience tells us not which is the truest, but which is the most 
convenient. Conventionalism provides a simple, precise and economical 
language for the expression of our knowledge of nature. According to this 
view, ordinary language is too poor; it is besides too vague to express 
relations so delicate, so rich and so precise. The basic assumptions regarding 
force, inertia, absolute space, and absolute time are convenfional in the sense 
that they are neither verifiable nor faisifiable. Conventionalism seeks to 
combine the precision and rigor of rationalism with the experimental fertility 
of empiricism.'^' 
Duhem also supports this view. His reasoning in support of this thesis 
is the following: (1) The logic of every disconfirmation, not less than of ever\ 
confirmation, of a presumably empirical hypothesis H is such as to involve at 
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some stage or other entire network of interwoven hypotheses in which H is 
ingredient rather than the separate testing of the component H. (2) It is an 
elementary fact of deductive logic that if certain observational consequences 
O are entailed by the conjunction of H and a set A of auxiliary assumptions, 
then the failure of O to materialize entails not the falsity of H by itself but 
only the weaker conclusion that H and A cannot both be true. The falsity of 
H is, therefore, inclusive in the sense that the falsity of H is not deductively 
inferable from the premise [(H.A)^ O]. -O.'*^ According to conventionalism 
a true theory is not a theory which gives an explanation of physical 
appearances in conformity with reality. It is theories that represent in a 
satisfactory manner a group of experimental laws. A false theory is not an 
attempt at an explanation based on assumptions contrary to reality. It is a 
group of propositions that do not agree with the experimental laws. Thus the 
reduction of physical laws to theories contributes to 'intellectual economy' in 
which Ernst Mach sees the goal and directing principle of science.'*^ 
Fictionalism: Theories are fictions, according to fictionalism. They 
read like factual accounts, and ostensively work according to the logic of 
description and reference, but they are products of the imagination and 
nothing else. They are like a novel. The episodes of a novel are coherent, and 
they may be quite convincing, i.e. have the ring of truth, but the key point of 
difference is this: the people who figure in the novel are not real people. Their 
names and addresses do not refer to real people and places. Art of novel-
writing consists in constructing characters and endowing them with 
characteristics so plausibly that we are willing to treat them as real people. 
And we do this partly in the interest of entertainment, and partly for the 
insight we get into character. Because the laws of nature, as it were, according 
to which the characters of fiction are delineated, must be truths about real 
human characters. The entities gain plausibility. But the entities themselves 
have no more reality than the characters of fiction, and the terms which are 
used to describe and particularly to refer to them are like the names and 
addresses of characters in novels.'''* 
Hans Vaihinger( 1852-1933) in his philosophy of the 'as if (Philosophe 
Des Als Ob), 1911, advanced a positivistic and fictionalistic theory of 
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knowledge. His main insight is expressed by the term 'As if. The central 
contention of the philosophy of 'as if is that the concepts and theories 
achieved by mathematics and the natural sciences, by economic and political 
theory and jurisprudence, by ethics, aesthetics and philosophy, are convenient 
fictions, devised by the human mind. He maintains that fictional constructions 
of the mind contradict reality and, in case of the boldest and most useful 
fictions, are even self-contradictory. Fictions are not, however, entirely 
divorced from experience—they are not invented in vacuum. Sensations are 
the starting point of all logical activity and at the same time the terminus to 
which they must return. This, of course, does not mean that fictions are 
verified by sensory experience—their fictional character precludes all 
verifications—but merely that sensory experience provides the occasions, for 
the stimulation and exercise of minds' inventive activities. It also provides the 
spheres for the employment and application if it's fictional constructs. The 
material of sensation is, according to Vaihinger, radically transformed by the 
thought; it is remodeled, recoined, compressed, purged of dross and mixed 
with alloys by the psyche itself''^ 
Vaihinger's fictionalism stresses the free, creative and inventive activity 
of the mind or psyche in the constitution of concepts and theories. Many of 
the creative activities of the mind are originally unconsciously performed and 
only later enter into consciousness; others are deliberately and consciously 
performed. But whether consciously or unconsciously devised, the resultant 
fictions are mental in structure. This position is by virtue, idealistic. 
According to this, logical thought is an activity, which fulfills the biological 
functions of assisting the organism to adopt and accommodate itself to its 
physical and social environment. This view remains at variance with 
pragmatism. The typical pragmatist ascribes 'truth' to his conceptual 
schemes—a truth that is attested by their practical consequences. But fictional 
constructs although are in contradiction to reality, have predictive function— 
by their help we are enabled to calculate events that occur. Although in 
themselves are fictitious, they lead to correct predictions regarding the future 
appearance of the sensations. And secondly, fictions devise hypotheses that 
are directed towards reality. A hypothesis is an ideational construct that 
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claims or hopes to coincide with some perception in the future. Fictionalism 
itself is the theory that distinguishes between fiction and hypothesis, and 
describes the role of fiction in knowledge as a hypothesis and not as a 
fiction.'^ 
Instrumentalism: Instrumentalism is Dewey's version of pragmatism. 
This is a view of meaning and truth derived from the natural sciences and 
applicable to philosophy and science. Pragmatic principle of verification and 
meaning was propounded or characterized by William James, enunciated with 
remarkable theoretical precision by C.S. pierce and, developed and applied by 
Dewey among others. Dewey says that instrumentalism is an attempt to 
constitute a precise logical theory of concepts, of judgments and inferences in 
their various forms, by considering primarily how thought functions in the 
experimental determination of future consequences. The essential feature of 
pragmatism in its instrumental version is its references to consequences. The 
term 'pragmatic' means only the rule of referring all thinking, all reflective 
considerations, to consequences for final meaning and test. The meaning of 
judgment consists of its anticipated consequences and its truth is established 
by their actual verification. 'All propositions which state discoveries or 
ascertainments, all categorical propositions, would be hypothetical, and their 
truth would coincide with their tested consequences'.""^ 
Traditional metaphysics and epistemology believe that reality lies 
behind and beyond the processes of nature; our search for reality transcends 
ordinary modes of perception and inference. Dewey thinks that such 
metaphysical and epistemological formulations are meaningless. He protests 
against setting up a universe as a system of fixed elements in fixed relations. 
Reality is, for him and the evolutionist, not a complete given, a fixed 
system—not a system at all, but changing, growing things. Dewey finds that 
experience and nature are not alien, but experience affords a means of 
discovering the realities of nature. So subject-object problem is here a pseudo-
problem. Dewey sees in thinking an instrument for the removal of collisions 
between what is given and what is wanted—a means of realizing human 
desire, of securing an arrangement of things which means satisfaction. 
fulfillment, happiness. Such a harmony is the end and test of thinking. 
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Science in this sense is the goal of thought. When the ideas, views, 
conceptions, hypotheses and beliefs that we frame, succeed, secure harmony 
and adjustment, we call them true. We keep on transforming and changing our 
ideas until they work. The success of the ideas is not the cause or the evidence 
of its truth, but is truth itself We must not separate the achieved existence 
from its process. All things are what they are experienced as and every 
experience is of something or the other. Things are also experienced 
aesthetically, morally, economically, and technologically; hence to give a just 
account of anything is to tell what that particular thing is experienced as. We 
must go to experience and see what it is experienced as. Here Dewey adopts 
an operational interpretation of a statement. According to instrumentalism, 
thinking serves human purposes, thinking is useful, and its utility is its truth. 
The human will is an instrument for realizing human aims. The so-called 
fixities such as atoms or God—have existence and import only in the 
problems, needs, struggles, and instrumentalities of conscious agents. So 
Dewey describes the inferences whereby we ascribe existence and properties 
to such scientific objects as atoms and electrons. This is merely to make 
predictions regarding perceptions registered under specified conditions. 
In his syntagma (lyon, 1658), P. Gassendi declares that all 
hypothetical or conditional statements should be considered to be 'natural 
instruments', i.e. devices by which knowledge can be made more orderly and 
penetrating."*^ According to instrumentalism, a theory is a partially interpreted 
formal system. It is mere computational device or instrument that is regarded 
as logically meaningless because it does not refer to anything.^ *^ Although 
theories do provide dispositional descriptions, they have nevertheless a purely 
instrumental function. When Galileo said of the Earth, 'and yet it moves', he 
uttered, no doubt, a descriptive statement. But the function or meaning of this 
statement turns out nevertheless to be purely instrumental; it exhausts it's 
meaning in deducing certain non-dispositional statements. In their case, 
knowledge is power (the power to foresee).^' 
Bellarmino was willing to let Galileo say that the Earth moved around 
the sun provided he added that this was just a manner of speaking that is made 
for easier analysis and more effective inference. Bellarmino's was an early 
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version of the instrumentalist view which holds theories to be neither true nor 
false but instead more or less effective instruments in the hands of the 
students of nature. Bellarmino suggested in effect that they are not 
contentions about fabric of the body of natural phenomena but are scalps and 
forceps in the hands of nature's anatomist." 
Operationalism: Operationalism in its fundamental tenets is closely 
akin to logical empiricism. Both schools of thought have put much emphasis 
on definite experiential meaning or import as a necessary condition of 
objectively significant discourse. Both have made strong efforts to establish 
explicit criteria of experiential significance. But logical empiricism has 
treated experiential import as a characteristic of statements, namely as their 
susceptibility to test by experiment or observation, whereas operationalism 
has tended to construct experimental meaning as a characteristic of concepts 
of the terms representing them, namely, as their susceptibility to operational 
definifion. An operational definition of a term is conceived as a rule to the 
effect that the term is to apply to a particular case if the performance of 
specified operation in that case yields certain characteristic result. For 
example, the term 'harder than' might be operationally defined by the rule 
that a piece of mineral, X, is to be called harder than another piece of mineral. 
Y, if the operation of drawing a sharp point of X across the surface of Y result 
in scratch marks on the latter.^ ^ 
Scientific theories are unavoidably and inevitably defective and limited. 
The realization of this defect or limitation was a profound shock to all 
philosophers of science and in fact constituted a watershed in our articulation, 
crystallization and appropriation of operationalism. How, then, could science 
be devised which would be built up from concept, and which would be 
immune from vast revolutionary changes. Bridgman thinks that the only way 
in which this could be circumvented would be by confirming science to the 
application of those concepts that could be understood in terms of 
experimental operations, and then, whatever happens to theory, the content of 
the true scientific knowledge would remain unchanged.^" The operationalists 
require that each meaningful theoretical term be defined operationally; that is. 
specification must be given of the result of operations or experiments on 
35 
observable entities that would justify the application of the term. The terms do 
not refer to unobservable, but they are made up of terms referring to 
observable. Any theoretical term that cannot be so translated is meaningless, 
and should be banished from science.^^ 
This view is first advanced by P.W. Bridgman in the 'Logic of 
Physics' (1927). For him, what do we mean by the length of an object? We 
evidently know what we mean by the length if we can tell what the length of 
any and every object is, and for the physicists nothing more is required. To 
find the length of an object, we have to perform certain physical operations. 
The concept of length is therefore fixed when the operations by which length 
is measured are fixed: that is, the concept of length involves as much as and 
nothing more than the set operations by which length is determined. In 
general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the 
concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations. If the 
concept is physical, as of length, the operations are actual physical operations. 
Or if the concept is mental, as of mathematical continuity, the operations are 
mental operations, namely those, by which we determine whether a given 
aggregate of magnitude is continuous. It follows that every meaningful 
scientific term must be either definable exhaustively in terms of a specific and 
unambiguous set of possible operations, or be itself a term denoting such an 
operation.^^ 
To safeguard the objectivity in science, all operations invoked in this 
kind of definition, are required to be intersubjective, in the sense that different 
observers must be able to perform the same operation with reasonable 
agreement in their results. Bridgman distinguishes several kinds of operations 
that may be invoked in specifying the meanings of scientific terms. The 
principal ones are (1) what he calls instrumental operations. These consists in 
the use of various devices of observation and measurement, and (2) paper-
and-pencil operations, verbal operations, mental operations, and the like—this 
group is meant to include, among other things, the techniques of mathematical 
and logical inference as well as the use of experiments-in-imagination. 
Hempel refers to them as symbolic operations. Symbolic operations always 
must ultimately make inference to some instrumental operations." 
He mentions the following aspects of operationalism: 
(1) 'Meanings are operational'. To understand the meaning of a term, we 
must know the operational criteria of its operation, and every meaningful 
scientific term must therefore permit of an operational definition. 
(2) To avoid ambiguity, every scientific term should be defined by means of 
one unique operational criterion. Even when two different operational 
procedures have been found to yield the same results, they must be 
considered as defining different concepts (for example, optical and 
tactual length). 
(3) Hypothesis incapable of operational test, or rather questions involving 
untestable formulations, are rejected as meaningless. If a specific 
question has meaning, it must be possible to find operations by which 
answer may be given to it. It will be found in many cases that the 
operations cannot exist, and the question therefore has no meaning.^^ 
2.2 Rule versus Practice in Science 
It is widely accepted that all activities of science are rule-bound as 
opposed to any other nonscientific enterprise. But if we take philosophical 
look at the position of facts, logic of discovery, and other rules of science as 
well, we shall get, in practice, a picture that is quite different from the widely 
accepted view. However, understanding the dichotomy between the 
methodological rules and the actual, practical and historical modes of doing 
science is essenfial for a judicious understanding of scientific discourse. 
Fact-theory Relation 
It is widely admitted that theory is a human creation and the fact is 
given. That is, facts represent some kind of reality. There exist some pure 
facts that are no less than reality. Fact is quite distinct from theoretical 
construct. So, when we justify acceptance of a theory we see whether there is 
agreement between the theory and the fact. If facts agree, the theory is 
accepted, if not, it is rejected. This is a very naive understanding of the 
relation of theory to fact. But, after due philosophical consideration, such a 
relationship can hardly be sustained. Feyerabend holds that theories may be 
removed because of conflicting observations; and observations may also be 
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removed for theoretical reasons. This is because learning does not go from 
observation to theory but always involves both elements. Experience arises 
together with theoretical assumptions, not before them. He says that if we 
eliminate parts of the theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject, then we 
have a person who is completely disoriented and incapable of carrying out 
the simplest action. Even as to children's learning, the whole process starts 
only because the child reacts correctly towards signals, interprets them 
correctly, for, he possesses means of interpretation even before he has 
experienced his first clear sensation.^ 
If theories and facts are intertwined, then how a theory can be tested 
against the data of experience, and how one theory can be said to 'account for 
the facts' better than another. Shapere says that test of a scientific theory can 
be accomplished if and only if there are at least some terms occurring in the 
theory which have a meaning independent of their theoretical context. And 
comparison of different scientific theories can be accomplished if and only if 
there are at least some such terms that have the same meaning in both of 
those different theories. If there is no such common meaning, the theories are 
not talking about the same things; hence cannot be compared with respect to 
their adequacy.^° A given theory rarely satisfies these conditions. This is 
because a theory is constructed in terms of hypothetical entities; the greatest 
advances in science have not been accomplished by means of laws referring 
explicitly to observations, but rather by means of laws that speak of various 
hypothetical entities. Electric, magnetic, and gravitational fields are among 
such hypothetical entities; they are not directly observable, and therefore, 
they are not theory-independent. Popper calls them metaphysical and 
speculative. In addition, the language representing the attributes of such 
hypothetical entities becomes theory-dependent.^' After the proved 
impossibility of Maxwell's demon and Heisenberg's principle of 
indeterminacy, men come to understand that the measuring instrument (man) 
is not simply a passive extension of our senses. Therefore, theory cannot be 
justified by the facts. Devid Hume argues that no matter how many tests 
confirm a hypothesis, it might still be wrong. Duhem argues that there is no 
such thing as a crucial experiment. No matter how unfavorable tests might 
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be, the hypothesis might be preserved by either adding assumptions or 
surrendering one of accepted assumptions. An individual hypothesis can 
never be tested in isolation of a whole group of other theories. Facts do not 
have power to make scientists accept the theory and reject it as well. 
This is widely recognized that theory emerges from the generalization of 
facts. In this sense, the facts are the source of theory - 'fact precedes theory'. 
Fact gets the high status in empiricist account of relationship of man and 
universe. According to empiricism, the senses are the only channel of 
communication between the knowing subject and the world. The sense 
experience is the necessary factor in every act of acquisition and control of 
knowledge. For this view, man is measuring instrument that reacts by its 
feelers (senses) to the outside world and to its own state as well. Accordingly, 
scientific theories are abstracted from facts. Facts are the origin of theory. 
Every theory emerges from and reduces into the facts. All theoretical 
knowledge is epiphenomenal, and should be considered as an economical, 
convenient means of accounting for facts. However, when we ponder over 
Newtonian and Copemican theories or other such theories, we realize that 
none of them is the result of generalization of facts. These theories were 
formulated even when hundreds of facts did not fit in with them. Only by 
theory-articulation, scientists sought to work out conformity between theory 
and facts. From this fact of history of science, it follows that theory too plays 
an instrumental role in creating of facts. Consider the discovery of oxygen. 
The same thing is discovered by Priestly long before Lavoisier, but only after 
a comprehensive theory is constructed by the time of Lavoisier, was he able 
to recognize diphlogisticated air as oxygen. All this suggests that 'theory 
precedes fact'. So, Duhem says 'an experiment in physics is not simply the 
observation of a phenomenon, it is, besides, theoretical interpretation of this 
phenomenon.'*''^  
Not only that, theoretical statements have their impact upon our 
accepting or refuting observational statements. Thus, for example, the 
acceptance or rejection of a statement concerning the existence or non-
existence of micro-organism in the test tube depends not only on the optical 
theory of the microscope we use, but also on the theoretical assumption that 
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if there are micro-organisms in the test tube, they would be observable by 
means of a microscope. No observational statement accounting for results of 
an experiment in which a measuring instrument is used can be accepted 
without recourse to some theory or assumptions. Galileo claimed that by 
means of the telescope he had constructed, he was able to discover mountains 
on the moon and spots on the sun. These observations were seriously 
questioned because they could not be reconciled with Aristotelian cosmology 
and the optical theory of instruments of the times. Even when we do not use 
any measuring instrument in the course of an experiment, the result is 
interpreted, and observational statement is accepted on the grounds of 
different assumptions and theories concerning the structure of the world and 
the mechanism of our cognitive function.^ ^ Ajdukiewicz says, " I do not see 
any difference between observation and theoretical statements. I believe that 
mere experimental data do not compel us to accept either or the other." In 
order to construct any sentence it is necessary to use some language, and in 
order to construct any judgment it is necessary to use some conceptual 
apparatus. "^ ^ 
Hanson says that two observers do not see the same thing, do not begin 
from the same data though their eyesight is normal and they are visually 
aware of the same object. Observing a protozoon—Amoeba, one saw a one-
celled animal, the other a non-celled animal. The same thing is observed as 
different, seeing is not only the having of a visual experience; it is also the 
way in which the visual experience is had. The physicist and the layman see 
the same thing, but they do not make the same statement of it. The infant and 
the layman can see: they are not blind. But they cannot see what the physicist 
sees; they are blind to what he sees. All this means that there is no pure 
observation. If we see some fact we see that as our theory suggests. This is 
why 0,Neil says, "theory provides, at least in part, the premises from which 
the facts may be inferred as conclusion."^^ 
Logic of Discovery 
Logic of discovery is the creative process of how to discover. The 
logic of discovery' deals with development and articulation of an idea at every 
stage in its history prior to its ultimate ratification. It would include an 
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account of how a theory was first invented, how it was primarily evaluated 
and tested, how it was modified, and the like. The logic of discovery is 
historically prior to the context of pursuit. Context of pursuit is a region 
between the context of discovery and the context of ultimate justification. 
Something is first discovered; if found worthy of pursuit, it is entertained; if 
further evaluation shows it to be worthy of belief, it is accepted. These three 
steps show the three contexts respectively: logic of discovery, logic of pursuit 
and logic of justification. These three contexts mark the temporal, if not 
logical, history of a concept. The logic of discovery could be construed as 
'the Eureka moment', i.e. the time when a new idea or conception is first 
drawn. The logic of discovery is a set of rules or principles according to 
which new discoveries can be generated. 
In everyday discourse, 'discovery' is a ' success' word. Because to say 
that a person P has discovered x carries with it the strong implication that (1) 
what has been discovered actually exists, and (2) in reporting the discovery p 
has correctly described x. In everyday contexts, to say that p has discovered 
that y, implies that y is true. But it has the unacceptable consequences that a 
theory, T, has been discovered only if T is true. For P has discovered y, 
where y may be false. To avoid this situation, Martin V. Curd gives a neutral 
account of the discovery of T in terms of 'the period of theory generation'. 
On this account it remains an open question whether T is true or false after it 
has been discovered or generated. So, discovery of a theory refers not to a 
specific moment but to an extended period of time. It begins at the moment 
when a scientist starts thinking seriously about a problem and ends when the 
theory or what Hanson calls the 'finished research report' is accomplished.^' 
So logic of discovery means the rules which guide during this period. 
However, Bacon, Descartes, Boyle, Locke, Leibniz and Newton—to 
name only the prominent—at their core of epistemology believe that it is 
possible to formulate rules which would lead to the discovery of 'useful" 
facts and theories about nature. Unlike now, there was then no distinction 
drawn between the context of discovery and of justification. The desire to 
develop a logic of discovery is to increase the rate of advance at which new 
discoveries are made by articulating fruitful rules for invention and 
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innovation, and to provide a sound warrant for our claims about the world. If 
a fool proof logic of discovery could be devised, it would be both the 
instrument for generating new theories, and automatic guarantee that theories 
produced by use of it are epistemologically well grounded. Hume, Reid, 
Priestly, and multitude of other enlightenment philosophers took for granted 
the existence of an 'inductive logic of discovery'. But if we trace the 
development of views about the logic of discovery, our optimism will be 
replaced by serious pessimism. There is general skepticism today about the 
viability of a logic of discovery because most of us cannot conceive that there 
might be rules that would lead us from laboratory data to theories as 
complex as quantum theory, general relativity, and the structure of DNA. 
Today's science virtually involves theoretical entities and processes that are 
inferentially far removed from the data, which they explain. There might be 
rules to lead one from tracks on a photographic plate to claims about the line 
structure of subatomic particles is, to say the least, impossible. Empirical 
generalizations are viewed as mundane, but the theories that are replete with 
unobservable entities are as grandiose ontological frameworks. In this level 
of theorizing inductive logic of discovery have been ignored, or in some case 
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their very existence is denied. 
Unlike enumerative induction, there is some non-inductive logic of 
discovery that is called 'self-corrective' logic of discovery. Such logic 
involves the application of an algorithm to a complex conjunction which 
consists of a predecessor theory and a relevant observation. The algorithm is 
designed to produce a new theory that is 'truer' than the old. Such logic was 
thought to be analogous to various self-corrective methods of approximation 
in mathematics, where an initial hypothesis was successfully modified so as 
to produce a revised hypothesis that was demonstrably closer to the true 
value. It does not restrict itself to sentences about observable. It could deal 
with the genesis of deep structural theories. Unfortunately, more than a 
century of exploration by a succession of major thinkers has not brought the 
self-corrective program to fruition. No one was able to suggest plausible 
rules for modifying earlier theories in the face of new evidence so as to 
produce clearly superior replacements. '^* 
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Hershel asserts that the manner of generation of a hypothesis is 
irrelevant. In the study of nature, we must not be scrupulous as to how we 
reach to acknowledge general facts, i.e., laws and theories. Whewell goes yet 
a step further and denies the very existence of a logic of scientific discovery. 
He says that scientific discovery must ever depend upon some happy thought 
of which we cannot trace the origin; some fortunate cast of intellect rises 
above all rules. No maxims can be given which inevitably lead to 
discovery.^^ According to Popper, the question as to how a new idea occurs 
to a man—whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific 
theory—may be of great interest to empirical psychology but is irrelevant to 
the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. There is no such thing as a 
logical method of having new ideas. Every discovery contains a creative 
intuition in Bergson's sense.^ ^ 
Logic of Justification 
We saw that there are no clear rules for discovery. We have now come 
to the view that there are no logical constraints and rules in discovery. The 
act of discovering is now free of hard and fast rules provided by the 
methodology of science. Philosophers who were interested in the logical 
structure of acquired knowledge, failed to establish any logic for discovery. 
However, they developed the idea that although discovery does not follow 
any logic, there is some logic of justification of that discovery. They thought 
that although there might not be any rules for discovery, yet there must be 
some rules for justifying a discovery under consideration. Since discovery 
occurs without any rules, it must be an irrational product; and since scientists 
are rational men, they cannot accept any theory without rational judgment. 
Therefore, for a rational acceptance, there must be some logic of justification. 
Although we do not apply rules when discovering, we can apply rules after 
the discovery. This idea makes a clear distinction between the context of 
discovery and the context of justification. The distinction suggests that rules 
may not be possible in the process of discovery but may be possible of 
application during the extent of justification of that discovery. So, logic of 
justification is based on the distinction between the context of discovery and 
the context of justification. 
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What is this distinction? How far is context of discovery different 
from context of justification ? How come logic is not possible for discovery 
but possible for justification? The following considerations would be in order 
in bringing out this distinction : 
(a) There is a temporal difference between the process of discovery and 
the process of justification. Chronologically speaking, process of 
discovery precedes the process of justification. This succession is 
necessary since any justification requires the existence of that which it 
justifies. 
(b) This is a distinction between the factual and the normative. The process 
of discovery is factual and the process of justification is normative that 
provides methods of justification. 
(c) Analysis of discovery is empirical; the study of a particular discovery 
may involve historical, psychological and sociological reasoning and 
research, but not logical methods. Analysis of justification is logical; 
the considerations, factors, methods etc. of justification are pre-
established. 
(d) The process of discovery and the methods of justification is the 
distinction between academic disciplines. Philosophy of science is seen 
as addressing the logical analysis of justification whereas history, 
psychology and sociology of science - all these empirical disciplines 
are seen as analyzing the process of discovery. The empirical 
disciplines have to learn philosophy of science. But philosophy of 
science cannot learn anything from the empirical disciplines since what 
counts as justification is solely a question of logical reasoning; the 
correctness of a particular justificatory procedure can be determined by 
logical reflection alone and by nothing else.^^ 
According to Husserl, the laws of logic of justification do not pertain to 
how one thinks, but how one should think in order to think correctly. It is not 
concerned with psychological motives or historical circumstances which 
drive us to accept a statement, but with logical rules which justify it. History 
of science leaves nothing to contribute to the logic of justification.^ ** 
44 
However, it is maintained that discovery may be irrational and need not 
follow any recognized method; justification, on the other hand, starts only 
after the discoveries have been made, and it proceeds in an orderly way. The 
distinction leads to two different questions about scholars in their fields of 
research: the first; what are the norms of their conduct, and the second; what 
should they be. The answer to the first question would then be descriptive 
and to the second, normative. 
However, such a distinction can be sustained only by the ongoing 
process of argumentation and counter-argumentation. For all practical 
purposes such a distinction is unmaintainable. The following reasons make 
the unmaintainability of such a distinction categorically clear : 
(a) The processes of discovery and justification are initially intertwined, 
with step of one type alternating with step of the other. Therefore, they 
are not temporally distinct processes; there is no reason to conclude 
that the entire process of discovery must be completed before the 
process of justification can begin. There are even cases in which the 
process of discovery and the process of justification may be nearly 
identical.^^ 
(b) As is said, discoveries may be analyzed only in terms of empirical 
sciences. But discovery has logical aspects also. For, a discovery and a 
mythical creation are not identical. 
(c) The common usage of 'discovery' includes some sort of justification. 
Saying 'some one has discovered that p ' implies that he or she has 
acquired some knowledge about p, and this in turn means some sort of 
justification. 
(d) Justification has external factors also. In the actual decision concerning 
theory-choice, there are factors that play a role, which can only be 
described, in sociological and psychological terms. Sociological factors 
come into play since the decision of a scientific community (Kuhn) 
with respect to theory choice can only be explained with recourse to the 
system of cognitive values held by this community. Psychological 
factors come into play since the decision of a single member of this 
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community can only be explained by the particular way this member 
interprets communal cognitive values. 
(e) Psychology and other empirical disciplines are relevant to 
epistemology. This is seen in genetic epistemology, evolutionary 
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epistemology and naturalized epistemology. In each of these 
disciplines it is maintained that empirical knowledge is relevant to the 
task of epistemology. 
(f) Understanding of history of science goes against the distinction under 
consideration. There are instances where method of justification was 
also changed to get over certain anomalies. The process of scientific 
change is dialectical; error and anomaly do not need to be avoided or 
overcome to be conformed to the prevalent methods of justification. On 
the contrary, they represent the 'other' necessary for the development 
of a higher synthesis.*' 
Feyerabend gives the historical argument that 'history generally, and the 
history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, 
more many-sided, more lively and subtle than even the best historian and best 
methodologist can imagine'. 'History is full of accidents and conjectures and 
curious juxtapositions of events and it demonstrates to us the complexity of 
human change and the unpredictable character of ultimate consequences of 
any given act or decision of men'. Moreover, science knows no 'bare facts' 
at all; the facts that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way 
and are, therefore, essentially ideational. This being the case, the history of 
science will be as complex, chaotic, entertaining, and full of mistakes as the 
ideas it contains, and these ideas in turn will be as complex, chaotic, full of 
mistakes, and entertaining, as are the minds of those who invented them.^ ^ In 
this condition, we cannot believe that the naive and simple-minded rules 
which methodologists take as their guide are capable of accounting for such a 
'maze of interactions'. Feyerabend says that the fact that science exists 
proves that methods of justification are frequently overruled. They were 
overruled by precisely those procedures, which are now said to belong to the 
context of discovery. To put it differently: in the history of science, standards 
of justification often forbid moves that are caused by psychological, socio-
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politico-economic and other external conditions and science survives only 
because these moves are allowed to prevail. He also says that we often make 
moves that are forbidden by methodological rules. We interpret the evidence 
so that it fits our fanciful ideas. We eliminate difficulties by ad hoc 
procedures, we push them aside, or we simply refuse to take them seriously. 
There is conflict between the contexts. Scientists occasionally choose the 
moves recommended by the context of justification, but they may also 
choose the moves that belong to the context of discovery. 
Kuhn says that methodological directives are insufficient to indicate a 
unique substantive conclusion to many sorts of scientific questions. In order 
to understand the evolution of scientific knowledge it is necessary to go 
beyond logic and methodology, to take into account the sociology and 
psychology of scientific community. Amsterdamski says that scientists take 
into account the history of development of knowledge, and do not reconstruct 
it in isolation from the actual history of science. If their model were purely 
normative, they would be fully justified in ignoring all the historical data. 
Lakatos says that 'the rational reconstruction never exhausts the history. For, 
history of science is always richer than its rational reconstruction, and 
therefore, any rational reconstruction of history needs to be supplemented by 
an empirical external history.' When the real history of events does not 
coincide with the rational reconstruction, external history explains the origins 
of those inconsistencies. 
All this means that logic of discovery and logic of justification are not 
distinct from each other; both are intertwined and operate under the historical 
process. Thus, there cannot be logic of justification as such either. 
Methodological Anarchism 
The above discussion brings out that methodological rules are 
untenable in both the context of discovery and the context of justification. 
Our present discussion goes one step further and proposes anarchism in 
scientific practice; rules are not just merely untenable, but rather we should 
not obey any unique method for science at all. What is anarchism? 
Scientists, according to this view, oppose any kind of restriction and they 
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demand that the individual be permitted to develop freely, unhampered by 
laws, duties or obligations.*^ Methodological 'anarchism' should be clearly 
distinguished from political anarchism. Anarchism in political sense cares 
little for human lives and human happiness; it contains precisely the kind of 
puritanical dedication and seriousness. But anarchism that is proposed for 
scientific practice is quite opposite in its attitude. It is like 'dadaism'. A 
Dadaist would not hurt even a fly—let alone a human being. Like Dadaism, 
the anarchism never hurts any scientist who does not want to obey any 
established method of science. It is serious neither for nor against any 
method; it is in favor of individual scientist's freedom of thought. The 
methodological is far more humanitarian than political anarchism. This 
model of anarchism, need not lead us to chaos. 
According to this view, an individual scientist gets freedom from a 
purported universal method. This view realizes that all methodologies, even 
the most obvious ones, have their limits. So, an anarchist plays his role like 
an under-cover agent who plays the game of Reason in order to undercut the 
authority of Reason. This recommends a new methodology which replaces 
induction by counter-induction and uses a multiplicity of theories, 
metaphysical views, fairy-tales etc. instead of the customary pair of theory 
and fact.^ ° Feyerabend argues for this multiplicity, in other words, 
methodological pluralism. He says that the world, which we want to explore, 
is a largely unknown entity. We must, therefore, keep our options open and 
we must not restrict ourselves in advance. Epistemological prescriptions may 
look splendid when compared with other epistemological principles, or with 
general principles—^but who can guarantee that they are the best way to 
discover, not just a few isolated facts, but also some deep-lying secrets of 
nature?^' 
Historical research shows that there is not a single rule-however 
plausible and however firmly grounded in epistemology - that is not violated 
at some time or other. It becomes evident that such violations are not 
accidental events; they are not results of insufficient knowledge or of 
inattention, which might have been avoided. On the contrary, we see that 
they are necessary for progress: the Copernican revolution, the rise of 
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modem atomism, quantum theory, the gradual emergence of the particle 
theory of light, occurred because some thinkers either decided not to be 
bound by certain obvious methodological rules, or because they unwittingly 
broke them.^ ^ The development of Copemican point of view from Galileo to 
the 20^ *^  century is a perfect example in this regard. We start with a strong 
belief that runs counter to contemporary reason and contemporary 
experience. The belief spreads and finds support in other beliefs, which are 
equally unreasonable. Research now gets deflected in new directions, new 
kinds of instruments are built, and evidence is related to theories in ways 
until there arises an ideology that is rich enough to provide independent 
arguments. We can say today that Galileo was on the right track, for his 
persistent pursuit of what once seemed to be a silly cosmology. What it 
amounts to is that scientists are not bound to obey a certain absolute, 
unchanging set of rules for scientific practice. Such a methodological 
orientation is summed up by Feyerabend in the dictum 'Anything goes'. 
2.3 Conception of Progress in Theory -change 
At this point, it would be in order to discuss some important aspects of 
scientific progress. How is a scientific change considered as progress? In 
which way can we conceive of it? However, we will try to present an outline 
regarding this matter here: 
Progress Thesis 
A theory of scientific progress is concerned with a variety of 
questions. Among them, the following are very much important: 
(1) In the course of epistemic change, has there been real progress or 
merely change? If so, what is the nature of that progress? 
(2) Is there a final goal towards which science is progressing? If so, what 
is this goal? Could there be something like the ultimate answer 
encapsulating the ultimate scientific theory? Are we approaching this 
final picture? 
(3) Since the notion of progress entails not merely the change but 
improvement in our knowledge, what normative standard of 
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comparison is involved there? How can we define the notion of one 
theory being epistemically better than another one? 
First of all, it is beyond question that there has not been merely 
epistemic change over time. Historically speaking, in our knowledge of the 
world there has been progress. There appears to have been progress in the 
past, but whether there has been real progress in some absolute sense or not 
is a different question. This progress has occurred both on the historical level 
(that is, collective growth) and on the individual level. Piaget argues that over 
the course of time our knowledge has increased and improved. Firstly, if we 
look at the history of science we will see that there is progress just as there is 
individual development. Every one would seem to admit that adults know 
more than children do, and know it in a more adequate way. Secondly, if 
there were no progress, then reason would not evolve rationally. 'Reason 
cannot change without reason' (la raison n'en peut changer qu'avec raison). 
Thus, if epistemic change is to be rational, then there must be progress in the 
change. If 'reason does not change without reason', then, the only 
explanation 'later is better' can be the reason of the change.^^ In every 
discipline, there is a succession of theories in time, and the new are different 
from the old. But this does not by itself imply progress. In order for change 
to be considered as progress, the change must claim that the new situation is 
'better' than the previous one. 'Scientific progress means scientific success: 
the success of scientists in getting better and better theories'.^^ Again, the 
question is: better for what? This question presupposes a goal of the change. 
Therefore, 'progress is a goal-theoretic concept. To say that ' X represents 
progress' is an elliptical way of saying 'X represents progress toward goal 
Y'. If our concern is with cognitive (as opposed to material, spiritual, or other 
forms of) progress, then Y must be some cognitive aim or aims, such as truth, 
greater predictive power, and greater problem solving capacity, greater 
coherence, or greater content. Given the aim of science is truth we must 
see, in order to make a rational sense of science, science as already including 
some knowledge of unobservable and being committed to improving this 
knowledge of the unobservable. This unobservable is the proper aim of 
science. And to acquire and improve the knowledge of unobservable is the 
task of science.^^ 
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However, to get an adequate understanding of scientific progress we 
should distinguish systematically between two types of progress, theoretical 
and empirical. Theoretical progress means progress in theoretical 
understanding. Aim-oriented empiricism tells us that the world is 
physicalistically comprehensible. Suppose T is the comprehensive, unified, 
true theory of every thing. Suppose also that Tn can be derived from T, Tn.i 
from Tn and ...To from T|. Suppose further that none of these derivations can 
be reversed. In this case, To, T|...Tn constitutes theoretical progress. To...Tn 
constitutes empirical progress if we can define approximate versions of these 
theories such that T-> Tn -> Tn.i^...To and thereby the problem is solved.^ ^ 
Empirical progress is no less of intellectual achievement than the theoretical 
progress. However, empirically successful theories may even be false in strict 
sense. For, science is not concerned just with the discovery of descriptive 
laws in order to develop a utilitarian ability of predicting and controlling 
nature. Instead, science produces laws under the pressure of the mind's 
natural tendency to explain nature causally.'°° Problem is solved with the 
satisfaction of mind. However, this satisfaction is not for ever. In course of 
time, people may again be dissatisfied with previous solution. Regardless of 
true solution of problem, solution has an important role for theory choice. For 
there is good reason to claim that a good error, or a new irrational is 
cognitively more relevant than many solutions. Without a criterion of 
demarcation for anomaly and error, progress cannot be thought of 
Conversely without a notion of progress, anomaly and error become either a 
matter of subjective judgment or a philosophically unproblematic issue.'°' 
Cohen says that Progress is a value term. It denotes some forms of 
improvement between at least two parameters. Thus, it is a two-place 
relation. The progress of knowledge that we believe the sciences achieve over 
time involves the relation between two intersubjectively shared belief-
descriptions. The basic progress relation can be conceived of as being of the 
following kind: 
(1) Progress ={<Ti,T2 >,...} 
Depicting progress in this manner amount to saying that progress is a two-
place relation linking two theories. It is an asymmetric and transitive relation. 
51 
With regard to improvement, there is the yardstick for comparing theories. 
This yardstick is the value that should be constant to the formulation of the 
relation. For a realist, this value is truth or truthlikeness. If one holds other 
views about science; other aims, like problem-solving or empirical adequacy, 
may serve equally well under a purely formal point of view. There may not 
be the obvious indications for ascertaining whether or not such progress is 
actually obtained between two theories. Any such estimation will be subject 
to human fallibility. We may believe that a certain theory-change was 
progressive, but may turn out that it was not. Therefore, the question of ideal 
semantic version of progress may arise as to what true progress is. 
Cohen says if we try to capture those ascriptions of progress that deal 
with our estimations of progress, the progress relation changes from a two-
place to a three- place relation. It now looks like this: 
(2) Progress = {< T,, T2, E>,...} 
Here E denotes the evidence that is cited as a ground for believing that T] is 
better than T2. If the available evidence changes, then our estimations of 
progressiveness may change with it. The equation (1) represents an ideal 
semantic notion of progress, and (2) does an epistemological version of 
progress. The progress is one thing, and our estimation of progress is quite 
another. The truth is one thing, indication of truth is quite another. What kind 
of estimations of progress and what kind of indications of truth, should be 
regarded sufficient for matters of dispute over theory preference is still 
unsolved. "^ ^ 
However, Cohen also analyses the equation for empirical progress. 
Here we replace the basic entities that are to be compared in terms of 
theoretical improvement. Instead of dealing with theories (T), we now deal 
with two phenomena or sets of phenomena (P). 
(3) Progress ={<P,,P2,E >,...} 
The rationale for this move lies in the fact that the conditions under which we 
would like to replace one set of phenomena with another are quite different 
from those that apply in the case of high-level theories. Phenomena are 
judged on the basis of data and the inference tickets used in their formulation. 
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A scientific phenomenon is a conceptual abstraction sprung out of the 
available data; it is far removed from sensible experiences. Theories are 
judged on the basis of phenomena and at the same time phenomena constitute 
an impressive intellectual achievement of science. Therefore, it is natural to 
conclude that progress in phenomenal change should complete our 
conception of scientific progress. 
Empirical progress occurs in three ways: (I) Pi contains the discovery 
of new phenomena in relation to P2. There are those cases where we 
somehow manage to establish new phenomena, i.e. phenomena that did not 
earlier figure within the empirical basis of our theories. The discovery of new 
type of galaxies or stars may serve as an intuitive example from astronomy. 
(2) P| corrects known phenomena in relation to P2. There are those cases 
where we manage to 'fine-tune' some known phenomena, i.e. specify them in 
new and better ways. This includes the case of merging or dividing known 
phenomena. (3) P] represents new methods or instruments in relation to P2. 
There are cases where new methods or instruments provide us access to 
hitherto inaccessible areas of reality. The introduction of radio telescopes or 
electron microscopes may serve as prominent example here. By means of 
these instruments, new types of phenomena become empirically detectable 
which hitherto were beyond the reach of scientific investigation. 
Cohen also says that empirical progress is perhaps relativised to 
discipline. For, some methodological standards are designed for the particular 
purposes of a given discipline, which may be at variance with standards from 
other disciplines. The degree to which they are in conformity with those very 
general standards is a matter of empirical investigation. Then the disciplinary 
methodological standards are considered as epistemologically prior. 
Therefore, the scientific rationality an4 scientific progress become 
intertwined, as two sides of the same coin. This view gives us the room to 
deviate from an insider judgment. We may find that the methodological 
standards accepted in the discipline do not validate the change. Or we may 
find that the standards do indeed validate the particular change, but the 
scientists were unaware of it and accepted the change for irrelevant 
reasons. "^ ^ 
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Regarding empirical progress, what precisely could it mean to say that 
we have discovered a new phenomenon? There may be three definitions of 
discovering new phenomenon. First, the new phenomenon, P, may emerge as 
the abstraction of a new set of data, utilizing legitimate inference tickets. 
Second, a new phenomenon, P, may be established by higher abstraction 
from given phenomena. Third, a new phenomenon, P, may be the result of 
merging several lines of abstractions from data to phenomenon, where each 
individual line employs some inference tickets that yield uncertainty with 
regard to P. Now come to the second kind of empirical progress and ask what 
could it mean to say that Pi corrects some phenomena in relation to P2. There 
are also three definitions of correcting the phenomenon. First, there are cases 
where a discipline realizes that certain inference tickets are much more 
problematic than assumed earlier. Second, there are cases where known 
phenomenon have been described differently by utilizing new inference 
tickets or new set of data or both. Third, this case of correcting may occur 
through the combination of these processes. One may replace a known 
phenomenon by utilizing a new classification that is better supported by the 
known data and inference tickets.'°^ However there are different views about 
whether scientific change results in progress or not. Following are among 
them: 
Cumulativism 
There is a belief (positivistic) that theory change is cumulative or 
content increasing. The main theme of accumulation is that success of old 
theories is always captured by their successors, which are at the same time 
expected to be able to account for things unexpected by their predecessors. 
Therefore, science progresses quite simply, because later theories can always 
do everything their predecessors could and more. There is another view 
(post-positivistic), which denies that theory change is cumulative. This view 
arises from the fact that in the history of science there are examples after 
example of theories that failed to solve all the problems solved by their 
predecessors. Both views accept wholly uncritically that wholesale retention 
of explanatory content is a precondition of cognitive progress. Therefore, 
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according to the first view there is progress in scientific change, for scientific 
change is cumulafive; on the other hand, the second view holds that science 
does not progress, for scientific change is not cumulative. According to 
simple accumulation, the development of science is a simple accretion of 
knowledge—accumulation of truth. Scientists admit that each law or theory 
remains without change. In the growth of science, there is only the 
enrichment without loss. Even when a new, more general theory is 
formulated, the previous one preserves its truth-value. There is no revolution 
in the history of science; or there is only one revolution—after that science is 
progressing with continuity. This is an extreme view of cumulativism. 
According to this view, the new truths remain together with the old ones and 
complement them. The result is that the global amount of human knowledge 
is increased, in the sense that more and more aspects of reality become 
known as a result of this proliferation of viewpoints, leading to a 
proliferation of domains of investigation.'°^ 
Revolutionism 
According to this view scientific change occurs without continuity. 
Every new theory is radically different than the previous one. The new theory 
sees the problems and their importance together with their solutions from a 
different vantage point. What is problem for the old may not be the same for 
the new; what is solved according to the old may not be solved at all. That is, 
their standards, methods of inquiry, rules for justification, ways of 
observations, techniques and evaluations of experiments—all are so different 
that two theories constitute two different worlds. Their concepts and terms 
are incommensurable to each other. In this condifion, if there occurs a 
change, the new theory produces such a different result that cannot make any 
addition to the old. This kind of change is mere change without having any 
growth. This view of scientific change is called revolutionism. As in social 
revolution, in science a new theory falsifies the old one. In normal science 
continuity reigns but in periods of revolution the continuity is broken. 
Revolutionary change just means that two theories see the same thing from 
two different perspectives; so there cannot be any progress in this change. 
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Dialecticism V ^ ^ ^ . . - ' ^ v / 
Neither cumulativism nor revolutionism taatsodj^l^:^ the actual 
history of science. Both are extremities, which do not hold water. So with a 
view to arrive at a better understanding of time-bound activities of science 
they must be replaced by a synthesis that unites the oppositions and at the 
same time goes beyond them. This may be called dialectical view of 
scientific change. This view realizes the role of cumulativity postulate (CP) 
and at the same time notices contradictions between the corresponded and the 
corresponding theories. Every new theory is more general or higher theory 
than the old ones. Contradiction of two lower level theories is explained 
away in this higher one; therefore, leading to an enrichment of knowledge. 
However, this higher theory becomes incommensurable to another higher 
theory, entailing another synthesis in the process. The contradictory theories 
together do not make any progress, but the higher one in relation to two 
lower theories does make progress. For example, the competition of Cuvier's 
catastrophism and Lyell's uniformitarianism in paleontology did not last long 
and Darwin's work led to a synthesis, which was commonly acknowledged. 
In this case, a competition of two one-sided theories led to a new theory, 
which is synthesis of the competing theories and at the same time, their 
negation. The whole process may be called a dialectical ascent. This view 
recognizes both the period of stability and the period of revolution. 
Infinity of Progress 
Progress is infinite. We cannot say, even in principle, that after such 
and such steps we will reach the goal. Scientific progress will never stop. 
There are three reasons for this infinity: (1) science uses better and better 
measuring instruments, and discovers more and more precise laws. The 
improvement of measuring instruments and methods has no limit. (2) The 
world is infinitely complicated, even at the surface. Everything has 
(probably) infinitely many properties; we discover them in turn. Every real 
process is infinitely complex because infinitely many side factors intervene; 
we take them into account one by one. (3) The world is (probably) infinitely 
complex in depth. Structure of matter consists of different levels; we reach 
them gradually. It is probable that the number of these levels is infinite. 
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Therefore, we should go forever discovering new fundamental elements of 
matters, and its new basic laws. The number of scientific revolutions would 
be infinite. Lenin says the infinity of scientific progress is associated with 
infinity of complexity of essence. Human thought goes deeper from 
appearance to essence, from essence of the first order to the essence of the 
second order etc, without end."^ 
According to Krajiwski scientific revolutions usually consist of 
revealing new idealizing assumptions of the old theories, and creating new 
factual theories. We approach absolute truth along a correspondence 
sequence T|, T2, T3....In such a sequence truth content gradually increases: 
Trc(T,)<Trc(T2)<Trc(T3)<.!.. 
At the same time we have new formulations of the initial theory, due to 
gradual revelation of its appropriate idealizing assumptions: Ti, T'l, T"i, .... 
This sequence also approaches absolute truth although in a different sense. 
We are dealing here with a model truth. When we introduce a concept of 
model truth-content, mTrc, analogous to the concept of classical truth-
content, we may write: 
mTrc (Ti) < mTrc (T2) < mTrc (T3) < .... 
In other words, we approach finally absolute truth on two planes: a factual 
and an idealizational. On the first plane, we have increasingly more exact 
factual laws. Here we approach absolute classical truth in an infinite process. 
In the second place, we have more adequate formulations of idealizational 
laws; we approach absolute model truth in an infinite process. Both processes 
are closely connected and neither of them is possible without the other. The 
concept of classical truth and concept of model truth are necessary in order 
to obtain a real picture of scientific progress."' 
Logic and History 
Scientific progress can be considered in two different ways. One is 
logic (internal history) that provides a model of progress, and the other is 
actual progress achieved (external history, with sociological, ideological, 
psychological factors etc.) that is accounted for in the history of science. For 
Krajiwski, model of the progress of science ought to be compatible in basic 
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outline with the real history of science. When it is not, it must be criticized. 
However, real history is never completely compatible with a model— 
numerous deviations are inevitable. In this case, we should criticize rather the 
history. This is not paradox as practice is never fully reasonable. It always 
deviates from rational scheme. Both have a bearing on each other. This is 
why, we can see an incompatibility of scientific rational with the actual 
historical. Here scientific rationale and history both could be criticized by 
each other. For, nothing is sacrosanct in science and history of science. 
Scientists' Concept of Progress 
Scientific progress in the eyes of scientists is different from that in the 
eyes of philosophers. Unlike philosophers, scientists maintain a 'logical 
relation'hetv/een theories in the historical development of physics. Scientists 
like Misner, Thome, and Wheeler hold that physics develops and expands 
with its unity by a network of 'correspondence principle'. Correspondence 
principle follows that the newer more sophisticated theory is better than its 
predecessor, because it gives a good description of a more extended domain 
of physics, in the way that the old theory gives the newer the power to 
recover the old. Rohrlich, one of the famous scientists, says that the old 
theories, having been proved correct over a long time, did not really become 
wrong. For him, they only become restricted to a limited domain of validity. 
Newtonian mechanics becomes restricted to phenomena in which the 
velocities are small compared with the velocity of light. He also says about 
another aspect of change that while the predictions of a theory will always 
remain correct when used in the domain of validity, the foundations of the 
theory may be radically modified by a more general theory. The notion of 
absolute space and absolute time are abandoned in the special theory of 
relativity. Here the lower level theory is derived from the higher, through 
which there build up a hierarchy of theories.^^^ 
Another scientist is Boltzmann. He says about scientific change that 
Physics is an essentially changing - perhaps ever-changing - enterprise. At no 
moment, it is quite right but seldom it is quite wrong. Physical theories that 
are well confirmed and accepted for a long time would in restricted sense be 
of eternal value. For all the discontinuity, there is some continuity even in the 
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sense of bridging over those discontinuities. He argues that formerly one 
used to say that the old view has been recognized as false. This sounds as if 
the new ideas were true. Thereby it is clearly expressed (1) that the earlier 
theory too had been useful because it gave an, if only partially, true picture of 
the world, and (2) that the possibility is not excluded that the new theory in 
turn will be superseded by a more suitable one. '"* 
For Walther Nerst, in contrast to inductive generalization there is 
another way where thoroughgoing ideas on the nature of certain phenomena 
are developed by purely speculative activity. Correctness of this kind of 
knowledge has to be tested by experiment only subsequently. Their success 
though does not provide correctness (does prove their usefulness), their 
failure does mean not only uselessness, but also their falsity. If any theory 
becomes successful, it has retained its validity over a wide range, but the 
limits of its applicability have been more sharply defined. There is scarcely 
one law established by an investigator of the highest rank that has not 
preserved for all time within its range of applicability. It cannot be said that 
the electromagnetic theory of light has completely overthrown the old optical 
theory put forward by Fresnel and others. On the contrary, now as formerly, 
an enormous range of phenomena can be adequately dealt with by the older 
theory. The new theory implies a great advance, but by no means nullifies the 
success of the older theory. He, therefore, concludes that scientific theories 
cannot be withered leaves in the course of time. They appear to be endowed 
under certain restrictions with eternal life. Every famous theoretical 
discovery of the day will doubtless undergo certain restrictions on future 
development and remain for all time the essence of a certain sum of truths."^ 
Disproof View of Progress : Einstein is one of the scientists who 
maintains the disproof view of scientific progress. According to disproof 
view, in the course of scientific change the older theory gets disproved and 
thereby rejected by the proponent of the new theory. Regarding quantum 
theory and classical mechanics Einstein says that quantum mechanics of 
Plank overthrew classical mechanics, in the case where sufficiently small 
masses move with sufficiently small velocities and sufficiently high 
acceleration. Kienle the astronomer shows himself to be a typical advocate of 
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the disproof view. For him, progress occurs by disproving an empirically 
well-supported theory. Progress is launched by the clash of theory and 
experience. Hermann Bondi, a physicist cosmologist, describes the fate of 
Newton's theory of gravitation by comparing the enormous number of tests 
each of which the theory had passed brilliantly. But it becomes disproved by 
a slight discrepancy in the motion of planet mercury. Newton's theory of 
gravitation was good and solid, tested well over a hundred thousand times, 
but when such a theory falls victim to the increasing precision and 
calculation, one certainly feels that he can never rest assured. So also, in 
Bondi's view theory-change occurs in disproving the earlier theory. 
Therefore, we cannot speak of progress as progress in which knowledge 
becomes more and more certain and more and more all-embracing. The true 
importance of this disproof view is that it leads to a jump in understanding."^ 
Conceptual Change View. This view is developed by the physicists, 
above all by Bohr and Heisenberg. Heisenberg says that by the unexpected 
phenomena in electromagnetics and atomic physics, there occurs a strange 
development. This development resulted in a change of meaning in many of 
the most fundamental concepts of physics. Then it is realized that the new 
phenomena can be understood, but they cannot be understood in the same 
sense as the phenomena of earlier physics. The word 'understanding' itself 
has changed its meaning. He holds that the aim of physics is to establish 
close theories. A close theory is a theory whose basic concepts have already 
uniquely determined the basic laws of the theory. This type of theory cannot 
be improved with small change. Great progress consists in the transition from 
one closed theory to another that becomes its successors. If a theory is closed 
then its improvement occurs only when its basic concepts become 
inapplicable. Its improvement then involves a conceptual change. According 
to Heisenberg there are four closed theories of physics: Newtonian 
mechanics, statistical thermodynamics, classical electro-dynamics and 
quantum mechanics. It was a conjecture of Heisenberg's that a fifth closed 
theory will come up in connection with a final theory of elementary particles. 
Of course, classical electro-dynamics and quantum mechanics are successors 
of Newtonian mechanics. The still missing fifth closed theory will become a 
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successor of each of these three theories. Upto now we know of only one 
closed theory which has been superseded."^ 
Correspondence Principle: Conceptual change view of change follows 
that in the relation between two theories, there is the relation in time, and 
there is all the historical stuff that such a case involves. Bohr and Heisenberg 
were convinced that above this there must be some logical relation between 
the theories expressing definite correspondence of their respective contents. 
Heisenberg says that new phenomena in science could not always be 
explained by using the known laws of nature. In some cases, new phenomena 
could only be understood by new concepts. These new concepts again could 
be connected in a close system and represented by mathematical symbols. 
Much richer and more complete conceptual connections have been assumed 
to hold between classical and quantum mechanics since the days of Bohr's 
theory of atom. The assumption is: for high quantum numbers the orbital 
frequencies of an electron in the atom would approximate the radiation 
frequencies. This assumption postulated by Bohr is called 'correspondence 
principle'. 
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Chapter - 3 
The Aim of Progress and the Falsifiable Hypothesis 
3.1 Nature of Falsifiable Hypothesis 
Origin of Hypothesis 
For Karl Popper, knowledge produced from any source can be 
scientific, if it is refutable and, in principle, amenable to appropriate or 
established procedures of testing. In other words, any theory can be considered 
a scientific theory if its claim can be subjected to critical evaluation. This 
theory may emerge from any source; myth, metaphysics, fiction etc. This view 
is anchored on the two-pronged realization, viz; (a) it is not clear and distinct 
that 'truth is manifest' and (b) induction cannot be the characteristic method of 
science. 
The theory of 'Manifest Truth' is bom out of the epistemological 
optimism inspired by Western Renaissance : a faith in man's power of 
discernment and understanding leading to certainity of knowledge. At the heart 
of new optimistic view of the possibility of knowledge lies on he doctrine that 
'truth is manifest'. The view of 'Manifest Truth' is espoused by Descartes. 
He says that truth may perhaps be veiled, but it may reveal itself. And if 
it does not reveal itself, it may be revealed by us. Removing the veil may not 
be easy, but once the naked truth stands revealed before our eyes, we have the 
power to see it, to distinguish it from falsehood, and to know that it is true. 
Truth is always recognizable as truth. Thus, truth has only to be unveiled or 
discovered. Once this is done, there is no need for further argument. We have 
been given eyes to see the truth, and the 'natural light' of reason to see it by. 
He mentions Bacon's and Descartes' view that 'there was no need for any man 
to appeal to authority in matters of truth, for, each man carried the sources of 
knowledge in himself— either in his power of sense perception which he may 
use for the careful observation of nature, or in his power of intellectual 
intuition which he may use to distinguish truth from falsehood by refusing to 
accept any idea which is not clearly and distinctly perceived by intellect." 
According to Karl Popper, if truth is manifest, it need not be 
explained, rather it creates the need to explain falsehood. How can we ever iall 
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into error if truth is manifest ? The Cartesian answer would be : through our 
own sinful refusal to see the manifest truth. Or, our minds harbour prejudices 
inculcated by education and tradition. Or, other evil influences which have 
perverted our originally pure and innocent minds. Ignorance may be the work 
of powers conspiring to keep us in ignorance, to poison our minds by filling 
them with falsehood, and to blind our eyes so that they can not see the manifest 
truth. This is called conspiracy theory of ignorance. The conspiracy theory of 
ignorance is well known in its Marxian form as the conspiracy of a capitalist 
press that perverts and suppresses truth and fills the worker's minds with false 
ideologies. However, such a conspiracy does not permit us to know the truth, 
otherwise truth is manifest. 
However, Popper criticizes the view of manifest truth and says that 
'manifest truth' is not manifest at all. In support of his contention, he forwards 
three reasons. Firstly, he argues that 'the simple truth is that truth is often hard 
to come by, and that once found it may easily be lost again. Erroneous beliefs 
may have an astonishing power to survive, for thousand years, in defiance of 
experience, and without the aid of any conspiracy. Thus the optimistic 
epistemology of Bacon and of Descartes cannot be true'. Secondly, 
epistemology of manifest truth has also led to disastrous consequences. The 
theory that 'truth is manifest' leads to every kind of fanaticism. For, it holds 
that only the most depraved wickedness can refuse to see the manifest truth. 
Only those who have every reason to fear truth can deny it, and conspire to 
suppress it. Thirdly, theory of manifest truth not only breeds fanatics but it may 
also lead to authoritarianism. This is so simply because truth is not manifest, as 
a rule. The allegedly manifest truth is therefore in constant need, not only of 
interpretation and affirmation, but also of reinterpretation and reaffirmation. An 
authority is then required to pronounce upon, and lay down, almost from day to 
day, what is to be the manifest truth. And it may learn to do so arbitrarily and 
cynically'. 'Know thyself how little thou knowest' was swept away by 'truth is 
manifest' thesis. Therefore, manifest truth could only replace one authority— 
that of Aristotle and the Bible—by another. The new authority is the authority 
of sense and the authority of the intellect.'^  However, he denies manifest truth 
and calls it false epistemology. 
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According to Popper, true epistemology must realize that all of us may 
and often do err, singly and collectively. However, this very idea of error and 
human fallibility involves another one—the idea of objective truth, the standard 
that we may fall short of. Thus, the doctrine of fallibility should not be 
regarded as a part of a pessimistic epistemology. This doctrine implies that we 
may seek for truth, for objective truth, though more often than not, we may 
miss it by a wide margin. And it implies that if we respect truth, we must 
search for it by persistently searching for our errors: by indefatigable rational 
criticism and self criticism.^ Therefore, we acquire knowledge from criticism, 
in other words, attempted refutation of the existing one. For Popper, knowledge 
is produced from critical examination of what is asserted, not by the tracing of 
its origins. Thus, the question, 'what is the source of knowledge, is wrongly 
put. Similarly, the question, 'what are the best sources of our knowledge'? is 
also wrongly put. For, no such pure, untainted, certain, ideal source exists. 
There are all kinds of sources of our knowledge, but none has the overarching 
authority. We have to give up the idea of ultimate source of our knowledge and 
admit that all knowledge is human; and that it is mixed with our errors, our 
prejudices, our dreams, and our hopes. All we can do is to grope for truth even 
though it be beyond our reach. Therefore, Popper proposes to replace the 
question of the sources of our knowledge by the entirely different question: 
how can we hope to detect and eliminate error.^ The proper answer to this 
question is by criticizing the theories and guesses of others, and also by 
criticizing the theories and guesses of our own. Popper says, "I do not know 
what is source of our knowledge, what I want you to criticize my tentative 
assertion as severely as you can; and to design some experimental test which 
might refute my assertion. If you do , I shall gladly , and to the best of my 
powers, help you to refute it". So, knowledge is an adventure of ideas. These 
ideas are produced by us, and not by the world around us.^ 
Therefore, any production of human mind, such as myth, metaphysics, 
story, guess, whatsoever, may be the source of our knowledge; this is the first 
step of our knowledge adventure. The second step is to try to eliminate error 
from that product by criticism, and that criticism may be as severe as possible 
at any given lime; for, we will try our best to eliminate the falsehood from our 
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product. Regarding the source of our knowledge there is a further question as to 
what is the method to produce a theoretical assertion? For Popper, it is 
conjecture rather than induction by which we obtain the initial assertions about 
the world. 
What is the induction? Any inference, which passes from singular 
statements, such as accounts of the results of observations or experiments, to 
universal statements, such as hypotheses or theories, is called induction. 
According to a widely accepted view, the logic of scientific discovery would be 
identical with inductive logic. But it is easy to see that the method of science is 
'conjecture and refutation' rather than induction. Popper says, it is far from 
obvious, from a logical point of view, that we are justified in inferring 
universal statements from singular ones, no matter how numerous. For, any 
conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false: no matter how 
many instances of, say, white swans we may have observed, this does not 
justify the conclusion that 'all swans are white'.^ 
Inductive method is strongly supported as a characteristic method of 
science by Reichenbach. He calls it the 'principle of induction'. For him, to 
eliminate it from scientific research would mean nothing less than to deprive 
science of its basic method of investigation. This is the principle by which 
scientists decide the truth or falsity of their theories. Without it science would 
no longer have the right to distinguish its theories from the fanciful and 
arbitrary creations of a poet's mind. For Popper, inductive logic cannot be 
deemed to be a principle. In case we accept induction as a principle, it would 
amount to accepting that such a principle would be the statement with the help 
of which we can put inductive inferences into a logically acceptable/orw. But 
the principle of induction cannot be a purely logical truth like a tautology or an 
analytic statement. If there were such a thing as a purely logical principle of 
induction, all inductive inferences would have to be regarded as purely logical 
or tautological transformations. But principle of induction is a synthetic 
statement, it has no such analytic property that is, a statement whose negation 
is self-contradictory, or logically not possible.'° 
The so-called principle of induction is thus superHuous. Furthermore, 
such a principle can lead to inconsistencies as well. For, the principle of 
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induction must be a universal statement in its turn. Now, if we try to regard its 
truth as known from experience, then the very problems which occasioned its 
introduction will arise all over again. To justify it, we should have to employ 
inductive inferences; and to justify these we should have to assume an 
inductive principle of a higher order; and so on. Thus, to attempt to base the 
principle of induction on experience breaks down, since it must lead to an 
infinite regress." Hume says that truth of induction is a sheer belief based on 
human psychology. In fact, there are no necessary connections between 
inductive sequences of observations. As Bom points out that no observation or 
experiment, however extended, can give more than a finite number of 
repetitions. Therefore, statement of law—B depends on A—always transcends 
experience. Yet this kind of statement is made everywhere and all the time, and 
sometimes from scanty material.'' 
Popper further claims that observations too are not a source of 
scientific knowledge. He forwards three reasons to show that scientific theories 
generally claiming to be derived from observations, are actually not derivable 
from them : 
Firstly, it is intuitively not credible. 
Secondly, it is historically false, 
Thirdly, it is logically impossible. 
Firstly, he says that if we examine the character of a theories, and of 
relevant observational statements, we shall not be convinced of any kind of 
necessary relationship between them. Take, for example, Newtonian theory of 
gravitation. There are no observational statements which directly or indirectly 
validate or support his theory. In the first place, observations are always 
inexact, while theory makes the exact assertions. Not only this, it is a great 
triumph for Newtonian theory that it stood up to subsequent observations 
regarding precision far beyond what could be attained in Newton's own time. 
Now it is incredible that more precise statements, let alone the absolutely 
precise statements of the theory itself, could be logically derived from less 
exact or inexact ones i.e. observations. Moreover, on the one hand, an 
observation is always made under very special conditions, and each observed 
situation is always a highly specific situation. While the theory claims to apply 
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in all possible circumstances, on the other. For example, a theory about 
planetary system applies not only to Mars or Jupiter, but to all planetary 
motions and all solar systems. Furthermore, observations are always concrete, 
while theory is abstract. For example, we can never observe anything like 
Newtonian force. Without the dynamical theory it is simply impossible to 
measure force. For all these reasons, it is intuitively not credible that the theory 
should be derivable from observations. 
Secondly, it is historically false to believe that Newton's dynamics 
was derived from observations. Popper says that this belief is widespread but 
that is merely a myth having no historical truth. To show this he refers to the 
part played by the most important precursor, Nicolas Copernicus. He says that 
Copernicus' idea of placing the Sun rather than the Earth in the center of the 
universe was not the result of new observations but of a new interpretation of 
old and well-known facts in the light of semi-religious Platonic and Neo-
Platonic ideas. The crucial idea can be traced back to the Plato's Republic. 
There we read that the Sun plays the same role in the realm of visible things, as 
does the Idea of the Good in the realm of Ideas. The Idea of the Good is the 
highest in hierarchy of Platonic Ideas. Accordingly, the Sun, which endows 
things with their visibility, vitality, growth, and progress, is the highest in the 
hierarchy of the visible things in nature. This Platonic Idea, then, forms the 
historical background of the Copemican revolution. Popper claims that it does 
not start with observations, but with religious or mythical ideas. So looked at 
from a historical or genetical point of view observations were not the source of 
heliocentric thesis. Historically speaking, idea of heliocentricity preceded the 
observations thereof. The idea become indispensable for interpretation of the 
observations; they had to be interpreted in its light. 
Thirdly, it is logically impossible to derive, for example, Newton's 
theory from observations. This conviction follows intimately from Hume's 
critique of the validity of inductive inference. Hume argues that if a theor\' 
follows from observations, no logically possible future observations can 
contradict the class of past observations. In other words, if B is a self-consistent 
observation- statement about a possible future event, and K is any class of pure 
observational statements about past events, then B can always be conjoined 
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with K without contradiction. Now if we add to this a theorem of pure logic, 
namely: 'whenever a statement B can be conjoined without contradiction to a 
class of statements K, then it can also be conjoined without contradiction to any 
class of statements that consists of statements of K together with any statement 
that can be derived from K.' Thus we can prove our point: if Newton's theory 
could be derived from a class of K of true observation-statements, then no 
future observation B could possibly contradict Newton's theory and the 
observations of K. But we can logically derive from Newton's theory and past 
observations a statement that tells us whether there will be an eclipse of the sun 
tomorrow. Now if this derived statement tells us that tomorrow there will be no 
eclipse of the sun, then our B is clearly incompatible with Newton's theory and 
the class K. It follows logically that it is impossible to assume that Newton's 
theory can be derived from observations. ^ 
J.M. Keynes in his A Treatise on Probability says that inductive 
inference, although not strictly valid, can attain some degree of reliability or of 
probability—inductive inferences are probable inferences. It is not given to 
science to reach either truth or falsity but scientific statements can only attain 
continuous degree of probability whose unattainable upper and lower limits are 
truth and falsity respectively. However, the idea of probability is again 
unsuitable for principle of induction. For, Popper says that, if a certain degree 
of probability is to be assigned to statements based on inductive inference, then 
this will have to be justified by involving a new principle of induction. And this 
new principle in its turn will have to be justified, and so on. Nothing is gained 
if the principle of induction is taken not as true, but only as probable. In short, 
like every other form of inductive logic, the logic of probable inference or 
probability logic leads either to an infinite regress, or to the doctrine of 
apriorism'. According to Popper, there is another problem with probability. 
The probability of statement is always the greater the less the statement says. It 
is inverse to the content or the deductive power of the statement, and thus to its 
explanatory power. Accordingly, every interesting and powerful statement 
must have a low probability, and vice versa. A statement with high probability 
will be scientifically uninteresting, for, it says little and has no explanatory 
power. Altliough we seek theories with a high degree of corroboration, as 
scientists we do not seek highly probable theories but explanations; that is to 
say, powerful and improbable theories. 
Thereafter, Popper examine the positivistic dogma of meaning in 
inductive logic. He mentions that meaning in inductive logic is equivalent to 
the requirement that all the statements in empirical science must be capable of 
being finally decided, with respect to their truth and falsity. This means that 
their form must be such that to verify them and to falsify them must both be 
logically possible. In this connection he indicates Schlick's view: a genuine 
statement must be capable of conclusive verification; and Waismann's view; 
'if there is no possible way to determine whether a statement is true then that 
statement has no meaning whatsoever. For, the meaning of the statement is the 
method of its verification'. Popper says, 'but there is no', 'such thing as 
induction. Thus, inference to theories, from singular statements which are 
'verified by experience' is logically inadmissible. Theories are therefore never 
empirically verifiable'. In view of the same, he denies induction as sole method 
of science. Then what is the characteristic method of science, is a question 
which needs elaborate consideration. 
In this regard. Popper holds that a system can be empirical or scientific 
only if it is capable of being tested by experience. This suggests that 
falsifiability rather than verifiability is the criterion of meaning of scientific 
discourse. In other words, it is not required that scientific system will be 
capable of being singled out once and for all in a positive sense; but it is 
required that its logical form will be such that it can be singled out, by means 
of empirical test, in a negative sense. It must be possible for an empirical 
scientific system to be refuted by experience. Thus, the statement 'it will rain 
or not rain here tomorrow' will not be regarded as empirical, simply because it 
cannot be refuted, whereas the statement 'it will rain here tomorrow' will be 
regarded as empirical.'^ 
It might be said that falsification is impossible, for any theoretical 
system should never be conclusively falsified. For, it is always possible to find 
some way of evading falsification. It is even possible without logical 
inconsistency to adopt the position of simply refusing to acknowledge an\ 
falsifying experience whatsoever. Popper says, on the contrary, that what 
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characterizes the empirical method is its manner of exposing theories to 
falsification. Its aim is not to save the lives of untenable systems but, on the 
contrary, to select that which by comparison is the fittest, by exposing them all 
to the fiercest struggle for survival.'' He says that there is a distinction between 
falsifiability and falsification. Falsifiability is the sole criterion of the empirical 
character of a system of statements. As to falsification, special rules must be 
introduced which will determine under what conditions a system is to be 
regarded as falsified. We say that a theory is falsified only if we have accepted 
a basic statement which contradicts it. This condition is necessary, but not 
sufficient. For, we have seen that non-reproducible single occurrences are of no 
significance to science. Thus a few strong basic statements contradicting a 
theory will hardly induce us to reject it as falsified. We shall take it as falsified 
only if we discover a reproducible effect, which refutes the theory. In other 
words, we only accept the falsification if a low level empirical hypothesis 
which describes such an effect is proposed and corroborated. This kind of 
hypothesis may be called a falsifying hypothesis. That the falsifying hypothesis 
must be empirical and so falsifiable, only means that it must stand in a certain 
logical relationship to possible basic statements. The hypothesis should be 
corroborated' refers to tests which it ought to have passed—tests which 
confront it with accepted basic statements. Thus, the basic statements play two 
different roles. On the one hand, we have used the system of all logically 
possible basic statements in order to obtain the logical characterization of the 
form of empirical statements. On the other hand, the accepted basic statements 
are basis for the corroboration of hypothesis. If accepted basic statements 
contradict a theory, then we take them as providing sufficient grounds for its 
falsification only if they corroborate a falsifying hypothesis at the same time."* 
Therefore, according to Popper scientific theories are in essence falsifiable 
hypotheses. 
Popper says that a hypothesis may be metaphysical, mythical or the 
assertion of any sort, but it is scientific if it is refutable by the empirical. For 
him, in certain sense, science is myth making just as religion is. Nevertheless, it 
has been different from religion because the former is empirically open to 
criticism whereas the second is not. There are two possible attitudes towards 
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any tradition or the assertion. One is to accept the assertion uncritically, often 
even being aware of it. This is the first order attitude. The other possibility is a 
critical attitude, which may result either in acceptance or in rejection, or 
perhaps in a compromise. This is the second order attitude. This second order 
attitude is the critical or argumentative attitude. Any assertion, which adopts 
this second order critical attitude, does become different. 
Therefore, the man to whom a myth was handed on would take the 
myth and would apply it to various things which it was supposed to explain, 
such as the movement of planets. Then he would say: I do not think that this 
myth is very good, for, it does no explain the actual observable movement of 
the planets; or whatever it might be. Thus, it is the myth or the theory which 
leads to, and guides, our systematic observations - observations undertaken 
with the intention of probing into the truth of the theory or the myth. 
From this point of view. Popper claims, the growth of the theories of 
science should not be considered as the result of the collection or accumulation 
of observations. On the contrary, the observations and their accumulation 
should be considered as the result of the growth of the scientific theories. This 
is what Popper calls the 'searchlight theory of science — the view that science 
itself throws new light on things; that it not only solves problems but it creates 
many more; and that it not only profits from observations but leads to the new 
ones. In this way, we look out for new observations with the intention of 
probing into the truth of our myths; and the myths then become changed from 
their rough manner to the scientific theory; and in time they become more 
realistic and agree better with observable facts. In other words, under the 
pressure of criticism the myths are faced to adopt themselves to the task of 
giving us an adequate and a more detailed picture of the world in which we 
live. Scientific theories are not just the result of observations, they are, broadly 
speaking, the product of myth-making.^° 
Krajewski, calls this view hypotheticism because according to it the 
investigation starts from a hypothesis. When scientists want to explain a set of 
phenomena, they create a hypothesis, which is a candidate for becoming a law. 
Next, ihey deduce different empirically testable consequences from il and test 
them in experiments. If the test gives positive result, the candidate is admitted 
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as a law, though this decision is never final. If the test gives negative result, the 
candidate is rejected. In this competition, the defeated and the defeater both are 
hypotheses.^' 
They are myth-making, for, they are produced from the imaginative 
mind of the scientists—they are not the abstract from the observations. First 
myth is produced then we observe according to that myth. Without theory, in 
other words, myth, we could not orientate ourselves in the world; we could not 
live, because our observations are always interpreted; we observe the thing as 
our theory suggests. For instance, the Marxists literally observe class struggle 
everywhere, for, their theory suggests that history of mankind is the history of 
struggle between classes; The Freudian observe everywhere repression and 
sublimation; the Adlerian sees how feelings of inferiority expresses themselves 
in every action and every utterance; all observations are designed by their 
theory.^ ^ 
Therefore, theory is not produced by abstraction from observations: 
Observation, itself, cannot operate without theory. For Popper, nothing can be 
built on pure data, because there is nothing as pure data; there is nothing simply 
'given' to us uninterpreted. All our knowledge is interpretation in the light of 
our expectations, our theories.^" Observation is very important; but its function 
is not that of producing theories. It plays its role in rejecting, eliminating, and 
criticizing theories; and it challenges to produce new myths, new theories 
which may stand up to these observational tests. Thus, scientific myths under 
the pressure of criticism become so different from religious myths. But, in their 
origin, remain myths or inventions just like the others.'^ '' 
Hypothesis as Conjecture 
For Popper, such myths are conjectures, and criticism of such myths 
refutation. For him, interplay of such 'conjectures and refutations' is the source 
of scientific knowledge. This is at once both the method and the source of 
knowledge. This method is nothing but a critical discussion of a problem under 
consideration. For Popper, critical discussion often relies upon a considerable 
amount of common background knowledge. This does not mean that 
background knowledge is a priori, and cannot be critically discussed in its turn. 
It only means that criticism never starts from nothins;."^ 
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For him, if a teacher tells a young scientist, "( 
he is badly advised. But he is well advised if his teacher tells him, "Try to learn 
what people are discussing nowadays in science. Find out where difficulties 
arise, and take an interest in disagreements. These are the questions which you 
should take up." In other words, you should study the problem-situation of the 
day. This means that you pick up, and try to continue, a line of inquiry, which 
has the whole background of the earlier development of science behind it. 
Popper says that the world is infinitely complex and we do not know 
where and how to start our analysis of this world. There is no wisdom to guide 
us; even a scientific tradition does not tell us as to where the point of departure 
is. It only tells us where and how other people started and where they got to. It 
tells us that people have already constructed in this world a kind of theoretical 
framework—not perhaps a very good one, but one which more or less works. It 
serves us as a kind of network, as a system of coordinates to which we can 
refer the various complexities of this world. We use it by checking it over, and 
by criticizing it. In this way, we make progress. 
The crucial question regarding conjecture is as to how we make it. 
According to Popper, our conjecture starts always from problems—either from 
practical problems or from a theory, which has run into difficulties. Once we 
are faced with a problem, we may begin to work on it. We may respond to such 
a situation in two ways: Firstly, we may proceed by attempting a guess or 
conjecturing a solution to our problem, and secondly, we may attempt to 
criticize our usually somewhat feeble guess. Such a guess or a conjecture may 
withstand our criticism and experimental tests, for some time. But as a rule, we 
soon find that our conjectures can be refuted, or that they do not solve our 
problem, or that they solve it only in part. We also find that even the best 
solutions—those able to resist the most sever criticism of the most brilliant and 
ingenious minds—soon give rise to new difficulties leading to new problems. 
Thus, we may say that the growth of knowledge proceeds from old problems to 
new problems by means of conjectures and refutations.^^ 
However, we may agree that our conjecture starts from problems, but 
we may still think that our problems must have been the result of observations 
and experiments. For, there can be nothing in our intellect which has not 
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entered it through our senses. That is, observation precedes problems. But the 
actual course happens to be fully different. Popper says that every animal is 
bom with some expectations or anticipations, which could be framed as 
hypothesis - a kind of hypothetical knowledge. We have a measure of innate 
knowledge from which we may begin, even though it may be quite unreliable. 
This innate knowledge, this inborn expectation, will, if disappointed, create our 
first problems. And the ensuing growth of our knowledge may be described as 
consisting throughout of corrections and modifications of previous knowledge. 
That observation cannot precede all problems may be illustrated by a simple 
experiment. 'This experiment consists of asking you to observe, here and now. 
You are all cooperafing, and observing! However, at least some of you, instead 
of observing, will feel a strong urge to ask: 'what do you want me to observe?' 
If this is your response then the experiment is successful. What we are trying to 
illustrate is that, in order to observe we must have in mind a definite question, 
which we might be able to decide by observation. 
Popper says that observation is always selective. Popper asked some 
physics students in Vienna to take a pencil and a piece of paper and after 
careful observation write down what they have observed. They asked, of 
course, what he had wanted them to observe. The instruction 'observe' is 
absurd. So, it needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, 
a problem. And its description presupposes a descriptive language; it 
presupposes similarity and classification, which in turn presupposes interests, 
point of view, and problems. 
For Katz, even animals cannot do without selection. He says that an 
animal according to his needs, divides the environment into edible and inedible 
things. Popper says that this rule applies not only to animals but also to 
scientists. For an animal, a point of view is provided by its needs, the task of 
the moment, and its expectations. For the scientists the point of view is 
provided by his theoretical interests, the special problems under investigation, 
his conjectures and anticipations, and the theories which he accepts as a kind of 
background: his frame of reference, his horizon of expectation. For him, 
scientific knowledge is produced from observations and observations are 
produced from some hypothesis, in other words, from some conjecture in 
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response to a felt problem and an urge of resolving the problem in expected 
manner. The paradox 'which comes first, hypothesis or observation?' is 
responded to by Popper by maintaining the priority of hypothesis. It is quite 
true that any particular hypothesis we choose will have been preceded by 
observations—the observations, for example, which it is designed to explain. 
But these observations in their turn presuppose the adoption of a frame of 
reference, a frame of expectation, a frame of theory. Popper says, if they were 
significant, if they created a need for explanation and thus gave rise to the 
invention of hypothesis, it was because they could not be explained within the 
old theoretical framework, the old horizon of expectation. In this way, if we go 
back to more and more primitive theories and myths we shall in the end find 
unconscious, or 'inborn expectations' operating behind them. 
According to Popper, it does not mean that the expectations are 
'inborn ideas' but rather every organism has inborn 'reactions' or 'responses', 
and among them, responses adopted to impending events. These responses we 
may describe as 'expectations'. The newborn baby 'expects' in this sense to be 
fed. He says, 'inborn expectations' may quite reasonably be called 'inborn 
knowledge' as well. This knowledge is not , however, valid a piori, for an 
inborn expectation, no matter how strong and specific, can be mistaken. Such 
expectations or knowledge may be valid a priori, only on psychological or 
genetic grounds, i.e. prior to all observational experiences. One of the most 
important of these expectations is the expectation of finding regularity. It is 
connected with an inborn propensity to look out for regularities, or with our 
need to find regularities.^^ 
However, the expectation of finding regularities is not only 
psychologically a priori but also logically a priori. It is logically a priori to all 
observational experiences, for, it is prior to any recognition of similarities; and 
all observations involve the recognition of similarities. But in spite of being 
logically a priori in this sense the expectation is not valid a priori. We can 
easily construct an environment, which is so chaotic that, we completely fail to 
find regularities."'" 
However, we start with a problem, a difficulty. This problem may be 
practical or theoretical. Whatever it may be, when we first encounter the 
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problem we do not know much about it. At best, we have only a vague idea as 
to what our problem really consists of. How, then, can we produce an adequate 
solution? Obviously, we cannot. We must first get better acquainted with the 
problem. But how? Popper answers that we can do so by producing an 
inadequate solution, and by criticizing it. He says that only in this way can we 
come to understand the problem. For, to understand a problem means to 
understand its difficulties; and to understand its difficulties means to 
understand why it is not easily soluble— why the more obvious solutions do not 
work. We might therefore produce additional more obvious solutions. These 
solutions must be criticized in order to find out why they do not work. In this 
way we become acquainted with the problem and may proceed from bad 
solutions to better ones—provided that we have the creative ability to produce 
new guesses, and more new guesses.^' 
Another prerequisite for starting our research, according to Popper, is 
'background knowledge'. For, to recognize some event as problematic we must 
have some preconceptions; be it mythical, metaphysical, fictional, or anything 
else, with which the event disagrees and is thereby considered as problematic. 
Moreover, to produce some solution or its criticism we must need some 
preconceptions that will regulate us. Without any connection, we cannot say 
anything. Popper says that while discussing a problem we always accept (if 
only temporary) all kinds of things unproblematic. These accepted things do 
constitute what Popper calls background knowledge. This background 
knowledge may operate as the starting point for the discussion of a problem 
under consideration. Few parts of this back ground knowledge will appear to us 
in all context as absolutely unproblematic, and any particular part of it may be 
challenged at any time, especially if we suspect that its uncritical acceptance 
may be responsible for some of our difficulties. But almost all of the vast 
amount of background knowledge, which we constantly use in any informal 
discussion will, necessarily remain unquestioned.^^ We need it because we 
cannot start from nothing, we always start from some previous knowledge. We 
conceive of truth and approach to truth within the content of available 
background knowledge. According to our method 'growth of knowledge' 
consists in modification of previous knowledge—either it is alternation or is 
large scale rejection." 
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According to Popper, initially when our tentative solution is discussed 
and criticized, everybody tries to find a flaw in it and refute it. Whatever the 
result of these attempts may be, we certainly learn from them. If the criticism 
of our friends or opponents is successful, we shall have learnt much about our 
problem. We shall know more about its inherent difficulties than we do before. 
And if even our most acute critics do not succeed, if our hypothesis is able to 
resist their criticism, then again, we shall have learned much; both about the 
problems and about our hypothesis, its adequacy and its ramifications. And as 
long as it does better, in the face of criticism, than its competitors, it may 
temporarily and tentatively be accepted as part of current scientific teaching.^'' 
He says, "without waiting passively for repetition to impress or impose 
regularities upon us, we actively try to impose regularities upon the world. We 
try to discover similarities in it, and to interpret it in terms of laws invented by 
us. Without waiting for premise, we jump to conclusion. These may have to be 
discarded later, should observation show that they are wrong".^^ We jump first 
to any theory and then while testing it try to find whether it is good or not; i.e. 
by repeatedly applying the critical method, we eliminate many bad theories and 
invent many new ones.^ ^ 
This kind of discovery is quite metaphysical. Brody says, 'While we 
regard a physical theory as a hypothetical explanation of material reality, we 
make it dependent on metaphysics"." Here metaphysics, as opposed to analytic 
philosophy, is considered to be perfectly meaningful. Faisifiability is the 
criterion which makes metaphysics quite meaningfiil for science. If 
metaphysics is meaningful for science then we feel reassured that there is no 
context of discovery. The theory may come from any source. The only criterion 
is that such theories must be falsifiable or refutable.^^ 
This view is called by Popper 'critical rationalism'. This position is in 
between Descartes' 'truth is manifest' and Bacon's 'nature is open book". Its 
essential difference from them is that it strongly restricts our claim to 
knowledge. There is no ultimate source of knowledge. Every source, every 
suggestion is welcome; and every source, every suggestion, is open to critical 
examination and can be subjected to interrogation, examination and criticism. 
Clarity and distinctness are not criteria of truth, but obscurity and confusion do 
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indicate error.^^ Therefore, science must begin with myths and with the 
criticism of myths; in other words, science does begin with 'conjecture and 
refutation'. 
3.2 Scientific Progress through Falsification 
Trial and Error 
If science advances by the way of changing its traditional myths, then 
we need something with which to start. If we have nothing to alter and to 
change, we can never get anywhere. Thus we need two beginnings for science: 
new myths, and a new tradition of changing them critically. 
'Conjecture and refutation' as the procedure of scientific knowledge 
makes it possible to understand that scientific theories are not the digest of 
observations but are inventions—conjectures boldly put forward for trial to be 
eliminated if they clash with observations. There is a question here if 
observation cannot be free of theory then how could the observation be the test 
of the theory. It is true that observations are rarely accidental. But as a rule 
observations are undertaken with the definite intention of testing a theory, by 
obtaining, if possible, a decisive refutation.'*' 
For him, every test of theory, whether resulting in its corroboration or 
falsification, must stop at some basic statement or other, which we decide to 
accept. If we do not come to any decision, and do not accept some basic 
statement or other then the test will have led nowhere. However, considered 
from a logical point of view, the situation is never such that it compels us to 
stop at this particular basic statement rather than at that, or else give up the test 
altogether. For any basic statement can, again in turn, be subjected to tests. 
This procedure has no natural end. Thus, if the test is to lead us to anywhere, 
we have to stop at some point or other and say that we are satisfied, for the time 
being.''" 
Therefore, basic statement is a primitive statement, because this is the 
statement located at the starting point of our investigation. We do not make any 
investigation for its truth. In this sense, it is conventional also, for it is the 
statement which is taken for granted on the basis of agreement. 'They arc 
accepted as the result of decision. And accepted basic statements are the basis 
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for the corroboration of a hypothesis, and thus indirectly for falsification. 
Popper argues against the view that basic statements can be justified by 
reference to perceptions, which he regards as a kind of psychologism. He 
admits that the decision to accept a basic statement is causally connected with 
our experiences, but we do not attempt to justify a basic statement by these 
experiences. Experiences can motivate a decision and acceptance or rejection 
of a statement, but a basic statement cannot be justified by them—no more than 
by thumping the table.''^ However, we need basic statements in order to decide 
whether a theory is to be called falsifiable, i.e. empirical. And we need them for 
the corroboration of a falsifying hypothesis, and thus for the falsification of 
theories. Therefore, corroboration of a theory by any test premised on basic 
statements would be tentative, for, we do know that this test is not the only test, 
there may be many other tests that would lead to the falsification of the theory. 
But falsification of the theory would be final, for, we know that at least this 
very test falsifies the theory. Beside, there may be many other tests of this kind. 
The role of the basic statement in the method of 'trial and error' is 
established on the position of observation: although theories cannot logically be 
derived from observations, they can clash with observations, they can 
contradict observations. This makes it possible to infer from observations that a 
theory is false. The possibility of refuting a theory by observations is the basis 
of all empirical tests. Therefore, a theory is empirical not when it is produced 
through conjecture, but when it is tested by the observations. The test of a 
theory is always an attempt to show that the competitor theory is mistaken, that 
is, that theory entails a false assertion. From a logical point of view, all 
empirical tests are therefore attempted refutations'.'*'* Such an attempted 
refutation can be made only on the basis of observation. Therefore, conjecture 
gives us theory and observation gives us empiricality of theory. 
Now the question is as to why do we put forward our theory to the 
trial? We need to do so because our theory which is mainly conjecture created 
by us may be constructed wrongly. Our conjecture is produced from the 
expectation of a solution—expectation for regularities. We have the propensity 
to look out for regularities, and to impose laws upon nature. Popper says that 
this propensity leads us to the psychological phenomenon of 'dogmatic 
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thinking'. He says that we expect regularities everywhere and attempt to find 
them even where there are none. And we stick to our expectations even when 
they are inadequate. In this situation, without a trial, our theory will remain a 
myth. Only a critical discussion can make the conjecture a proper scientific 
theory. This dogmatism is to some extent necessary. It is demanded by the 
situation, which can only be dealt with by forcing our conjecture upon the 
world. Moreover, the dogmatism allows us to approach a good theory in stages, 
by way of approximation. Dogmatic attitude makes us stick to our first 
impressions, which is indicative of strong belief 
According to Popper, a theory needs to be under trial to be a scientific 
theory, as dogmatism is never a scientific attitude. What we call 'science' is 
differentiated from the myths not by being some thing distinct from a myth, but 
by being accompanied by a tradition of critically discussing the myth. The 
application of this tradition results in the acceptance or the rejection of the 
theory or perhaps in a compromise. This tradition is the critical or 
argumentative attitude. In a certain sense, sciences are myth-making just as 
religion is; but they are different from myth only because they adopt the critical 
attitude. As a result, the myth changes and changes in the direction of giving a 
better and better account of the world. And they change us to observe things, 
which we would never have observed without these theories or myths.^ ^ 
Critical attitude is ready to modify its tenets; it admits doubt and demands tests. 
This is indicative of our uncertainty with regard to the theories under 
consideration. For, the attitude is clearly related to the tendency to test them, to 
refute them. The attempt to sort out error through critical discussion is the 
characteristic of science. For Popper, this is the method of 'trial and error'. This 
is also called the method of falsification; for, in this method we try to discover 
a mistake in a theory to falsify or eliminate it. 
Conjectures may be considered as dogmatic rather than rational, but 
the 'trial and error' method makes them scientific. There is nothing irrational if 
we tentatively accept some theory with an eagerness to revise it with 
experiment. Popper says that if this is our task, then there is no rational 
procedure other than the method of 'trial and error'. The method is not simply 
identical with the scientific method; this is applied not only by Einstein but 
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also, in a more dogmatic fashion, by the amoeba. The trial and error method 
fundamentally is the method used by any living organism in the process of 
adaptation. So, this is very natural to the human intellectual process. Men seem 
inclined to react to a problem either by putting forward some theory or by 
fighting against such a theory, once they detect its weakness. This struggle of 
ideologies, which is obviously explicable in terms of the method of 'trial and 
error', seems to be characteristic of any thing that may be called a development 
of human thought.'*^ 
Popper says that in this method we first boldly propose a theory then 
try our best to point out its possible errors. If our critical efforts do not succeed 
then we accept them tentatively. From this point of view, all laws, all theories, 
are essentially tentative, or conjectural or hypothetical, even when we feel 
unable to doubt them any longer. For, before a theory has been refuted we can 
never know in what way it may have to be modified'. This method can easily 
by-pass the logical problems that arise against induction. The first is Hume's 
discovery that it is impossible to justify a law by observation and experiment, 
since it 'transcends experience'. In trial and error method, we may reject a law 
or theory on the basis of new evidence, without necessarily discarding the old 
evidence which originally led us to accept it. Secondly, the principle of 
empiricism which asserts that in science only observation and experiment may 
decide upon the acceptance or rejection of scientific statements, including laws 
and theories does not cut much ice. There are many historical examples when a 
theory has not been rejected even in the face of contradiction with the 
experimental facts. Newton's theory had no complete experimental support. It 
appeared to be in disagreement with natural phenomena, yet it survived for 
centuries until Einstein's theory appeared. According to the method of trial and 
error, a theory can be rejected only by that experiment which at the same time 
corroborates the falsifying hypothesis— the hypothesis that is presently 
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competing. 
By this method, we also can by-pass the question, which arose against 
induction: 'why is it reasonable to believe that the future will be like the past"? 
In this method it is perfectly reasonable to act on the assumption that future 
will, in many respects, be like the past, and that well-tested laws will continue 
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to hold; but it is also reasonable to believe that such course of action will lead 
us at times into severe trouble, since some of the laws upon which we heavily 
rely may easily prove unreliable. 
In the 'trial and error' method, we consciously attempt to make our 
theories or conjectures suffer in the struggle for the survival of the fittest. Our 
corroboration may be uncertain, but our falsification would be certain. 
However, the fittest theory is not fittest in pragmatic sense. "There are many 
false theories which often serve well enough: most formulae used in 
engineering or navigation are known to be false, although they may be 
excellent approximations and easy to handle, and they are used with confidence 
by people who know them to be false".^' On the contrary, they are fittest in the 
spirit of truth. In this method, we search for truth and the falsified theories are 
known or believed to be false while the non-falsified theories may still be true. 
The success of this method depends very largely on the number and variety of 
the trials: the more we try the more likely it is that one of our attempts will be 
successful.^^ In this method, scientists ought to take into account less probable 
hypothesis at first and expose them to the most severe test. If a hypothesis is 
falsified it must be rejected. If it is not falsified it is corroborated, and 
temporarily persists. But this does not mean that it is true or even probable true; 
further tests sooner or later usually falsify it. The falsification is complete and 
conclusive, the corroboration is never so.^ ^ 
The physicist J.E. Wheeler uses the word 'mistake' in Popperian spirit 
when he comments about the learning process in science viz; "our whole 
problem is to make the mistake as far as possible". '^^  Since "truth is hard to 
come by out of mistakes, it needs both ingenuity in criticizing old theories, and 
ingenuity in the imaginative invention of new theories".^^ 
Illustrating 'trial and error' method Popper says that faced with a 
certain problem, the scientist offers, tentatively, some sort of solution—a 
conjecture or theory. Science accepts this theory only provisionally. Then 
criticism and testing go hand in hand; the theory is criticized from very many 
different points, which may be vulnerable. Theories are put forward tentatively 
and trial out. If the out come of a test shows that the theory is erroneous, then it 
is eliminated; the method of 'trial and error' is essentially a method of 
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elimination.^^ Furthermore, 'it is the critical procedure, which contains those 
choices, those rejections, and those decisions, which show that we have learnt 
from our mistakes, and thereby added to our scientific knowledge'. Its 
success depends mainly on three conditions: one, sufficiently numerous 
ingenious theories should be offered; two, the theories offered should be 
sufficiently varied and, three, sufficiently severe tests should be made. In this 
way we may, if we are lucky, secure the survival of the fittest theory by 
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elimination of those which cannot compete in the struggle for survival. 
According to Popper, this is like dialectic method of the development 
of human thought. Dialectic is a theory, which maintains that development is 
characterized by what is called the dialectic triad: thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis. Fist there is some idea, theory, or movement, which may be called a 
thesis. Such a thesis will often generate opposition, because, like most things in 
this world, it will probably be of limited value and will have its weak spots. 
This opposing idea or movement is called the antithesis, because, it is directed 
against the thesis. The struggle between the thesis and antithesis goes on until 
some solution is reached which, in a certain sense, goes beyond both thesis and 
antithesis by recognizing their respective values and by trying to preserve the 
merits and avoid the limitations of both. This solution, which is a third step, is 
called the synthesis. Once attained the synthesis in its turn may become the first 
step of a new dialectic triad. In this case opposition will be aroused again 
which means that synthesis can then be described as a new thesis, which has 
produced a new antithesis. The dialectic triad will thus graduate to a higher 
level, and it may again negotiate a higher level when a second synthesis has 
been attained. 
For Popper, such a dialectic development may be explained by 
showing that it operates in conformity with the method of 'trial and error'. But 
it is not exactly the same as the development of a theory by trial and error. The 
trial and error method deals only with an idea and its criticism, i.e. thesis and 
antithesis. And the struggle between an idea and its criticism or a thesis and 
antithesis leads not to a synthesis but to the elimination, and the competition of 
theories would lead to the adoption of a new theory only if enough theories arc 
at hand and are offered for trial. In dialect, only one thesis is offered to start 
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with and the one is opposed to the other. But trial and error method is sHghtly 
. . . 59 
wider and not confined to one idea and criticism. 
Popper says that dialectic is slightly different from the trial and error 
theory in some other respect also. For. the trial and error theory will be content 
to say that an unsatisfactory view will be refuted or eliminated. On the other 
hand, a dialectician emphasizes that although the view may have been refuted, 
there will most probably be an element in it, which is worthy of preservation. 
For a dialectician— a thesis produces an antithesis leading to synthesis. For 
trial and error theory, it is only our critical attitude, which produces the 
antithesis. Criticism is, in a very important sense, the main motivating force of 
any intellectual development. Without contradiction, without criticism, there 
would be no rational motive for changing our theories. There would be no 
intellectual progress. Contradiction is fertile only in so far as we are determined 
not to put up with contradictions, and to change any theory which involves 
contradictions. If we put up with contradictions, it will no longer be productive 
of intellectual progress. Criticism is a self-corrective and open-ended process. 
It ought to or it does invite counter-criticism with gusto. While dogmatism may 
refuse to be criticized by asking as to 'why', criticism will have to respond to 
counter-criticism by 'why not'. Otherwise scientific progress will come to a 
standstill or dead end.^" 
Growth of Science 
However, there is no real danger that the growth of science will come 
to an end. Popper holds that our infinity of ignorance and our trial and error 
process of learning together ensures that science can never complete its task. 
Such a danger may be in authoritarianism of a criterion, but in our process of 
learning, there is no place for such an attitude. Here every theory is welcome 
but none has the final authority. Every theory must come under the severe 
pressure of criticism, for, it is the criticism which makes a theory scientific. 
There may be another danger from faith in formalization and precision, but 
since our producing theory starts from the expectation of some solution of the 
problem-situation and making the conjecture of the solution, there is no place 
for formalization. Conjecture being mainly metaphysical, there can never be 
any structural limitation as such. Conjecture opens up all kinds of possibilities 
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for imagination; so, danger lies only in the lack of imagination, which is 
attributable not to the science but to the scientists.^' This is not likely to happen 
that human being as a whole will become breft of imagination; someone or the 
other does take a critical stand against an existing theory or prevailing 
orthodoxy. 
Therefore, infinity of imagination or growth in the process of 
conjecture and refutation inseparably characterize the project of scientific 
research. Growth is of seminal significance in science. Apart from having vital 
social and political implications, scienfific growth basically signals onward 
march of intellectual progress. The continued growth is essential to the rational 
and empirical character of scientific knowledge. If science ceases to grow it 
looses that character. It is the way of its growth which makes science rational 
and empirical, the way in which scientists differentiate amongst available 
theories and choose the better one or the way they give reasons for rejecting all 
the available theories thereby suggesting some of the conditions with which a 
satisfactory theory should comply.^ ^ 
However, Popper maintains that growth in the process of 'conjecture 
and refutation', is not the accumulation of observations but rather the repeated 
overthrow of scientific theories and their replacement by better or more 
satisfactory ones. So "it is not like a library, as more and more books 
accumulate so more and more knowledge accumulates. But scientific growth is 
by criticism: it grows by a method more revolutionary than accumulation—by 
a method which destroys, changes, and alters, the whole things including its 
most important instruments, the language in which our myths and theories are 
formulated". The critical examination of theories of this sort leads us to 
subject them to further tests and, if we deem it necessary to overthrow them. 
This leads us to further experiments and observations of a kind which nobody 
would ever have dreamt of without the stimulus and guidance provided both by 
our theories and our criticism of them. 
If there is competition of the sort stated just above between the 
existing and falsifying hypotheses, the competing theories become 
incomparable. Mow. then, will we understand the growth among the competing 
theories? According to Popper, "the case is that not only are all the theories 
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conjectural but also all appraisals of theories, including comparison of the 
theories, and including the observational tests. All appraisals of theories are 
appraisals of the state of their critical discussion".^" This condition in the long 
run leads either to dogmatism or to an infinite regress or to the relativistic 
doctrine of rationality; consequently, we are caught amongst a phethora of 
incommensurable frameworks. A rational and fruitful discussion is impossible 
unless the participants share a common framework of basic assumptions, or at 
least, unless they have agreed on such a framework for the purpose of the 
discussion. A discussion among participants who do not share a common 
framework may be difficult. A discussion will also be difficult if the 
frameworks have little in common, and it will be the easier the greater the 
overlap between the frameworks.^^ In this context, popper says that we should 
logically distinguish between a mistaken method of criticizing, and the correct 
method of criticizing. The mistaken method of criticizing is what starts from 
the question: how can we establish or justify our theories? By contrast, the 
correct method of critical discussion starts from the question: what are the 
consequences of our theories? Are they all acceptable to us? Thus it consists in 
comparing the consequences of different theories and tries to find out which of 
the competing theories or frameworks has consequences that seem preferable to 
us. It is thus conscious of the fallibility of all our methods and it tries to replace 
all our theories by better ones.^ ^ 
We may say that more the fruitful discussion, more the participants 
learn from it. The more interesting questions and difficult questions they are 
asked, the more new answers they are induced to think of. Consequently, more 
they are shaken in their opinions, the more their intellectual horizon is 
extended. Fruitfulness in this sense will almost always depend on the original 
gap between the opinions of the participants in the discussion. The greater the 
gap, the more fruitful can the discussion be provided that such a discussion is 
not altogether impossible owing to incommensurability of frameworks.^^ 
However, even without a discussion there is also a possibility of a 
fruitful confrontation amongst people deeply committed to different 
frameworks.' It is understandable that two ways of life and two ways of 
looking at the world are incommensurable. Yet, two theories, which try to 
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solve the same family of problems, including their offspring, need not be 
incommensurable. It is possible for us to transcend the two different 
frameworks—psychologically, socially and genetically or physiologically—by 
critical method. We can understand even a bit of the language of the bees. 
Admittedly, this understanding is conjectural and rudimentary. But almost all 
understanding is conjectural, and the deciphering of a new language is always 
rudimentary to start with. It is the method of science, the method of critical 
discussion, which makes it possible for us to transcend not only our culturally 
acquired but even our inborn frameworks. This method has made us transcend 
not only our senses but also our partly innate tendency to regard the world as a 
universe of identifiable things and their properties. Critical thought can 
challenge and transcend a framework even if it is rooted not only in our 
conventional language but also in our genetics. Revolution does not produce a 
theory incommensurable with its predecessors; the very task of the revolution 
is to explain the old category of thing-hood by a theory of greater depth.^ ^ 
The myth of the framework is clearly the same as the doctrine that one 
cannot rationally discuss anything that is fundamental; or that a rational 
discussion of principles is impossible. This doctrine is logically an outcome of 
the mistaken view that all rational discussion must start from some principles. 
This is mistaken, for, behind it there is the tacit assumption that a rational 
discussion must have the character of a justification or of a proof or of a 
demonstration, or of a logical derivation from admitted premises. But the kind 
of discussion which is going on in the natural science might have taught us that 
there is also another kind of rational discussion: a critical discussion, which 
does not seek to prove or justify or establish a theory.^° 
Though in the method of'trial and error' we do not and cannot justify 
a theory, we can, through this method, have a criterion, the criterion of 
criticism, to choose the better among the competing theories. This possibility 
eventuates scientific change into progress. For Popper, the history of science, 
like the history of all human ideas, is a history of irresponsible dreams, of 
obstinacy, and of error. But science is the one of the very few human activities 
in which errors are systematically criticized and fairly often corrected. We do 
make mistakes, but by recourse to continuous criticism, we often learn from 
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our mistakes. And this is why we speak clearly and sensibly that we can make 
progress in scientific endeavours. We have the criterion of criticism to choose 
among the competing theories and we can, as well, gradually eliminate errors^' 
While scientific change signals progress, the process of change does not entail 
any loss. In almost all human endeavors, there is change, but rarely the 
progress, for, the gain is balanced by some loss. Given that elimination of the 
error is the result of progress, there is no loss in science. Such progress without 
incurring any loss is possible in science thanks to the criterion of criticism. 
Although the world at any moment's necessarily conjectural or theory 
impregnated, this does not prevent us from progressing to better theories. How 
do we do it? The essential step is the linguistic formulation of our beliefs. This 
objectifies them; and this makes it possible for them to become targets of 
criticism. Thus, our beliefs are replaced by competing theories, by competing 
conjectures. And through the critical discussion of these theories we can 
progress and continuity graduate to better theoretical positions. 
According to Popper, we may be able to say, by the criterion, whether 
it would be an improvement on other theories with which we are accounted. 
We have criterion of TQ\at\ve potential satisfactoriness, which can be applied to 
a theory even before we know whether or not it will turn out. This criterion of 
relative satisfactoriness is extremely simple and intuitive. It characterizes as 
preferable the theory which tells us more, contains the greater amount of 
empirical information or content, which is logically stronger, which has the 
greater explanatory and predictive power, and which can therefore be more 
severely tested by comparing predicted facts with observations. All these 
properties, which we desire in a theory, can be shown to amount to a higher 
degree of empirical content or of testability. 
For him, all these properties can be stated as three requirements for the 
theory to get nearer to truth. The first requirement is that the new theory should 
proceed for some simple, new, powerful and unifying idea about some 
connection between hitherto unconnected things or facts or new theoretical 
entities. This requirement is called 'simplicity'. It seems to be intimately 
connected with the idea that our theories should describe the structural 
properties of the world—an idea which it is hard to think out fully without 
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getting involved in an infinite regress. Secondly, we require that the new theory 
should be independently testable, that is to say, apart from explaining all the 
explicanda, which it was designed to explain, it must have new and testable 
consequences. It must lead to the prediction of phenomena which have not so 
far been observed. If the second requirement is satisfied then the new theory 
will represent a potential step forward, whatever the outcome of the new tests 
may be. For, it will be better testable than the previous theory. Moreover, we 
will be confronted by the new problems to be solved by the new explanatory 
theories. And to some extent, it will be fruitful as an instrument of 
exploration. '^* Thirdly, we require that the theory should pass some new, and 
severe tests. Some of the most interesting and most admirable theories ever 
conceived can be refuted at the very first test. For, even the greatest physicist 
can not anticipate the secretes of nature: his inspiration can only be guesses, 
and it is no fault of his or of his theory, if it is refuted. Even Newton's theory 
was in the end refuted; and we hope that we shall in this way succeed in 
refuting, and improving upon every new theory. 
However, Popper offers a simple and obvious idea about the content of 
a theory and shows how science makes progress. He argues that 'the 
informative content of the conjunction, ab, of any two statements, a and b, will 
always be greater than, or at least equal to, that of any of its components. Let a 
be the statement ' it will rain on Friday'; b the statement 'it will be fine on 
Saturday'; and ab the statement 'it will rain on Friday and it will be fine on 
Saturday'. It is then obvious that the informative content of this last statement, 
the conjunction ab, will exceed that of its component a and also that of its 
component b. And it will also be obvious that the probability of ab will be 
smaller than that of either of its components. 
Let us suppose that Ct(a) is 'the content of the statement a\ and Ct(b) 
is 'the content of the statement b\ and Ct(ab) is 'the content of the conjunction 
a and b', we have 
(l)Ct(a)<Ct(ab)>Ct(b) 
This contrasts with the corresponding law of the calculus of probability. 
(2)P(a)>P(ab)<P(b) 
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These two laws, (1) and (2), together state that with increasing content, 
probability decreases, and vice-versa. In other words, content increases with 
increasing improbability. Thus if our aim is the advancement or growth of 
knowledge, then a high probability (in the sense of probability calculus) cannot 
possibly be our aim as well; these two aims are incompatible. 
Popper says that this head-on collision would be avoidable if people 
were not so generally inclined to assume uncritically that a high probability 
must be an aim of science. What is more important, one merely has to 
recognize that the property which we cherish in theories and which we may 
perhaps call 'verisimilitude' or 'truth likeness' is not a probability in the sense 
of the calculus of probability of which 'P(a) > P(ab) < P(b)' is an inescapable 
theorem. If we aim, in science, at a high informative content—if the growth of 
knowledge means that we know more, that we know a and b, rather than a 
alone, and that the content of our theories thus increases — then we have to 
admit that we also aim at a low probability, in the sense of the calculus of 
probability. And since a low probability means a high probability of being 
falsified, it follows that a high degree of falsifiability, or refutability, or 
testability is one of the aims of science—in fact, precisely the same aim as a 
high informative content. So, the criterion of potential satisfactoriness is thus 
testability or improbability. Only a highly testable or improbable theory is 
worth testing, and is actually satisfactory if it withstands sever tests. However, 
it is possible to compare the severity of a test objectively and to admit the 
explanatory power and the degree of corroboration of a theory. 
This criterion can easily be illustrated with the help of historical 
examples. The theories of Kepler and Galelio were unified and superseded by 
Newton's logically stronger and better testable theory, and similarly Fresnel's 
and Faraday's by Maxwell's. Newton's theory and Maxwell's' in turn, were 
unified and superseded by Einstein's. In such a case, the progress was towards 
a more informative and therefore logically less probable a theory. A theory 
which is not in fact refuted by testing those new and bold and improbable 
predictions, to which it gives rise can be said to be corroborated by these severe 
tests. Galelio's discovery of Neptune, Hertz's discover\' of electromagnetic 
wave, Edington's eclipse observations can well remind us the fact. There are 
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other important discoveries, which lead not to corroboration, but to its 
refutation. For instance, Lavoisier's classical experiments do not establish the 
oxygen theory of combustion; yet they tend to refute the phlogiston theory.'^ 
Therefore, every refutation should be regarded not as a failure but as 
a great success; not merely a success of the scientist who refuted the theory, 
but also the scientist who created the refuted theory and who thus in the first 
instance suggested the refuting experiment. Even if a new theory should meet 
an early death, it should not be forgotten; rather its beauty should be 
remembered and history should record our gratitude to it—for bequeathing to 
us new and perhaps still unexplained experimental facts and new problems, and 
for services it has thus rendered to the progress of science during its successfiil 
but short life. The refuted theory is always important. For, our aim as scientists 
is to discover the truth about the problems and we must look at our theories as 
serious attempts to find the truth. If they are not true, they may be important 
stepping-stones towards the truth, instruments for further discoveries.''^ 
History of science may say that the individual scientist wishes to 
establish his theory rather than refute it. But from the point of view of progress 
in science, this wish can easily mislead him. Moreover, if he does not himself 
examine his favorite theory critically, others will do so for him. The only result, 
which will be regarded by them as supporting the theory, will be the failure of 
interesting attempts to refute it; failure to find counter examples where such 
counter examples would be most expected, in the light of the best of the 
competing theories. Thus, it need not create a great obstacle to science if the 
individual scientist is biased in favor of a pet theory. However, Cloude 
Bernard's comment viz; 'those who have an excessive faith in their ideas are 
not well fitted to make discoveries'^' deserves our serious attention and 
consideration. 
Popper holds that we need not only successful refutations, but also 
positive success. We must manage reasonably often to produce the theories that 
contain new predictions, especially predictions of new effects, new testable 
consequences suggested by the new theory and never thought of before. Tf we 
should only succeed in refuting our theories but not in obtaining some 
verifications of predictions of a new kind, it means that our problem has 
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become so difficult that the structure of the world is beyond our powers of 
comprehension. So, we need two kinds of successes: success in refuting our 
theories, and success on the part of some of our theories in resisting at least 
some of our most determined attempts to refute them'.^" In this way we make 
the progress in science. 
The above lines suggest that science progresses from theory to theory 
by eliminating the false theory. And this consists of a sequence of better and 
better theory, in other words, better deductive systems. However, a scientific 
theory is an attempt to solve a scientific problem, which is connected or 
concerned with the discovery of an explanation. Therefore, science should be 
visualized as progressing from problems to problems—to problems of ever 
increasing depth. The conscious task before the scientists is always the solution 
of a problem through the construction of a theory, which solves the problems, 
for example by explaining unexpected and unexplained observations. Thus 
science always starts from and ends with problems—problems of an increasing 
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depth, and an ever increasing fertility in suggesting new problems. So science 
grows from problem to problem; science progresses towards the increasing 
depth of the problems by gradual elimination of errors. Every change renders 
progress, for in every refutation we eliminate our mistakes, thus enriching our 
knowledge. 
3.3 The Problem of Realism with Falsification 
Truth as Regulative Principle 
If science progresses from problem to problem, what about truth that is 
most interesting about progress? Before discussing the question, we should see 
what is the truth we expect in progress. It is very simple and obvious that we 
expect the objective truth. However, Tarski re-established a theory of absolute 
or objective truth, which shows that we are free to use the intuitive idea of truth 
as correspondence with the facts. The highly intuitive character of Tarski's 
ideas seems to become more evident if we first decide explicitly to talk 'truth" 
as a synonym for 'correspondence with the facts', then we proceed to define 
the idea of'correspondence with the facts". There are two formulations, each of 
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which states very simply under what conditions a certain assertion corresponds 
to the facts. 
(1) The statement, or the assertion, 'snow is white' corresponds to the facts 
if, and only if, snow is, indeed, white. 
(2) The statement, or the assertion, 'Grass is red' corresponds to the facts if 
and only if, grass is, indeed, red. 
This is an objective notion of truth. There are many other notions of 
truth that are subjective in their character. The coherence theory holds 
'consistency' for truth, the evidence theory holds 'known to be true' for truth, 
and the pragmatic or instrumentalist theory holds 'usefulness' for truth. These 
are all subjective or epistemic theories of truth. They are subjective in the sense 
that they all stem from the fundamental subjectivist position which can 
conceive of knowledge only as a special kind of mental state, or as a 
disposition; or as a special kind of belief, characterized, for example, by its 
history or by its relation to other beliefs. Whereas, Tarski's is objective or 
metaphysical theory of truth. The objective theory of truth leads to a very 
different attitude. This may be seen from the fact that it allows us to make 
assertions such as the following: a theory may be true even though nobody 
believes it, and even though we have no reason for accepting it, or for believing 
that it is true. A similar assertion, which the correspondence theory would 
make quite naturally, is this: even if we hit upon the true theory, we shall, as a 
rule, be merely guessing, and it may well be impossible for us to know that it is 
true. On the other hand, a theory may be false, although we have comparatively 
good reasons for accepting it. 
This is the theory of objective or absolute truth. The question is do we 
achieve this kind of truth in scientific progress through the method of 'trial and 
error'? We in science seek for highly informative theory, while the highly 
informative theory has the low probability to be true. In other words, if our new 
theory is more informative than the old one, it means that the new would, in 
contrast to the old, have low probability to be true. From this point of view, we 
do obviously not obtain the truth or approach the truth. Then, how will we 
conceive of the theor>' as progressing to achieve the truth slated above? So far. 
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we have seen our learning process 'conjecture and refutation', it is obvious that 
by our method, we seek truth, and to do that we eliminate falsity. Thus, it is 
also obvious that science allows us to say that we search for truth. Scientific 
change, occurred by our constant attempt to falsify the existing theory, is a 
change for real. 
In this context we need to analyze our learning process to find out 
what do we obtain through it? However, one great advantage of the process of 
'conjecture and refutation' is that it allows us to say that we carry on search for 
truth, though we may not know when to have found it. According to Popper, 
this method does not give us any criterion of truth but we are nevertheless 
guided by the idea of truth as a regulative principle. He fiirther says that though 
there is no general criterion by which we can recognize truth, there is 
something like criterion of progress towards the truth. According to him, the 
status of truth in the objective sense, as correspondence to the facts, and its role 
as a regulative principle, may be compared to that of a mountain peak, which is 
permanently, or almost permanently, wrapped in clouds. The climber may not 
merely have difficulties in getting there—he may not know when he gets there, 
for, he may be unable to distinguish, in the clouds, between the main summit 
and some subsidiary peaks. Yet this does not affect the objective existence of 
the summit, and if the climber tells us 'I have some doubts whether I reached 
the actual summit', then he does, by implication, recognize the objective 
existence of the summit. The very idea of error, or doubt implies the idea of an 
objective truth which we may fail to reach. He says that though it may be 
impossible for the climber ever to make sure that he has reached the summit, it 
will often be easy for him to recognize that he has not reached it, or not yet 
reached it; for example, when he is turned back by an overhanging wall. 
Similarly, there will be cases when we are quite sure that we have not reached 
the truth. Coherence may not be a criterion of truth — for even a demonstrably 
consistent system may be false in fact—incoherence does establish falsity. So, 
for him, if we are lucky, we may discover inconsistencies and use them to 
establish the falsity of our theories.^'' 
Verificationists demand that we accept a belief only if it can be 
justified by positive evidence; that is to say, shown to be true. However, as 
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falsificationists we believe that we never give positive reasons justifying the 
belief that a theory is true. Therefore, science has nothing to do with the quest 
for certainty or probability or reliability. In our theory of falsification, we are 
not interested in establishing scientific theories as secure, or certain, or 
probable. Conscious of our fallibility we are only interested in criticizing them 
and testing them, in the hope of finding where we are mistaken; in the hope of 
learning from our mistakes; and if we are lucky, we hope also of proceeding to 
better theories. Popper, therefore, calls falsificationist the negativist.^^ 
Though negativists, we follow a critical discussion in search of 
mistakes with the serious purpose of eliminating as many of these mistakes as 
we can, in order to get nearer to truth. So truth here is a regulative principle, 
for, all our scientific activities are conducted in the hope of getting nearer to 
truth but actually at every step of theory change, we just liberate ourselves from 
the falsity rather than obtaining the truth. This kind of truth is a 'formal' or 
'procedural' truth. There is the concept of 'substantive truth' but that is 
independent of the method. In other words, the substantive truth being beyond 
method regulates it. 
In view of the same, Popper says, we will have to accept that the task 
of science is the search for truth—for true theories. And since our search for 
truth starts from the expectation for some solution of the some relevant and 
interesting problems, our research is thus for the relevant and interesting truth. 
Therefore, we stress that truth is not the only aim of science. We want more 
than mere truth. What we look for is interesting truth—truth which is hard to 
come by. And in the natural sciences what we look for is truth which has a high 
degree of explanatory power. Mere truth is not enough; what we look for is 
answer to our problems — a difficult, a fertile problem, a problem of some 
depth. Popper says that we are as much interested in truth as the member of a 
court of justice. When the judge tells a witness that he should speak 'the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth', then what he looks for is as much of 
the relevant truth as the witness may be able or willing to offer. A witness who 
likes to wonder off into irrelevancies is unsatisfactory as a witness, even 
though these irrelevancies may be truisms, and thus part of'the whole truth". It 
is quite obvious that what the judge—or anybody else—wants when he asks for 
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'the whole truth' is as much interesting and relevant true information as can be 
got. And many perfectly candid witness have failed to disclose some important 
information simply because they were unaware of its relevance to the case. 
And we are interested in bold conjectures due to the methodological conviction 
that only with the help of such bold conjectures can we hope to discover 
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interesting and relevant truth. 
From Truth to Verisimilitude 
Scientific research aims at the objective truth. It also conjectures the 
interesting truth that is relevant in the context of human epistemological and 
methodological struggle. Then, how does the conjectural and human truth make 
sense in the context of scientific search for objective truth? How does 
conjectural and human truth approach to objective truth ? We see a solution of 
the question in Popper's method of trial and error. He says that the idea of 
'approach to truth' is based on the assertion that' one theory corresponds better 
to the facts than the other.' But can we really speak of better correspondence? 
Is there such a thing as degree of truth? If an earlier theory is Ti and a later 
theory is T2, then has T2 superseded Ti, or progressed beyond Ti, by 
approaching more closely to the truth than T|? He says that 'there is no doubt 
whatever that we can say of a theory T2 that it corresponds better to the facts; 
or that as far as we know it seems to correspond better to the facts, than another 
theory T). To clarify the issue Popper mentions the following list of six types 
of cases in which we should be inclined to speak of better correspondence. 
(1) T2 makes more precise assertions than Ti, and these more precise 
assertions stand up to more precise tests. 
(2) T2 takes account of, and explains, more facts than T). 
(3) T2 describes, or, explains, the facts in more detail than T). 
(4) T2 has passed test whichT) has fail to pass. 
(5) T2 has suggested new experimental tests, not considered before TT was 
designed and T2 has passed these tests. 
(6) TT has unified or connected various hitherto unrelated problems. 
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If we reflect upon this list, we can see that the content of the theories 
T| and T2 plays an important role in it. For, in our list of six cases, the 
empirical content of theory T2 exceeds that of theory T|. This suggests that we 
combined here the idea of truth and the idea of content into one. Therefore, 
every statement or theory is not only either true or false but has independent of 
its truth value—some degree of 'likeness', which is defined in terms of truth 
and falsity content. Popper calls this 'likeness' 'verisimilitude'. The idea of 
degree of better correspondence to truth is therefore the degree of greater 
'likeness' or verisimilitude to truth.^ * 
But how is it possible for 'truth and falsity content' to define the 
'degree of likeness', in other words, degree of truth? Popper has offered a 
solution of this question in his book Logic of Scientific Discovery. He says that 
the content of a statement a is the class of all the logical consequences of a. If a 
is true, then this class can consist only of true statements, for, truth is always 
transmitted from a premise to all its conclusions. But if a is false, then its 
content will always consist of both true and false conclusions. For example, 'it 
always rains on Sunday' is false, but its conclusion that 'it rained last Sunday' 
can happen to be true. Thus, there may be more or less truth in a statement in 
so far as its content consists of a greater or lesser number of true statements. 
Popper calls this class of the true logical consequences of a the 'truth-
content' of a; and the class of the false consequences of a the 'falsity-content' 
of a. Assuming that the truth-content and the falsity-content of two theories Ti 
and T2 are comparable, we can say that T2 is more closely similar to the truth, 
or corresponds better to the facts, than Ti, if and only if either. 
(a) The truth-content but not the falsity content of T2 exceeds that of T|, 
(b) The falsity-content of T), but not its truth-content, exceeds that of T2. 
If we now work with the assumption that the falsity-content and the 
truth-content of a theory a are in principle measurable, then we can go slightly 
beyond this definition and define a measure of the verisimilitude or 
truthlikeness of a, in symbol Vs(a). The simple definition will be: 
Vs(a) = Ct|(a) - Ct,.(a). where CtT(a) is a measure of the truth 
content of a, and CtpCa) is a measure of falsity content of a. It is obvious that 
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Vs(a) satisfied our two demands, according to which Vs(a) should increase, if 
and only if either: 
(a) If CtT(a) increase while CtF(a) does not, and 
(b) If CtpCa) decreases while CtrCa) does not. 
This is the approximation to truth, or verisimilitude. However it also has the 
same regulative character as the absolute truth. According to our learning 
process, 'conjecture and refutation' everything is conjecture. Producing theory, 
falsifying hypothesis, observational test, and even our knowledge about the 
approximation to the truth and everything else undergoes attempted refutation. 
So our knowledge of approximation is only a guess. But we can examine our 
guess critically, and if it withstands severe criticism, then this fact may be 
taken as a good critical reason in favour of it (approximation to truth).^^ 
Popper says that verisimilitude so defined, the maximum 
verisimilitude would be achieved only by a theory, which is not only true, but 
also completely comprehensively true. It means it would correspond to all 
facts, as it were, and only to real facts. He concedes this to be a remote and 
unattainable ideal than a mere correspondence with some facts. But all this 
holds only for the maximum degree of verisimilitude, and not for the 
comparison of theories with respect to their degree of verisimilitude. The idea 
of higher or lower degree of verisimilitude seems less remote and more 
applicable and therefore perhaps more important for the analysis of scientific 
methods than the idea of absolute truth itself.^ *' 
Popper mentions another role of verisimilitude. Even after T2 has been 
refuted in its turn, we can still say that it is better than T). For although both 
have been shown to be false, the fact that T2 has withstood tests which Ti did 
not pass, may be a good indication that the falsity content of Ti exceeds that of 
T2, while its truth content does not. Thus, we may still give preference to T2. 
even after its falsification, because we have reason to think that it agrees better 
with the tacts than did Ti, Similarly, a theory Tj that is more precise than T| 
has a higher degree of verisimilitude than Tj. Newton's dynamics, for example, 
even though we may regard it as refuted, has of course, maintained its 
superiority over Kepler's and Galileo's theories. The reason is its greater 
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content or explanatory power. Newton's theory continues to explain more facts 
than did others, continues to explain them with greater precision and unify the 
previously unconnected problems of celestial and terrestrial mechanics. 
In the final analysis, we should not be confused about the difference 
between 'verisimilitude' and 'probability', because 'likely' is the other word 
for 'probability' which comes originally from 'like the truth' or 'verisimilar'. 
However, progress in science means progress towards more interesting and less 
probable theories, and this means, as a rule, progress towards less familiar and 
less comfortable or plausible theories. So, theory of greater verisimilitude is 
totally different idea of 'probability'. Both they are different in an important 
respect. The logical probability represents the idea of approaching logical 
certainty, tautological truth, through a gradual diminution of informative 
content. Verisimilitude, on the other hand, represents the idea of approaching 
comprehensive truth. It thus combines truth and content while probability 
combines truth with lack of content.^ ^ Popper says that if we take the word 
'probable' in any of the many senses which satisfies the calculus of probability, 
then it can never be shown to be 'probable'.^^ Moreover 'Probability 
statements are not falsifiable'.^ "* Thus we should not attribute truth, or 
probability to our theories. The use of such standards as truth, and 
approximation to truth, plays a role only within our criticism. We may reject a 
theory as untrue; and we may reject a theory as being less close or approximate 
to truth than one of its predecessors or competitors.^^ 
Therefore, verisimilitude is neither 'truth' nor 'probability', it is kind 
of truth at the level of our interest. It is comprehensive truth. On the other hand, 
absolute truth is regulative of this comprehensive truth or verisimilitude. Our 
gradual achievement of verisimilitude at its highest reach will still remain the 
verisimilitude, for, it is essentially verisimilitude, not truth. Our theory being 
conjectural, producing theory and its criticism is an endless process. In the 
learning process, we always find a refuting hypothesis and no hypothesis has 
the authority not to undergo criticism. The issue of empirical science in this 
way appears fully agnostic.'^'' 
Then what do we do when we search for truth? According to Popper, 
we search, then, for greater verisimilitude only. He explains this position as 
104 
following: Let us take a square as representing the class of all statements, and 
divide it into two equal sub areas, the rue statements (T), and the false ones (F): 
Now the task of science is to cover by hits as much as possible of the 
target (T) of the true statements, by the method of proposing theories or 
conjectures that seem promising, and as little as possible of the false area (F). It 
is very important that we try to conjecture true theories but truth is not the only 
property of our conjectural theories. For, we are not particularly interested in 
proposing trivialities or tautologies. 'All tables are tables' is certainly true—it 
is more certainly true than Newton's and Einstein's theories of gravitation, but 
it is intellectually unexciting. That is why scientific research is least interested 
in such tautological, sure and certain trivialities. 
According to Popper, we are after interesting and enlightened truth, we 
are after theories that offer solutions of interesting problems. If at all possible, 
we are after deep theories. When we speak about approach to truth, it means 
'the whole truth' that is , the whole class of true statements, the class T. A false 
theory may appear to be nearer to truth than other false theory. For example, 'it 
is now 9.45 p.m.' seems nearer to truth than 'it is now 9.40 p.m.' if in fact it is 
9.48. Therefore, the idea of higher or lower verisimilitude is applicable both to 
false and true statements. Their truth content is essential in our context. In this 
sense we can say that the aim of science is the better approximation to truth, 
greater verisimilitude.^' 
Newton never believed. Popper says, that his theory was really the last 
word, and Einstein never believed that his was more than a good approximation 
to the true theory. This is because the truth, in other words, the class of all true 
statements is unattainable. What we can do is to increase the truth content and 
decrease the falsity content. Now, will our long struggle of increasing truth 
content and decreasing the falsity content at some time end up in the attainment 
of all true statements or will verisimilitude ever culminate into the absolute 
truth? Such a situation is impossible of attainment as our theorv in its' essence 
is conjectural. A conjectural theory is characterized by two things: (a) there is 
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no restriction to produce another conjecture better than the first; every previous 
knowledge makes the scientists more competent to produce the competent 
theory to refute previous ad infinitum and (b) Our theory being mere conjecture 
we cannot be certain for any assertion to be true. As a resuh, there always is the 
scope for any other conjecture to be shown better by any trick of the 
imagination or creativity. In that case, we may regard, with our capacity at the 
time, the truth as falsehood and vice-versa, because the conjecture does not 
possess any absolute criterion of truth. Our method says that no corroboration 
is conclusive. And if every previous theory is false according to the method, 
then meta-induction allows us to say that every future theory, when it is past by 
other, will also be false. At this point, Popper says, scientific community ought 
to be, and to a considerable degree actually is, an open society in which no 
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theory, however dominant and successful is ever sacred. 
There may arise another question that if truth is illusive as considered 
in our learning process and if our theory is the creation of our imaginative 
mind, then is it not that scientific knowledge is essentially subjective? For 
Popper, it would be so if our method had claimed to know the reality. For, 
theory of knowledge has a certain essential subjectivity. The question such as 
'How do I know?' and 'what do I know?' start inevitably from personal 
experience. Its data are egocentric. But in our method of 'trial and error', we 
admit that our knowledge is guesswork. Therefore, the question 'How do I 
guess?' and 'what do I guess?' are not analogous at all. Popper says that this 
question is psychological; it has no epistemological impact. The difference 
between 'How do I know? What do I know?' and ' How do I guess? What do I 
guess?' is as to the fonner "I do know' but to the latter 'I do not know'. In our 
method, we do not prove that our guesses are correct, but we are most anxious 
to have them criticized in order to replace them if possible by better guesses. 
The moment we replace the idea of knowledge by that of guesswork, the 
apparently 'essential subjectivity' of the theory of knowledge disappears. 
Guesses, as opposed to this, are proposals, and as such may be met by 
anybody's counter-proposals.^^ 
The shift from 'knowledge' to 'guess work' necessitates that all laws 
and theories be deemed to be hypothetical or conjectural. We must regard them 
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to be guesses. Therefore, from a rational point of view, we should not rely on 
any theory, for, no theory has been shown to be true, or can be shown to be 
true. Nevertheless, we have reason to prefer as basis for action the best-tested 
theory.'"" The shift from 'truth' to 'verisimilitude' and from 'know' to 'guess' 
gives us a middle position. For, in relation to truth we cannot speak of the 
subjective part of theorizing, when producing a conjecture. The idea of 
verisimilitude we can incorporate both parts:-- subjective and objective. In our 
method of 'conjecture and refutation' the subjective part is in conjecture, 
because we are allowed here to use our creative imagination, to use myth; and 
the objective part is in the process of refiitation, because our criticism is always 
directed by the regulative idea of truth, and any body can propose his counter-
proposal for severe criticism.'"' Although the work of rejection, in other words, 
the work of criticism by severe test gives us objective result, the result may not 
correspond to reality, because our criticism too is the conjecture of another sort. 
In this method, we know what is false but we do not know what is true. 
To summarise the above discussion, we can say that for Popper 
ftindamental scientific theories are by nature hypothetical. We have analysed 
the process of scientific change with a view to understand whether such a 
change as conceived by Popper entails the progress or not, and also whether 
such progress entails the gradual attainment of truth or not. For Popper, 
although hypotheses are falsifiable, every falsification culminates into progress, 
and every step of progress aims at truth. 
However, all these issues chiefly depend on the nature of fundamental 
scientific theories which Popper calls falsifiable hypotheses. For Popper 
hypotheses may originate from myth, metaphysics, fiction whatsoever, but they 
can be scientific if they are falsifiable. They are myth-making, for they are 
produced from the imaginative mind of the scientists - they are not abstracted 
from the observations. This position denies induction as the method and 
verification as the criterion of a scientific statement. Rather, falsifiability is the 
criterion which, to begin with, accords scientific status to such hypothesis. 
Falsifiability is the criterion which makes metaphysics quite meaningful or 
relevant for science. 
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For Popper, only a critical discussion can make any conjecture a 
proper scientific theory. What we call 'science' is differentiated from the myths 
not by being something distinct from a myth, but by being accompanied by a 
tradition of critically discussing the myth. Conjectures may be considered as 
dogmatic rather than rational, but the 'trial and error' method makes them 
scientific. There is nothing irrational if we tentatively accept some theory with 
an eagerness to revise it with experiment. Popper maintains that growth in the 
process of'conjectures and refutations' is not the accumulation of observations 
but rather the repeated overthrow of scientific theories and their replacement by 
better or more satisfactory ones. So it is not like a library, as more and more 
books accumulate so more and more knowledge accumulates. But scientific 
growth occurs in a way that is more revolutionary than accumulation. In its 
growth science destroys, changes and alters everything including its most 
important instruments and language. Yet science makes progress, for if a 
hypothesis falsifies the other, the falsifying hypothesis is better than falsified 
one. Therefore, every falsification is considered as growth. 
Popper holds that in such a growth we gradually get closer and closer 
to truth. For him, when we falsify a theory by another one, it means that we 
eliminate some mistakes from our previous knowledge. The elimination of 
falsity - content of knowledge logically entails increase in truth-content. 
However truth attained in such a progress is 'regulative truth', for we do not 
achieve truth directly, but it is conceived only through eliminating falsity. For 
Popper, we may mistakenly falsify a true theory and corroborate a false one. So 
we do not have such a criterion by which truth could be sorted out 
categorically. Yet the ongoing process of falsificafion is directed towards truth. 
So. truth in science is regulative truth, which is assessed through a mutual 
calculation of truth-content and falsity-content, a degree of truth which Popper 
calls verisimilitude. Verisimilitude is not just truth, but truth-likeness. So 
through scientific progress as conceived by Popper we do not attain the 
absolute truth, rather something like truth. 
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Chapter - 4 
The Status of Progress in Paradigm-shift 
4.1 Nature of Paradigm 
What is Paradigm? 
In science all achievements are not of the same level. There are some 
such achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges 
as supplying the foundation for its further practice. These achievements 
expound the body of accepted theories and illustrate many or all of its 
successful applications with exemplary observations and experiments. 
Aristotle's Phisica, Ptolemy's Almagest, Newton's principia and optics, 
Franklin's Electricity, Lavoisier's Chemistry, Lyell's Geology and many 
other works are achievements of this kind. They serve, for a time, implicitly 
to define the legitimate problems and methods of a research field for 
succeeding generations of practitioners. This level of achievements is 
sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away 
from competing modes of scientific activity. And they are sufficiently open-
ended to leave all sorts of problems, for the redefined group of practitioners, 
to resolve. This kind of achievements are stipulated as paradigms by Kuhn. 
For him, paradigms are some accepted examples of actual scientific 
practice. They include law, theory, application and instrumentafion. They 
provide models from which there spring up particular traditions of scientific 
research. Ptolemaic or Copemican astronomy, Aristotelian or Newtonian 
dynamics, corpuscular opfics or wave optics are examples of paradigms. Men 
whose research is based on a shared paradigm are committed to the same 
rules and standards for scientific practice. This commitment and the apparent 
consensus, are prerequisites for normal science. Normal science means 
research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements.' Seen 
sociologically, a paradigm is a set of scientific habits. By following them 
successful problem- solving be it intellectual, verbal, behavioral, 
technological, any or all of them can be carried on. It depends on the type of 
problems being solved.^ 
According to Kuhn, without a paradigm scientific development cannot 
be counted and conceived of In the absence of a paradigm or some candidate 
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of paradigm, all of the facts—that could possibly pertain to the development 
of a given science, are likely to seem equally relevant. As a result, mere fact 
gathering becomes nearly random activity. Furthermore, in the absence of a 
reason for seeking some particular form of recondite information, mere fact 
gathering is usually restricted to the wealth of data. And then it becomes a 
pool of casual facts, observations and experiments. Kuhn says that mere fact 
gathering; for example, Pliny's encyclopedic writings or Baconean natural 
histories, produces a morass. Then one hesitates to call this literature science 
though this is filled with information, some of which is very recondite. This 
fact-gathering is necessary in the pre-paradigm stage, but paradigm is 
necessary for this fact-gathering to be a significant science. Kuhn says that 
what the fluid theory did for electricians is that it suggested which 
experiments would be worth performing and which would not. This theory is 
highly directed to the fact-collection and theory-articulation. As a result, it 
removes the confusion. He mentions Bacon's statement that truth emerges 
more readily from error than from confusion. 
According to J. L. Aronson, scientific paradigm is a network of rules 
and commitments that make sense of a variety of interrelated scientific 
activities. We compare different scientific theories not in terms of their 
outward formal structures but rather in terms of their respective networks of 
rules and commitments. Science is just like any other human activity, subject 
to its own set of rules and forms of life.'* 
However, once a Physics textbook told the students that light is 
transverse wave motion. But during the eighteen century the paradigm for this 
field, provided by Newton, taught that light was a material corpuscle. This is a 
transformation of the paradigms, which is called scientific revolution, and this 
successive transformation from one paradigm to another via revolution is the 
usual developmental pattern of mature science.^ 
In this development there are different stages of affairs, respectively: 
non-paradigm science, multiple- paradigm science and dual-paradigm science. 
Non- paradigm science is the state of affairs right at the beginning of the 
process of thinking about any aspect of the world, i.e. the stage when there is 
no paradigm. Kuhn says that at this stage only the easily accessible facts are 
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collected in a casual manner, where all facts seem equally relevant. And these 
different and overlapping sets of facts are interpreted in differing 
metaphysical or quasi-fanciful ways. At this stage, there can be a sort of 
scientific research that is non esoteric. Though the practitioners are scientists, 
the net result of their activity is something less than science. This is a pre-
scientific philosophical stage. 
Secondly, in multiple- paradigm science, far from there being no 
paradigm, there are on the contrary too many. Within the sub-field defined by 
each paradigmatic technique, technology can sometimes be quite advanced 
and puzzle-solving research can progress. But each sub-field as defined by its 
technique is so obviously narrow and trivial than the field as defined by 
intuition. Thirdly, during the period of crisis, however, just before a scientific 
revolution, Kuhn says, many of the characteristics of pre-paradigm science 
again set in. During this period there are always two competing paradigms 
struggling for the mastery. This is considered as dual-paradigm science.^ 
However, paradigm is mere a model or pattern, or is rarely an object of 
replication. Kuhn says that unlike judicial decision in the common law, 
paradigm is an object for further articulation and specification under new or 
more stringent conditions. The success of a paradigm is largely a promise of 
success discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples. Normal 
science is the actualization of that promise. And actualization is achieved by 
extending the knowledge of facts that the paradigm displays as particularly 
revealing and by increasing the extent of the match between those facts and 
the paradigm's preconditions.^ Laudan says that paradigm is the primary 
element of scientific thought which offers a model of scientific tradition and 
activity. Paradigm is way of looking at the world, broad quasi-metaphysical 
insights or hunches about how the phenomena in some domain should be 
explained. However, paradigm is distinguished from hypothetic-deductive 
theory. In hypothetic- deductive theory, premise is fixed, and we know what it 
is all. On the contrary, paradigm is a 'way of seeing', where the more we 
articulate the paradigm the more we know what it is. Paradigm is a 
metaphysical model that more or less comprises the scientific community's 
beliefs about Nature. 
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Paradigm Determines all Scientific Activities 
Paradigm determines the normal science whicii we call problem-
solving research. Normal science is a practice that performs the work of 
actualization of the paradigm even though the techniques and standards of 
actualization are provided by paradigm too. Therefore, normal science is not 
an independent enterprise. Losee says, 'normal science is a conservative 
enterprise.' 
However, all activities of normal science are determined by paradigm. 
In scientific research, most scientific observations consume much time, 
equipments and money. Here the paradigm determines on what aspects of 
nature do scientists report?, what determines their choice?, what motivates the 
scientists to pursue that choice to a conclusion?, etc. Kuhn says that paradigm 
does all these things for normal science. Research cannot go with confusion. 
Thus paradigm provides a vision for normal science. But this vision of normal 
science is drastically restricted vision. This restriction is bom from confidence 
in a paradigm and is essential to the enterprise to be normal science. 
Syncrotons and radiotelescopes are the examples of how much paradigm is 
necessary for the scientists. Scientists undertake research only when a 
paradigm assures them that the facts they seek are important. Furthermore, 
from Tycho Brahe to E. O. Lawrence, some scientists have acquired great 
reputations, not for any novelty of their discoveries, but for the precision, 
reliability and scope of the methods they developed for redetermination of a 
previously known sort of facts.* It indicates that paradigm determines the 
importance of the research topic. 
From this point, another aspects comes out that normal science seems 
an attempt to force nature into the relatively inflexible box that the paradigm 
supplies. As a result, no part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new 
sort of phenomena, and nor do scientists normally aim to invent new theories. 
Instead, normal scientific research is directed to the articulation of those 
phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies. Even 
determination of fact, which is one of the most important works of normal 
science, is not independent of paradigm. Rather it is directed to those facts 
that can be compared directly with the predictions of the paradigm. History of 
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science tells us that Atwood's Machine—first invented almost a century after 
the principia had appeared— gave the first unequivocal demonstration of 
Newton's second law; special telescope is designed to demonstrate the 
Copemican prediction of annual parallax; Foucault's apparatus was directed 
to show that the speed of light is greater in air than in water. These and many 
others like them illustrate the immense effort and ingenuity, that have been 
required to bring the nature and the theory into closer and closer agreement. 
But the attempt to demonstrate this agreement also is obviously more 
dependent upon a paradigm than Nature. For instance, without the principia, 
measurement made with the Atwood Machine would have meant nothing at 
all.^ Experiments and observations articulate the paradigm by resolving some 
of its residual ambiguities and by permitting the solution of problems to 
which the paradigm had previously only drawn attention. 
The following example will tell us how the factual determination does 
also depend on paradigm. If we ask an eminent physicist and a chemist 
whether a single atom of helium is or is not molecule, both would answer 
without hesitation, but their answers would not be the same. For the chemist 
the atom of helium was a molecule because it behaves like one with respect to 
the kinetic theory of gas. For the physicist, on the other hand, the helium atom 
was not a molecule because it displays no molecular spectrum. Presumably, 
both men are talking of the same particle, but they are viewing it through their 
own research training and practice. Their experiences in problem-solving told 
them what a molecule must be. Undoubtedly their experiences had had much 
in common, but they do not, in this case, tell the two specialists the same 
thing.'" Their answers were different because their paradigms were different. 
Experiments, which are another most important work in normal 
science, are no more than the alternative ways of applying paradigm to the 
new area of interest. For example, the experiments of heating and cooling, by 
mixtures and by change of state of matter, were no more than the paradigm 
application of the caloric theory of heat. Heat could be released and absorbed 
in many other ways, so many experiments could be undertaken to elaborate 
these various possibilities, but all these experiments would arise from the 
caloric theory as paradigm. Thus, once the phenomenon of heating by 
117 
compression was established, all further experiments in the area became 
paradigm-dependent in this way. Often a paradigm, developed for one set of 
phenomena, is ambiguous in its applications. Then experiments are necessary 
to articulate the paradigm, but those experiments are, again, oriented by 
paradigm." There are no paradigm-independent experiments either. 
Kuhn says that A part of normal theoretical work consists simply in the 
use of existing paradigm to predict factual information of intrinsic value. The 
manufacture of astronomical ephemeredes and the computation of lens 
characteristics, are examples of this sort. These are manipulations of theory 
whose purpose is to display a new application by reformulation of paradigm. 
The principia retained, as a first venture, some of the clumsiness because so 
much of its meaning was only implicit in its application. So, from Euler and 
Lagrange in the eighteenth century to Hamilton, Jacobi and Hertz in the 
nineteenth and many European brilliants repeatedly endeavored to 
reformulate mechanical theory in an equivalent but logically and aesthetically 
more satisfying form. 
Thus, whatever works are done by normal science are but the 
articulation of the paradigm. Kuhn says that normal science does not discover 
the new facts, but rather it discovers those facts that fit the paradigm. Any 
fact, which is not to articulate paradigm, does not get significance and it 
remains a mere fact. But the fact that is related to the paradigm is one that 
scientists expect, and therefore becomes an important one. For example, in the 
nineteenth century little attention was paid to the experiment that measured 
electrical attraction with the device like the pan balance. They yielded neither 
consistency nor simple result because they could not be used to articulate the 
paradigm from which they are derived. Therefore they remained mere facts, 
unrelated and unreliable to the continuing progress of electrical research.'^ 
Normal science is puzzle-solving activities and it is entirely detennined 
by paradigm. For, what is puzzle and when it is solved - both are determined 
by paradigm. Kuhn says that puzzle means the special category of problems 
that can serve to test ingenuity or skill in a solution. Dictionary illustrations 
are 'Jigsaw puzzle' and 'Cross word puzzle". These words characteristically 
resemble the problems of normal science. There is no question of criterion of 
goodness in a puzzle, that its outcome should be intrinsically interesting or 
important. On the contrary, the really pressing problems, such as, a cure for 
cancer, or the design of a lasting peace, are often not puzzle at all, because 
they may not have any solution. Consider the Jigsaw puzzle whose pieces are 
selected at random from each of two different puzzle boxes. Sine that problem 
is likely to defy even the most ingenious of men; it cannot serve as a test of 
skill in solution. In any usual sense it is not a puzzle at all. He says that not 
the intrinsic value but the assured existence of a solution is criterion for a 
puzzle. So, when a paradigm, as a criterion for choosing problems, is taken 
for granted, we assume that the problems have some solution. If it is to 
classify as a puzzle, a problem must be characterized by assumed solution. 
There must also be rules that limit both the nature of acceptable solutions and 
the steps by which they are to be obtained. To solve a jigsaw puzzle is not, for 
example, merely to make a picture. Either a child or a contemporary artist 
could do that by scattering selected pieces upon the neutral ground. The 
picture thus produced might be far better, and certainly be more original, than 
the one from which the puzzle had been made. Nevertheless such a picture 
would not be a solution. To achieve that all the pieces must be used, their 
planeside must be turned down, they must be interlocked until no hole 
remains. These are among the rules that govern the jigsaw puzzle solution. 
Similar restrictions upon the crossword puzzle, riddles, chess problems, are 
readily discovered.''* Thus 'paradigm is taken as guarantying the existence of 
a solution to every puzzle generated by apparent discrepancies between it and 
observations.' Similarly normal science, like puzzle-solving activity, is a 
highly determined activity. 
Paradigm is Responsible for Novelty 
We have seen so far the characteristics of science are determined by 
paradigm. Now we will see that it is paradigm which is responsible for 
novelty too. Normal science does two things. Firstly, normal science, as a 
puzzle solving activity, is highly cumulative enterprise, and. therefore, aims at 
the steady extension of the scope and precision of scientitlc knowledge. But 
normal science does not aim at novelty of facts or theories. Even when it is 
highly successful, it fmds none. Secondly, there comes some situation when 
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normal science, due to being oriented by paradigm encounters some 
phenomena which paradigm can not assimilate. History of science suggests 
that this sort of new and suspected phenomena are repeatedly uncovered by 
scientific research, and radical new theories are again and again been invented 
by scientists to assimilate them. The scientific enterprise has developed a 
uniquely powerftil technique for producing such phenomena. Kuhn says that 
if this characteristic of science is to be reconciled, then research under a 
paradigm must be a particularly effective way of inducing paradigm change. 
The crisis originates because normal science ultimately leads only to the 
recognition of such anomalies,'^ Anomalies produced inadvertently by a game 
played under one set of rules, requires the elaboration of other set for their 
assimilation. After they have become parts of science, the enterprise in which 
novelties are assimilated is never quite the same game. 
Anomalous facts, after being assimilated, become expected by the 
paradigm and become new facts. Assimilation of anomalous facts demands a 
complete adjustment with theory. Until the scientists have learnt to see nature 
in a different way, the new fact is not quite a scientific fact at all. Factual 
novelty is not independent of theoretical novelty; new facts emerge with new 
theory. To see how factual novelty follows from theoretical novelty in 
scientific discovery, we examine, following Kuhn, a particular famous 
example, the discovery of oxygen. 
In his famous book The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Thomas 
Kuhn writes that at least three different men have a legitimate claim to the 
discovery of oxygen. Several other chemists also must, in the early 1770's, 
have had enriched air in a laboratory vessel without knowing it. However, the 
earlier of the claimants to prepare a relatively pure sample of the gas was the 
Swedish apothecary, C. W. Scheele. We may, however, ignore his work since 
it was not published until oxygen's discovery had repeatedly been announced 
elsewhere and thus had no effect upon the historical pattern. The second in 
time to establish a claim was the British scientist and divine, Joseph Priestly. 
He collected the gas by releasing it from heated red oxide of mercury as one 
item in a prolonged narrow investigation of the 'airs' evolved by a large 
number of solid substances. In 1774 he identified the gas thus produced as 
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nitrous oxide, and in 1775, led by further tests, he declares the same as 
common air with less than its usual quantity of phlogiston. The third claimant 
was Lavoisier. He started the work that led him to oxygen after Priestley's 
experiments of 1774 and possibly as the result of a hint from Priestly. Early 
in 1775 Lavoisier reported that he obtained 'air itself entire' by heating the red 
oxide of mercury — it emanates purer and more respirable. By 1777, 
probably with the assistance of a second hint from Priestly, Lavoisier had 
concluded that the gas was a distinct species, one of the two main constituents 
of the atmosphere. This is a conclusion that Priestly was never able to accept. 
Now the question is who first discovered oxygen. In any case, when 
was oxygen discovered? In that form, question could be asked even if only 
one claimant existed. Regarding priority and date, an answer does not at all 
concern us. Nevertheless, an attempt to produce one will illuminate the nature 
of discovery, because there is no answer of the kind that is sought. Kuhn says 
that discovery is not the sort of process about which the question can be 
asked. Priestley's claim to discovery of oxygen is based upon his priority in 
isolating a gas that was later recognized as a distinct species. But Priestley's 
sample was not pure, and, if holding impure oxygen in one's hands is to 
discover it, then that had been done by every one who ever bottled 
atmospheric air. Besides, if Priestly is the discoverer, when was the discovery 
made? In 1774 he thought he had obtained nitrous oxide, a species he already 
knew; in 1775 he saw the gas as dephlogisticated air. Lavoisier's claim may 
be stronger, but it presents the same problem. 
We cannot award the discovery to Lavoisier for the work of 1775, 
which led him to identify the gas, as the 'air itself entire'. Presumably we wait 
for the work of 1776 and 1777, which led Lavoisier to see not merely the gas 
but what the gas was. Yet even this award could be questioned, for, in 1777 
and to the end of his life Lavoisier insisted that oxygen was an atomic 
'principle of acidity', and that oxygen gas was formed only when that 
'principle' did interact with caloric. Shall we, therefore; say that oxygen had 
not yet been discovered in 1777? Some may be tempted to do so. But the 
principle of acidity was not banished from chemistry until after 1801. and 
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caloric linger until thel860's. Oxygen had become a standard chemical 
substance before either of those dates. 
Thomas Kuhn says that clearly we need a new vocabulary and new 
concepts for analyzing events like the discovery of oxygen. The sentence 
'oxygen is discovered' is undoubtedly correct but it misleads by suggesting 
that discovering something is a single simple act assimilable to our usual 
concept of seeing. Ignoring Scheele, we can safely say that oxygen had not 
been discovered before 1774, and we would probably also say that it had been 
discovered by 1777 or shortly thereafter. Any attempt to date the discovery 
must inevitably be arbitrary because discovery as a sort of phenomenon is 
necessarily a complex event, one which involves recognizing both that 
something is and what it is. If oxygen were dephlogisticated air then we 
should insist without hesitation that Priestly had discovered it. 
However, what Lavoisier announced in his paper from 1777 on, was 
not so much the discovery of oxygen as the oxygen theory of combustion. 
That theory was the keystone for a reformulation of chemistry so vast that it is 
usually called the chemical revolution. What the work on oxygen did was to 
give new form and structure to Lavoisier's earlier understanding. It told him a 
thing he was already prepared to discover the nature of the substance that 
combustion removes from the atmosphere. That advance awareness of 
difficulties must be a significant part of what enabled Lavoisier to see in 
experiments like Priestley's a gas that Priestly had been unable to see there 
himself Conversely the fact that a major paradigm revision was needed to see 
what Lavoisier saw must be the principal reason why Priestly was, to the end 
of his long life, unable to see it. Therefore, it is paradigm, which enables the 
scientists to see what something is. Rorty says, normal science is closed, 
rational, but revolutionary science is the introduction of new problems and 
explanations. For Kuhn, observation and conceptualization, fact and 
assimilation of it by theory are insuperably linked in discovery. Only when all 
relevant conceptual categories are prepared in advance, can discovering that 
and discovering what occur. This conceptual assimilation, we can say. 
involves a change in paradigm. 
The discovery of the Leyden Jar displays all these features as well as 
the others we have observed before. When it began, there was no simple 
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paradigm for electrical research. Instead a number of theories were in 
competition. None of them succeeded in ordering the whole variety of 
electrical phenomena very well. That feature is the source of the anomalies. 
And this provides background for the discovery of Leyden Jar. One of the 
competing schools of electricians took electricity to be a fluid. And that 
competition led a number of scientists to attempt bottling the fluid by holding 
the water-filled glass vial in their hands, touching the water to a conductor 
suspended from an active electrostate generator. On removing the Jar from the 
machine and touching the water with his free hand, each of these 
investigations they experienced a severe shock. Those experiments did not 
provide electricians with the Leyden Jar. That device emerged more slowly 
and it is again impossible to say just when its discovery is completed. The 
Leyden Jar emerged only after the experiments that necessitated the drastic 
revision of the fluid theory and thus provided the first full paradigm for 
electricity. 
In science as in playing card experiment, novelty emerges only with 
difficulty—manifested by resistance—against a background provided by 
expectation e.g. by paradigm. Initially, only the anticipated and usual are 
experienced even under circumstances where anomaly is later to be observed. 
But further acquaintance does result in awareness of something wrong and 
does relate the effect to something that has gone wrong before. That 
awareness of anomaly opens a period in which conceptual categories, e.g. 
paradigm, are adjusted until the initially anomalous has become the 
anticipated. At this point the discovery has been completed.^^ 
4.2 Paradigm-Shift versus Scientific Progress 
Proliferation of Paradigms 
Normal science as rule governed enterprise makes progress by 
articulating the paradigm. But there comes some such situation that any 
articulation of paradigm does fail to assimilate certain anomalous phenomena. 
They are neither anticipated nor the paradigm can provide such rules to 
absorb them. Kuhn says that awareness of such anomalies is a necessary 
precondition for the emergence of a new paradigm. Galileo's contributions to 
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the study of motion depended closely upon difficulties discovered in 
Aristotle's theory by scholastic critics. Thermodynamics was bom from the 
collision of two existing nineteenth century physical theories. Quantum 
mechanics was bom from a variety of difficulties surrounding blackbody 
radiation, specific heat, and the photoelectrical effect. In all these cases, the 
awareness of anomaly had lasted so long and penetrated so deep that one can 
appropriately describe the field affected by it as a growing crisis.^' 
But mere awareness of anomaly is not sufficient for the emergence of 
the new one, because there may be residual expectation that the theory will 
solve all the problems in future. If situation gets more difficult which 
demands a large-scale paradigm-destruction and major shift in the problems 
and techniques of normal science, then the theory is gradually preceded by a 
period of profound professional insecurity. That insecurity generates the 
persistent failure. And this failure of existing paradigm is the next step to the 
awareness of anomaly, which is the prelude to a search for new one. 
In this regard, Kuhn mentions a famous case of the 'awareness of 
anomaly' and the 'failure of the paradigm', in the emergence of Copemican 
astronomy. When its predecessor, the Ptolemaic system, was first developed, 
it was admirably successful in predicting the changing position of both stars 
and planets. No other ancient system had performed so well. For the stars, 
Ptolemaic astronomy is still widely used as an engineering approximation. 
For the planets, Ptolemaic predictions were as good as Copemican. But for a 
scientific theory, to be admirably successful, is never to be completely 
successful. With respect both to planetary position and to precision of the 
equinox, predictions made with Ptolemaic system never quite conformed to 
the best available observations. These discrepancies constituted many 
principal problems for many of Ptolemy's successors. Then they sought to 
solve the anomaly by adjusting their paradigm and they, given a particular 
discrepancy, were invariably able to eliminate it. But as time went on, 
astronomy's complexity was increasing far more rapidly than its accuracy and 
correcting of the discrepancies. By the early sixteenth century an increasing 
number of Europe's best astronomers recognized thai the astronomical 
paradigm was failing in applications to its own traditional problems. 
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However, that recognition of failure was prerequisite to Copernicus' rejection 
of Ptolemaic paradigm and his search for a new one. Though there are some 
historical elements, such as, the social pressure for calendar reform, the 
medieval criticism of Aristotle, the rise of renaissance, neoplatonism and 
other external elements significant in determining the timing of breakdown, 
the failure of Ptolemy's system remained as the core of the crisis.^^ 
Confronted with anomaly or with crisis scientists take a different attitude 
toward the existing paradigm. The willingness to try any thing, the expression 
of explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy and to debate over 
fundamentals—all these occur in this situation and nature of there research 
changes accordingly. 
However, such a failure in the normal problem-solving activity 
culminates into proliferation of the theories to assimilate the anomalous 
phenomena. Kuhn says that the rules of normal science of the dominant 
paradigm break down, and through this proliferation of different articulations 
of different competing theories, the rules of normal science become 
increasingly blurred. In this situation, no paradigm can dominate over the 
research field, and every paradigm seeks to dominate. Copernicus complains 
that in his day astronomers were so inconsistent in their investigations that 
they may be compared to an artist who gathers the hands, feet, head, and other 
parts for his image from diverse models, where each part is exactly drawn, but 
not related to a single body, since they in no way match each other— 
resulting in the monster of a man. The situation usually becomes so 
intolerable that scientists sometimes desert their field of operation.^^ Kuhn 
calls this stage the 'period of crisis'. Proliferation is the sole character of this 
stage. On the way to the emergence of a new paradigm, this proliferation is an 
inevitable stage. By the time Lavoisier began his experiments on airs in the 
early 1770's, there were almost as many versions of the phlogiston theory as 
there were pneumatic chemists.^'' 
Kuhn says that the emergence of the relativity theory was also 
preceded by such a crisis and proliferation. In the late seventeenth century a 
number of natural philosophers criticized Newton's version of absolute space. 
They were very nearly able to show that absolute positions and absolute 
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motions were without function at all in Newton's system. And they did 
succeed in hitting the classical concept by their fully relativistic conception of 
space and motion. But, for him, their critique was purely logical and 
aesthetical—at no point did they relate their views to any problems that arose 
when applying Newton's theory to nature. As a result, their views died with 
them. Relativistic philosophy of space began to be related with the acceptance 
of the wave theory of light after about 1815. If light is wave motion 
propagated in mechanical ether governed by Newton's laws, both celestial 
observation and terrestrial experiment become potentially capable of detecting 
drift through the ether. But numerous articulations of the ether theory to 
absorb drift, failed. The situation changed again only with the gradual 
acceptance of Maxwell's electromagnetic theory. Despite its Newtonian 
origin, it ultimately produced a crisis for the paradigm from which it did 
spring up. Einstein's special theory of relativity emerged in 1905 only after a 
whole services of earlier observations designed to detect drift through the 
ether turned out to be anomalous.^^ 
Thus proliferation is the usual symptom of crisis, which results from 
the persistent failure of the existing paradigm. This crisis is the necessary pre-
condition of the emergence of the new one. Further developments depend on 
the response of scientists to the crisis. History of science has traced out that 
scientists even when confronted by severe and prolonged anomalies leading to 
loss of faith and consideration of alternatives, do not renounce the 
paradigm—one that has led them into crisis. Scientists do not reject a 
paradigm just by being confronted with anomalies or counter-instances, 
because anomalies are counter-instances only to a prevalent epistemological 
theory. Scientists do not falsify the paradigm only because that there are 
counter instances against the theory. Kuhn cites two reasons for such a 
situation. Firstly, there are two reasons for that; one, there is no such thing as 
research without counter instance, which differentiates normal science from 
science in a state of crisis. Counter-instances arise because no paradigm for 
scientific research ever completely resolves all its problems. Secondly, every 
problem—that normal science sees as a puzzle—can be seen from another 
viewpoint, as counter-instances and as a source of crisis. Copernicus saw as a 
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counter instances what most of Ptolemy's other successors had seen as 
puzzles in the match between observation and theory. Lavoisier saw as 
counter-instances what Priestly had seen as successfully solved puzzles in the 
articulation of the phlogiston theory. And Einstein saw as counter-instances 
what Lorentz, Fitzgerald and others had seen as puzzles in the articulation of 
Newton's and Maxwell's theory. They can at best help to create a crisis or 
reinforce one that is already very much in existence. By themselves they 
cannot and will not be the reason to reject the paradigm, because anomalies 
could be defended. Scientists will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc 
modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict. A 
scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative candidate is 
available to its place— the competitor of the old. Newton's second law faced 
difficult factual and theoretical research; a large amount of observations went 
against it; yet it functioned for committed Newtonians, like a purely logical 
statement, unless the appearance of an alternative paradigm i.e. the special 
theory of relativity. For Kuhn, it is because there is no such a thing as 
research in the absence of a paradigm. To reject one paradigm without 
simultaneously substituting another is to reject science itself 
According to Kuhn, at embryo level, often a new paradigm emerges 
before a crisis has developed or been explicitly recognized. A minor break-
down of the paradigm is sufficient to induce in someone a new way of 
looking at the field. Take, for example, Thomas Young's first account of the 
wave theory of light; it appeared at a very early stage of a developing crisis in 
optics. That time, the crisis was almost unnoticeable. It emerged as an 
international scientific scandal only after a decade of Young's account. So in 
any way there must be a candidate for paradigm for a competition. This 
competition is a necessary condition for scientific change. 
During the period of crisis, just before a scientific revolution. Kuhn 
says that many of the characteristics of the pre paradigm science again set in, 
except that the locus of difference is both smaller and more defined. During 
this period there are always two competing paradigms struggling for the 
masteiA'."'' 
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The competition begins with the failure of the paradigm and when 
prevailing theory itself is under attack. This attack becomes a genuine test for 
the theory and a negative outcome of a test may be regarded, not as the 
personal failure of the experimenters but as a failure of the theory. When a 
paradigm remains dominant, failure is attributed to the experimenters, 
because dominance of the paradigm ensures that there must have been some 
solution. But when a paradigm is under attack, failure goes to the paradigm, 
because that time theory lose that status. In Kuhn's words, 'a failure that had 
previously been personal may then come to seem the failure of the theory 
under test'.'^ ^ However, for Kuhn, this failure reflects not on the paradigm but 
on the man—the man committed to the paradigm. Then his colleagues see 
him as ' the carpenter who blames his tools'.^^ In this situation scientists 
become willing to leave the prevailing paradigm. 
Non-existence of Rationality 
In the process of paradigm-shift, there occurs a proliferation of them. 
Now the question is as to how scientists choose one of them. What is the 
process by which a new candidate for paradigm replaces its predecessors? A 
new interpretation of nature, whether by a discovery or a theory, fist comes in 
the mind of one or a few individuals. It is they who first learn to see science 
and the world differently. Kuhn says that their ability to make the transition is 
facilitated by two circumstances that are not common to most other members 
of the profession. One, they are the people whose attention has been 
invariably and intensely concentrated upon a crisis provoking problems. Two. 
they are men so young or new to the crisis-ridden field where practice has 
committed them less deeply than most of their contemporaries to the world 
view and rules determined by the old paradigm.^^ However, other reasons are 
at work why scientists shift their allegiance. 
The question is how are they able to convert the entire profession or 
the relevant professional subgroup to their way of seeing science and the 
world? What causes the group to abandon the tradition of normal research in 
favor of another. Here philosophers will readily try to explain such a shift by 
recourse to a enquiry about the testing verification, or falsification of 
established theories. But history of science has a different stor\' to tell. 
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Feyerabend says that history generally, and the history of revolution in 
particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more man-sided, more 
lively, and subtler than even the best philosopher and best methodologist can 
ever imagine. History is full of accidents, conjectures, and curious 
juxtapositions of events. It demonstrates to us the complexity of human 
change and the unpredictable character of ultimate consequences of any given 
act or decision of men. In this condition it can not be believed that the naive 
and simple-minded rules which methodologists take as their guide are capable 
of accounting for such a maze of interactions . 
How, then, will we justify that which of the competing paradigms 
would be accepted or rejected. In principle, without applying a standard, 
justification is impossible. There must be a criterion on the basis of which one 
can regard a theory better than other, and can reach the decision to accept or 
reject one of the competing theories. 
According to Kuhn, there are no external standards to permit such a 
judgment. He says, what occurs in the history of science is neither a decline 
nor a rise by standards, but simply a change demanded by the adoption of a 
new paradigm. Furthermore, that change has since been reserved and could be 
worked out again. Einstein succeeded in explaining gravitation as attractions 
and that explanation has turned science to a set of canons and problems that 
are more like those of Newton's predecessors than of his own predecessors.^" 
He says that Newton's mechanics improves on Aristotle's and that of 
Einstein's improves on Newton's as instruments for puzzle solving. However, 
he shows that in their succession there is no coherent direction of ontological 
development, on the contrary, in some important respects, though by no 
means in all, Einstein's general theory of relativity is closer to Aristotle's than 
either of them to Newton's.^"' 
The choice between competing paradigms cannot be resolved by any 
criterion of normal science. Since two scientific schools disagree about what 
is a problem and what is a solution, they will inevitably talk through each 
other's paradigms; each paradigm will be shown to satisfy criteria it dictates 
for itself and to fall short of a few of those dictated by its opponent. Secondly, 
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since no paradigm ever solves all the problems it defines, and since no two 
paradigms leave all the same problems unsolved, paradigm debates always 
involve the question: what is the 'significant problem' among others that they 
solved? 
For Kuhn, the proponents of competing paradigms will often disagree 
about the list of problems which any candidate for paradigm must resolve. 
Their standards or their definition of science is not the same. Since the old 
paradigm is the background of the new, it ordinarily incorporates much of the 
vocabulary and apparatus that the traditional paradigm had previously 
employed. However, it seldom employs these borrowed elements in quite the 
traditional way. Within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and 
experiments fall into a new relationship one with the other. For example, what 
Ptolemy meant by 'earth' was fixed- position. His earth, at least, could not be 
moved. Correspondingly, innovation of Copernicus was simply to move the 
earth. Rather, it was a completely new way of regarding the problems of 
physics and astronomy — one that necessarily changed the meaning of 'earth' 
and 'motion'. Therefore, Kuhn says that the proponents of the competing 
paradigms practice their tradition in different worlds. One contains 
constrained bodies that falls slowly, the other pendulum that repeats their 
motion repeatedly. In one, solutions are compounds, in the other, mixtures. 
One is embedded in a flat, the other in a curved, matrix of space. Practicing in 
different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things when they 
look from the same point in the same direction. They see the things in 
different relations. That is why a law that cannot even be demonstrated to one 
group of scientists, may occasionally seem intuitively obvious to another.^'' 
Thus the puzzles are relativised to a paradigm. What may be a puzzle in one, 
may not be so in other. Therefore, one cannot be in a position to say that 
theory) is better than theory2 because theoryi is a better puzzle solver than 
theory2.'^ 
For Kuhn, a research worker, when he is engaged in normal science 
where testing are performed, is a solver of puzzles not a tester of paradigm. 
Though he may try out a number of alternative approaches—rejecting those 
that failed to yield the desired result —he is not testing the paradigm when he 
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does so. Instead, he is like a chess player who tries out various alternative 
moves in search for a solution. But it happens only with the problem stated 
and the board physically or mentally before him. These trials, whether by the 
chess players or by the scientists, are trials only of themselves, not of the rules 
of the game. They are possible only so long as the paradigm itself is taken for 
granted. Therefore a scientist who performs testing, verification or 
falsification, is not in a position to test the paradigm. 
Scientists are not in a position to make verification of paradigms either. 
Verification is like natural selection; it picks out the most viable among the 
actual alternatives in a particular historical situation. It makes little sense to 
suggest that verification is establishing the argument of fact with theory, 
because all historically significant theories have agreed with fact, but only 
more or less. There is no more precise answer to the question whether or how 
well an individual theory fits the facts. 
Probability test may be another one, which is supposed to make the test 
of paradigm. But, for Kuhn it again begs the question. In their most usual 
form, probabilistic theories all have recourse to one or another of the pure or 
neutral observational languages. According to probabilistic theory, a theory 
should pass either of the tests: one, it should pass the test where we compare 
the given scientific theory with others which might be imagined to fit the 
same collection of observed data, two, it should pass the test which demands 
the constructions in imagination of the entire test that the given scientific 
theory might conceivably be asked to pass. In both cases, scientists have 
constructed some alternatives to compare with. But since there can be no 
scientific or empirically neutral system of language or concepts, the proposed 
construction of alternate tests and theories must proceed from within one or 
another paradigm based tradition. Thus restricted, it would have no access to 
all possible theories. As a result probabilistic theories disguise the verification 
situation as much as they illuminate it. 
For paradigm testing, it makes a great deal of sense to ask which of 
two actual and competing theories fits the facts better. But history of science 
shows this as vain; neither Priestly nor Lavoisier's theor}'. for example, 
agreed precisely with existing observations, yet few contemporaries hesitated 
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in concluding that Lavoisier's theory provided the better fit of the two. Again, 
some process like counting the number of problems solved by each might 
settle competition more or less routinely. But in fact these conditions are 
never met completely. The proponents of competing paradigms are always at 
least slightly at cross-purposes. Neither will grant all non-empirical 
assumptions that the other needs in order to make its case. Like Proust and 
Portholes arguing about the composition of chemical compounds, they are 
bound partly to talk through each other. Though each may hope to convert the 
other to his way of seeing science and its problems, neither may hope to prove 
his case. The competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can 
be resolved by proofs."^ 
If we examine situations where scientists are required to make choice 
between the handful of paradigms that confront them at any time , we 
discover that the relevant evidence and appropriate methodological standards 
fail to pick out one contender as unequivocally superior to its extant rivals. 
Laudan calls such situations cases of logical indetermination by way of 
contrasting them with more global or more familiar forms of indetermination. 
For, although methodological rules and standards do constrain and delimit to 
some degree a scientist's choices of options; those rules, and standards are 
never sufficient to compel or unequivocally warrant the choice of one 
paradigm over other. 
Of course, it is true to history of science that philosophers offer the 
methods and principles for scientific research. It is also true to the history that 
there is not a single rule that remains valid under all circumstances, and not a 
single agency to which appeal can always be made. For Feyerabend, the result 
of historical research is that there is not a single rule, however plausible and 
however firmly grounded in epistemology, which is not violated at some time 
or other. It becomes evident that such violations are not accidental events; 
they are not result of insufficient knowledge or of inattention, which might 
have been avoided. On the contrary, we see that they are necessary for 
progress. Indeed, one of the most striking features of recent discussion in the 
histor}' and philosophy of science is the realization that events and 
developments, such as discovery of atomism in antiquity, the Copernican 
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evolution, the rise of modem atomism (kinetic theory, dispersion theory, 
stereochemistry, quantum theory), the gradual emergence of the wave theory 
of light, occurred because some thinkers, either decided no to be bound by 
certain obvious methodological rules, or because they unwittingly broke 
them.^ ^ 
For Laudan, it would drive us to the conclusion that every scientist has 
different reasons for his theory preference from those of his co-workers. The 
view entails, among other things that it is a category-mistake to ask, say, why 
physicists think Einstein's theory is better than Newton's; for, on Kuhn's 
view, there must be as many different answers to that question as there are 
physicists.''^ There are no rules, which allow the members of a scientific 
community objectively to evaluate fundamental scientific theories, therefore 
we can not objectively say that soccer is a better game than chess or that a 
strike in soccer is better than a move in chess.'" Normal science is the normal 
condition of science. Within normal science, the genuine testing of the 
prevailing theories is rendered, in some mysterious psychological-cum-
sociological way, impossible.'*'^  Laudan says that the consequences of 
hypotheses may be judged when sustained by experiment; but such a 
judgment is intra-theoretic, inaccessible to proponents of alternative theiries.''" 
Test of a scientific theory can be accomplished if and only if there are 
at least some terms, that have theory-independent meaning; and a comparison 
of different scientific theories can be accomplished if and only if there are at 
least some such terms that have the same meaning in both of those different 
theories. If there is no such common meaning, the theories are not talking 
about the same things, and hence cannot be compared with respect to their 
adequacy. From this point of view, even if the distinction between 
'theoretical' and 'observational' terms is not a sharp one, nevertheless there 
must be some overlap of meaning between different theories if they are to be 
comparable.'^'' Shapere says that no experiment or piece of observational 
evidence is 'crucial' to the falsification of any single scientific statement, 
because there are always many alternative courses that may be taken in the 
face of counter evidence.'*^ 
Richard Rorty says that holistic theory seems to licence everyone to 
construct his own little whole—his own little paradigm, his own little 
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practice, his own little language-game—and then to crawl into it.^ ^ Dudly 
Shapere maintains the same view; he says that it is impossible to segregate a 
component of the meanings of terms occurring in different theories such that 
those theories will have the same, or overlapping , observational 
vocabularies; even though the same terms may occur in those different 
theories, those terms do not have the same meanings, for meaning depends 
intimately on and varies with theoretical context."*^ Moreover, as a problem 
changes, so , often, does the standard that distinguishes a real scientific 
solution from a mere metaphysical speculation, word-game, or metaphysical 
play. The normal scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution 
is not only incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which 
has gone before.'** 
However, Kuhn denies the thesis that a theory is rejected when it is 
falsified by a fact. He shows that every theory meets with different anomalies, 
i.e. facts contradicting it, but is never rejected by scientists unless they find a 
theory better than the previous one.'*^ In science, the testing situation never 
consists simply in the comparison of a single paradigm with nature. Instead, 
testing occurs as part of the competition between two rival paradigms for the 
allegiance of the scientific community.^" The decision to reject one paradigm 
is simultaneously the decision to accept another; and the judgment leading to 
that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with 
each other.'' 
Thus, what can be said is that no standards of rationality operate in any 
process of justification between the successive theories. History of science is 
a testimony to the same. Copemicanism made few converts for almost a 
century after Copernicus' death; Newton's work was gradually accepted, 
particularly on the continent, more than half a century after the principia 
appeared; Priestly never accepted the oxygen theory; nor Lord Kelvin the 
electromagnetic theory; and so on. Therefore, Maxplank remarked that a new 
scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making 
them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new 
generation grows up which is familiar with the new." 
For Feyerabend, standards that have worked for scientific research, 
work not for their logical force but for their material effect. Just as a well 
134 
trained pet will obey his master no matter how great the confusion in which 
he finds himself, and no matter how urgent the need to adopt new pattern of 
behaviour, so, in the very same way a well trained rationalist will obey the 
mental image of his master, he will conform to the standards of argumentation 
he has learnt, he will adhere to these standards no matter how great the 
confusion in which he finds himself, and he will be quite incapable of 
realizing that what he regards as the 'voice of reason' is but a causal after-
effect of the training he has received. He will be quite unable to discover that 
the appeal to reason to which he succumbs so readily is nothing but a 
political manoeuvre.^^ Therefore, we conclude that there does not exist the 
rationality by which scientists would be able to justify which of the paradigms 
is better, or, how much it fits the nature. 
Paradigm-shift: Replacement without Retention 
Kuhn mentions that in principle, a new phenomenon might emerge 
without reflecting destructively upon any part of past scientific practice. For 
example, discovering life in some less well known part of the galaxy would 
not destruct the existing paradigm that is incompatible with the existence of 
life on the moon (though today discovering the existence of life on the moon 
would destruct the existing paradigm). By the same token, a new theory does 
not have to conflict with any of its predecessors. It might deal exclusively 
with phenomena not previously known. For example, the quantum theory 
deals with subatomic phenomena unknown before twentieth century. Or, the 
new theory might be simply a higher-level theory than those known before. 
This higher-level theory links together a whole group of lower level theories 
without substantially changing any. Today, the theory of energy conservation 
provides just such links between dynamics, chemistry, electricity, optics, 
thermal theory and so on. Still other compatible relationships between old and 
new theories can be conceived. If they were scientific, the development would 
be genuinely cumulative.^'' 
But there is increasing reason he says, to wonder whether accumulation 
can possibly be an image of science. For, after pre-paradigm period the 
assimilation of all the new theories and of almost all new sorts of phenomena 
demands the destruction of a prior paradigm. Consequently, there grows a 
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conflict between competing schools of scientific thought. Cumulative 
acquisition of novelty is not only rare in fact, but also improbable in principle. 
For him, only normal research is cumulative. For, the man who is striving to 
solve a problem defined by existing knowledge and technique, is not, 
however, just looking around. He knows what he wants to achieve, and he 
designs his instrument and directs his thought accordingly. But, unanticipated 
novelty, the new discovery, can emerge only to the extent that his 
anticipations about nature and his instruments prove wrong. So, there must be 
a conflict between the paradigms that disclose anomalies. 
There are, in principle, only three types of phenomena, in response to 
which a new theory might be developed. The first consists of phenomena 
already well explained by existing paradigm, and these explanations seldom 
provide either motive or point of departure for theory construction. When they 
do, the theory that results is seldom accepted. A second class of phenomena 
consists of those whose nature is indicated by existing paradigms, but whose 
details can be understood only through further theory articulations. These are 
the phenomena to which scientists direct their research much of the time, but 
that research aims at the articulation of existing paradigms rather than at the 
invention of new ones. Kuhn says, that only when these attempts at 
articulation fail, do scientists encounter the third type of phenomena. These 
phenomena are recognized anomalies whose characteristic feature is their 
stubborn refusal to be assimilated to existing paradigm. This type alone gives 
rise to new theories.^^ This kind of new theory demands the replacement of 
the old. For, hypothesis which is new gives us the evidence that cannot be 
obtained in any other way. Therefore, the consistency condition, condition 
which demands that new hypothesis agrees with accepted theories, cannot be 
conformed. History of science tells us that Newton's theory is inconsistent 
with Galileo's law of free fall and with Kepler's law; that geocentric 
astronomy is inconsistent with the heliocentric one; that wave optics is 
inconsistent with geometrical optics; and so on .^ ^ 
Now if new theories are called forth to resolve anomalies in the 
relation of an existing paradigm, then, according to Kuhn, the successful new 
theory must somewhere pennit predictions that are different from those 
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arrived from its predecessors. And that difference could not occur if the two 
were logically compatible. So in the process of being assimilated, the second 
must displace the first. For example, even a theory like energy conservation, 
which today seems a logical superstructure, did not develop historically 
without paradigm destruction. Instead, it emerges from a crisis in which an 
essential ingredient was the incompatibility between Newtonian dynamics and 
caloric theory of heat. Only after the caloric theory of heat had been rejected, 
could energy conservation become part of science. So, it is hard to see how 
new theories could arise without these destructive changes in beliefs about 
nature.^^ 
Kuhn argues that by nature, the successive paradigms are different 
from each other, because they tell us different things about the population of 
the universe and their behavior. For example, they differ about such questions 
as the existence of subatomic particles, the materiality of light and the 
conservation of energy. These are the substantive differences between 
successive paradigms. But paradigm differs in more than substance, for, they 
are directed not only to nature, but also back upon the science. For, they are 
the source of the methods, problem-field, and standards of solution. As a 
result, the reception of a new paradigm often necessitates a redefinition of the 
corresponding science. Therefore, some old problems may be relegated to 
another science or declared unscientific. Others that were previously 
nonexistent or trivial, may, with a new paradigm, become the very archetypes 
of significant scientific achievements. Moreover, the problems change, so 
often alongwith the standards that distinguish a real scientific solution from a 
mere metaphysical speculation, word-game, or mathematical play. So, the 
normal scientific research of the successive paradigms is not only 
incompatible but also often actually incommensurable.^^ 
Paradigms constitute the ways in which scientists of different traditions 
view the world. They guide scientists differently when they frame their 
experiments and theories. A paradigm determines what the scientist of a given 
tradition takes to be the facts, what his problems are, and the standard he 
requires a theory to meet; and all these will, in general, var}' from paradigm to 
paradigm .For example, since Newtonian physics is based on a paradigm 
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different from Einstein's; the later is not, a more general and accurate version 
of the former; terms such as 'space', 'time', 'mass' and the like have entirely 
different meaning in the two theories.^^ S. Toulmin argues that men who 
accept different ideas and paradigms will not even have the same problems; 
events which are 'phenomena' in one man's eyes will be passed over by the 
other as 'perfectly natural'.^ *^ 
For Kuhn, new theory means a transition from the old. He says that 
the transition is not achieved by an articulation or extension of the old 
paradigm. Rather it is a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals. 
This is a reconstruction that changes some of the field's most elementary 
theoretical generalizations as well as many of its methods and applications. 
During the transition period, there will be large but never complete overlap 
between the problems that can be solved by the old and by the new paradigm. 
But there will be a decisive difference in the models of solution when the 
transition is complete. The profession will have changed its view of the field, 
its methods and its goal. 
According to him, this transition is just like 'picking up the other end 
of the stick'. This is a process that involves handling the same bundle of data 
as before, but placing them in a new system of relations with one another by 
giving them a different framework'. Or, this is like a visual gestalt; the marks 
on paper that were first seen as a bird are now seen as an antelope, or, vice 
versa. However, he says that parallel can be rhisleading. Scientists do not see 
some thing as 'something else'; instead, they simply see it .we have already 
examined some of the problems created by saying that Priestly saw oxygen as 
dephlogisticated air. In addition, the scientist does not preserve gestalt's 
subject's freedom to switch back and forth between ways of seeing. 
Nevertheless the switch of gestalt is useful elementary prototype for what 
occurs in full-scale paradigm shift.^' 
Kuhn holds that when paradigms change, the world itself changes with 
them. Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in 
new places. Even more important, during revolution scientists see new and 
dirferenl things when looking with familiar instruments in place thc>' have 
looked before. He says that, it is rather, as if, the professional community had 
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been suddenly transported to another planet where familiar objects are seem 
in different light and are joined by unfamiliar ones as well. Thus after 
revolution, scientists are responding to different worlds. At this point, the 
familiar demonstrations of a switch in visual gestalt prove so suggestive. 
What were ducks; in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits 
afterwards. The man who first saw the exterior of the box from above, later 
sees its interior from below. The world is not fixed once and for all by the 
nature of environment and of science. Rather it is determined jointly by the 
environment and by the normal scientific tradition. Therefore, when the 
normal scientific tradition changes, the scientist's perception of his 
environment must be reeducated, and he must learn to see a new gestalt. After 
he has done so, the world of his research will seem here there, 
incommensurable with the one he had inhabited before. Scientists from 
different worlds, then, operate at cross-purposes.^^ 
The change of paradigm with the character of this sort is called by 
Kuhn scientific revolution. For him, essential part of the change can be 
described by the metaphor of this political term; there is parallelism between 
political change and scientific change. Political revolutions are inaugurated by 
the political community. There grows a sense that existing institutions have 
ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment and, in part, 
created by the same institutions. In much the same way, scientific revolutions 
are inaugurated by growing sense that an existing paradigm has ceased to 
function adequately in the exploration of nature to which that paradigm itself 
had previously led the way. In both political and scientific development, the 
sense of malftinction that leads to crisis is prerequisite to revolution.^^ 
However, scientific revolutions, seem revolutionary only to those 
whose paradigms are affected by them. To outsider they may seem normal 
parts of the development process. Astronomers, for example, could accept x-
rays as mere addition to knowledge, because their paradigms were unaffected 
by the existence of the new radiation. But for men like Kelvin, Crookes, and 
Roentgen, whose research dealt with radiation theory with cathode ray tubes, 
the emergence of x-rays necessarily violated their paradigm.''^ 
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Kuhn analyses political revolution and shows that scientific revolution 
occurs in the same way. He says that political revolutions aim to change 
political institutions in ways that those institutions themselves prohibit their 
own applications. Their success therefore necessitates the partial 
relinquishment of one set of institutions in favor of another, and in the 
interim, society is not governed by institutions at all. Initially it is crisis that 
attenuates the roles of political institutions, as we have already seen it 
attenuates the role of paradigms. An increasing number of individuals become 
increasingly alienated from political life and behave more and more 
eccentrically within it. Then many of those individuals commit themselves to 
some concrete proposals for the reconstruction of society in a new 
institutional framework. At that point the society is divided into competing 
camps or parties - one seeks to defend the old institutional constellation, the 
other seeks to institute some new one. 
Once that polarization has occurred, political recourse fails. Because 
they differ about the institutional matrix within which political change is to be 
achieved and evaluated, and because they acknowledge no supra-institutional 
framework for the adjudication of revolutionary difference. Then the parties 
to revolutionary conflict must finally resort to the techniques of mass 
persuasion, often including force. Though revolutions have had a vital role in 
the evolution of political institutions, that role depends upon their being 
partially extra-political and extra-institutional events. 
Kuhn says that the historical study of paradigm change reveals very 
similar characteristics in the evolution of science. Like the choice between the 
competing political institutions, the choice between competing paradigms 
proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community's life. Here 
also the choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the evaluative 
procedures, and, for, normal science depend in part upon a particular 
paradigm whereas that paradigm itself is at issue. When paradigms enter into 
a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each group 
uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense. The resulting 
circularity does not make the arguments wrong or even ineffectual. The man 
who premises a paradigm, when arguing in its defense, can nevertheless 
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provide a clear exhibit of what scientific practice will be like for those who 
adopt the new view of nature. For Kuhn, that exhibit can be immensely 
persuasive, and often competitively so. Yet whatever its force is, the status of 
the circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made logically or 
even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into the circle. 
As in political revolution, so in paradigm choice, there is no standard higher 
than the assent of the relevant community. The community of scientists within 
which persuasive arguments are effective, becomes quite a social group. 
Aronson says that scientific change is not an objective, continuous, 
process, but is driven by social and political forces, which make a 
replacement of the old by an entirely new set of scientific institutions. Thus, 
scientific progress cannot be characterized as a linear accumulation of 
knowledge.^^ Kuhn says that periods of revolution overthrow the old 
paradigm and break the continuity. The new theories are incommensurable 
with the old ones. ^^  
So, since the new paradigm is entirely conflicting with the old, they 
cannot both be accepted simultaneously; but rather the new can be accepted 
only if the old is rejected. 
4.3 Paradigm-shift and the Question of Realism 
Psychology of Discovery 
Construction of a paradigm and replacement of the earlier by the later 
paradigm are the activities that are directed mostly on the basis of 
psychological elements effective on scientists' thought. As a result, both 
activities remain far from being objective. Moreover, paradigm-shift occurs 
essentially to meet up the crisis. This is an instrumentalist aim of theory 
where theory is constructed with the purpose to solve the puzzles. In other 
words, paradigm does not aim to describe the reality of the world. Given the 
characteristics of paradigm, scientists do not shift their allegiance from one 
paradigm to another on the basis of any rationale, such as, testing, 
verification, falsification etc. In this matter neither proof nor error is at issue. 
How, then, do they reject the old and accept the new paradigm? Shapere says 
that 'no process yet discovered by the historical study of scientific 
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development at all resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by 
direct comparison with nature. That remark does not mean that scientists do 
not reject scientific theories, or that experience and experiments are not 
essential to the process in which they do so. But it does mean that the act of 
judgment that leads scientists to reject a previously accepted theory is always 
based upon more than a comparison of that theory with the world. 
Feyerabend says that arguments that are offered by Galileo do not 
suffice and his utterances are indeed arguments in appearance only. For, 
Galileo uses propaganda. He uses psychological tricks in addition to whatever 
intellectual reason he has to offer. These tricks are very successful: they led 
him to victory. His propaganda obscures this fact by insinuating that the new 
results which emerge are known and conceded by all, and need only be called 
to our attention to appear as the most obvious expression of the truth. He says 
that Galileo reminded us that there are situations in which the non-operative 
character of shared motion is just as evident and as firmly believed as the idea 
of the operative character of all motions is in other circumstances. The 
situations are: events in a boat, in a smoothly moving carriage.^^ The counter-
inductive argument, which was proposed by Galileo, is: you cannot discern 
the whirling of the earth and to rock placed on to the tower, because in 
common with the rock, you possess from the earth that motion which is 
required for following the tower; you do not need to move your eyes. Next, if 
you add to the rock a downward motion which is peculiar to it and not shared 
by you, and which is mixed with this circular motion, the circular portion of 
the motion which is common to the stone and the eye continuous to be 
imperceptible. The straight motion alone is sensible, for, to follow that you 
must move your eyes downward. This is strong persuasion indeed. Yielding 
to this persuasion, we now quite automatically start considering the conditions 
of the two cases and becomes relativist. His is the essence of Galileo's 
trickery.^" 
New theory is less competent, so if it is to succeed, the only way is to 
resort to means other than arguments. It will have to be brought about by 
irrational means such as propaganda, emotion, ad hoc hypothesis, and appeal 
to prejudices of all kinds. We need this irrational means in order to uphold 
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what is nothing but a blind faith until we have found the auxiliary science, the 
facts, the arguments that turn the faith into sound knowledge.^' No discovery 
comes with full-fledged adequacy at the start. Only in the future research 
through ad hoc hypotheses, which opens up the possibilities, theory gets 
maturity. Copernicus who invents a counter induction as opposed to 
Ptolemy's becomes successful leading to progress in science, acted simply on 
faith. And on Galileo provides support to Copernicus by his new dynamics 
and new instruments, telescope—both of which were again, based on 
psychological trickery, propaganda and so on. The new dynamics removes the 
inconsistency between the motion of the earth and the conditions affecting 
ourselves, and those in the air above us. But the new dynamics, by which he 
offers support to Copernicus, was not adequate to follow according to 
scientific method. 
We start with a strong belief that runs counter to contemporary reason 
and contemporary experience. The belief spreads and finds support in other 
beliefs which are equally unreasonable. Research now gets deflected in new 
directions, new kinds of instruments are built, evidence is elated to theories in 
new ways until there arises an ideology that is rich enough to provide 
independent arguments for any particular part of it. We can say today that 
Galileo was on the right track. For, his persistent pursuit of what once seemed 
to be a silly cosmology has by now created the material needed to defend it. 
And this is not an exception -it is the normal case: theories become clear and 
reasonable only after their incoherent parts have been used for a long time. 
Such unreasonable, nonsensical, unmethodological foreplay thus turns out to 
be an unavoidable precondition of clarity and of empirical success.^^ 
Kuhn holds that the transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm 
is a conversion experience that cannot be performed on the basis of method. 
Any scientist -particularly whose productive career has committed him to the 
older tradition - put up a life-long resistance to an upcoming paradigm. Like a 
determination on religious faith, he would not be accused of violating the 
standards, because there are no such standards to be violated. This is why 
Laudan says that Priestley's continued refusal to accept the theorv of 
Lavoisier though unreasonable, was neither illogical nor unscientific.^'' 
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Kuhn says that the source of resistance is the assurance that the older 
paradigm will ultimately solve all its problems. Inevitably, at the time of a 
revolution, scientists sometimes becomes stubborn and pigheaded. But it is 
also something more, for, some assurance is what makes normal or puzzle-
solving science possible. It is only through normal science professional 
community exploits the potential scope and precision of the older paradigm; 
and then isolate the anomalies out of which a new paradigm may emerge. So 
another pigheadedness towards the anomalies is necessary for the new 
paradigm to emerge. It is 'belief on which the second kind of pigheadedness 
lies—belief that the new will solve all the problems. 
He says, when a new candidate for paradigm is first proposed, it has 
seldom solved more than a few of the problems it confronts; and most of 
those solutions are still far from perfect. Until Kepler, the Copemican theory 
scarcely improved upon the prediction of planetary position made by 
Ptolemy. When Lavoisier saw oxygen as 'the air itself entire' his new theory 
could cope not at all with the problems presented by the proliferation of new 
gases, a point that Priestly made with great success in his counter attack. It is 
only much later, after the new paradigm has been developed, accepted, and 
exploited that the new arguments are developed. Though even in the area of 
crisis the new paradigm is little superior to its traditional rival, it is 'belief — 
that the new will solve all the problems in future—on which the proponents 
hold on to the new. Of course, the new handles some problems better and has 
disclosed some new regularity. But the older paradigm can presumably be 
articulated to meet these challenges as it has met other before. Both Tycho 
Brahe's earth-centered astronomical system and the later versions of the 
phlogiston theory were responses to challenges posed by a new candidate for 
paradigm, and both were quite successful.^^ 
In addition, Kuhn holds that the defenders of the old paradigm can 
almost always point to the problems that its new rival has not solved and that 
are the strong support for the old. Until the discovery of the composition of 
the water, the combustion of hydrogen was a strong argument for the 
phlogiston theory and against Lavoisier's. After oxygen theory had triumphed 
it could still not explain the preparation of a combustible gas from carbon . 
144 
which is a strong support for phlogiston theory. For Kuhn, even in the area of 
crisis the balance of arguments and counter-arguments is very close indeed. In 
addition, outside that area, the balance will often decisively favor the old. In 
short, if a new candidate for paradigm had to be judged from the start by 
hardheaded people who examine only relative problem-solving ability, the 
science would experience very few major revolutions. 
Therefore, we see in the history of science that method cannot guide 
research and psychological tricks can bring the success of the theory. There 
are some situations when our most liberal judgments and our most liberal 
rules would have eliminated an idea which we regard today as essential for 
science. The ideas survived, but they cannot be said to be in agreement with 
reason. They survived because prejudices, passion, conceit, errors, sheer 
pigheadedness, in short all the elements that criticize the context of discovery 
and are opposed to the dictates of reason were permitted to have their way. To 
express it differently: Copemicanism and other irrational views exist today 
only because reason was overruled at some time in their past.'^ 
It follows that paradigm debates are not really about relative problem-
solving ability. Instead, the issue is which paradigm should , in future, guide 
research on problems many of which neither competitor can yet claim to 
resolve completely .So the man who embraces a new paradigm at early stage, 
must have faith that the paradigm will succeed with many large problems. A 
decision of that kind can only be made on faith. Kuhn says, for revolution, 
there must be at least few scientists who feel that the new proposal is on the 
right track and sometimes only personal and inarticulate aesthetic 
considerations can do that. Neither Copernicus' astronomical theory nor 
DeBroglie's theory of matter had many other significant grounds of appeal. 
Even today, Einstein's general theory attracts men principally on aesthetic 
ground - an appeal, which few people previously had been able to 
experience. Arnson says, 'if truth, logic, and experimentation would not be 
the primary considerations in a debate over paradigms, then scientific 
progress would be like the development of taste in an aesthetic community.^'' 
However, this is not to suggest that new paradigm's triumph ultimately 
comes through some mystical aesthetics. On the contrary, very few men 
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desert a tradition for reasons alone. Often those who do, turn out to have been 
misled. But if a paradigm is ever to triumph it must gain some first 
supporters—men who will develop it to the point where hardheaded 
arguments can be produced and multiplied. And even those arguments, when 
they come are not individually decisive, for, scientists are reasonable men, 
one or the other argument will ultimately persuade many of them . However, 
there is no single argument that can persuade them all. Rather than a single 
group conversion, what occurs is an increasing shift in the distribution of 
professional allegiance.*" 
Kuhn also says that what intervenes between the first sense of trouble, 
and the recognition of an available alternative, must be largely unconscious. 
Among other cases, however, Copemican, Einsteinian, and contemporary 
nuclear theory can be cited to show that considerable time elapses between 
the first consciousness of breakdown and the emergence of a new paradigm. 
At the start, a few candidates for paradigm may have few supporters. 
Moreover, on occasions, supporters' motive may be suspect. Nevertheless, if 
they are competent, they will improve it, explore its possibilities, and show 
what it would be like. And as that goes on, if the paradigm is once destined to 
win its flight, the number and strength of the persuasive arguments in its favor 
will increase. More scientists will then be converted, and the exploration of 
the new paradigm will go on. Gradually, the number of experiments, 
instruments, articles, and books based upon the paradigm will multiply. Still 
more men, convinced of the new view's fruitfulness, will adopt the new mode 
of practicing normal science, until at least only a few elderly hold-outs 
remain. Moreover, even they, we cannot say, are wrong. Though historian can 
always find men —Priestley for example — who were unreasonable to resist 
for as long as they did, he will not find a point at which resistance becomes 
illogical or unscientific. At the most, he may wish to say that the man who 
continues to resist after his whole profession has been converted has ipso-
facto ceased to be a scientist.*^ 
This is why Aronson says, debate over theory choice, cannot be cast in 
form that fully resembles the logical or mathematical proof. Rather debate is 
about premises, and its recourse is to persuasion as a prelude to the possibility 
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of proof. The debate over theory acceptance is ultimately about values and it 
cannot be settled either by proof or by experiment. The superiority of one 
theory to another cannot be proved in the debate. Instead, each party must try 
0-3 
by persuasion to convert the other. 
This pattern of scientific change follows three things which are part of 
the human psychological move: 
1. The criteria of choice between theories function not as rules, which 
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determine choice, but as values, which influence it. 
2. Tests are being conducted all the time, but these tests are of a particular 
sort, for, in the final analysis, it is the individual scientist rather than 
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current theory, which is tested. 
3. Kuhn's view seems to imply that a theory is not accepted because it is 
better than any alternative; on the contrary, it is called 'better' because it 
Of. 
is accepted. 
In the final analysis, it is asserted that there is no logic of discovery 
that would assure us that our invention does achieve some bits of truth (or, 
nearer to truth) than the rival position. But great science and scientists, like 
great poets, are often inspired by non- rational intuition. 
Seeing Something As 
We have seen that all the scientific activities are determined by 
paradigm. And we have also seen that paradigm is product of human 
intellectual work. Given the facts stated here, the reality, in other words, 
'thing-in-itself, is beyond the scientific capacity, for, all scientific activities 
are closed into the paradigm. We can understand something more about 
paradigm when we look at the Nature through some paradigm; we shall 
realize that our understanding of the world is paradigm-dependent. There is 
no paradigm-free understanding. We do not see a thing as it is, we see what 
our paradigm suggests us to see. 
Kuhn exemplifies the matter with ' playing-card experiment'. The 
players, until taught by prolonged exposure that universe contains anomalous 
cards, saw only the types of cards for which previous experience had 
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equipped them. Once they are provided the requisite additional categories, 
they are able to see ail anomalous cards in the first inspection. Still other 
experiments demonstrate that the perceived size and color of experimentally 
displayed objects also vary with subjects' previous training and experience. 
However, scientific experiments are also like 'playing card experiment'. 
Paradigm provides the categories for scientists to see the anomalies. 
Kuhn mentions the example of the discovery Uranus. This is the 
example of seeing something as paradigm suggests. Europe's most eminent 
observers, astronomers had actually seen the star in the position that we now 
suppose to must have been occupied by Uranus. One of the best observers in 
this group had actually seen the star on four successive nights in 1769; he saw 
it without noting the motion that could have suggested another identification. 
Herschel first observed the same object twelve years later with much 
improved telescope of his own manufacture. As a result he was able to notice 
an apparent dish-size that was at least unusual for a star. Something was awry, 
and, therefore, he postponed identification pending further scrutiny. That 
scrutiny disclosed Uranus's motion among the stars, and Herschel therefore 
announced that he had seen a new comet. Only several months later, after 
fi^itfiil attempt to fit the observed motion to a cometary orbit, did Lexell 
suggest that the orbit was probably planetary. When that suggestion was 
accepted, there were fewer stars and one more planet in the world of the 
professional astronomers. 
However, it means that a celestial body that had been observed for 
almost a century was seen differently after 1781. Like anomalous playing 
card, it could no longer be filled to the perceptual categories (star or comet) 
provided by the previously prevailing paradigm. This happened also in 
chemistry. With the change of vision, Priestly had seen dephlogisticated air 
where others had seen nothing at all. In learning to see oxygen, Lavoisier had 
to change his view of many other more familiar substances. So Lavoisier saw 
nature differently.^^ 
What is discovered with the emergence of paradigm is not the part of 
the world, but it is an interpretation of observation of the world, which comes 
with new paradigm. Observations themselves are not fixed once and for all bv 
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nature of the environment and of the perceptual apparatus. According to 
Kuhn, what new comes with paradigm is an interpretation of the observations. 
On this view, Priestly and Lavoisier both saw oxygen, but they interpreted 
their observations differently. Aristotle and Galileo both saw pendulums; but 
they differed in their interpretation of what they both had seen. This discovery 
is neither wrong nor a mere mistake; this is a shift of scientist's mind about 
fundamental matter. Even individual data are not unequivocally stable. A 
pendulum is not a falling stone, nor is oxygen dephlogisticated air. 
Consequently, the data that scientists collect from direct observation are 
themselves different. More importantly, the process—by which scientists 
make transition from constrained fall to the pendulum, or, from 
dephlogisticated air to oxygen - is not one. There may be alternative 
processes to do the job. However, Kuhn says that the scientist who embraces 
a new paradigm is like the man wearing inverting lenses. He confronts the 
same constellation of objects, he nevertheless finds them transformed through 
and through in many of their details. 
For Feyerbend, if we become clear about the nature of the total 
phenomena, we will find that what we achieve by theory is different from 
'thing-in-itself. There are two things: one, noticing a phenomenon, the other, 
expressing it with the help of an appropriate statement. But when saying in a 
certain observational situation—'the moon is following me' or 'the stone is 
falling straight down', we may, of course, abstractly subdivide this process 
into parts, and we may also try to create a situation where statement and 
phenomenon seem to be psychologically apart and waiting to be related. But 
under normal circumstances such a division does not occur—statement and 
phenomenon are firmly glued together. Sensation and the mental process are 
so firmly connected with their reactions that a separation is difficult to 
achieve. The sensation and mental process together produce the unit of 
phenomenon. Thus produced phenomenon, considering the origin and the 
effect of such operations, is called 'natural interpretation'. It is an idea that is 
so closely connected with observations. In the history of thought natural 
interpretations have been regarded as a priori presuppostions of science.* "^ 
The history of science, after all, does not just consist of facts and 
conclusions drawn from facts. It also contains ideas, interpretations of facts, 
problems created by conflicting interpretations, mistakes, and so on. On 
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closer analysis we even find that science knows no 'bare facts' at all but that 
the facts that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are. 
therefore, essentially ideational. This being the case, the history of science 
will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the ideas it 
contains, and these ideas in turn will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, 
and entertaining, as are the minds of those who invented them.'^ ' History also 
tells us more things. The standards that justify the theory compete just as 
much as theories compete and we choose the standards most appropriate to 
historical situation in which the choice occurs. Knowledge so conceived is an 
ocean of alternatives subdivided by an ocean of standards. It forces our mind 
to make imaginative choices and thus makes it grow. It makes our mind 
capable of choosing, imagining, criticizing.^^ Boltzman writes, 'we cannot 
utter a single statement that would be a pure fact of experience'. For Duhem, 
'primary qualities are only provisional' and can be subdivided by further 
research. For Mach, 'all concepts are theoretical'.^^ 
There was no independent evidence in favor of the heliocentric theory. 
This was, at least initially, a conjecture that had no foundation in empirical 
facts. The only favorable remark that could be made was that it somewhat 
simplified calculations by a suitable coordinate transformation. This is a 
phenomenon well known in mathematical physics. There are many problems 
which admit of immediate solution, and whose solution is very cumbersome 
in different coordinates. Such choice and resulting mathematical success does 
not imply that the coordinate system chosen has any dynamical preference 
over other coordinate system. After all, the solubility of a problem, depends 
as much upon the mathematical formalism as upon nature. They exist 
asymmetric in the formalism, which do not exist in nature. The fact that the 
problem of positional astronomy can be dealt with in a more simple manner in 
a coordinate system, in which the Sun is at rest, therefore does not imply that 
the Sun is actually at rest and that the Earth moves.^'' 
It can be argued that a paradigm can touch the actual world if there is 
within its framework, increase of predictive accuracy, scope, and fertility of 
theories which ensure progress. This argument is quite similar to the argument 
that theory touches the reality because it survives. Nevertheless, this 'survival 
150 
value' will not attest to the truth or approach to the truth of hypothesis. For, 
history of science tells us that 'even false theory may well have survival 
value'.^^ Both wave theory of light and corpuscular theory, have been grounds 
for many technologies. Ptolemy's theory is still used for many successful 
predictions. 
We also cannot attribute truth to any theory that is accepted after the 
crisis, for, defeat or success of a theory is not a necessary sign of either 
falsehood or truth. Success or defeat happens to a theory in some 
circumstances in the history. In the history of science, we find that ideas are 
often rejected before they can show their strength. Even in a fair competition, 
one ideology, partly through accident, partly because greater attention is 
devoted to it, may assemble success and overtake its rivals. This does not 
mean that the beaten rivals are without merit and have ceased to be capable of 
making a contribution to knowledge. It only means that they have temporarily 
run out of the steam. They may return and defeat their defeaters. The 
philosophy of atomism is excellent example. It was introduced in antiquity 
with the purpose of saving microphenomena such as motion. It was overtaken 
by the dynamically more sophisticated philosophy of the Aristotelians, 
returned with the scientific revolution was pushed back with the development 
of continuity theories and returned again late in the nineteenth century, was 
again restricted by complimentarity etc. Or take the idea of motion of the 
Earth. It arose in antiquity, was defeated by the powerftil arguments of the 
Aristotelians, regarded as an incredible ridiculous view by Ptolemy, and yet 
staged a triumphant comeback in the seventeenth century. On the other hand, 
the rise, success and triumph of a new theory, point of view, or philosophy 
almost always leads to a considerable decrease of rationality and 
understanding. When the view is first proposed, it faces a hostile audience. 
The reasons are often disregarded, or laughed out of court, and unhappiness 
is the fate of the bold inventors. But if the reasons are understood and 
accepted, if there is some temporary success, then interest may be aroused and 
people may devote themselves to the study of the theory. Professional groups 
form and make the theory sufficiently respectable to be represented in 
conferences and meetings. Scientists and philosophers from distant fields 
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,trying to show their erudition, drop a hint here and there. This is quite an 
uninformed desire to be on the right side which is in turn taken as a sign of 
the great importance of the theory. But this increase in importance 
unfortunately is not accompanied by better understanding. Quite the contrary, 
problematic aspects which were originally introduced with the help of 
arguments, now become basic principles. Doubtful points, having been 
generally accepted, turn into slogans. Debates with opponents become 
standardized and also more and more unrealistic; for, the opponents, now 
seem to raise only quibbles. So, finally we have success but it is the success 
of a manoeuvre carried out in a void; not the success of a reasoned view 
overcoming difficulties.^ 
We simply cannot uncover nature, as it is, in order to compare our 
theories. Comparison is limited to the features among our theories, certainly 
not between theories and objective reality.^^ Paradigm may be wrong, but 
there is no way to correct it ; for, to correct something presupposes another 
paradigm which exists only in so far as that old paradigm is rejected. 
Therefore, there is acceptance and rejection, but not correction. 
Regarding, pure observational language; one has yet to be devised. The 
'duck-rabbit' shows that two men with the same retinal impressions can see 
different things; the inverting lenses show that two men with different retinal 
impressions can see the same thing. Actual language of observation has not 
ever supplied a generally applicable language of pure percepts. Therefore no 
language can produce mere natural and objective report on 'the given'.^^ 
Like a collection of data, in laboratory, scientists create the things. The 
operations and measurements that a scientist undertakes in the laboratory are 
not 'the given' of experience but rather 'the collected with difficulty'. There is 
not what the scientist sees. Rather they are concrete indices to the content of 
more elementary perceptions. And as such they are selected for the scrutiny, 
because they promise opportunity for the fruitful elaboration of an accepted 
paradigm. Therefore, operations and measurements are paradigm-determined. 
Science does not deal in all possible laboratory manipulations. Instead, it 
selects those manipulations, which are relevant to the juxtaposition o( a 
paradigm with the immediate experience, which is again determined, by the 
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paradigm. The measurements to be performed on a pendulum are not the 
ones relevant to the case of constrained fall. Nor are the operations relevant 
for the elucidation of oxygen's properties uniformly the same as those 
required for investigating the characteristics of dephlogisticated air. 
Since every part of scientific understanding is determined by paradigm, 
the achievements of scientific research become relative to the paradigm. In 
Aronson's language, not only experimental procedures are value-laden, but 
also standards, rules, values, and commitments—all are value-laden in the 
sense that they are determined by paradigm. Paradigm determines what the 
relevant data are, what questions we should ask, what experiments we to 
perform, how to handle the new data; what counts as evidence for or against a 
supposition, what counts as good or bad experimental result, and so on.'^° So, 
different paradigms make different understandings about the same world. It 
entails that what we achieve by our scientific equipments is not 'thing-in-
itself. Rather we see the things as paradigm represents them. In Margolis 
language: scientific terms are not synonymous with description.'*'' Therefore, 
in the process of paradigm-change we neither come 'closer to truth' nor 'more 
accurate description' of the world. Paradigm solves the puzzles whereas 
puzzles are artifacts. Therefore, what paradigm does is to supply the tools that 
construct a solution to the puzzle. 
To conclude, we can say that for Kuhn, paradigms are some accepted 
examples of actual scientific practice. They include law, theory, application 
and instrumentation. Particular scientific community acknowledges them as 
supplying the foundation for its further practice. Men whose research is based 
on a shared paradigm are committed to the same rules and standards for 
scientific practice. This commitment and the apparent consensus are 
prerequisite for normal science. Normal science means research firmly based 
on paradigm. The most important part of the nature of paradigm is its 
determination of all scientific activities. All activities of normal science are 
determined by paradigm. 
Further, we have discussed whether or not a paradigm-shift results in 
scicnlitlc progress. The relation of successive paradigms is stated as 
paradigm-shift versus scientific progress. The scientific march is sometimes 
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caught in a critically analomous situation leading to the breakdown of the 
existing paradigm and proliferation of competing but incommensurable 
paradigms for the resolution of the crisis. There are no transparadigmatic 
rational standards leading to such a resolution. In view of the same we cannot 
decide as to which of the competing paradigms is better. Scientific progress 
can only be ganged if we can somehow deem successive scientific paradigms 
to be increasingly or exceedingly better than the preceding ones. Since there 
is no common standard to make a judgment about the merits of the successive 
paradigms, we just can not assert whether or not paradigm-shift entails 
progress. Furthermore, a paradigm-shift is a replacement without retention. 
When paradigms change, the world itself changes with them, for during 
revolutions scientists see new and different things around them. What were 
ducks in the scientists' world before the revolution are rabbits afterward? 
Thirdly, we have discussed the question of realism: does paradigm-
shift entail the gradual attainment of truth? There are reasons to maintain that 
paradigm-shift does not entail the gradual attainment of truth. The first and 
foremost reason is that since there is no progress, there is no gradual 
attainment. Secondly, scientists are not committed to truth in their choice of 
paradigms. No discovery comes with fully-fledged adequacy at the start. In 
this condition, persuasion, propaganda, emotion, faith, etc. motivate the 
scientists to adhere to the new paradigm in the hope that in future it will 
become dominant. For Kuhn, transfer of allegiance from paradigm to 
paradigm is a religious conversion experience which cannot be performed on 
the basis of method. Lastly, since when we see the world through a paradigm, 
we do not see the world as it is, but rather we see the world as the paradigm 
suggests. Therefore, 'seeing something as' deflects us from the 'true 
description' of the world. 
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Chapte r -5 
The Research Programme and the Pattern of Progress 
5.1 Pattern of Progress in Research Programme 
Theory as a Research Programme 
Lakatos' research programme view stands on two things: first, the 
historical facts which Popper fails to accommodate in his view and second, 
the rationality of science. Regarding the first, he says, history of science tells 
us that scientists have thick skin. They do not abandon a theory merely 
because facts contradict it. They invent some rescue hypothesis to explain the 
anomalies, or if they cannot explain the anomaly, they ignore it, and direct 
their attention to other problems. Scientists talk about anomalies, recalcitrant 
instances, but they do not reject the theory merely for that. History of science, 
of course, has recorded the account of how crucial experiments killed 
theories, but this is an alleged reason for that, for such accounts are fabricated 
long after the theory had been abandoned. History is witness that Newtonians 
were not prepared to reject their theory in the face of recalcitrant evidence— 
they did not specify, as Popper suggests, under what conditions they would 
abandon Newtonian theory. Even some Newtonian scientists would have been 
exactly as nonplussed as are some Marxists. When Newton published his 
'principia', it could not properly explain even the motion of the moon; in fact, 
lunar motion refuted Newton. Not only that, the same thing happened to the 
relativity theory of Einstein; Kaufmann, a distinguished physicist, refuted 
Einstein's relativity theory in the very year it was published.' Historical 
evidence can be marshalled to show that scientists do not reject the theory 
with anomalies instantly. 
Regarding the second, Lakatos holds that scientists cannot be irrational 
about theory choice. We cannot, as opposed to Kuhn, capitulate and agree that 
a scientific revolution is just a psychological change in commitment. He says 
blind commitment to a theory is not an intellectual virtue; it is an intellectual 
crime. There must be the explicit demarcation between science and pseudo-
science, scientific progress and intellectual decay. So, there should be an 
objeclive standard of honesty.' 
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However, these two things; historical facts and intellectual demand 
should be accommodated in our understanding of the scientific change. Only 
then can we try to grasp how science progresses and what it achieves through 
this progress. In doing this work, Imre Lakatos, the philosopher of science, 
proposes a reconstruction of the history of science and claims that unit of 
scientific consideration is not an isolated theory, but rather a series of theories 
which he calls the 'scientific research programme'. 
Lakatos says that the typical descriptive unit of great scientific 
achievement is not an isolated hypothesis, but rather a research programme. 
Science is not simply trial and error, as Popper holds; a series of conjectures 
and refutations. For, the proposition 'all swans are white' may be falsified by 
the discovery of one black swan, but such trivial trial and error does not rank 
as science. Newtonian science could not have been science if it was just a set 
of four conjectures—^three laws of mechanics and the law of gravitation. But 
rather it has been science because, these four laws constitute only the 'hard 
core' of the Newtonian programme, and there is something more than 'hard 
core', which is called auxiliary hypotheses that make a vast protective belt to 
keep the hard core protected from refutation. Even more importantly, the 
research programme also has a heuristics, that is, a powerful problem solving 
machinery that digests anomalies and turns them into positive evidence. For 
instance, if any phenomenon say motion of a planet, goes against Newtonian 
theory, does not occur as it is expected by the Newtonian theory, the 
Newtonian scientist checks his conjectures concerning atmospheric refraction, 
propagation of light in magnetic storms, and hundreds of other conjectures 
which are all part of the Newtonian progamme, so that he can explain away 
the difficulty. Even he may imagine a hitherto unknown planet and calculate 
its position, mass and velocity in order to explain the anomaly.^ This is the 
heuristics power of the programme that is supplied by the auxiliary 
hypotheses building a protective belt round the hard core. 
For this character of the theory, Lakatos claims that Newton's theory 
of gravitation, Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, Marxism, 
Freudianism, all are research pogrammes. Each of them consists of a 
characteristic hard core stubbornly defended, a flexible protective belt, and its 
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elaborate problem-solving machinery. Each of them at any stage of its 
development has unsolved problems and undersigned anomalies. Lakatos says 
that all theories are born refuted and die refuted. However, they are not 
equally good; some have more powerful heuristic capacity to explain away 
the unsolved problems and some have less powerful heuristic capacity. But all 
research pogrammes have one common characteristic. They all predict novel 
facts—facts which had been undreamt of or contradicted by the previous 
theory. For instance, in 1686 Newton published his theory of gravitation. 
Newtonian scientists predicted the existence and exact motion of small 
planets that had never been observed before. Hally, working on Newtonian 
programme, calculated on the basis of observing a brief stretch of a comet's 
path that it returns in seventy-two years' time. He calculated to the minute 
when it would be seen again at a well-defined point of the sky. This was 
incredible. But seventy-two years later, when Newton and Hally were long 
dead, Hally's comet returned exactly as Hally predicted. Similarly, Einstein's 
programme made the stunning prediction that if one measures the distance 
between two stars in the night, and if one measures the distance between the 
two stars during the day, the two measures will be different. This is a novel 
fact that nobody had thought to make such an observation before Einstein's 
programme. These are the discoveries of the novel facts that every research 
programme does as common character. 
Lakatos also says that a research programme that does not discover any 
novel fact, or stops to discover novel facts, is a degenerating research 
programme. On the other hand, any research programme that continues to 
discover novel facts is a progressive research programme. In degenerating 
research progammes theories are fabricated only in order to accommodate 
known facts. For instance, Marxism never predicted a stunning novel fact; but 
rather it has some famous unsuccessful predictions. It predicted the absolute 
impoverishment of working class. It predicted that the first socialist 
revolution would take place in the industrially most developed society. It 
predicted that socialist society would be free of revolutions. It predicted that 
there would be no conflict of interest between socialist countries. Thus the 
early predictions of Marxism were bold and stunning but they failed. Marxists 
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explained all their failures. They explained the rising living standards of the 
working class by devising a theory of imperialism; they explained why the 
first socialist revolution occurred in the industrially backward Russia. They 
explained Berlin 1953, Budapest 1956,and Prague 1968. They explained the 
Russo-Chinese conflict. But their auxiliary hypotheses explaining away the 
anomalies were all cooked up after the event to protect Marxian theory from 
the facts. The Newtonian theory led to novel facts; the Marxian lagged behind 
the facts and has been running fast to catch up with them. So the Newtonian 
programme is progressive research programme, whereas the Marxian is 
degenerating programme. 
Therefore, according to Lakatos, the hallmark of empirical progress is 
not trivial verifications, but heuristic power. So, it is no success for 
Newtonian theory that stones, when dropped, fall toward the Earth, no matter 
how often this is repeated. Its success is the discovering of the novel facts. On 
the other hand, so-called refiitations are not the hallmarks of empirical failure, 
for all programmes grow in a permanent ocean of anomalies. What really 
counts are dramatic, unexpected, stunning predictions of novel facts. In this 
nature of the research programme there is the answer to the question as to 
how scientific revolutions come about. If we have two rival research 
programmes, where one is progressive and other is degenerating, scientists 
tend to join the progressive programme. This is the rationale of scientific 
revolutions. In this regard, Lakatos says that it is matter of intellectual honesty 
to keep the record of degenerating programme public, but it is not dishonesty 
to stick to a degenerating programme and try to turn it into a progressive one. 
This means that a theory does not change instantly. One must treat a budding 
programme leniently. For, a programme may take decades before they get off 
the ground and become empirically progressive. There may be criticism, but it 
cannot result into the rejection instantly. Unless there is no better theory, 
merely some isolated facts can never make any criticism effective. 
Programme criticizes another programme. The progressive programme 
replaces the degenerating programme, neither instantly nor irrationally.'' 
Lakatos explains why the change does not occur instantly. According 
to him. no experimental result can kill a theory in a full blow. For, a research 
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programme has a heuristic power to solve the problems. The auxiliary 
theories of the programme makes the protective belt round the programme, 
and explain away the recalcitrant evidence. A programme can be saved from 
counter-instances either by some auxiliary hypotheses or by a suitable 
interpretation of its terms. However, saving a theory may be of two kinds: one 
is progressive and other is degenerating. If the auxiliary theory does explain 
the anomalies and at the same time discover some novel facts some of which 
are corroborated, then this is a progressive problem-shift of the programme. 
On the other hand, if the auxiliary theory does explain the anomalies and at 
the same time it explains some known facts rather than discover novel facts, 
then this is a degenerating problem-shift of the programme.^ 
Therefore, any scientific theory has to be appraised together with its 
auxiliary hypotheses, its initial conditions, and even together with its 
predecessors, so that we may see by what sort of change it was brought about. 
It means that we appraise not any isolated theory but a series of theories. Let 
us take a series of theories, Tl, T2, T3, ... where each subsequent theory 
results from adding auxiliary clauses to the previous theory in order to 
accommodate some anomalies. Lakatos calls such a series as theoretically 
progressive. If each new theory has some excess empirical content, that is 
some novel hitherto unexpected facts, over its predecessors, and if some of its 
excess empirical content is also corroborated and leads us to actual discovery, 
then, for Lakatos, it is called empirically progressive. Finally Lakatos calls a 
problem-shift progressive if it is both theoretically and empirically 
progressive, and degenerating if it is not. For him, we accept a problem-shift 
as scientific only if it is, at least, theoretically progressive; if it is not we reject 
it as pseudo-science. Progressiveness is measured by the degree to which the 
series of theories leads us to the discovery of novel facts. We regard a theory 
in the series 'falsified' when it is superseded by a theory with higher 
corroborated content. This type of falsification thus shifts from the problem of 
how to appraise 'theories' to the problem of how to appraise 'series of 
theories'. Not an isolated theory, but only a series of theories can be said to be 
scientific or unscientific: to apply the term 'scientific' to a single theory is a 
category mistake.^ 
163 
However, the heuristic power of the programme has two different 
functions: negative heuristic and positive heuristic. The negative heuristic of a 
research programme isolates a 'hard core' of propositions, which are not 
exposed to falsification. These propositions are accepted by convention and 
are deemed irrefutable by those who implement the research programme. The 
positive heuristic is a strategy for constructing a series of theories in such a 
manner that shortcomings at any particular stage can be overcome. The 
positive heuristic is a set of procedural suggestions for dealing with 
anticipated anomalies. Anticipated anomalies means that anomalies that are 
anticipated by the programme when it is proposed. That is, when a 
programme is first produced, it is produced in an ocean of anomalies; some of 
them are corroborated and some are expected to be so. In other words, the 
existence of those anomalies is suggested by the programme itself. However 
as a research programme unfolds, a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses are 
created around the hard core of non-falsifiable propositions. So Lakatos's 
research programme goes like this: 
positive 
heuristic 
Theory I 
auxiliary 
rcore) 
hypotheses 
Theory 3 
For example the Newtonian research programme for the calculation of 
planetary and lunar orbits may be reconstructed as follows^: 
Theory 
T, 
T2 
Auxiliary hypothesis 
Sun stationary. 
Sun and planet are 
Point-masses such that 
ms>>mp 
Sun and planet move about 
common centre of gravity. 
Result of applying theory 
Kepler's laws deduced. 
Fit only approximate. 
Improved fit, but motions of 
Jupiter and Saturn are 
anomalous. 
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T3 
T4 
Acknowledge perturbations 
Seek approximate solutions to 
3-body interaction. 
Correction introduced for 
Asymmetric mass-distribution 
T. A trans-Uranic planet exists. 
Fit further improved. 
Anomalous motions of 
Jupiter and Saturn described 
byT3. 
Motion of Moon anomalous. 
Motion of Moon described 
with improved accuracy by T4. 
Anomalous motion of Uranus 
noted as more data becomes 
available. 
Neptune discovered near 
predicted location. 
For Lakatos test of a research programme is directed at the protective 
belt of auxiliary hypotheses. He emphasizes that a single negative test result 
does not refute an entire research programme. Given a negative test result, a 
fruitful strategy may modify the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses to 
accommodate the anomaly. Lakatos insisted that there are rules of appraisal of 
sequences of theories. Some sequences constitute 'progressive problem shift' 
and others constitute 'degenerating problem shift'. 
A sequence of theories Ti, T2, T3, ... is progressive if the following 
conditions are fulfilled: 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
Tn accounts for the previous success of Tn-1; 
Tn has greater empirical content thanTn-1; and 
Some of the excess content of Tn has been corroborated. Otherwise the 
problem shift is degenerating. 
Domain 
accounted for 
by Tn-1 and 
also by Tn 
Excess 
content of 
Tn 
Map of progressive problem shift 
Lakatos's criterion of incorporation with corroborated excess content. 
He emphasizes that this criterion is an objective criterion. A research 
programme receives an affirmative evaluation only so long as it displays the 
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power to anticipate and accommodate additional data. However, this objective 
criterion must be applied at a particular time. And a research programme that 
is judged degenerating at a particular stage of its development might stage a 
D 
comeback years later. 
Negative and Positive Heuristic 
However, we have shifted our problem from 'theory' to a 'series of 
theories' - Research programme. Such series in the growth of science, is 
characterized by a certain continuity, which cormects their members. This 
continuity evolves from a genuine research programme. This programme 
consists of methodological rules: Some tell us what path of research to avoid 
(negative heuristic), and others what paths to pursue (positive heuristic).^ 
Huristic of a particular research programme, for example, Cartesian 
metaphysics is : the universe is a huge clock work where push is the only 
cause of motion. This is a powerftil heuristic principle. It discouraged work on 
scientific theories like Newton's theory of action of distance, which are 
inconsistent with it. This kind of guidance is negative heuristic. On the other 
hand, it encouraged work on auxiliary hypotheses, which can save it from 
apparent counter evidence like Keplerian ellipses. This kind of guidance is 
positive heuristic. 
The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the modus 
tollens at this hard core. Instead, we must use our ingenuity to articulate or 
even invent auxiliary hypotheses, which form a protective belt around this 
core, and we must redirect the modus tollens to these. It is this protective belt 
of auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt of tests and adjusted and 
readjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the hardened core. A 
research programme is successful if all this leads to a progressive problem 
shift; unsuccessful if It leads to a degenerating problem shift. The classical 
example of a successful research programme is Newtonian gravitation theory 
- possibly the most successful research programme ever. When it was first 
produced, it was submerged in an ocean of anomalies and opposed by 
observational theories supporting these anomalies. But Newtonian theory 
turned, with brilliant tenacity and ingenuity, counter instances one after 
another into corroborating instances. It did it primarily by overthrowing the 
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original observational theories in the light of which this contrary evidence 
was established. In this process they themselves produced new counter-
examples, which they again resolved. They turned each new difficulty into a 
new victory of their programme. 
In Newtonian programme for example, the negative heuristic bids us to 
divert the modus tollens from Newton's three laws of dynamics and his law of 
gravitation. This core is irrefutable by methodological decision of its 
proponents. Anomalies must lead to changes only in the protective belt of the 
auxiliary, observational hypotheses and initial conditions. But its each 
successive link in this exercise predicts some new facts; each step represents 
an increase in empirical content. Each prediction is in the end verified, though 
they may have seemed momentarily to be refuted. As against empirical 
progress, theoretical progress may be verified immediately. We may be 
frustrated by a long series of 'refutations', but a lucky content-increasing 
auxiliary hypothesis may turn a chain of defeats into a resounding success 
story, either by revising some false facts, or by adding novel auxiliary 
hypotheses. We then say that we must require that each step of a research 
programme be consistently content- increasing. Each step constitutes a 
consistently progressive theoretical problem shift. All we need, in addition to 
this, is that every increase in the content should be seen to be retrospectively 
corroborated. The programme as a whole should also display an intermittently 
progressive empirical shift; we do not demand that each step should produce 
immediately an observed new fact. The term intermittently gives sufficient 
rational scope for dogmatic adherence to a programme in the face of prima 
facie refutations. We maintain that if and when the programme ceases to 
anticipate novel facts, its hard core might have to be abandoned. 
Research programmes, besides their negative heuristic, are also 
characterized by their positive heuristic. Even the most rapidly and 
consistently progressive research programmes can digest their counter 
evidences only piecemeal. Lakatos pointed out that a programme emerges 
among the ocean of anomalies and the anomalies are never completely 
exhausted, though the heuristic effort keeps solving them. But it should not be 
thought that yet unexplained anomalies are taken in random order, without 
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any preconceived order. The order is usually decided in the theoretician's 
cabinet, independently of the known anomalies. Few theoretical scientists 
engaged in a research programme pay undue attention to refutation. They 
have a long-term research policy, which anticipates these refutations. This 
research policy, or order of research, is set out more or less in detail in the 
positive heuristic of the research programme. The negative heuristic specifies 
the hard core of the programme that is refutable by the methodological 
decision of its proponents; the positive heuristic consists of a partially 
articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to change, develop the 
'refutable variants' of the research programme, how to modify, sophisticate, 
the refutable protective belt." 
Here, we are to remember that the word 'heuristic' and the word 
'methodology' are not the same thing. Although their function is in general 
sense the same, but there is some essential difference. The word 'heuristic' is 
also used by Whewell. The meaning of this word is 'the art of discovery'. 
This meaning is not far from what we commonly mean by 'methodology'. 
The two words run alongside in Lakatos work. Heuristic is a theory of finding 
out, or, advice on 'how to solve the problem'. Heuristic is forward-looking 
advice, telling how to get on with the job. But 'methodology' is backward-
looking advice—it always suggests to scientist the pre-established rules. But 
heuristic may invent its own rules for its own purpose to solve the problem. 
Each research programme has it own forward-looking heuristic. The 
unspecific maxims about proliferation of programme, modesty and 
pigheadedness that are seen in the history of science, are a matter of heuristic 
rather than that of methodology.'^ 
However, the positive heuristic of a programme saves the scientists 
from becoming confused by the ocean of anomalies. The positive heuristic 
sets out a programme which lists an ocean of ever more complicated models 
simulating reality. The scientists' attention is riveted on building these 
models. And these models follow the instructions that are laid down in the 
positive part of his programme. They ignore the actual counter examples, and 
also the available data. For example. Newton first worked out his programme 
for a planetary system with a fixed point like Sun and one single point—like 
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planet. It was in this model that he derived his inverse square law for Kepler's 
ellipse. But this model was forbidden by Newton's own third law of 
dynamics. Therefore, the model had to be replaced by one in which both Sun 
and planet revolve round their common center of gravitation. This change was 
not motivated by any observation but by a theoretical difficulty in developing 
the programme. Then he worked out the programme for more planets as if 
there were only heliocentric but no interplanetary forces. Then he worked out 
the case where the Sun and planets were not mass- points but mass-balls. 
Again, for this change he did not need the observation of an anomaly; infinite 
density was forbidden by a touchstone theory, therefore planets had to be 
explained. This change involved considerable mathematical difficulties, held 
up Newton's work and delayed the publication of the principia, by more than 
a decade. Having solved this puzzle, he started working on spinning balls and 
their wobbles. Then he admitted interplanetary forces and started work on 
'perturbation'. At this point he started to look more anxiously at the facts, 
many of them were beautifully explained by this model, many were not. It 
was then that he started to work on bulging planets, rather than round planets, 
etc. This is why Newton despises people who stumbled on a first naive model 
but did not have the tenacity and ability to develop it into a research 
programme. He despises people who thought that a first version, which is a 
mere aside, constituted a discovery. Newton held up publication until his 
programme had achieved a remarkable progressive shift.'^ 
Most, if not all, Newtonian 'puzzles', which lead to a series of new 
variants of the programme superseding each other, were foreseeable at the 
time of Newton's first naive model. No doubt Newton and his colleagues did 
foresee them. Newton must have been fully aware of the blatant falsity of his 
first variants of the programme. So there is another thing in the programme, 
which is called 'model'. A model is a set of inifial conditions, which is bound 
to be replaced during the further development of the programme, and one 
even knows, more or less, how. From this point of view, there may be manv 
irrelevant refutations of any specific variant of the programme. But the 
existence of these irrelevant refutations is fully expected and there is positive 
heuristic as a strategy both for predicting and digesting them.'^ Let us imagine 
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a situation, which will illuminate the positive heuristic. Firstly, the three 
consecutive versions Tl, T2, T3, predict some new facts successfully but 
others unsuccessfully, that is, each version is both corroborated and refuted in 
turn. Finally, H4 is proposed which predicts some novel facts but stands up to 
the severe tests. Problem-shift of this kind is progressive. This intermittent 
success is due to the positive heuristic. 
Positive heuristic is very flexible guidance. We may formulate the 
positive heuristic of a research pogramme as a metaphysical principle. For 
instance, one may formulate Newton's programme like this: ' the planets are 
essentially gravitating spinning- tops of roughly spherical shape'. In research 
programme, Lakatos says that this idea was never rigidly maintained. The 
planets are not just gravitational; they have also, for example, electromagnetic 
characteristics, which may influence their motion. Positive heuristic is thus, in 
general, more flexible than negative heuristic. Moreover, it occasionally 
happens that when a research programme gets into a degenerating phase, a 
little revolution or a creative shift in its positive heuristic may push it forward 
again. Therefore, the 'hard core' is separate from the more flexible, 
metaphysical principles expressing the positive heuristic.'^ 
This considerations show that the positive heuristic forges ahead with 
almost complete disregard of reftitations. Although one must point out that 
any verification of the ( n+1)"' version of the programme is a refutation of the 
n"" version, some defeats of the subsequent versions are always foreseen. It is 
the verifications that keep the programme going, recalcitrant instances 
notwithstanding. We may appraise their heuristic power even after their 
elimination: how many new facts did they produce, how great was their 
capacity to explain refutations in the course of their growth, etc."' We may 
also appraise them for the stimulus they gave to mathematics. The real 
difficulties for the theoretical scientists arise rather from the mathematical 
difficulties of the programme than from anomalies. The greatness of the 
Nevv'tonian programme comes partly from the development—by Newtonian— 
classical infinitesimal analysis which was a crucial precondition of its 
success.''' 
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Relative Autonomy of Research Programme 
Pattern of scientific progress in the change of research programme is 
understood on the basis of two main ideas : relative autonomy of research 
programme and the status of crucial experiment. Both these ideas establish the 
fact that a research programme does not become rejected with the emergence 
of a crucial experiment showing the counter-evidence. But rather every 
research programme is possessed of some degree of autonomy for which a 
research programme ignores the counter-evidence. However, this basic idea 
makes scientific progress rational. The relative autonomy of theoretical 
science is a historical fact. Autonomy of the a research programme means that 
a research programme can continue to exist even in the face of a huge number 
of anomalies or counter-instances. It alters not for any modus toUens to itself, 
but for the modus tollens from it to the anomalies. This is called the autonomy 
of the programme. Lakatos claims that this very phenomenon of the history of 
science has been accounted for by his research programme. Which problems 
scientists will work on is determined by the positive heuristic of the 
programme rather than by psychologically worrying anomalies. The 
anomalies are listed but saved aside in the hope that they will turn, into 
corroborations of the programme. Only those scientists have to rivet their 
attention on anomalies who are either engaged in trial and error exercise or 
who work in a degenerating phase of a research programme when the positive 
heuristic runs out of steam. It is quite unlike naive falsificationism which 
holds that once a theory is refuted by experiment, it is irrational to develop it 
further. One has to replace the old refuted theory by a new unrefuted one.'^ 
However, the autonomy comes from the dialectic of positive and 
negative heuristic in a research programme. Lakatos analyses a few aspects of 
two spectacularly successful research programmes, where their heuristic 
power gives them autonomy. One is Prout's programme based on the idea that 
' all atoms are compounded of hydrogen atom' and another is Bohr's 
programme based on the idea that ' light-emission is due to electrons jumping 
from one orbit to another within the atoms'. 
Prout, in 1825. claimed that the atomic weights of all pure chemical 
elements were whole numbers. He knew very well that anomalies abounded. 
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but said that these arose because chemical substances as they ordinarily 
occurred were impure. That is, the relevant experimental techniques of the 
time were unreliable, or, to put it in other terms, the contemporary 
'observational' theories in the light of which the truth-values of the basic 
statements of his theory were established were false. The champions of 
Prout's theory therefore embarked on a major venture; to overthrow those 
theories, which supplied the counter-evidences to their thesis. For this, they 
had to revolutionize the established analytical chemistry of the time and 
correspondingly revise the experimental techniques with which pure elements 
were to be separated. Prout's theory, as a matter of fact, defeated theories 
previously applied in purification of chemical substances one after another. 
Even so some chemists became tired of the research progamme and gave it 
up, since the successes were still far from adding up to a final victory. For 
instance, Stas, being frustrated by some stubborn, recalcitrant instances, 
concluded in 1860 that Prout's theory was 'without foundations'. But others 
were more encouraged by the progress than discouraged by the lack of 
complete success. For instance, Marignac immediately retorted that although 
the experiments of Monsieur Stas are perfectly exact, there is no proof that the 
differences observed between his results and those required by Prout's law 
cannot be explained by the imperfect character of experimental methods. 
Crookes says that 'not a few chemists of admitted eminence consider that we 
have here an expression of the truth, masked by some residual or collateral 
phenomena which we have not yet succeeded in eliminating. In Crookes view 
in 1886 some present atomic weights merely represented a mean value. 
Indeed, Crookes went on to put this idea in a scientific form; he proposed 
concrete new theories of 'fractionation'. But his new observational theories 
turned out to be as false as they were bold. His theories being unable to 
anticipate any new facts, they were eliminated from the history of science.'^ 
However, a generation later, it was found that a very basic hidden 
assumption failed the researchers. The assumption was that: 'two different 
pure elements may behave identically in all chemical reactions but can be 
separated by physical methods'. This idea required a change oTthe concept of 
' pure element', which constituted a change of the research programme itself. 
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This revolutionary, highly creative shift was taken only by Rutherfod's 
school. After many vicissitudes and the most convincing apparent disproofs, 
the hypothesis was thrown out by Prout. And a century later, this become the 
cornerstone of modem theories of the structure of atoms.^ *^  This is the relative 
autonomy of a research programme, which is performed by the negative and 
the positive heuristic. 
Due to the relative autonomy not only the anomalies but also the 
inconsistencies are overlooked by the research programme. History of science 
shows that some of the most important research programmes were grafted on 
to the older programme with which they were blatantly inconsistent. For 
example, Copemican astronomy was grafted on to Aristotelian physics, 
Bohr's programme on to Maxwell's. It does not mean that consistency does 
not remain a regulative principle and inconsistency does not remain a 
problem. But it is other way round. The reason is simple. In the view of a 
research programme, it may be rational to put the inconsistency into some 
temporary or ad hoc quarantine, and carry on with the positive heuristic of the 
programme.^' But the ever more sterile inconsistencies and ever more ad hoc 
hypotheses is the degenerating phase of the programme and in this condition 
the programme loses it empirical character. One thing more about 
inconsistency in the research pogramme rather than any isolated theory is that 
such an inconsistency cannot be 'crucial' to the programme. Crucial 
experiment described by an accepted basic statement that is inconsistent with 
a theory cannot refute the programme, whereas it can refute an isolated 
theory. According to methodology of scientific research programme, any 
accepted basic statement may make a clash, but it alone can never entitle the 
scientist to reject a theory. Such a clash may present a problem, but can in no 
circumstances be deemed a 'victory' against, and thereby a rejection of the 
programme.^^ Progress is marked by instances verifying excess content rather 
than by falsifying instances. That is, if any programme keeps discovering new 
facts some of which are corroborated, then the programme is progressing and 
no counter-evidence can prevent it. 
It is heuristics of the programme, which make the 'relative autonomy' 
possible for the programme. The negative heuristics save the 'hard core" by 
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producing auxiliary hypotheses, which, on the one hand, explain away the 
counter-instances, and on the other hand, discover some novel facts some of 
which are corroborated. The positive heuristic ignores the recalcitrant 
evidences, puts them aside in the hope that they would be solved in the course 
of time. Positive heuristic defines problems, outlines the construction of a belt 
of auxiliary hypotheses, foresees anomalies, and finally turns them 
victoriously into positive evidences. Scientists list anomalies but as long as 
their research programme sustains its momentum, they may freely put them 
aside. In these two ways, a programme maintains autonomy from the crucial 
experiments or counter instances. Lakatos says that "It is primarily the 
positive heuristic of his programme, not the anomalies, which dictates the 
choice of his problems. Only when the driving force of the positive heuristic 
weakens, may more attention be given to anomalies".^ "* 
In this way a programme obtains a high degree of autonomy from the 
theoretical science. The relative autonomy of the programme also comes 
about fi-om the idea that mere falsification must not imply rejection. Mere 
falsification is to be regarded but not to be acted upon. For, crucial 
experiments is an honorific title, which may, of course, be conferred on 
certain anomalies, but only long after the event, only when one programme 
has been defeated by another one. Thus, nature may shout 'No', but human 
ingenuity may always be able to shout louder. With sufficient resourcefulness 
and some luck any theory can be defended progressively for a long time, even 
if it is false. No experiment is crucial at the time, let alone before.^ ^ 
According to Lakatos, such an autonomy of the programme makes a 
rational ground to give it some time for progress. This is the intellectual 
honesty that one should not reject a programme just with appearing a counter 
instance against it, without giving it the time and chance to show its 
competence to solve that. A research programme is said to be progressing as 
long as its theoretical growth anticipates its empirical growth, that is, as long 
as it keeps predicting novel facts with some success. This condition of the 
programme is called by Lakatos 'progressiveproblem shift'. It is stagnating if 
its theoretical growth lags behind its empirical growth, that is, as long as it 
gives only post hoc explanations either of chance discoveries or of facts 
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anticipated by, a rival programme. This condition is called by him 
'degenerating problem shift'}^ If a research programme progressively 
explains more than a rival, it supersedes it, and the rival can be eliminated. 
The rivalry of two research programmes is, of course, a protracted process 
during which it is rational to work in either, or in both. Within a research 
proogramme a theory can only be eliminated by a better theory - by one, 
which has excess empirical content over its predecessors, some of which is 
subsequently confirmed. And for this replacement of theory by a better one, 
the first theory does not even have to be falsified. Therefore, empirical 
falsification and actual rejection become independent of each other. For him, 
before a theory has been modified we can never know in what way it had 
been refuted, and some of the most interesting modifications are motivated by 
the positive heuristic of the research programme rather than by anomalies. 
Lakatos also says that it is very difficult to decide when a research 
programme has degenerated hopelessly or when one of the two rival 
programmes has achieved a decisive advantage over the other. Neither the 
logician's proof of inconsistency nor the experimental scientist's verdict of 
anomaly can defeat a programme in one blow. One can be wise only after the 
event. Here modesty plays a greater role than codes. One must realize that 
one's opponent, even if lagging badly behind, may still stage a comeback. No 
advantage for one side can ever be regarded as absolutely conclusive. There is 
never anything inevitable about its defeat. Thus, pigheadedness, like modesty 
has more rational scope. Since there is no instant rejection of any 
programme, it means that every programme maintains an autonomy of its 
own. 
Therefore, rejection of one programme is not just an instant activity. 
The better programme falsifies the other, but this falsification cannot be 
decided at some preconceived particular time. This falsification is declared 
only with hindsight. Since falsification is understood only after the event, 
there remains the situation for two different programmes to exist together at 
the same time - not only two; there may be more than two programmes. 
Krajewski calls this view 'pluralistic hypothetism". because there is a 
competition among different hypotheses. This is unlike "dychotomic 
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hypothetism' where competition occurs only between two hypotheses. 
Falsification of this kind—that is, falsification among different hypotheses, 
with hindsight, after existing long together is called by Lakatos 'sophisticated 
falsification'.^* 'Sophisticated falsification' denies that in the case of scientific 
theory our decision of theory-choice depends upon the result of experiments. 
No experiment or experimental report or observational statement etc. alone 
can lead to falsification. There is no falsification before the emergence of a 
better theory. After long time competition scientists can understand which 
theory is better. Thus falsification can be said to have a historical, in other 
words, time-bound character. The elimination of theory by test is neither 
sufficient, nor necessary. Progressive problem-shift does not have to be 
interspersed with 'reftitations'. Science can. grow without any refutations 
leading the way. This shows that proliferation of theories is much more 
important for sophisticated falsification. Proliferation of theories cannot wait 
until the accepted theories are refuted. The intellectual honesty demands that 
one should try to look out things from different points of view, to put forward 
new theories.^^ 
In accordance with sophisticated falsification, Einstein's theory is not 
better than Newton's because Newton's theory was refiited but Einstein's was 
not. There are many known anomalies to Einsteinian theory. Einstein's theory 
is better than Newton's because it explained everything that Newton's theory 
had successfiilly explained and forbade events about which Newton's theory 
had said nothing but which had been permitted by other well corroborated 
scientific theories of the day. Moreover, at least, some of the unexpected 
excess Einsteinian content was in fact corroborated.^^ All this shows the 
autonomy of the programme. This kind of autonomy of the 'mature science' 
may only be maintained by such a scientific unit as 'research progamme', 
which consists of 'hard core', auxiliary hypotheses with positive and negative 
heuristic power. It is not any isolated theory that can maintain this autonomy. 
However, the main contribution of 'research programme' to the 
rational reconstruction of history of science is that it incorporates both 
rational and irrational moves of scientists' activities. Kuhn maintained the 
irrational aspect and Popper did the rational aspect, but Lakatos maintains 
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both by giving rational ground for irrationality of scientists' activities. For 
him, rational reconstruction of science cannot be comprehensive since human 
beings are not completely rational animals. And even when they act rationally 
they may have a false theory of their own rational actions. What was external 
history for the falsificationist, may well be explained as internal history in 
terms of a promising research programme. For instance, Plank was discontent 
with his own 1900 radiation formula, and regarded it as 'arbitrary'. For the 
falsificationist, the formula was a bold falsifiable hypothesis and Plank's 
dislike of it a non-rational mood, explicable only in terms of psychology. 
However in research pogramme view. Plank's discontent could be explained 
rationally (internally): it was rational condemnation of 'ad hoc' theory. To 
mention yet another example, for falsificationism, irrefutable metaphysics is 
external intellectual influence, in our approach here, it is a vital part of the 
rational reconstruction of science.^' 
However, according to autonomy of research programme, we should 
be modest in our hopes for our own projects because rival pogramme may 
turn out to have the last word. There is place for pigheadedness when one's 
programme is through a bad patch. The mottos are to be proliferation of 
theories, leniency in evaluation, and honest 'score-keeping' as to which 
programme is producing results and meeting new challenges.^^ 
Crucial Experiment and Hindsight Appraisal 
The status of crucial experiment determines the process in which 
science makes progress. This is most important character of a research 
programme that there are no such things as 'crucial experiment'. There is no 
experiment which can instantly overthrow a research programme. The issue 
of 'crucial experiment' is one, which is claimed to maintain the relation 
between the theory constructed by man and the nature considered as reality. 
Lakatos says that an experiment is seen as crucial only long after the event. 
When a research programme suffers defeat and is superseded by another one, 
one may only with long hindsight—call an experiment crucial. Moreover, 
scientists, of course, do not always judge heuristic situation correctly. Their 
temperament affects their decision. As Lakatos says, a rash scientist may 
claim that his experiment defeated a programme, and parts of the scientific 
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community may even, rashly, accept his claim. But if a scientist in the 
'defeated' camp puts forward, a few years later, a scientific explanation of the 
allegedly 'crucial experiment' within (or consistent with) the allegedly 
defeated pogramme, the honorific title may be withdrawn and the crucial 
experiment may turnfi"om a defeat into a new victory for the programme. He 
mentions, for example that, there were many experiments in the eighteenth 
century, which were, as a matter of hisorico-sociological fact, widely accepted 
as crucial evidence against Galileo's law of free fall, and Newton's theory of 
gravitation. In the nineteenth century there were several experiments based on 
measurements of the velocity of light which disproved the corpuscular theory 
and which turned out later to be erroneous in the light of relativity theory. 
These experiments were later deleted from the justificationist's textbooks as 
manifestations of shameful shortsightedness or even of envy. 
In the light of these considerations, the idea of instant rationality can 
be seen to be Utopian. Rationality, reason of theory change, works much 
slower than most people think, and even then, fallibly. Therefore, Lakatos, 
says that the continuity of science, the tenacity of some theories, the 
rationality of certain amount of dogmatism, can only be explained if we 
construe science as a battleground of research programmes. The bettleground 
implies the theoretical pluralism rather than theoretical monism. This 
conception allows the scientists to adhere to a research programme despite 
anomalies or inconsistencies. Scientists may introduce or adhere to any 
programme with its own heuristic power. Therefore, no experiment can 
monopolise any programme."'* If the experiment is not crucial, if degenerating 
problem-shift is no more sufficient reason to eliminate a programme, if 
Popperian reftitation and Kuhnian crisis are not at work in the rejection of a 
programme, it leads us to the question, how are research programmes 
eliminated? According to research programme view, an objective reason is 
provided by a rival programme, which explains the previous success of its 
rival and supersedes it by a further display of heuristic power. But the 
criterion of heuristic power depends on how we construe 'factual novelty". 
Lakatos points out that it is not immediately ascertainable whether a new 
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theory predicts a novel fact or not; but novelty of a factual proposition can 
frequently be seen only after a long period has elapsed. 
In this regard, some examples are mentioned by Lakatos. Kepler's 
ellipses were generally admitted as crucial evidence for Newton and against 
Descartes only about one hundred years after Newton's claim. The anomalous 
behavior of Mercury's perihelion was known for decades as one of the many 
yet unsolved difficulties in Newton's progamme; but only long after 
Einstein's theory explained it better, a dull anomaly was transformed into a 
brilliant reftitation of Newton's research programme. Young claimed that his 
double-slit experiment of 1802 was a crucial experiment between the 
corpuscular and the wave pogrammes of optics; but his claim was 
acknowledged only much later, after Fresnel progressively developed the 
wave programme ftirther. All this means that the anomaly, which had been 
known for decades, received the honorific title of reftitation; and the 
experiments received the honorific title of crucial experiment only after a long 
period of uneven development of the two rival programmes. Thus, 'crucial' 
character of the experiment becomes evident only retrospectively.^^ 
This consideration led to new emphasis on the hindsight element in our 
appraisal and led to further liberalization of our standards. For Lakatos, a new 
research programme, which has just entered the competition, may start by 
explaining 'old facts' in a novel way but may take a very long time before it is 
seen to produce genuine novel facts. He mentions that the kinetic theory of 
heat seemed to lag behind the result of the phenomenological theory for 
decades before it finally overtook it with the Einstein-Smoluchowski theory 
of Brownian motion in 1905. After this, what had previously seemed a 
speculative reinterpretation of old facts, turned out to be a discovery of novel 
facts.^ ^ 
Considering all this, Lakatos holds that we should not reject anything 
instantly. He says that we must not discard a budding programme simply 
because it has so far failed to overtake a rival power, simply because it has 
been refuted by a crucial experiment. We should not abandon it if it 
constitutes a progressive problem shift. And we certainly regard a newly 
interpreted fact as a new fact, ignoring the insolent priority claims of amateur 
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fact collectors. As long as a budding research programme can be rationally 
reconstructed as a progressive problem-shift, it should be sheltered for a while 
from a powerful established rival.^ ^ But it does not mean that crucial 
experiments have no force to overthrow a research programme and therefore 
anything goes. For him, when two research programmes compete, they 
gradually encroach on each other's territory. An experiment is repeatedly 
performed and as a result, the first is defeated in this battle, while the second 
wins. But in this case, the war is not over if any research programme is 
allowed a few such defeats. All it needs for a comeback is to produce a 
content increasing version and a verification of some of its novel contents. If 
such a new comeback, after sustained effort, is not forthcoming, the war is 
lost and the original experiment is seen, with hindsight, to have been crucial. 
He further describes that it is very difficult, even with such a crucial 
experiment, to defeat a research programme supported by talented and 
imaginative scientists. Alternatively, stubborn defenders of the defeated 
programme may offer ad hoc explanations of the experiments or a shrewd ad 
hoc reduction of the victorious programme to the defeated one. But he calls 
such efforts as unscientific.'^ ^ 
From these considerations we see that there are two different issues: 
(1) the methodological appraisal of a research programme, and (2) the 
decision whether to continue to apply a research programme. With regard to 
first issue, Lakatos specifies the rules of appraisal for research programme. 
But this appraisal-verdict is not a static judgment; rather it may change with 
time. For, any crucial negative evidence may change into positive evidence in 
the course of long competition. Moreover, a negative experimental finding 
may come to be regarded as 'crucial' against a programme only in retrospect. 
With regard to the second issue, it is not the duty of a philosopher of science 
to recommend research decisions to the scientist. Some scientists may choose 
to pursue a degenerating research programme in the hope that further work 
will reestablish the programme as progressive. For Lakatos, it is perfectly 
rational to play a risky game; what is irrational is to deceive oneself about the 
risk.-"' 
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The scientific progress conceived through the characteristics of 
research programme, such as heuristic, autonomy and leniency towards 
crucial experiment, occurs not in the way of instant revolution and does not 
result in a complete rejection of the previous programme. Unlike Kuhn and 
Popper, in such a pattern of progress, every defeated programme has the 
possibility to be powerful once again - a research programme change is not a 
permanent revolution. This kind of process of progress Lakatos calls 
sophisticated falsification. Here progress is not determined by experiment, but 
by the heuristic power of the programme. For Agassi, we may stick to the 
hypothesis in the face of known facts in the hope that the facts will adjust 
themselves to theory.'*' 
5.2 Question of Realism and Research Programme 
Growth and Truth 
To grasp the issue of 'truth' in the 'growth' of science, we need to 
analyze the conception of 'sophisticated falsification'. For, it is that concept 
which specifies the pattern of growth in the research programme view. 
According to 'sophisticated falsificationism' we may reject, in the long course 
of time, the previous theory, but we are never entitled to consider the rejected 
theory as false theory, for, the methodology of scientific research programme 
declares the scope that a rejected theory may well again be a champion, and 
the champion theory may be defeated in the constant competition of different 
research programmes. Since the rejected is not declared false, the accepted 
cannot be declared as true in the same token. It is necessary for something to 
be true to be proven, for mere claim or convention cannot be taken as true. 
But the research programme view does not provide us with any proven 
knowledge. 'Proof is a conclusive decision about theory choice, whereas 
research programme does not give us any such conclusive decision—neither 
failure nor success is final in our approach. 
For centuries knowledge has meant proven knowledge—proven either 
by the power of intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and 
intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances 
and minimize the gap between speculation and establish knowledge. But 
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proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the 
replacement of Newtonian theory by Einsteinian one. Lakatos mentions that 
Newtonian theory gave, in the physical science, a static understanding, but 
Einstein's theory gave a relative understanding, resulting in the turning of 
tables, and now very few philosophers or scientists thinking that knowledge 
is, or can be proven knowledge. Lakatos says that intellectual honesty does 
not consist in trying to entrench or establish one's position by proving it. 
Rather intellectual honesty consists in specifying precisely the conditions 
under which one is willing to give up one's position. Committed Marxists and 
Freudians by refusing to specify such conditions, showed their intellectual 
dishonesty. For him, belief may be a regrettable unavoidable biological 
weakness to be kept under the control of criticism, but commitment is an 
outright crime."*^  Which of the theories are true, demands a justification of 
theories. But a research programme does not leave any scope for such 
justification, for justification of scientific knowledge consists of proven 
knowledge and a research programme does not construct such knowledge. 
Popper has scrutinized and said that under very general conditions all theories 
have zero probability; whatever the evidence, all theories are not only equally 
improvable but also equally improbable.'*^ 
Therefore, the attempt for discovering truth shifts from justification to 
dogmatic falsificationism. According to dogmatic falsificationism , though 
science cannot prove a theory, it can disprove - it can work out with complete 
logical certainty repudiation of what is false.'*'* For this view, the form of 
statement of scientific hypotheses is a human device that we hand over to 
nature for the task of deciding whether any of the contingent lowest-level 
conclusions are false. Man invents scientific systems and then discovers 
whether or not it accords with the observed facts.'*^ In this way, dogmatic 
falsificationism rejects the false theories, which indirectly claim to go nearer 
to truth. But this method has no place in the research programme view. For, it 
rests on the assumption that is not warranted in our approach of sophisticated 
falsificationism. The assumption is that any 'hard fact' which is contradicting 
the theory is entitled to falsify the theory, that is, being contradicted with hard 
fact the theory is considered as false. But in sophisticated falsification, a 
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theory may be refuted by the hard fact but may not be rejected; even if it is 
rejected it is not conclusively declared as false, for the rejected theory may be 
champion again. A theory's rejection or acceptance does not depend upon 
'truth' or 'falsity', but it depends on whether it is degenerating or progressive. 
Again this depends on the negative and positive heuristic offered by how 
efficaciously the auxiliary hypotheses are constructed. Lakatos by his research 
programme says that Modus tollens does not go from fact to theory, but from 
theory to fact. Therefore, there is no question, according to research 
programme, of a theory being attested by the facts. 
Even methodological falsi ficationism cannot offer us truth by 
falsification. According to methodological falsification, the basic statement 
that is taken as established facts to falsify the theory is taken by decision, that 
is, it is conventionally granted. Therefore, if this empirical basis clashes with 
theory, the theory may be called 'falsified', but it is not falsified in the sense 
that it is disproved. If a theory is falsified, it may still be true. If we follow up 
this sort of falsification by the actual elimination of a theory, we may well end 
up eliminating a true and accepting a false theory. On the other hand, the 
basic statement itself need normally be interpreted as a separate premise."*^ 
All this tells us that no other method of theory-choice on the basis of 
'truth value' is warranted by the research programme. Now we will examine 
the nature of a research programme that will tell us that the consideration of 
theory- choice does not depend on 'truth value'. About Lakatos's 
programme, Krajewski says 'permanent revolution of Popper is desirable 
neither in society nor in science—a period of stability is also necessary. 
Revolutionary periods are more favorable to theoretical aims, whereas 
evolutionary periods are more favorable to practical aims of science. Thus 
Popper and Kuhn are both one-sided; one sees only the truth, another sees the 
practice (puzzle-solving). But Lakatos advocates a synthesis of both.''^ This 
combination is constructed by research programme, which is committed 
neither to truth nor to practice—according to research programme 
commitment is outright crime. Research programme may be powerful by its 
heuristic capacity, but may not be true. Research programme may be 
progressive or degenerating, but not true or false. 
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Fact versus Truth 
It is generally believed that nature (facts) attests the theory constructed 
by human mind whether it is true or false. But in the research programme 
view, facts do not deserve such a status. For, facts have such status only in the 
monotheoretic model, but here in our approach there can exist different 
research programmes together at the same time. Lakatos opts for, rather 
powerfully advocates a pluralistic model. For Lakatos, in pluralistic model 
there are two types of theory; the interpretative theory and the explanatory 
one. The fist provides the hard facts and the second explains them. So here 
facts have no such independent status. In the monotheoretic model we regard 
the higher-level theory as an explanatory theory to be judged by the facts 
delivered from outside. In the case of clash we reject the explanation. In the 
pluralistic model we may decide, alternatively, to regard the higher-level 
theory as an interpretative theory to judge the facts derived from outside. In 
case of clash we reject the facts as monsters. 
According to Lakatos, it is not that we propose a theory and nature 
may shout 'No'; rather we propose a maze of theories, and nature may shout 
'Inconsistent'. So, what nature shouts about a theory is not 'truth', but 
'consistency'. Now the question is as to which of the mutually inconsistent 
theories should be eliminated? The sophisticated falsificationist can answer 
this way: one has to try to replace first one, then the other, then possibly both, 
and opt for that new set up which provides the biggest increase in 
corroborated content, which provides most progressive problem-shift.'*^ 
Secondly, does consistency follow truth? Answer to this question, in my 
opinion is that truth must be consistent, but consistency may not be truth. For. 
sense of consistency depends on our knowledge; we judge any theory as 
consistent or inconsistent on the basis of the knowledge of the day. Thus, we 
may consider any inconsistent theory as consistent due to the lack of the 
knowledge. The same consideration is applicable to 'truth'. 'Truth' and 
'falsity' are considered on the basis of the knowledge of the day. 
To understand the nub of this point, Lakatos needs take a close look at 
the falsifying hypothesis in this way. Let us take the theory T and the refuting 
hypothesis R. How well corroborated is R? R is the verdict of the 
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experimental scientists after a rigorous application of the 'experimental 
techniques' of the day—this is R|. The experimentalist while testing T, 
applied T] — theories of the day. He interpreted what he saw in the light of 
Ti. But what if Ti is false? Why not apply T2 rather than T, and claim that 
atomic weights according to T2, for example, must be whole number? Then 
this will be a hard fact in the light of T2, and T| will be overthrown. So, the 
clash is not between theories and facts but between two higher level-theories. 
The clash is then not any more between a logically higher-level theory and the 
lower level-falsifying hypothesis. The problem should not be put in terms of 
whether a refutation is real or not. The problem is how to repair an 
inconsistency between the interpretative theory and the explanatory one. 
Explanatory theory is what explains some higher phenomena on the basis of 
known facts; an interpretative theory is what recognizes those facts. 
Interpretative theory produces facts, explanatory theory solves the problem on 
the basis of those facts.''^  Any theory is inconsistent if it builds up an 
explanation on the basis of facts that are not recognized by the interpretative 
theory. Moreover, a fact can be interpreted in different ways. Which of the 
interpretations should be applied depends on the particular time when it is 
applied. Interpretative theory is speculative theory. Our acceptance of any 
interpretative theory rather than other is not infallible either. 
Agassi says that when we decide whether it is the replacement of the 
interpretative or of the explanatory theory that produces novel facts, we must 
take a decision about the acceptance or rejection of the basic statement. When 
we reject, then we have only postponed the decision, not avoided it. We 
cannot get rid of the problem of the empirical basis, if we want to learn from 
experience.^^ we cannot avoid the decision about which sort of propositions 
should be the observational ones and which theoretical ones. We cannot 
avoid either the decision about the truth-value of some observational 
propositions. These decisions are vital for the decision whether a problem-
shift is empirically progressive or degenerating. Although testing the basic 
statement has no natural end, we always come to a point when there is no 
further disagreement.^' This is the status of a factual statement. So, theorv 
may clash with a factual statement, but it does not necessitate the rejection of 
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the theory. ' Theory can only be eHminated by a better theory, that is, by one 
which has excess empirical content over its predecessors, some of which is 
subsequently confirmed. And for this replacement of one theory by a better 
one, the first theory does not even have to be falsified in Popper's sense of the 
term. Thus, progress is marked by instances verifying excess content rather 
than by falsifying instances; empirical falsification is independent of actual 
rejection.^^ 
Lakatos says that when scientists tend to ignore counterexamples and 
bypass the emergent problems and apply their theories regardlessly, they are 
not being irrational in doing so. They frequently and rationally claim that the 
experimental results are not reliable, or that discrepancies which are asserted 
to exist between the experimental results and the theory are only apparent and 
that they will disappear with advance of our understanding.^^ Scientists do 
continue to use theories in the face of evidence that seems to refute them. 
Newtonian mechanics is a case in point. Scientists in the nineteenth century 
recognized that the anomalous motion of mercury counted against the theory. 
Nevertheless they continued with it. And they were not acting irrationally in 
so doing; because refutation and rejection are not the same and refutation 
neither is nor should be followed invariably by rejection. Theories should be 
allowed to flourish even within an 'ocean of anomalies'.^'' Such a position 
tells us that facts discovered by our research programme are not entitled to 
ensure us truth. 
All this means that progressive shift ensures the progress of science, 
but progress does not mean the 'approach to reality'. Research programme 
view tells us that knowledge does grow whatever we think about truth or 
reality. One can see by direct inspection that knowledge has grown. This is 
not a lesson to be taught by general philosophy or history but by detailed 
reading of special sequences of texts. For instance, we know more about 
polyhidra or atomic weights than we once did. There is no doubt that more 
knowledge is available to us than was grasped even by the then geniuses. All 
this only means that knowledge is growing. But it does not mean that 
knowledge is Justified true belief- at least the research programme view docs 
not assert that. 
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In the final analysis, for Lakatos the fundamental scientific products 
are not isolated theories, but a series of theories which he calls research 
programme. For him, through the change of research programme science 
makes progress. Now what is the pattern of that progress - does it ensure the 
gradual attainment of truth? For Lakatos scientific progress can not be 
irrational as Kuhn holds and such progress is not committed to attainment of 
truth as Popper holds. 
These Lakatosian judgements about scienfific progress solely depend 
on the nature and characteristics of research programme. The research 
programme consists of a hard-core hypothesis and auxiliary ones. The 
auxiliary theories of the programme makes the protective belt round the 
hardcore, and explain away the recalcitrant evidence. A research programme 
can be saved from counter-instances by auxiliary theories. History of science 
tells us that scientists do not abandon a theory merely because facts contradict 
it. For Lakatos as long as a programme continues to discover new facts, the 
programme is considered as progressive. Such a progressive programme is 
not rejected just because of a contradicting fact. It is rejected if it fails to 
continue to discover new facts. Then such a degenerating programme is 
replaced by the progressive one. This is the rational change, for it is rational 
to adopt a progressive programme in place of the degenerating one. This 
progressive vs degenerating problem-shift is the rationality of theory choice. 
Therefore, for Lakatos, scientific change is rational and progressive. Pattern 
of such progress is characterized chiefly by its' 'relative autonomy'. The 
crucial experiments may falsify the programme, but cannot make scientists 
reject it. 
Now what is the position of truth in such a pattern of progress ? Is a 
progressive research programme accepted because of its commitment to truth 
over the degenerating one ? For Lakatos, growth of science is directed 
towards discovering more and more novel facts, and acceptance and rejection 
of a theory do not depend on the truth value. He says that we may reject the 
previous theory, but we are never entitled to consider the rejected theory as 
false. For, the methodology of scientific research programme assures us that a 
rejected theory may well again be a champion, and a pioneering theory may 
187 
be defeated in the constant competition of different research programmes. 
Since the rejection is declared false, the acceptance cannot be declared as true 
in the same token. Truth is premised on proof or conclusive evidence about a 
theory choice, whereas a research programme does not give us any such 
conclusive evidence or definitive proof Neither failure nor success is final in 
change of programmes. Moreover, research programme view asserts that 
nature (facts) does not attest a theory constructed by humans either as true or 
false. It is not that we propose a theory and nature may shout 'No'; rather we 
propose theories (pluralism), and nature may shout 'inconsistent'. So, what 
nature shouts about theory is not 'truth', but 'consistency'. Truth must be 
consistent, but consistency may not be truth. For, consistency depends on our 
knowledge, we judge any theory as consistent or inconsistent on the basis of 
our research programme to the best of our knowledge and belief 
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Chapter - 6 
The Research Tradition and the Character of Scientific 
Progress 
6.1. Character of Progress in Research Tradition 
Theory as Research Tradition 
Scientific research starts from encountering of a problem and ends with 
the solution of that problem. Thus Laudan says that scientific activity is 
problem-solving activity; how science solves the problems. But there are 
mainly two kinds of problems for science to solve: the empirical problems 
and the conceptual problems. The empirical problem is the object of solving 
and the conceptual problem is the way of solving. It does not mean that the 
empirical problem and conceptual one are entirely two distinct problems; they 
both are inter-connected—empirical problem is oriented by the conceptual 
framework, and the conceptual framework is designed with a view to solve 
the empirical problem. 
Now when is a question solved? An empirical problem is solved, for 
Laudan, when scientists properly no longer regard it as an unanswered 
question, i.e. when they believe they understand why the situation 
propounded by the problem is the way it is. It is the theory which provides us 
with such an understanding. A problem is solved with reference to some 
theory that purportedly solves the problem in question. So, he says, when we 
ask whether a problem has been solved, we are really asking whether it stands 
in a certain relationship to some theory or other.' So it is nothing but theory 
which solves the problem. 
But there are two types of theories; the term 'theory' refers to two 
types of things. According to Laudan, we often use the term 'theory' to 
denote a specific set of related doctrines, which can be utilized for making 
specific experimental predictions and for giving detailed explanation of 
natural phenomena. Example of this type of theory would include MaxwelTs 
theor\' of ciectromagnatism, the Bohr-Kramers-Sloter theory of atomic 
structure, Einstein's theory of photoelectric effect, Marx's labour theory of 
value, Weginer's theory of continental drift, and the Freudian theory of the 
Oedipal complex. By contrast, the 'theory' is also used to refer to much more 
general, much less easily testable, sets of doctrines or assumptions. For 
instance, one may speak about theory of evolution or the kinetic theory of 
gases. In each of these cases, Laudan says that, we are referring not to a single 
theory, but to a whole spectrum of individual theories. The term 'evolutionary 
theory' for instance, does not refer to any single theory, but to an entire family 
of doctrines that are historically and conceptually related. These doctrines 
work from the assumption that organic species have common lines of descent. 
Similarly, the term ' atomic theory' generally refers to a large set of doctrines, 
all of which are predicated on the assumption that matter is discontinuous. He 
mentions that a particularly vivid instance of a theory, which includes a wide 
variety of specific instantiations, is offered by recent 'quantum theory'. Since 
1930, that term has included quantum field theories, group theories, so-called 
s- matrix theories, and renormalized field theories. That is, it is a grand theory 
which embodies huge conceptual divergence. So the second type of theory is 
different not only in generality but also in the modes of appraisal and 
evaluation. This kind of theory is the primary tool for understanding. Larry 
Laudan calls this type of theory scientific research tradition. Among these 
two type of theories the first is specific theory in contrast to research tradition. 
Research tradition provides the specific theory, and specific theory touches 
the empirical problem with a view to solving it. A research tradition is the 
very base of the answer to an empirical question, it is the source of the answer 
to the quesfion. Therefore, if we ask what kinds of things solve the problems, 
the answer of this question is no more than the research tradition; for solution 
is the understanding of why the problem is the way it is, and it is, research 
tradition which, provides all the components of such an understanding. 
To understand anything we need ontology and methodology about that 
thing; and it is the research tradition, which provides the same. For Laudan, a 
research tradition provides a set of guidelines for the development of specific 
theories. Part of those guidelines constitutes an ontology, the types of 
fundamental entities, which exist in the domain or domains within which the 
research tradition is embedded. The function of specific theories within the 
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research tradition is to explain all the empirical problems in the domain by 
'reducing' them to the ontology of the research tradition. For example, if the 
research tradition is behaviorism, it tells us that the only legitimate entities, 
which behavioristic theories can postulate, are directly and publicly 
observable physical and physiological signs. If the research tradition is that of 
Cartesian physics, it specifies that only matter and mind exist, and the theories 
that talk of other types of substances are unacceptable. Moreover, the research 
tradition outlines the different modes by which these entities can interact. 
Thus Cartesian particles can only interact by contact, not by action at a 
distance. Entities within Marxist research tradition can only interact by virtue 
of the economic forces influencing them.^ This understanding of ontological 
level is provided by research tradition. 
The research tradition, very often, will also specify certain modes of 
procedure which constitute the legitimate methods of inquiry open to a 
research within that tradition. These methodological principles will be wide-
ranging in scope, addressing themselves to experimental techniques, modes of 
theoretical testing and evaluation, and the like. For instance, the 
methodological posture of the scientist in a strict Newtonian research tradition 
is inevitably inductivist, allowing for the espousal of only those theories, 
which have been inductively inferred from the data. The mode of procedure 
outlined for a behavioristic psychologist is what is usually called 
'operationalism'. Put simplistically, a research tradition is thus a set of 
ontological and methodological do's and don'ts. To attempt to talk about what 
is forbidden by the metaphysics and methodology of research tradition is to 
put oneself outside that tradition and to repudiate it. If, for instance, a 
Cartesian physicist starts talking about forces acting-at-a-distance, the 
scientist in question then goes beyond the pale. By breaking with the ontology 
and methodology of the research tradition within which he has worked, he has 
violated the strictures of that research tradition and divorced himself from it. 
Needless to say, for Laudan, that is not necessarily a bad thing. Some of the 
most important revolutions in scientific thought have come from thinkers who 
had the ingenuity to break with the research traditions of their day and to 
inaugurate new views. He also says that one may break with any tradition and 
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create another, but when he will go to solve any empirical problem, he must 
be within some or the other research tradition. For his understanding of the 
question is provided by the tradition—without tradition he cannot have any 
understanding, good or bad. So, a primary working definition of a research 
tradition, according to Laudan, could be put as follows: a research tradition is 
a set of general assumptions about the entities and processes in a domain of 
study, and about the appropriate methods to be used for investigating the 
problems and constructing the theories in that domain. 
Generally research tradition consists of two components: One, a set of 
beliefs about what sorts of entities and processes make up the domain of 
inquiry and two, a set of epistemic and methodological norms about how the 
domain is to be investigated, how theories are to be tested, how data are to be 
collected, and the like. Research traditions are not directly testable, both 
because their ontologies are too general to yield specific predictions and 
because their methodological components, being rules or norms, are not 
straightforwardly testable assertions about matters of fact. Research traditions 
serve several specific functions. Among others: (a) they indicate what 
assumptions can be regarded as uncontroversial 'background knowledge' to 
all the scientists working in that tradition; (b) they help to identify those 
portions of a theory that are in trouble and should be modified or amended; 
(c) they establish rules for the collection of data and for the testing of theories; 
(d) they pose conceptual problems for any theory in the tradition which 
violates the ontological and epistemic claims of the parent tradition, etc.^ 
A specific theory is a kind of bridge between the empirical problems 
and the research tradition. The specific theory, which gives an explanation of 
the empirical problem and thus solution to the problem, is provided by 
research tradition. So we need to see the relation between the specific theories 
and the tradition in order to appreciate how our understanding originates from 
tradition and through specific theory goes to empirical level, in the process, 
solving the problem or the problems under investigation. 
Every research tradition, however, will be associated with a series of 
specific theories, each of which is designed to particularize and illustrate the 
ontology of the research tradhion. The individual theories will be empirically 
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testable for they will entail some precise predictions about the objects in the 
domain. By contrast research traditions are neither explanatory, nor 
predictive, nor directly testable. Laudan says that their very generality as well 
as their normative elements, preclude them from leading to detailed accounts 
of specific natural processes. The whole function of a research tradition is to 
provide us with the crucial tools we need for solving problems, both empirical 
and conceptual, A successful research tradition with its corresponding 
theories leads to the adequate solution of an increasing range of empirical and 
conceptual problems.^ 
Then he illustrates the relation of research tradition and specific 
theories, and says that research traditions do not entail their component 
theories; nor do those theories entail their parent research traditions. A 
research tradition at best specifies a general ontology for nature, and a general 
method for solving natural problems within a given natural domain. A theory, 
on the other hand, articulates a very specific ontology and a number of 
specific and testable laws about nature. To be told, as the nineteenth century 
mechanical research tradition tells us, that heat is simply a form of motion, 
does not deductively lead us to Boltzmann's version of the kinetic theory of 
gases or to statistical thermodynamics. Similarly, there is the reverse relation 
between tradition and theory. For example, given the theory of impact as 
developed by Huygens, we cannot deduce the basic assumptions of the 
research tradition within which Huygens worked. It is never possible to 
deduce the whole of the research tradition from one, or even all, of the 
theories allied to it. 
However, Laudan explains that the entailment relation does not work 
here for the reason that there are a number of mutually inconsistent theories 
which can claim allegiance to the same research tradition, and there are a 
number of different traditions which can, in principle, provide the 
presuppositional base for any given theory. Laudan mentions at least two 
specific modes by which theories and research traditions are related: one is 
historical and the other is conceptual. It is a matter of historical fact that most 
of the major theories of science have emerged when the scientist who 
formulated them was working within one or other specific research tradition. 
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For instance, Boyl's theory of gases was developed within the framework of 
the mechanical philosophy, Buffon's embryological theories were developed 
as efforts to apply the Newtonian tradition to biological phenomena. 
Historical research can always identify the research tradition with which a 
particular theory has been associated. In this sense, Laudan says, the 
connection between a theory and research tradition is as real as any fact of the 
past, and it is as important as the most important facts of the past. 
Though they are two different types of theories, there is an interaction 
between them. The most important modes of interaction are generally 
influences of research tradition upon its constituent theories. These influences 
take a variety of forms: 
Problem Determining Role : Before the scientific theories are 
formulated within a tradition, a research tradition will often strongly influence 
the range and the weighting of the empirical problems with which the specific 
theories must grapple. Laudan says that either the ontology or the 
methodology of the research tradition can influence upon the decision as to 
what are to count as legitimate problems for constituent theories. Research 
tradition does this work by indicating that it is appropriate to discuss certain 
classes of empirical problems in the given domain, while others belong to 
foreign domain, or are pseudo-problems which can be legitimately ignored. 
He mentions in this regard that the rise of the Cartesian mechanical research 
tradition in the seventeenth century radically transformed the accepted 
problem domain for optical theories. It did so by arguing, or rather by simply 
postulating, that problems of 'perception and vision'—problems which had 
classically been regarded as legitimate empirical problems for any optical 
theory— should be relegated to psychology and to physiology, fields outside 
the domain of optics, so that such empirical problems could be safely ignored 
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by the mechanistic optical theorist. 
Constraining Role: According to Laudan's research tradition view, it 
is the primary function of research tradition to establish a general ontology 
and methodology for tackling all the problems of a given domain, or set of 
domains. By this work a tradition acts as a constraint on the theories; as to 
which of the theories can be developed within the domain. If the ontology of a 
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research tradition denies the existence of the forces acting-at-a -distance, then 
it clearly rules out as unacceptable any specific theory which relies on 
no-contact-action. Any research tradition, which has a strongly inductivist or 
observationalist methodology, will regard specific theories postulating entities 
that cannot be observed, as unacceptable. Much of the opposition to subtle 
fluid theories, atomic theories, etc. was due to the fact that the dominant 
methodology of the period denied the epistemic and scientific 
wellfoundedness of theories, which dealt with unobservable entities. 
Heuristic Role : The research tradition plays also a heuristic role for 
the specific theories. Since specific theories postulate certain types of entities 
and certain methods for investigating the properties of those entities, a 
research tradition can play a vital heuristic role in the construction of specific 
scientific theories. Although, specific theories cannot be deduced from 
research tradition yet a tradition can provide vital clues for theory 
construction. Laudan mentions that when Descartes attempted to develop a 
theory of light and colours, he had already defined his general research 
tradition. His research tradition amounted to the assertion that the only 
properties that bodies can have are those of size, shape, and motion. He did 
not specify precisely what sizes, shapes, positions, and motions particular 
bodies could exhibit. However, he did make it clear that any specific physical 
theory would have to deal exclusively with these four parameters. As a result, 
Descartes knew that his optical theories would have to be constructed along 
such lines. So, he sought to explain colours in terms of the shape and 
rotational velocity of certain particles. Since his general tradition made it clear 
that particles of light are exactly like other material bodies, he recognized that 
he could apply general mechanical theories to a theoretical analysis of light. 
Laudan shows another kind of heuristic role for the research tradition 
which arises when one of its constituent theories requires modification. He 
says that any sound tradition will contain significant guidelines about how it 
can be modified and transformed, so as to improve its problem-solving 
efficacy. When early version of kinetic theory of gases was confronted by 
some serious predictive failures, there was enormous flexibility within the 
tradition that paved the way towards possible modifications. If more degree of 
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freedom was needed to accommodate seeming energy losses, kineticists could 
introduce molecular spin or alert their assumptions about molecular 
elasticities. If gases did not condense in accordance with theoretical 
predictions, the addition of weak intermolecular attractions could do the job. 
All these and many similar gambits emerge quite plausibly from regarding 
matter as possessing a molecular and mechanical composition. By such a 
heuristic role research tradition tries to solve the anomalies. 
Justificatory Role : It is one of the important functions of research 
traditions to rationalize or justify theories. Specific theories make many 
assumptions about nature, assumptions that are generally not justified either 
within the theory itself or by the data that confirm the theory. These are 
usually assumptions about basic causal processes and entities, whose 
existence and operation the specific theories take as 'given'. Laudan points 
out that it is the research tradition which rationalizes these assumptions. He 
says that when, for instance, Sadi Camot developed his theory of the steam 
engine, his was a working out of the theory, which presupposed that no heat 
was lost in performing the work of driving a piston. Camot offered no 
rationale for that assumption, and quite rightly felt no need to do that. 
Caloricist research tradition, within which he was working, laid it down as a 
primary postulate that heat was always conserved. Camot was thus able to 
presuppose, in developing this theory, certain things about nature, which his 
theory could not itself establish." That is, the caloricist research tradition 
rationalizes that energy is not lost. These are the functions through which 
research tradition produces an understanding about scientific problems; this 
understanding is, in other words, called the solution to the problems. 
Rationale of Theory-choice 
From the above consideration we are now entitled to stipulate that the 
aim of science is the resolution or clarification of problems. The more crucial 
implication of this view is that scientific progress does not become parasitic 
upon 'rationality', which is outside the scientific activity itself In classical 
view, rationality has tended to be viewed as an a-temporal concept; the idea 
was that vvc can determine whether a statement or theor> is rationally credible 
independently of any knowledge of its historical career. Here the 
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progressiveness is totally dependent upon the rationality. To be progressive is 
to adhere to a series of increasing rational beliefs. But a worrying difficulty 
with it is that whereas progress is readily understood, rationality is far more 
obscure. 
Since science is an aim-oriented enterprise and if its aim is problem 
solving, then problem-solving effectiveness would be the rationality of theory-
choice. This type of rationality is not outside of scientific activity itself; it is 
immanent rather than transcendental one. If science makes advancement in 
solving the problems, then this advancement is the rationale of theory-choice. 
Now progressiveness will determine rationality rather than rationality 
determining progressiveness. If any theory is effective in solving the problem, 
then it is rational to accept that theory. Now the question arises as to when is a 
problem solved? It depends on the research tradition that tells us about the 
nature and status of the problems, about the rules of appraisal and about other 
methodological criteria. When a research tradition changes, rationality of 
theory-choice also changes. This amounts to saying that rational is 
progressive and progressive is rational. Any theory that is effective in solving 
the problems, is progressive and thus rationally acceptable. So problem-
solving effectiveness is the rationale of theory-choice. 
'Problem-solving effectiveness' of a theory is assessed by recording 
how many problems are solved by it in comparison to its competitors. In this 
regard, Laudan says that we have three types of problems: solved problems, 
unsolved ones, and anomalous instances. For him, among them all, it is solved 
problems that determine whether a theory is more effective than its rival or 
not. For, 'problem solving effectiveness' of a theory is understood only when 
a theory solves some problems. He also points out that one should not 
conclude from this that unsolved problems are unimportant for science. 
Solved problems are nothing but problems that have been transformed from 
unsolved to solved ones. But unsolved problems are not like solved ones in 
showing effectiveness of theory, for 'a theory's failure to solve some 
unsolved problems generally will not weigh heavily against that theory. For, 
we usually cannot know a priori that the problem in question should be solved 
by that sort of theory. Also, the problems matter which are already solved by 
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Other theory. So, in appraising the relative merits of theories, the class of 
unsolved problems is altogether irrelevant. What matter for purpose of theory 
evaluation are only those problems that have been solved, not necessarily by 
theory in question, but some known theory. 
Given that science aims at solving the problems and that solved 
problems are its career, we can now talk about the model of progress. The 
core assumptions of such a model, according to Laudan, are simple: (1) the 
solved problems -empirical or conceptual—is the basic unit of scientific 
progress; (2) the aim of science is to maximize the scope of solved empirical 
problems and minimize the scope of anomalous and conceptual problems. 
The problem solving effectiveness of a theory depends on the balance it 
strikes between its solved problems and its unsolved ones. This balance can 
be understood in the light of following: Imagine some domain in which we 
notice a certain puzzling phenomenon, P. The phenomenon P constitutes the 
unsolved problems for the scientist who wishes to develop a theory, Ti, 
specifically with a view to resolving P. Once Tj is announced, several things 
are likely to happen simultaneously. Some fellow scientists may observe that 
T] predicts other phenomena in a domain beside P. These predictions will be 
tested, and very often, some of them will not be borne out in our observation. 
Thus the obser\'ation of these discrepant results will constitute one or more 
anomalies for T|. At the same time, it may be pointed out that T| makes 
certain assumptions about natural processes which run counter to some of our 
most widely accepted theories, or are incompatible with our methodological 
norms. This will constitute one or more conceptual problems for theory T|. 
Laudan explains that it is true that T| has solved its initial empirical 
problems, P, and to that extent, we can say that 'progress' has been made. But 
unfortunately, Tj has generated several others anomalies and conceptual 
problems. It is entirely possible that more serious problems have been 
generated than resolved by the invention of T]. Suppose that a second theorist 
comes along who is convinced that he can improve Tp Such improvement 
would be exhibited by showing that a new theory, T2, could explain the initial 
empirical problem of T| without generating as many anomalies and 
conceptual problems as Ti has produced. Now we could all agree that it 
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would be more reasonable to accept T2 than to accept T|. Therefore, Laudan 
holds that the acceptance of T2 is progressive and the continued espousal of Ti 
is unprogressive or regressive. '' 
From this analysis Laudan defines an appraisal measure for a theory in 
the following way: the over-all problem solving effectiveness of a theory is 
determined by assessing the number and importance of the empirical 
problems which the theory solves, and reducing the number and importance 
of the anomalies and conceptual problems which the theory generates. 
Problem solving effectiveness may also come about simply by an expansion 
of the domain of solved empirical problems with all the other vectors 
remaining fixed. In such a case the replacement of T| by T2 is clearly 
progressive. Effectiveness can also result from a modification of the theory, 
which eliminates some troublesome anomalies, or which resolves some 
conceptual problems. If the aim of science is problem solving, progress can 
occur if and only if the succession of scientific theories registers an increasing 
degree of problem solving effectiveness.''' This position is like that of Kuhn. 
He holds that the ability to solve problems is neither the unique nor 
unequivocal basis for theory (paradigm) choice.'^ 
Here one thing should be remembered that a specific theory can or 
cannot be progressive, such theories are designed to explain only a particular 
empirical problem. As against such theories a research tradition is a 
productive one. For, only a research tradition can be held accountable with 
regard to the number of specific theories. So, degree of effectiveness can be a 
character of such a qualitative theory as research tradition. Therefore, 
'problem solving effectiveness' of a theory means 'problem solving 
effectiveness' of a research tradition. One research tradition (RT) can be 
replaced by another RT. Thus it is RT which is the unit of scientific change. 
Important and substantive changes can occur within an on-going research 
tradition. 
In the final analysis, 'problem solving effectiveness' as the rationale 
for theory choice, in other words, tradition-choice successfully explains the 
historical fact that reason of theory-choice is relative to milieu. For, research 
tradition includes the conceptual problems of the day also. Laudan says that 
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Aristotle was not being irrational when he claimed, in the fourth century B.C., 
that the science of physics should be subordinate to, and legitimated by, 
metaphysics. Thomas Aquinas or Robert Grosseteste were not merely stupid 
or prejudiced when they espoused the view that science must be compatible 
with religion. The view that science is quasi-independent of non-scientific 
disciplines is itself a research tradition that generated considerable degree of 
progress and that is why it may be rational in the twentieth century to accept 
it. But the fact that a belief is rational in the present age or in any age for that 
matter, does not necessarily entail that it was rational at other times and 
places. Quite the reverse is more often the case. No research tradition can 
claim to be an eternal and universal problem solver. 
However, to make a choice between two theories, they should be 
comparable. For, rationale of theory-choice can only be applied if theories 
are comparable. Traditions being the supplier of assumptions at ontological 
and methodological levels, they cannot have any theory-free observational 
language; neither can there be any correspondence rules to appraise the 
tradition for the same reason. Then how do two research traditions become 
comparable? Since, according to Laudan, aim of scientific theories is 
problem-solving, theories do not require observational language or 
correspondence rules—we can talk about different theories, for, all theories 
aim at the same thing i.e. problem-solving. However, it can genuinely be 
asked as to how we can show that different theories address the same 
problem? 
Laudan's answer to this question is straightforward. He says that the 
terms in which a problem is characterized will generally depend upon the 
acceptance of range of theoretical assumptions, Ti, T2, T3, ...Tn.. These 
assumptions may, or may not, constitute the theories, that solve the problem. 
If a problem can be characterized only within the language and framework of 
a theory that purports to solve it, then clearly no competing theory could be 
said to solve the same problem. But, so long as the theoretical assumptions 
necessary to characterize the problem are different from the theories that 
attempt to solve it, then it is possible to show that the competing explanatory 
theories are addressing themselves to the same problem. Laudan considers the 
203 
following elementary example: Since antiquity scientists have been concerned 
to explain why light is reflected off a mirror or other polished surface 
according to a regular pattern. Relating the incident to the reflected angle, the 
problem of reflection, thus characterized, involves many quasi-theoretical 
assumptions, e.g., that light moves in straight lines, that certain obstacle can 
change the direction of a ray of light, that visible light does not 
continuously fill every medium, etc. Now the theories that solve the problem 
are not inconsistent with those relatively low level theoretical assumptions 
required to state the problem. Throughout the seventeenth century, for 
example, numerous conflicting theories of light addressed themselves to the 
problem of reflection. The various optical theories were all regarded as 
solving the problem of reflection, because that problem could be characterized 
in a way that was independent of any of the theories, which sought to solve it. 
It does not suggest that all the problems which a theory or tradition attempts 
to solve can be characterized independently of the theory which tries to solve 
them. We want to say just that there are far more problems common to 
competing research traditions than there are problems unique to single one. 
These shared problems provide a basis for rational appraisal of the relative 
problem solving effectiveness of competing research traditions. When early 
nineteenth century geologists debated the explanation of stratification, they 
could all—whether uniformitarian or catastrophist, Neptunist or vudeanist, 
Huttonian or Wemerian, God fearing or God denying, French, English or 
German—agree that one problem for any geological theory was that of 
explaining how such uniform and distinct layers had been formed. 
Another part of Laudan's argument is the answer to the question, viz., 
can two different theories agree to accept some particular problem as a solved 
one. It may happen that a problem is considered as has been solved by one 
theory, but not by another. Then how will we measure their relative merits? 
His answer to this question is that since rationality consists in accepting 
research traditions which had the highest problem solving effectiveness, an 
appropriate determination of the effectiveness of a research tradition can be 
made within the research tradition itself without reference to other tradition. 
We simply ask whether a research tradition has solved the problems that it 
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sets for itself; we ask whether it generated any anomaly or conceptual 
problem in its own process; we ask whether, in the course of time, it has 
expanded the domain of solved problems and minimized that of anomalies 
and conceptual problems. Laudan hopes that if we did this for all the major 
research traditions in science, then we should be able to construct something 
like a progressive ranking of all research traditions at a given time. For him, 
it is thus possible at least in principle and perhaps in practice, to be able to 
compare the progressiveness of different research traditions, even if those 
traditions are utterly incommensurable in terms of the substantive claims they 
make about the world.'^ 
Continuity and Change 
However, Laudan tries to carry out an analysis of his notion of a 
research tradition and says that change of research tradition takes two distinct 
forms. First, the most obvious way in which a research tradition changes is by 
a modification of some of its subordinate or specific theories. For him, 
research traditions are continuously undergoing changes of this kind. 
Researchers often discover that there is, within the framework of the tradition, 
a more effective theory for dealing with some of the phenomena in the 
domain than they had realized previously. They think that by slight alternation 
in previous theories, or modification of boundary conditions, or revision of 
constants proportionately, or minor refinements of terminology, they will be 
able to improve on the problem solving success of any of the theories within 
the research tradition. Whenever they discover a theory, which is a significant 
improvement on its predecessor, they drop the latter immediately. This is the 
reason why theories change so rapidly; the history of any flourishing tradition 
will exhibit a long succession of specific theories. 
Second, another important way in which research traditions evolve is a 
change of some of its most basic core elements. If one looks at the great 
research traditions in the history of scientific thought—Aristotleanism. 
Cartesianism, Newtonianism to mention only a few—one can see 
immediately that there is scarcely any interesting set of doctrines which 
characterizes any one of these traditions throughout its entire history. Certain 
Cartesians, at times, repudiate the Cartesian identification of matter and 
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extension. Huygens admits the possibility of void space, yet he remains 
Cartesian.'^ Scheffler puts it in this way : underlying historical changes of 
theory, there is a constancy of logic and method, which verified each 
scientific change with that which preceded it and with that which is yet to 
follow.'^ 
These are the changes within a research tradition, but in course of 
scientific development research tradition itself changes. As ongoing traditions 
and their theories encounter a number of problems; anomalies are discovered 
and basic conceptual problems arise; proponents of the tradition find 
themselves unable to eliminate these anomalies and conceptual problems by 
modifying specific theories within the tradition. For Laudan, in such 
circumstances, it is common for partisans of the tradition to explore what sort 
of minimal changes can be made in the deep level methodology and ontology 
of that tradition to eliminate the anomalies and conceptual problems. 
Sometimes scientists find it impossible to tinker with one or another 
assumption of the research tradition with a view to eliminate its anomalies 
and conceptual problems. At this point, scientists may most likely abandon 
the tradition. However, even at this stage, they can choose to solve the 
anomalies and conceptual problems by introducing one or two modifications 
in the core assumptions of a tradition. This way they preserve the bulk of 
assumptions of a research.^" 
Laudan further holds that 'Research tradition undergoes a natural 
evolution—an evolution which represents a change that is far from 
repudiation of former tradition and the creation of a new one. For him, if the 
research tradition has undergone numerous evolutions in the course of time, 
there probably can be many discrepancies between the methodology and 
ontology of its earliest and its latest formulation. Thus, Newtonian research 
tradition in Michael faraday's hands is a far cry from that of Newton's first 
followers. But he points out that, a finger grained analysis of the historical 
evolution will show that there was a continuous intellectual descent from 
Newton to Faraday, but they were as different as their end points look from 
their beginnings. ' We can see no degree of similarity between earlier and 
later stages in the development of a tradition, but at the same time they remain 
the same cnlitv. 
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If a tradition remains the same entity in the course of development, 
how do we understand the replacement of one tradition by another? Laudan 
says that at any given time certain elements of research tradition are more 
central to, and more entrenched within, the tradition than other elements. It is 
these more central elements, which are taken, at that time, to be more 
characteristic of the research tradition. To abandon them is indeed to move 
outside the tradition, whereas the less central tenets can be modified without 
repudiation of the research tradition. But what are the unrejectable elements 
and how are they rejected ? He says, when it can be shown that certain 
elements, previously regarded as essential to whole enterprise, can be 
jettisoned without compromising the problem solving success of the tradition 
itself, these elements cease to be a part of the unrejectable core of the research 
tradition.^' So, it is the old tradition out of which the new emerges. The old 
changes into the new tradition. They are different traditions. Since the new 
emerges from the old, in course of time, there is continuity between every 
successive stage from the beginning to the end. 
It can be asked as to what happens to the theory when it is faced by an 
anomaly? Do we then experience a break in the change and continuity of a 
theory ? According to Laudan, the occurrence of an anomaly raises doubts 
about, but need not compel the abandonment of theory exhibiting the 
anomaly. For him, this is because of two things: (1) In any empirical test, it is 
a complex conjunction of a variety of theories that is required for deriving any 
experimental predicting. For instance, in order to test a theoretical statement 
as simple as Boyl's law, we must invoke theories about the behavior of our 
measuring instruments. Boyl's law by itself predicts nothing whatever about 
how those instruments will behave. Now in this condition, if the prediction 
turns out to be erroneous, we do not know where to locate the error within the 
complex. It follows that we can never legitimately claim that any theory has 
ever been refuted. The decision that one particular theory within the network 
is false is completely arbitrary. On the other hand, to abandon a theory 
because it is incompatible with the data assumes that our knowledge of the 
data is infallible and veridical. But once we realize that data themselves are 
only probable, the occurrence of an anomaly does not necessarily require the 
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abandonment of a theory. (2) One of the most cognitively significant activities 
of scientists is the successful transformation of a presumed empirical anomaly 
for a theory into a confirming instance for that theory. There are many 
instances in history of science that anomalous instance has turned out to be 
the confirming one. For example, Prout's view was that all the elements were 
composed of hydrogen and consequently the atomic weights of all elements 
should be integral multiples of the weight of hydrogen. Rerzelius and others 
found that several elements had atomic weights incompatible with Prout's 
theory. These results constituted very serious anomalies for Proutian 
chemistry. But discovery of isotopes and refinement of isotopic techniques 
enabled physical chemists to separate out the isotopes of the same element. 
Each isotope was found to have an atomic weight that was an integral 
multiple of hydrogen. Previously anomalous results could now be explained 
on Prout's hypothesis. Thus, the very phenomenon that had earlier constituted 
anomalies for Prout's hypothesis becomes positive instance for it.^ ^ This is 
why, Laudan says, a scientist can adhere to a theory of less effectiveness in 
the hope that he will improve it. He holds that the choice of one tradition over 
its rival is a progressive choice precisely to the extent that the chosen tradition 
is a better solver than its rivals. He calls this kind of appraisal the context of 
acceptance. Another mode of appraisal is context of pursuit. There are many 
historical cases where scientists have investigated and pursued theories or 
traditions that were potentially less acceptable, less worthy of belief, than 
their rivals. Scientists often begin to pursue and explore a new research 
tradition long before its problem-solving success qualifies it to be accepted.^^ 
Prout did not leave his theory as he saw it in anomalies. He was rationally 
justified in doing this, for a scientific theory aims at problem solving and 
Prout also aimed at problem solving while adhering to the theory. His 
adherence to the theory culminated into a very important progress of science. 
Thus making of progress does not necessarily entail rejection of theory. 
Scientists may rationally or justifiably continue to hold the old theory. 
'Problem solving effectiveness' of a theory means the theory 
maximizes the solved problems and minimizes the anomalous and conceptual 
problems— a theory that does this work better is a better problem-solver. But 
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there are two subordinate measures about whether 'problem solving 
effectiveness' of the tradition increases or decreases in the course of time. 
This account will make us understand why a scientist may continue to hold 
the research tradition of less ability or effectiveness : 
a. The general progress of a research tradition: this is determined by both 
older and recent versions of the tradition. This is momentary 
adequacy—total progress obtained by the tradition thus far. 
b. The rate of progress of a research tradition: This is about the changes 
in the momentary adequacy of the tradition during any specific time 
span. 
It is important to note that the tradition may show a high degree of general 
progress, yet show low rate of progress. Alternatively, research tradition may 
have a high rate of progress during its recent past while exhibiting limited 
general progress.^^ 
This subordinate measure can explain the historical fact that a scientist 
can often be working alternatively in two different, and even mutually 
inconsistent, research traditions. Particularly, during periods of scientific 
revolution, it is commonly the case that a scientist will spend part of his time 
working on dominant tradition and a part of his time working on one or more 
of its less successful, less fully developed rivals. It may seem to be an 
irrational move by a scientist. But Laudan says that scientists can have good 
reason for working on theories that they would not accept. To see what could 
count as 'good reason' here we need only consider the following general kind 
of case. He argues that we have two competing research traditions, RT and 
RT'; suppose further that the momentary adequacy of RT is much higher than 
that of RT', but that the rate of progress of RT' is greater than the related 
value for RT. So far as acceptance is concerned, RT is clearly the only 
acceptable one of the pair. We may nonetheless decide to work on RT' to 
further articulate and explore its problem solving merits. This is on the ground 
that it has recently shown itself to be capable of generating new solutions to 
problems at an impressive rate. Because most new research traditions bring 
new analytic and conceptual techniques, and thereby are likely to pay problem 
solving dividends.^ '^ 
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This kind of rationality of pursuit, Laudan says, is nothing other than 
what is implicitly described in scientific usage as 'promise' or 'fecundity'. 
Daltonian atomism generated so much interest in the early years of the 
nineteenth century largely because of its scientific promise rather than its 
concrete achievements. At Dahon's time, the dominant chemical research 
tradition was concerned with elective affinities. But Dalton's early atomic 
doctrine could claim nothing like the over-all problem solving success of 
elective affinity chemistry; still worse Dalton's system was confronted by 
numerous serious anomalies. But this does not entail that atomists shall not be 
able hereafter to explain these apparent anomalies in satisfactory manner. 
Although most scientists refused to accept the Dalton's approach, many 
nonetheless were prepared to take it seriously, claiming that the serendipity of 
the Daltonian system made it at least sufficiently promising to be worthy of 
further development and refinement. Thus the pursuit of any research 
tradition—no matter how regressive it may appear —can always be rational. 
Laudan claims that a scientist may not only pursue a regressive 
tradition, he may also amalgamate two traditions for the same reason i.e., with 
an eye at problem-solving thereby leading to another kind of continuity. There 
are two ways in which different research traditions can be integrated. In some 
cases one tradition can be grafted onto other, without any serious modification 
in the presuppositions of either. Thus, in eighteenth century natural 
philosophy, many scientists were simultaneously Newtonians and subtle fluid 
theorists. Their adherence to the research tradition of subtle fluid led them to 
postulate imperceptible aetherial fluids in order to explain the phenomena of 
electricity, magnetism, heat, etc. Their Newtonianism led them to assume that 
the constituent particles of such fluids interacted not by contact but rather by 
means of strong forces of attraction and repulsion, acting-at-a-distance across 
empty space. The ftision of these traditions was to constitute itself a major 
research tradition—one which Schofield has lebelled materialism. So it would 
be serious error to assume that a scientist cannot consistently work in more 
than one research traditions. 
In other cases, however, the amalgamation of two or more research 
traditions requires the repudiation of some of the fundamental elements of 
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each of the traditions being combined. In these cases, the new tradition, if 
successful, requires the abandonment of its predecessors. In the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, geological followers of Hutton were hammering out 
a new tradition, which drew on elements of Caloricist heat theories and 
Vuleanist geology. These research traditions could not be preserved intact 
and, as result, the Huttonians had to forge what was regarded as an 
evolutionary research tradition which incorporated elements of traditions 
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which had been previously incompatible. 
Non-cumulative Progress 
It is generally accepted that cognitive progress is possible if knowledge 
is acquired through purely cumulative theories. Cumulative theory means a 
theory which may add to the store of solved problems, but which never fails 
to solve all the problems successfully solved by its predecessors. Put slightly 
differently, a necessary condition for one theory, T2, to represent progress 
over another, T|, is that T2 must solve all the solved problems of Ti and some 
excess content. So a series of theories is progressive if each later member in 
the series must entail all the corroborated content of its predecessors and some 
excess content. 
But this pattern of progress is rarely satisfied in the history of science. 
Prior to Hutton, Cuvier and Lyell, geological theorists had been concerned 
with a very wide range of empirical problems, such as how deposits get 
consolidated into rocks; how the earth originated from celestial matter and 
slowly acquired its present form; when and where the various animals and 
plants originated; how the earth retains its heat; the subterraneous origins of 
volcanoes and hot springs and the origin and constitution of igneous rocks. 
Solutions of varying degree of adequacy had been offered in the eighteenth 
century to each of these problems. Yet after 1830, particularly with the 
emergence of stratigraphy, there were no serious geological theories, which 
addressed themselves to many of the problems mentioned above. Laudan 
argues that does it mean that geology was not progressive between 1830and 
about 1900?, whereas geological theories after Cuvier and Lyell successfully 
addressed themselves to a very different set of empirical problems, including 
those of bio-graphy, stratigraphy, climate, erosion, and long-sea distribution. 
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The same is illustrated within physics by the failure of Newton's optics to 
solve the problem of refraction in Icelan spar which had been explained by 
Huygens' optics; and by the failure of early nineteenth century caloric 
theories of heat to explain phenomena of heat convection and generation, 
which had been solved by Count Rumford in the 1790's. Within chemistry, 
many problems had been solved by the early theories of elective affinities that 
were not solved by Dalton's later atomic chemistry. A still better example is 
offered by Franklinic electrical theory. Prior to Franklin, one of the central 
solved problems of electricity was the mutual repulsion of negatively charged 
electrical bodies. Various theories, especially vorticular ones, had solved this 
problem by the 1740's. Franklin's own theory, which was widely accepted 
from the middle to the end of the eighteenth century, never adequately came 
to grips with this problem. These examples show that knowledge of the 
relative weight or the relative number of problems can allow us to specify 
those circumstances under which the growth of knowledge can be progressive 
even when we lose the capacity to solve certain problems.^^ 
Therefore, Laudan maintains that progress is an aim-theoretic concept. 
To say that 'X represents progress' is an elliptical way of saying 'X represents 
progress towards goal Y'. If our concern is with problem-solving, we can 
meaningfully speak of progress without reference to accumulation. Suppose, 
for instance, that Ti has already solved problems a, b, and c, while T2 solved 
a, b, d, f, and g. If our cognitive aim is to possess solutions to the largest 
number of problems, then clearly T2 is progressive in comparison to T|.''° In 
problem-solving model of progress we assess the number and the weight of 
the empirical problems a theory is expected to solve. Similarly we assess the 
number and weight of its empirical anomalies. Finally we assess the number 
and centrality of its conceptual difficulties. Constructing the appropriate 
scales, our principle of progress tells us to prefer that theory which comes 
closest to solving the largest number of important empirical problems while 
generating the smallest number of significant anomalies and conceptual 
problems.-'' So. there is no need to satisfy the 'condition of accumulation' to 
make progress in science. 
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6.2 Question of Realism and Research Tradition 
Science as Problem-oriented Enterprise 
In Laudan's analysis of the model of progress, we see that progress is 
essentially related to the solution of problem, and science is essentially a 
'problem-solving activity'. Laudan emphasizes that science is problem 
oriented enterprise. If it is established that aim of scientific research is solving 
the problem and nothing else, our general idea of truth as an aim of scientific 
discourse should be given up. However, this position is outright anti-realism. 
Laudan's anti-realism is established on two grounds. One, if science is 
essentially a problem oriented enterprise, it by-passes truth as its aim. Two, 
scientific activity is essentially problem-solving activity. But solution of a 
problem does not necessarily mean the achievement of truth. 
We will see here how Laudan regards science as problem-oriented 
enterprise. Scientists work on problems, and problems are not objective; 
rather problems arise when they experience or feel the tension. He claims that 
any answer whatever to the question is regarded as solution to that problem, 
the answer is called theory in scientific parlance . Any theory is constructed to 
solve the problems. Theories matter cognitively, insofar as, and only insofar 
as, they provide adequate solutions to problems. If problems constitute the 
questions of science, it is theories, which constitute the answers. The ftinction 
of a theory is thus to resolve ambiguity, or to reduce irregularity into 
uniformity, or to show that what happens is some how intelligible and 
predictable. It is this complex of functions to which we refer when we speak 
of theories as solutions to problems. Therefore, Laudan says that the first and 
essential acid test for any theory is whether it provides acceptable answers to 
interesting problems; in other words, whether it provides satisfactory 
solutions to important problems.^^ So the aim of a theory is solving the 
problems felt by us. He mentions four types of problems and maintains that 
functions of scientific theories are to solve these problems : scientific 
problems, intra-scientific problems, normative problems and world view 
problems. 
Empirical Problem: Scientists encounter two types of problems which 
scientific theories are designed to solve: empirical problems and conceptual 
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ones. For example, Laudan illustrates, when we observe that heavy bodies fall 
towards the earth with amazing regularity and ask how and why they so fall, 
we pose an empirical problem. We observe that alcohol left uncovered in a 
glass soon disappears. To ask an explanation for that phenomenon is again to 
raise an empirical problem. We may observe that the offspring of plants and 
animals bear striking resemblances to their parents. To inquire into the 
mechanisms of trait transmission is also to raise an empirical problem. More 
generally, Laudan says that anything about the natural world that strikes us as 
odd, or otherwise in need of explanation, constitutes an empirical problem. ^  
We can roughly divide empirical problems into three types, relative to 
the function they have in theory-evaluation: (1) Unsolved problems -
problems that have not yet been adequately solved by the theory. This is also 
called potential problems, these constitute what we talk to be the case about 
the world, but for which there is as yet no explanation, (2) Solved problems— 
those empirical problems that have been adequately solved by a |heory. These 
are also called actual problems, (3) Anomalous problems - those empirical 
problems that a particular theory has not solved, but that one or more of its 
competitors have. An anomalous problem does not mean a falsifying 
instance.^ "* For Laudan, solved problems count in favour of a theory, 
anomalous ones constitute evidence against a theory, and unsolved problems 
simply indicate lines for future theoretical inquiry. Therefore, the hallmark of 
scientific progress is the transformation of anomalous and unsolved empirical 
problems into solved ones. However, these empirical problems can not be 
deemed to be objective problems, because empirical problems are themselves 
theory-dependent. Unless our theoretical framework indicates any 
phenomenon as a problem, the phenomenon remains unproblematic. This is 
why fall of Apple was simple event to us but was a great and important 
problem to Newton. Laudan says that whether a given phenomenon is a 
genuine problem, or how important it is, or how heavily it counts against a 
theory - these are very complex questions. We are unsure if an empirical 
effect is genuine; because many experimental results are difficult to 
reproduce, because physical systems are impossible to isolate, because 
measuring instruments are often unreliable, because the theory of error even 
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leads us to expect 'freak' results etc. Moreover, it often takes a considerable 
time before a phenomenon is sufficiently authenticated to be taken seriously 
as a well-established effect. Secondly, even when an effect has been well 
authenticated, it is very unclear as to which domain of science it belongs to, 
and therefore, which theories should seek, or be expected, to solve it. For 
instance, it is unclear whether the problem 'the moon seems larger near the 
horizon' is an astronomical, or an optical, or a psychological problem or what. 
As a result of this uncertainty, no one could show convincingly that theories 
in any particular domain should be expected to solve such problems. 
Laudan holds that an empirical problem, depends in part on the theory 
we possess. In this sense, an empirical problem is not empirical as such. But it 
is called empirical because it is a problem about the world. If we ask ' how 
fast do bodies fall near the earth?', we are assuming that there are objects akin 
to our concepts 'body" and 'earth' which move towards one another 
according to some regular rule. That assumption, of course, is a theory-laden 
one, but we nonetheless assert it to be about the physical word. For, empirical 
problems are first order problems; they are substantive questions about the 
objects that constitute the domain of any given science. All this means that the 
problems are different from facts, and solving a problem cannot be reduced to 
explaining a fact. For Laudan, a problem need not accurately describe a real 
sate of affairs. All that is required is that it be thought to be an actual state of 
affairs by some agent. There are many facts about the world which do not 
pose empirical problems simply because they are unknown. Even many 
known facts do not necessarily constitute empirical problems. To regard 
something as an empirical problem, we must feel that there is a premium on 
solving it. At any given moment in the history of science, many things will be 
well-known phenomena, but will not be felt to be in need of explanation or 
clarification. It was known, since the earliest times, for instance, that most 
trees have green leaves. But such a fact only becomes an empirical problem 
when someone decided it was sufficiently interesting and important to deserve 
explanation. Finally, problems recognized as such at one time can cease to be 
problems at later times. The staggering problem 'how the earth took its shape" 
within the last 6,000 to 8.000 years, no longer remained a problem to be 
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solved.^^ This is about empirical problems. They are not entitled to represent 
reality, therefore, solution of them is not endorsed with truth of the world. 
The second type of scientific problems is conceptual one. With 
reference to conceptual problems, Laudan cites the example of epicyclic 
astronomy of Ptolemy. Its core criticism did not deal with its adequacy to 
solve the chief empirical problems of observational astronomy. It was readily 
granted by most of Ptolemy's critics that his system was perfectly adequate 
for 'saving the phenomena'. Rather the bulk of criticism was directed against 
the conceptual credentials of the mechanisms Ptolemy utilized for solving the 
empirical problems of astronomy. In the same way, the debates between 
Copemican and Ptolemaic astronomers (1540-1600), between Newtonians 
and Cartesians (1720-1750), between wave optics and particle optics (1820-
1850), between atomists and anti-atomists (1815-1880), etc. are all examples 
of important scientific controversies where the empirical support for rival 
theories was essentially the same. Such problems are called conceptual 
problems.^^ 
For Laudan, the most vivid type of internal conceptual problem arises 
with the discovery that a theory is logically inconsistent, and thus self-
contradictory. A second class of internal conceptual problems arises from 
conceptual ambiguity or circularity within the theory. Unlike inconsistency, 
the ambiguity of concepts is a matter of degree rather than of kind. Faraday's 
early model of electrical interaction was designed to eliminate the concept of 
action-at-distance. As it happened, Robert Hare showed, Faraday's model 
required short range actions-at-distance. Faraday had merely replaced one 
otiose concept by its virtual equivalent. This kind of criticism led Faraday to 
re-think his views on matter and force and was eventually responsible for the 
emergence of Faraday's field theory."^ ^ 
A conceptual problem is a problem, which is exhibited by some theory or 
the other. Conceptual problems have no existence independent of the theories 
that exhibit them. If empirical problems are first-order questions about the 
substantive entities in some domain, conceptual problems are higher-order 
questions about the well-foundedness of the conceptual structures that have 
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been devised to answer the first-order questions. Conceptual problems arise 
for a theory, T, in one of the following ways: 
a. When T exhibits certain internal inconsistencies, or when its basic 
categories of analysis are vague and unclear; these are internal 
conceptual problems. 
b. When T is in conflict with other theory or doctrine T', which proponents 
of T believe to be rationally well founded: these are external conceptual 
problems. 
c. When T violates principles of research tradition of which it is a part. 
d. When T fails to utilize concepts from other, more general theories to 
which it should be logically subordinate.^^ 
However, such conceptual problems emanating from the 
disagreement with a worldview, or with an accepted normative theory, or with 
the theory accepted in other scientific disciplines, are finally produced by the 
imaginative mind of the scientist with a view to solve the empirical problems 
thereof They are produced from the disagreement with existing, dominating 
way of understanding. Therefore, conceptual problems are independent of 
physical order of scientific investigations. All four types of conceptual 
problems mentioned above are very much theoretical problems. Therefore, 
any solution of them by some other theory cannot be deemed to be describing 
or representing the phenomenal features of the real world. 
Intra-scientific Problem: According to Laudan, this kind of problem is 
produced when the imagination of a scientist goes counter to the theory 
accepted in other parts of science. For instance, Ptolemy's system, for all its 
empirical values, made the assumption that certain planets move around 
empty points in space, that planets do not always move at constant speed, and 
the like. But these were in flagrant contradiction with the then universally 
accepted physical and cosmological theories about the nature and motion of 
the heavy bodies. In spite of ingenious efforts to reconcile these differences 
by Ptolemy and others, most of the crucial conceptual problems remained, 
and were to plague the development of mathematical astronomy until the end 
of the seventeenth century. To mention another instance, the astronomical 
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system of Copernicus's made a number of assumptions about the motion of 
bodies which were inconsistent with the then accepted Aristotiian mechanics. 
One of the strongest sixteenth century arguments against the Copemican 
system consisted in pointing out that the theory of Copernicus was 
unacceptable because it ran counter to the tenets of the best-estabUshed 
physical theory. It was Galileo's signal contribution to deal with this 
conceptual problem. He recognized the incompatibility between Aristotiian 
physics and Copemican astronomy and remedied the situation by designing a 
new physics that was independently plausible as well as compatible with 
Copemican astronomy. Intra-scientific conceptual problems occur because 
scientific disciplines and domains are never completely independent of one 
another. The chemist will look to the physicist for ideas about atomic 
stmcture; the biologist will utilize chemical concepts when talking about 
organic microstmctures.'"' These intra-scientific problems are no more than 
theoretical problems or human intellectual problems having no necessary 
relationship with the real world. 
Normative Problem: Laudan points out that science is an activity 
conducted by seemingly rational agents. Therefore, science has certain aims 
and goals. A rational assessment of science must, therefore, articulate those 
goals. But there are questions with regard to the nature of these goals. The 
question of the appropriation of the most effective method for achieving these 
goals is also of vital significance. Only through an effective or appropriate 
methodological strategy can we be oriented as to what or what not should be 
done by the scientists, in order to achieve the cognitive, epistemic, and 
practical goals of the scientific enterprise. As scientist is to bear these norms 
in his assessment of theories. History of science tells us that these norms have 
been perhaps the single major source for most of the controversies in theory 
acceptance. If a scientist has good grounds for accepting some methodology 
and if some scientific theory violates that methodology then it is entirely 
rational for him to have grave reservations about the theory. This situation 
constitutes the conceptual problems or what we call normative problems. An 
example of this kind of conceptual problem is the development of Newtonian 
theor}'. The development of this theory goes counter to the dominant 
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inductivist methodology of the times. This incompatibility produced an acute 
conceptual problem. Some of Newtonians sought to resolve this problem by 
simply repudiating their physical theory. On the other hand, some insisted the 
norms themselves should be changed so as to bring them into link with the 
best available physical theories. In the light of further conceptual problems, 
the latter group devised a new methodology, i.e. the hypothetico-deductive 
methodology.'*' From normative kind of problems we know that science is 
goal oriented activity where goals and the methods both are settled by 
scientific minds. Human goals finally operate within human domains. So 
solution of such problems cannot be deemed to be resolving the problems 
pertaining to real physical world. 
Worldview Problem: The world view problem is very important for the 
question of realism. Laudan says that this type of external conceptual problem 
arises when a particular scientific theory is seen to be incompatible with some 
other body of accepted but prima facie nonscientific beliefs. For him, within 
any culture, there are widely accepted beliefs that go beyond the scientific 
domain. Such beliefs fall in areas as diverse as metaphysics, logic, ethics, 
theology, and social and moral ideologies. Although the total populations of 
reasonable beliefs changes with time, there has never been a period of history 
of thought when the theories of science exhausted the domain of rational 
beliefs. One of such problems is the confrontation of Newtonian physics with 
Cartesian ontology of force. How can bodies exert at points far removed from 
the bodies themselves? He says that Buchdohl, Heimann, and McGuire have 
convincingly shown that this issue had become the central philosophical and 
scientific problem of the Enlightenment. Not satisfied with Cartesian 
ontology, philosophers and scientists all over Europe began to re-evaluate 
such traditional issues as the nature of substance, the relation of properties to 
substances, and particularly, the nature of our knowledge of substance. What 
resulted from this reappraisal at the hands of Kant, Priestley. Hutton, and 
others was a new ontology which argued for the priority of force over matter 
and which made the powers of activity into the basic building blocks of the 
physical world. Similarly, one of the most persistent sets of conceptual 
problems in twentieth century physics has been the dissonance between 
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quantum mechanics and our philosophical beliefs about causality, change, 
substance and reality.'*^ These are the world view problems. 
However, these are the problems which scientists seek to solve. The 
aim of science is problem-solving, whether the problems are empirical or 
conceptual. The empirical problems represent the 'correspondence' and 
conceptual problems represent the 'coherence' about our knowledge. " 
History of science reveals that a worldview problem is more serious a 
problem than an empirical one. For instance, no one proposed abandoning 
Newtonian mechanics because it could not accurately predict the motion of 
the moon; but many thinkers were seriously prepared to dismiss Newtonian 
physics because its ontology was incompatible with the accepted metaphysics 
of the day. This is not because science is more rationalistic than empirical; but 
rather because it is usually easier to explain away an anomalous experimental 
result than to dismiss out of hand a conceptual problem.'*'* From this point of 
view, we see that metaphysics and other ideologies have an effective 
influence on theory formulation. The theories of this kind cannot necessarily 
claim to be committed to the reality of the world. Rather they produce such 
knowledge which is constructed within human ideology and metaphysics. 
Significance of Problem : However scientific activity, for Laudan, is no 
more than solving these problems—the products of science are solutions of 
these problems. In fact, all our scientific achievements are solutions of 
problems. However, there is another thing that matters significantly: all 
problems and all solutions are not of equal weight. Therefore, the relative 
importance of problems and the degree of adequacy of solutions have become 
the crucial points of debate in contemporary scientific discourse. Some 
solutions are decidedly better and richer than others. In assessing the 
adequacy of any theory we will ask not how many facts confirm it, but how 
important those facts are. We will ask not how many problems the theory 
solves, but about the significance of those problems. So there is a dialectic 
between challenging problems and adequate theories.''^ This is a historical fact 
that scientists have often abandoned a theory in the face of only a few 
anomalies and have at other times retained a theor>' in the fece of an ocean of 
empirical refutations. So it is not so much how many anomalies a theory 
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generates, but rather how cognitively important those particular anomalies 
are.''^ This means that a problem is valued in terms of its significance, and it is 
no more than relative importance of problems understood in the light of our 
knowledge at a particular time. So problems and their solutions are not 
impersonal. 
This point will be clearer in the light of another feature of our 
understanding of the scientific problems. It is often unclear whether a seeming 
problem really is an empirical problem, i.e. whether there is any natural 
phenomenon there to explain at all. For example, experiments in extrasensory 
perception is a case in point. Most scientists today would claim to be unsure 
that there is any indication of ESP, which is in need of theoretical explanation 
(The so-called pseudo-sciences generally flourish on just such cases, where it 
is unclear whether there's, at the outset, any problem which needs to be 
solved). So, whether a problem is a genuine problem depends on the 
theoretical understanding about that problem. Before the time of Descartes, 
problems of the impact and collision of bodies were at the periphery of the 
concerns of writers on motion and mechanics, scarcely even recognized as 
problems that a theory of motion should resolve. But the mechanical 
philosophy of Descartes promoted problems about impact to the forefront of 
mechanics. And the problems of impact and collision were regarded as among 
the most urgent in physics. It means that 'recognition' and 'importance' of a 
problem depends on theoretical understanding. Without an appropriate type of 
theory, modes of problem weighting would be impossible.'*^ 
Like empirical problems, there are certain circumstances that tend to 
promote or demote initial importance of conceptual problems also. Laudan 
mentions some such situations as follows that may show that conceptual 
problems also become significant in the context of their importance accorded 
to them through and by human understanding. 
1. The nature of the logical relation between two theories exhibiting 
inconsistency instead of being mutually supportive produce conceptual 
problems. Other things being equal, the greater the tension between two 
theories, the weightier the problem will be. 
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2. When a conceptual problem arises as a result of a conflict between 
theories, T| and T2, the seriousness of that problem for Ti depends on 
how confident we are about the acceptability of T2. If T2 has proven to 
be extremely effective at solving empirical problems and if its 
abandonment would leave us with many anomalies, then matters are 
very difficult for the proponents of T|. If, on the other hand,T2's record 
as a problem solver is very modest, then T2's incompatibility with T] 
will probably not count as a major conceptual problem for Ti. In both of 
the cases, a feeling of tension, or confidence, points to the role of the 
scientific community's socio-psychology in the crystallization or 
development of scientific problems. This reminds us of the Kuhnian 
sociology of science. 
3. If a theory poses a certain conceptual problem, there is usually some 
ground for hope. We think that with very minor modification in the 
theory, we can bring it into line and thus eliminate the problem. If, on 
the other hand, a theory has been known to have a particular conceptual 
problem for some length of time, if partisans of that theory have 
repeatedly and unsuccessfully tried, to make the theory consistent with 
our norms and other accepted beliefs, then that problem assumes an ever 
greater importance. It also assumes an ever-greater significance in 
debates about the acceptability of the theory.''^ Solution of such a 
problem depends on the ability of the concerned scientists: we are again 
reminded of Kuhn's example of tools in the hand of carpenters. It 
indicates the instrumental dimension of scientific theories too that 
assumes significance in our efforts to resolve scientific problems. 
The essential task of science is to solve problems, be they empirical or 
conceptual. Scientific research is a problem-solving activity. Science may 
have as wide a variety of aims as individual scientists have a multitude of 
motivations. For Laudan, science aims to explain and control the natural 
world. Truth is not the only interesting motive for scientists. Social utility and 
prestige too motivate them in theory-formulation and theory choice. 
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Solution versus Truth 
The same thing can be discussed from another perspective. The 
objective of science is solving the problem even when problems themselves 
indicate the anti-realistic nature of scientific discourse. The solution of a 
problem can not claim to be an attainment of truth. The research tradition 
view of scientific progress tells us that science is essentially the 'problem-
solving activity' and its aim is solving of the problems, whether empirical or 
conceptual. From beginning to the present, history of scientific activities 
shows that all scientific achievements are but the solutions of the problems. 
Those achievements are considered as advancement of science because they 
have solved the problems that scientists encountered. Progress of science 
means to increase the amount of the solved empirical problems and decrease 
the amount of the anomalous problems and the unsolved ones. So, scientific 
progress means progress in solving the problems. Now the question is that do 
the solutions of problems amount to achieving the truth, or even approaching 
the truth? Do the solutions of problems represent the real picture of the 
world? 
According to Laudan, one of the richest and healthiest dimensions of 
science is the growth through time, and the standards it demands for 
something to count as a solution to a problem also change with time. What 
one-generation of scientists will accept as a perfectly adequate solution, will 
often be viewed by the next generation as a hopelessly inadequate one. The 
history of science is replete with cases where solutions whose precision and 
specificity were perfectly adequate for one epoch were deemed totally 
inadequate for other. In physics, Aristotle cites the problem of fall as a central 
phenomenon for any theory of terrestrial mechanics. Aristotle himself sought 
to understand both 'why bodies fall downwards' and 'why they accelerate in 
fair. Aristotelian physics provides answers to these questions, which were 
taken seriously for over two millennia. For Galileo, Descartes, Huygens, and 
Newton, Aistotle's views were not really solutions to the problem of fall at 
all. lor they failed utterly to explain the uniform character of the fall of a 
body, fherefore, a solution is always a solution of the time. 
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For a logician, the explaining theory must entail an exact statement of 
fact to be explained and the theory must be either true or highly probable. On 
the other hand, Laudan says, a theory may solve a problem so long as it 
entails even an approximate statement of affairs concerning the problem. He 
says that in determining whether a theory solves a problem, it is irrelevant 
whether the theory is true or false, well or poorly confirmed. Moreover, what 
counts as a solution to a problem at one time may not necessarily be regarded 
as such at all times. He also says that facts are very rarely, if ever, explained 
because there is usually disconcordance between what a theory entails and our 
laboratory data. By contrast, empirical problems are frequently solved for 
problem solving purposes. So we do not require an exact, but only an 
approximate, resemblance between theoretical results and experimental ones. 
Newton did solve, and widely regarded as having solved, the problem of the 
curvature of the earth—even though his results were not identical with 
observational fmdings.^ ^ 
Furthermore, for Laudan, the notion of solution is highly relative and 
comparative in a way that the notion of explanation is not. We can have two 
different theories that solve a problem, and yet say one is a better solution 
than the other. For instance, philosophers of science have been very troubled 
by the relationship of Galileo and Newton's theories of fall and the data 
thereof. They were unable to say that both theories explained the 
phenomenon of fall. Whereas it is, for Laudan, surely more natural 
historically and more sensible conceptually, to say that both theories solved 
the problem of free fall, one perhaps with more precision than the other. It 
redounds to the credit of both that each provided an adequate solution to the 
problem at hand. We can all agree, for instance, that Ptolemy's theory of 
epicycles solved the problem of retrograde motion of the planets, regardless 
of whether we accept the truth of epicyclical astronomy. Equally, every one 
agrees that Thomas Young's wave theory of light—whether true or false— 
solved the problem of the dispersion of light. Lavoisier's theory of oxidation, 
whatever its truth status, solved the problem of why iron is heavier after being 
heated than before."'' So. a solution targets a problem, not the reality of the 
world. 
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Laudan also points out that determining whether a tradition is 
successful in solving any problem does not mean that tradition has been 
'confirmed' (or 'refuted'). Nor can such an appraisal tell us anything about 
the truth (or falsity) of the tradition. He shows that a research tradition may be 
enormously successful at generating fruitful theories and yet flawed in its 
ontology and methodology. Equally a research tradition might be true, and yet 
unsuccessful at generating theories that were effective problem solvers. Thus 
when we reject a research tradition, we are merely making a tentative decision 
not to utilize it for the moment because there is an alternative to it that has 
proven to be a more successful problem solver.^^ 
Moreover, there are cases in the history of science where the success of 
a theory is highly suspect if the theory is linked to an unsuccessflil research 
tradition—even though the theory is possessed of great problem solving 
merits. Laudan mentions that Rumfort's theory of heat conduction and 
convection was far superior to any alternative theories of thermal flow in 
fluids available in the period from 1800 to 1815. Nonetheless, few scientists 
took Rumford's theory seriously because the research tradition in which he 
worked had been discarded by the emergence of a rival research tradition. 
Contrarywise, a theory even an inadequate one, will have some strong 
arguments in its favor if it is linked with a research tradition that is otherwise 
highly successful. For instance, theories of mechanistic physiology in the late 
seventeenth century were highly regarded in many circles where the 
mechanistic research tradition was flourishing even though they were 
significantly inferior to certain theories in other less successful research 
traditions." All this asserts that success of the tradition cannot be regarded as 
the success in achieving truth. In the same token, failure does not necessarily 
assert the falsity of tradition. When we say that a, is an anomaly for a theory 
T, we are not saying that a, falsifies T; rather we are saying that a, the sort of 
problem which a theory such as T ought to be able to solve has not been 
solved by it as yet. Such an anomaly does not prove that T is false; it only 
raises the doubts about the problem-solving effectiveness of T. 
Therefore, Laudan says that research traditions should not be Judged in 
terms of truth or falsity, for, research traditions are historical creatures. Since 
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they are created for solving the problems, they have merits or demerits with 
regard to that purpose—not truth-value. Research traditions are articulated in 
a particular intellectual milieu, and like all other historical institutions they 
wax and wane. Just as surely as research traditions are bom and thrive, so 
they die and cease to be seriously regarded as instruments for furthering the 
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progress or science. 
In the final analysis, to suppose truth to be a goal of science is to 
portray the activity of science as irrational. Truth can never be recognizably 
negotiated by a scientist. Rational behaviour demands that we have a 
recognizable goal. The achievement of the goal should be publicly worthy of 
celebration. The failure to attain the goal, too should be, in principle, 
confirmable. Problem-solving rather than truth-finding can be deemed to be 
such a recognsiable goal. Truth is not a goal of science and of individual 
scientist.^^ History has a tendency to characterize the aim of science in terms 
of such transcendental properties as truth and apodictic certainty. If science is 
so conceived, it emerges as non-progressive since we evidently have no way 
of ascertaining whether our theories are more truth-like or nearly certain than 
they formerly were. We do not yet have a satisfactory semantic 
characterization of truth-likeness, let alone any epistemic account of when it 
would be legitimate to judge one theory to be more nearly true than another.^^ 
If science aims at any recognizable goal, then that is not 'truth' but 'solution' 
to the problems about the world. 
To conclude, for Laudan, the fundamental scientific products are 
research traditions. According to him, there are two types of theories. One of 
them denotes a specific set of related doctrines which can be utilized for 
making specific experimental predictions and for giving detailed explanation 
of natural phenomena; for instance, theory of electromagnetism. By contrast 
the term 'theory' also denotes much more general, much less easily testable, 
sets of doctrines or assumptions; for instance, theory of evolution or kinetic 
theory of gases. In this case we are referring not to a single theory, but to a 
whole spectrum of individual theories. The term 'evolutionary theory' for 
instance does not refer to any single theory, but to an entire-familv of 
doctrines that are historically and conceptually related. This kind of theory is 
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the primary tool for understanding. Larry Laudan calls this type of theory 
scientific research tradition. Problem selection, heuristics, standard of 
appraisal - all are determined by research tradition. For Laudan, scientific 
research starts from encountering of a problem and ends with the solution of 
that problem. So, scientific activity is problem-solving activity. It is rational 
to accept a research tradition which has greater problem-solving ability in 
place of a research tradition which has less problem-solving ability; problem-
solving effectiveness is the standard of judgement in theory choice. Therefore, 
for Laudan scientific change is rational and progressive. 
Progress occurred in this way is yet non-cumulative progress. The 
principle of accumulation says that the later theory is supposed to add to the 
store of solved problems, but never fails to solve all the problems solved by 
its predecessors. According to research tradition view, a theory is better only 
for its greater problem-solving ability, though it fails to solve exactly those 
problems that are solved by its predecessors. 
The most important part of the character of progress is associated 
with the position of truth in the progress. For Laudan, science is essentially a 
problem-solving activity. The aim of scientific research is solving the 
problems and nothing else. Science solves empirical problems, conceptual 
problems, intra-theoretic problems, world-view problems, etc. All these 
problems are created by us when we come across the world with our own 
intellectual capacities. So, none of these problems is necessarily related with 
reality. Our research tradition which is the primary tool of understanding 
determines which of the problems are significant for our research. This 
indicates that problems are not objective, rather selective. Furthermore, the 
solution of these problems does not entail truth. Laudan holds that the richest 
and healthiest dimensions of science is the growth through time, and the 
standards it demands for something to count as a solution to a problem also 
changing with time. For him, a theory solves a problem so long as it entails an 
approximate statement of affairs concerning the problem. Therefore, in 
determining whether a theory solves a problem, it is irrelevant whether the 
theor>' is true of false. It is research tradition which determines when a 
scientist is to be satisfied with the solution of the problem. Therefore, a 
solution can not describe the real state of affairs. 
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Chapter - 7 
The Structure of Progress in Evolutionary Change 
7.1. Change and Continuity in Evolution 
Concept: Neither Static nor Dynamic 
Toulmin's view of evolution of scientific change is based on the 
reconciliation of two opposite extreme views of the standard of rationality. On 
the one hand, arguments are given for static rationality that are not changeable 
in the course of time; on the other hand, arguments are given for dynamic 
rationality that have no constant meaning of them, and they are as changing as 
time does. However, neither of them does conform to the history of science. 
Toulmin criticizes these views and shows that concepts are neither static nor 
dynamic but concepts evolve in the processes of evolution. 
The argument for ultimate, fixed, ahistorical static standard of rational 
judgment is put forward among others, mainly by Gottlob Frege. He holds the 
argument that if everything were in continual flux and nothing maintained itself 
in a fixed state for all times to come, then there would no longer be any 
possibility of getting to know about he world. Everything would plunged into 
confusion.' In view of the same, we must concern ourselves only with timeless 
ideas. Accordingly, human Mind must struggle towards the same, little by little. 
This immense intellectual effort at last will achieve knowledge of a concept in 
its pure form, by stripping off the irrelevant accretions which veil it from the 
eye of the Mind.^ 
However, Toulmin says, reality is very different. He stresses that 
outside logic and mathematics, this Olympian stance is not so easily 
maintained. On the other hand, historical realization cannot be escaped by this 
conviction of ultimate principle. For him, Frege's method distracts us from the 
process of conceptual change. For instance, if we compare the dynamical 
concepts of Buridan, Aristotle and of Einstein we will find that no such 
standard is operating in their work at all. The search for a perennial standard in 
the works of Buridan, Aristotle and Einstein or for that matter, in the political 
ideas of Machiavelli, Plato and of Marx is a fruitless venture. For Toulmin, any 
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attempt to judge intellectual boundaries between rival theories, soon drives us 
beyond the range of a purely formal analysis. What entities we shall accept in 
our account of the world, depends on what formal language we decide to use in 
describing it. In this sense, we are condemned to an ontological relativity. In 
addition to this, there is a general complaining that the formal system is so 
abstract that it has no bearing on the arguments used in the contemporary 
theoretical physics. For example, Quantum mechanics had never been 
formulated according to the rigorous standards of modem logic. 
Therefore, the rationality we are concerned with is neither a formal nor 
a pragmatic matter. The pragmatists and positivists advocate 'simplicity' and 
'convenience' to be the reason for theory change. However, even these criteria 
are violated with impunity by the actual history of science. History tells us that 
Copernicus's new heliocentric system was far more specific, varied and 
sophisticated than what is hinted by such vague terms as 'simplicity' and 
'convenience'. Especially at the outset, the Copemican theory was by many 
tests substantially less simple or convenient than the traditional Ptolemaic 
analysis.^ 
Historically speaking, successive theories are first applied and later 
modified in course of the ongoing evolution of relevant intellectual activities. 
No theory emerges once and for all; every theory matures in the course of time. 
Even man's faculties of understanding develop historically. Toulmin says, the 
problem of human understanding is two-fold; 'man knows' and 'he is conscious 
that he knows'. We acquire knowledge and at the same time we are aware of 
our own activities as a knower. It means that knowledge and the knower both 
are the object of knowledge. Knowledge grows, and by reflection upon knower, 
it deepens as well. Looking outside ourselves we extend our knowledge, 
looking inwards we deepen our knowledge. When our knowledge grows, we 
reflect upon knower accordingly; when our reflection deepens, we acquire 
knowledge accordingly. Throughout the history of thought these twin activities 
have gone on continuously. Change in one results in the change of other. 
Accordingly, we are busy reconsidering our picture of ourselves as knower in 
the light of recent extensions to the actual content of our knowledge.^ Touhnin 
argues that the same type of object will fall within the domains of several 
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different sciences, depending on what questions are raised about it. Also, what 
it is that makes a problem 'problematic' will be from the point of view of 
specific descriptions. Thus, the nature of an intellectual discipline always 
involves both its concepts and also the men who conceive them. Thus 
knowledge and knower both are the subject matter of a discipline. 
So, the standards for appraising our existing stock of ideas are not self-
evident. Toulmin says that questions about the processes, procedures, and 
mechanics by which our concepts are developed, acquired, used and improved 
may be topics for particular sciences or disciplines. They may be discussed 
from the perspective of neurophysiology or logic, cultural anthropology or the 
sociology of science, etc. However, the central issues of epistemic 
philosophy—justification and appraisal, judgment and criticism etc. — have 
never been concerned with factual matters alone. By contrast, the philosophical 
probing into epistemology also goes as far as it can go what sources our 
concepts ultimately derive their intellectual authority from. Like the question of 
the ultimate source of moral and political authority, this question too has 
generated great controversies of judgment and evaluation.^ 
In this regard, we may consider the influence of the belief in a 'fixed 
order of nature'. Toulmin says that until almost 1800 A.D., most scholars and 
scientists were restricted within an ahistorical worldview- Fixed laws in physics 
and fixed principles of understanding were deemed to be operating universally 
and eternally. This fixed order of nature was immutable also in human body 
and brain along with the rest of the material world. This is again a short step to 
assuming that human nature was similarly fixed and permanent. So the 
fundamental epistemological task was to discover the principles or processes by 
which human mind acquires intellectual mastery over the order of nature. Since 
'the intelligence of man' and 'the intelligibility of nature' presumably are 
operating on stable unchanging principles, the relationship between them is 
presumably stable and unchanging as well. Fixed mind masters fixed nature 
according to fixed principles.^ 
But Toulmin says the position of these presuppositions of seventeenth 
ccnlur}' natural and social sciences has changed drastically. The ultimate 
unchanging particles of matter, the stable planetary systems and animal species. 
232 
the timeless imperatives of morality and social life— all assumed or presumed, 
supposed or proposed eternal principles and values lost their vigour and rigour 
and shine and stream. For Toulmin all principles and values are historically 
developing or evolving. Today physical sciences have broken their earlier ties 
with theology. Even the scientific phrase Maws of nature' is no longer thought 
of as implying the 'sovereign will' of creator. These laws are, by now, 
considered as merely working assumptions. This is only a part of the picture. 
The older axioms have long since been called into question. Their implications 
have been discounted. The structural invariants of the seventeenth century 
world picture have all crumbled under the ongoing march of history and been 
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transformed into historical variables. 
Toulmin says that historical realization is diametrically opposite to the 
philosophy of Plato who deemed rationality to be ultimately associated with 
certain 'ideas' that are independent of our individual Mind. It goes against the 
medieval theological approach as well which argues that the objective ground 
of rational knowledge lays in the divine Mind. It also goes against the Castesian 
contention that rationality lays in the harmony established by God between 
those ideas which human mind finds totally 'clear and distinct'. The Kantian 
definition of rationality as structuring of our experiences can also not be 
acceptable to the advocates of historically evolving rationality. Whatever the 
so-called ultimate sources of rationality that were deemed to be historically 
invariant during nineteenth century came into head-on collision with 
discoveries of history and anthropology. Montesquieu had made it familiar that 
human populations and cultures become different in accordance with different 
geographical locations climates, soils, resources and traditions. But even in his 
view. Reason and Nature remained as fixed as ever. He offered environmental 
explanations of differences. If such and such environmental situations are 
offered then such and such life will develop. It sounds to be geometrical 
reasoning. The problem of human understanding today cannot be set in 
Aristotlean terms also. In Aristotlean philosophy, man's epistemic task is to 
cognize the fixed essence of nature. Today's epistemology is no longer 
Hegelian as well. For Hegel human mind alone develops historically against a 
static background of nature. 
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Historical change is beyond human control. Some new factor or 
influence or idea enters — imperceptibly but irreversibly—into the course of 
our intellectual development. For example, Crook's voyage was planned to 
establish finally the eternal structure of God's creation. But its real outcome 
was concentration of attention on the variety and apparent inconsistency of 
man's moralities, cultures, and ideas. In this way, the most forcible impression 
of the voyage had come not from its intended astronomical results, but rather 
from some curious anthropological by-products. Moreover, theoretical as well 
as practical disagreements are often decided by the balance of power rather than 
by the principles. There is a reftisal to listen to the opponent's case, an 
obsession with power rather than principle, and a willingness to impose by 
violence or threats opinions which have failed to carry conviction on there 
merits. Such factors cannot be ignored in the intellectual articulation and 
historical development of any discipline. '^  
Therefore Toulmin says that we should come to terms with the 
phenomenon of inevitable interaction between human Ideas and Natural 
world; neither of them is an invariant. Instead of a fixed mind, gaining 
command over fixed nature by applying fixed principles, we should expect to 
find variable epistemic relationship between a variable Man and a variable 
Nature. That is, the relations between outward-looking and inward-looking 
activities changes from one period of intellectual history to another." 
For Toulmin, the discoveries of ethnology and anthropology have 
given us a more profound understanding of the past. They have also given us 
powerful explanations for cultural variability. Contemporaneously, even the 
basic categories of human thought are deemed to be the products of a 
historical sequence rather than qualifications of 'pure reason'. Toulmin says 
that since the beginning of twentieth century, men have finally become aware 
that the relativity of human thought affects all types of concepts; be they 
moral or mathematical. What concepts a man employs, what standards of 
rational judgment he accepts, how he conceives his life and the world outside, 
etc.. depend not only on the universal human nature, but also on when he 
happens to be born and where he happens to live. We learn to regard certain 
methods as superstitious only to find them operating somewhere else. At 
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various periods of history different methods have carried equal conviction and 
authority.'^ Therefore it is clear that conceptual diversity is a characterizing 
feature of the history of science. It is implausible to suppose that there is any 
fixed, absolute and unchanging set of concepts adequate for doing science.'^ 
Revolution to Evolution 
But this historical evolution does not culminate into relativism and 
hence into the denial of continuity of scientific change. R.G. Collingwood 
who is a giant advocate of relativism holds that we are 'acculturated' by our 
upbringing. As a result, we think according to intellectual presuppositions 
characterising our own culture. These are just like ethical presuppositions that 
determine not only what kinds of conduct we consider right or wrong, but also 
what kinds of phenomena we regard as puzzling or self-explanatory. Similarly 
in science, such presuppositions in which we are brought up, determine not 
only what kinds of things we consider true or false, but also what kinds of 
phenomena we regard as puzzling or self explanatory. For him, what type of 
picture of the world we use to interpret our experience, what type of scientific 
arguments and evidence we find cogent or plausible etc., are determined by 
these presuppositions. Also these presupposifions of men, in other words, their 
intellectual standards, have varied between different historical and cultural 
milieus in just the same way as their ethical and aesthetic standards. 
Therefore, the search for a rationality transcending a particular milieu is the 
pursuit of a will-o-the-wisp.''* 
Coolingwood also holds that our concepts form not axiomatic 
system, but system of presuppositions; and the logical relations between them 
are not truth-relations but meaning-relations. In this system, these 
presuppositions remain merely relative ones, because the same concepts that 
are presupposed at one level will, at another level, be dependent on yet more 
general presuppositions. At this level, the summit of the conceptual hierarchy 
the most general presuppositions do not depend on a yet more general kind. 
Collingwood calls these concepts and principles the 'absolute presuppositions'. 
Here their validity does depend on their own culture.'^ 
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Since the meaning of the presuppositions depends on the varying 
cultural milieus, there cannot be continuity in the development through the 
successive concepts. Whereas the fixed principles do recognize the continuity, 
it cannot do so to the relevance of time of scientific change. Again, a relative 
presupposition system does recognize the relevance of time, it cannot do so to 
the continuity or development in theory change. The formal analysis of pure 
concepts and the historical analysis of absolute presuppositions are two 
opposite extremes. Neither of the systems can succeed to reconstruct the actual 
history of science. For Toulmin, they fail due to their acceptance of the familiar 
assumption, viz., 'rationality must be equated with logicality'. Accordingly, 
they both assume that different concepts and beliefs can be compared rationally 
only so long as they can be referred to a ' logical system'.'^ The only difference 
between these two systems is that while formal analysis conforms to 'logical 
system', historical analysis cannot do so. A single 'logical system' is 
presupposed both by conforming and non-conforming stances. The absolutists 
assert that the universal impartial, and rational judgments can be formulated 
into eternal principles, whereas, the relativists simply deny that any such 
standpoint can have any universal validity. This common assumption prevents 
both men from coming to terms with the rationality of conceptual change.'^ 
Toulmin says that rationality lies neither in a single 'logical system' nor in a 
temporal sequence of such systems but rather in the process of evolution. In 
the process of evolution, there is both continuous development and the 
relevance of history or time. Therefore, rationality in the growth of scientific 
concepts is to be understood in terms of 'process' instead of 'system'. This 
process is evolutionary process that shows the relativity of scientific concepts 
without falling into relativism.'^ 
To understand the process which maintains rationality within relativity 
through time Toulmin gives an example from the practice of law. In the process 
of legal history, the practical procedures which lawyers, judges, and professors 
of jurisprudence have dealt with, come up for formal philosophical analysis 
only later. .lurisprudence corresponds to the historical or cultural milieus of 
legal practice. In the legal practice, lawyers and judges manage to work their 
way through problems, for which philosophers have not as yet stated any 
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coherent or satisfactory theoretical solution. Furthermore, if we demand exact 
criteria for distinguishing successive periods of legal history, then philosophers 
will tend to be question-begging. He argues that the phrases like 'the peri clean 
era', 'the high middle ages', and 'the Enlightenment' are notoriously vague. 
The culture of Spain is, no doubt, different from the culture of Finland; but 
what about Galicia and Castile, Catalonia and Roussillon. Are we there 
concerned with so many different cultures, or rather with so many variants of a 
single culture? Evidently, neither 'culture' nor 'period' can be divided off with 
complete theoretical precision; and 'historico-cultural milieus' are doubly ill-
defined, combining the vagueness of both. Another aspect of this example is 
that judicial separations and judicial comparisons go on simultaneously. That is, 
periodically different courts of the same country, or different courts of the 
different countries maintain the independence from each other, and at the same 
time hold the options of considerations of the judgments of the other courts. 
This example tells us more. Toulmin argues that the boundaries 
between jurisdictions are normally clear, sharp, and agreed upon. If it would 
not have been so, a rival court might claim judicial authority over the same 
territory or case. It would damage the authority of both courts. Secondly, within 
the common law tradition earlier decision may always be called up for 
reconsideration, or may be cited as bearing on a case presently before the court. 
Thus highest courts have a standing right to reconsider decisions arrived at in 
any earlier decade. Even they can declare the judges responsible for some 
previous decisions 'mistaken'—however well that ruling was supported by 
arguments accepted at the time. Ancient rulings and decisions from remote 
jurisdictions are scrutinized with particular care, before being accepted as 
bearing in a case to be decided here and now. A decent respect for judicial 
relativit)' never plunges the courts into mere judicial relativism. On the 
contrary, the judicial experience of all mankind is kept available as reserve, on 
which the court can call—with due attention to historical and cultural 
differences—in arriving at a just resolution of current cases.^ '^  
The method of science is much more like that of common law tradition. 
In practice, physical scientists are accustomed to drawing a similar subtle yet 
fundamental distinction between relativity and relativism. They are compelled 
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to acknowledge the relativity of the judgment and measurement. They 
acknowledge it not just as an abstract conundrum, but also as a substantive 
difficulty arising in their own professional work. Therefore, they have 
developed procedures with a view to do justice to this relativity, without falling 
into the trap of outright relativism. From this point of view, Toulmin says that 
Einstein's theory of relativity—every thing is relative—is entirely 
misconceived. The intellectual strategy of relativistic physics is quite contrary 
to relativism. Its method is like judicial court. Einstein began by recognizing 
that 'measurements of spatio-temporal magnitude' involve a hitherto 
unsuspected relativity to the choice of 'reference frame' or 'reference object'. 
They are made and considered relative to, say, the surface of the earth or a free 
falling elevator or a high-energy particle or a distant galaxy. If we understand it 
as involving an outright relativism we should then have to dismiss physical 
comparisons between frames of references as meaningless, which was not the 
contention or conclusion of Einsteins. On the contrary, he set out to establish 
general impartial procedures for making just these comparisons.^' Einstein was, 
after all, a physicist. He could never have agreed to treat spatio-temporal 
measurements as comparable only within a single reference system, for that 
would have meant abandoning his fundamental obligations as a natural 
philosopher. Instead, he worked out new equations for catering to the needs of 
one-frame measurements originally made relative to different reference frames. 
As a result, a spatio-temporal judgment made in different frames could be 
safely transformed without running into theoretical difficulties. With the actual 
content of our spatio-temporal judgment depending upon a particular frame, 
rational procedures were thus devised for comparing measurements relative to 
different frames. This particular example of Einstein's work like the every-day 
procedures of the law, should encourage us rather to consider what rational 
procedures will circumvent the every real practical difficulties posed by 
differences in cultural and historical milieus. This is the characteristic of 
universality. Noam Chomsky has claimed that all human thought and language 
display certain universality, continuity, or patterns of grammatical structures ." 
The professional careers of many theoretical physicists spanned the 
years from 1890 to 1930 through the change over in question. Toulmin argues 
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that if there had, in fact, been any breakdown of communication by an authentic 
scientific revolution, we should be able to document it from the testimony of 
these physicists. In addition to this, the total effect of 450 years (from 
fourteenth to eighteenth century) of conceptual change in physics and 
astronomy would make it hard for physicists to understand each other's 
questions. The gulf between their theoretical positions was not rationally 
unbridgeable. We cannot say that Copernicus and Galileo, Kepler and Newton 
were the authors of a totally new and all-embracing paradigm. We cannot say 
that their novel world picture snapped all intellectual connections with the 
physicists of earlier times. If the men of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
changed their minds about the structure of the planetary system; they were not 
forced, motivated, or cajoled into doing so—they were driven to do so. In a 
word, they did not have to be converted to Copemican astronomy; the 
arguments were there to convince them.^ "^  Toulmin also argues that today, 
political scientists try to avoid exaggerating the contrasts between 'normal 
change' and 'revolution'. Even the most unconstitutional change does not 
involve absolute and comprehensive breach of political continuity. In geology, 
Lyell's uniform causes had become sufficiently drastic, and Agassiz's 
catastrophes had become sufficiently uniform—the original criterion of telling 
normal from catastrophic changes had disappeared. So, instead of a 
revolutionary account of intellectual change, which sets out to show how entire 
'conceptual systems' succeed one another, we therefore need to construct an 
evolutionary account, which explains how 'conceptual populations' came to be 
progressively transformed.^ "* Evolution rather than revolution maintains both 
the time factor and continuity over the change. 
7,2. Scientific Progress in the Process of Evolution 
Organismic Development 
Now we will see how the process of evolution occurs in science. 
Toulmin illustrates that we can make a distinction that results from the shift of 
rationality from 'logical system' to 'procedure': the first is a 'theoretical 
principle" and the second a 'disciplinary one'. There are basic theoretical 
concepts and principles in the science, such as. Newton's principle of universal 
gravitation, or Mendel's genetic principle of segregation and combination, etc. 
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Also there are the disciplinary principles, such as 'all physiological functions 
are to be explained in chemical terms' —which defines the basic intellectual 
goals of a science, and gives it a recognizable unity and continuity i.e. identity 
of that science. The first sort of principle may change with time that is the 
changeable aspect of the science. The second principle is a continuous aspect of 
that science which remains identical through change. These two together make 
an organismic development. Toulmin says that in organismic development an 
individual passes through different stages of life, say from childhood to 
boyhood to manhood and so on, but at the same time, the particular individual 
remains one and the same. John remains John though he negotiates many twists 
and turns in the course of his life. When two scientific positions share similar 
intellectual aims and fall within the scope of the same discipline, then the 
historical transition between them can always be rationally discussed. It can be 
done even in the absence of common theoretical concepts between their 
respective supporters. Given the very minimum continuity of disciplinary aims, 
presuppositions will remain commensurable because both have a common set 
of'disciplinary task'.^^ 
There is another distinction between 'propositional system' and 
'conceptual population'. Propositional system is a complete body of scientific 
theory (e.g. Newtonian physics), which constitutes a single, coherent logical 
system, which must be accepted or rejected in its entirety. On the other hand, 
conceptual population is something in which we can make radical changes 
piecemeal. While , history of science testifies that no scientific theory has 
been rejected in its entirety, in populational change any individual may or may 
not survive. There are innovations and selections over periods in populations. 
This process has something 'biological' about it. So this process of 
conceptual change substantially resembles the process of organic change—the 
process of evolution. Evolutionary change that is seen quite obviously in 
zoological realm can also be traced in our conceptual development. Toulmin 
shows that biological evolutionary change has four main theses and each one 
of them has a counterpart in the realm of conceptual change. These are stated 
in Toulmin's book 'Human Understanding'.^^ 
Firstly, evolutionary change is concerned with the question: why there 
arc recognizable organic species. This question is much like why species 
change as they do. How the species instead of loosing their initial distinctness. 
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can be transformed into other. Until nineteenth century, organic species had 
been thought of in two different ways, neither of which is historical. One view 
was that total population of living creatures can be divided into distinct and 
separate kinds, each of which maintains itself unchanged by producing 
offspring of the same kind. This view is called zoological realism. Another 
view was that living things are classified into species only by our own arbitrary 
intellectual decisions. In reality, there exist nothing but individuals. This view 
is called nominalism. 
Secondly, continuity and change can be explained in terms of a dual 
process of' variation' and selective perpetuation'. There are variant forms or 
features of individuals of a certain population, only some of which are 
transmitted to the subsequent population. If the variants are disadvantageous, 
they are not naturally selected and thus the generation remains stable in its 
character. If the variants are advantageous to an organic population, they are 
selected by nature, registering slow changes in its over all character. 
Thirdly, a novel variation can demonstrate its advantages only in a 
situation which involves much of the 'selective pressure'. Failing serious 
competition, individual variants have no chance to outreproduce their rivals 
and the species will gradually lose its distinct character. Again, natural 
selection can be effective, only where the 'forum of competition' is not too 
extensive. If animals and birds interbreed freely over a large area, 
advantageous variants within one particular locality will be swamped by 
cross-breeding over the larger area, in the process, failing to establish 
themselves permanently even within that favorable locality. 
Fourthly, variants are selectively perpetuated if and only if they are 
sufficiently 'well-adapted'. The word 'adaptation' simply refers to the 
effectiveness with which different variants cope with the 'ecological 
demands' of the particular environment. The term 'demand' itself embraces 
both physical conditions of life (climate, soil, and terrain) and other coexisting 
populations of living creatures (predators, prey, shade-plants, camoutlage. 
parasites, intestinal flora, etc.). 
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Now, Toulmin contends that these characters of evolution are 
applicable to the conceptual development as well. 
Firstly, Intellectual enterprises are not an unordered continuum. They are 
separate and well-defined 'discipline' (species) by their own body of 
concepts, methods, and fundamental aims. The intellectual content of such a 
discipline may change drastically over a long period of time. This change may 
happen to the methods and aims also. Yet each discipline displays a 
recognizable continuity. The conceptual change like evolutionary change in 
biology has two aspects; (i) the coherence and continuity by which we 
identify a discipline as a distinct entity and (ii) profound long-term changes by 
which a discipline is transformed or superseded. 
Secondly, the continuity and the change both involve a dual process: 
variations and selection. In any live discipline, intellectual novelties are 
always entering the current pool of ideas and techniques. Only a few of these 
novelties establish themselves in the relevant discipline and are subsequently 
transmitted to the next generation. Thus, the continuing innovation is balanced 
by the continuing critical selection. Yet, in suitable circumstances, a discipline 
either gets the continued stability or is transformed rapidly into some thing 
new and different. 
Thirdly, this dual process can produce a marked conceptual change. 
With certain conditions, at any given time, there exist enough men of natural 
inventiveness and curiosity to make innovations and variations. The 
problematic question is as to on which conditions such a novelty can prove its 
'advantage' and so win a place in the relevant discipline. Once again, there 
must exist suitable 'forum of competition' within which intellectual novelties 
can survive for long to show their conquests or defeats. Within such a forum, 
they are criticized and weeded out with enough severity to maintain the 
coherence of the discipline. The dual process of 'variation' and 'selection" 
works like Popper's dialectical method of'conjecture' and 'refutation'. It lays 
down the ecological conditions that can lead to effective scientific change. 
Fourthly, the selection process picks out those novelties which best 
meet the specific 'demands' of the local intellectual environment. These 
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demands comprise of both the immediate issues that each conceptual variant 
is designed to deal with, and other concepts with which it must coexist. The 
terms like 'competition', 'merits', 'demands', and 'success' - all are 
correlative notions that can be understood as aspects of the process of 
conceptual variation and disciplinary selection. 
From this discussion, we can see that the evolutionary account of 
scientific advancement characteristically is like evolutionary account of 
organismic development. From evolutionary point of view, science may be 
regarded as a means used by the human species to adapt itself to the 
environment; to invade new environmental niches, and even to invent new 
ones. There are three levels of evolutionary adaptation: genetic adaptation: 
adaptive behavioral leaning, and scientific discovery. These three levels play 
their roles through variation and selection.^^ 
Toulmin further explains that intellectual disciplines comprise of 
historically developing populations of concepts, as organic species comprise 
of organisms. In the evolutionary change, there is interplay of innovation and 
selection; there occurs variations in the population and at the same time there 
remains a characteristic unity and continuity of the discipline. It is because the 
available 'ecological niches' impose a sufficient unity and continuity on the 
population, despite the continual diversification of individual organisms. At 
this point, a populational approach debars us from giving permanent definition 
of the resulting disciplines. Therefore, the same features are not absolutely 
and eternally constitutive of physics or chemistry at every stage of their 
development. Scientific disciplines like organic species are evolving historical 
entities rather than eternal beings. The works of Buridan and Galileo, 
Maxwell and Feyman and so many other successive contributions have not 
been a common commitment to a single, permanent and unchanging or 
essential physics. Rather it has simply been the characteristic unity and 
continuity, which their common intellectual enterprise has preserved, despite 
all its changes through the last hundred years.^^ In Toulmin's evolutionary 
model of conceptual change, the 'population' is comprised of the collection of 
concepts, methods and fundamental aims. His 'species" is comprised of more 
or less separate and well-defined 'disciplines', each characterized by its own 
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body of concepts, methods and fundamental aims.^' In view of the same, he 
claims that the pattern of evolutionary change applies to the process of 
conceptual change within scientific disciplines. 
Conceptual Variation 
'Organic variation' and 'natural selection' are the characteristic 
components of the process of evolution. However, here Toulmin shows that 
the two components occur in detail in scientific change also. He says that any 
discovery of new truth or concept is considered as a real,'possibility'. 
Scientists treat some new proposal as a 'possibility', more often than not with 
an eye on some other problem or group of problems. Novel suggestions 
become 'possibility' only in so far as they might contribute to a 'possible 
solution' of the problems at hand. However, random variations alone will 
never lead to evolution—it must be inheritable ones. For if every new 
generation of (say) animals comprised a fresh batch of individuals with its 
own entirely independent characters, the process of natural selection would 
have nothing to work on. Likewise, to be genuine conceptual variations there 
have to exist a suitable professional 'forum' of discussion. For, conceptual 
change can proceed only where transient innovations do not automatically die 
with their creators. The disciplinary novelties are able to prove their worth, 
through the necessary available professional forums, and by the shared 
intellectual ambitions of the scientific community. Conversely, the absence of 
a suitable 'forum' may be fatal to the proper consideration of an intellectual 
variant. For instance, Mendel's isolation from his fellow scientists made it 
difficult for them to recognize the significance of the problems.^° 
Therefore, intellectual innovations, like biological ones, are also 
inheritable. It is obvious in western astronomy. The foundation of western 
astronomy is the rational approach to geometry originating in classical 
Greece. From Heraclitus upto Kepler, the ruling theoretical problems of 
astronomy were guided by the astronomy of Greece. In china, by contrast, 
geometry remained pragmatic rather than a logical network of abstract 
theorems. China did not inherit Greek geometry. So the internal answer to the 
question. 'Why did China never have its Galileo?' is, "Because it ne\er had its 
Euclid'. Their innovations were Confucian rather than Platonic, .hist like 
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human genealogy there is conceptual genealogy of any intellectual discipline 
as well. ' 
He further describes the character of variations. He says that 
conceptual variation occurs in different sciences at different rates, at different 
times. Sciences do not all change so that nothing remains stable. They register 
changes by the shifting of the center of attention from one historical epoch to 
another. For example, the ideas of dynamics may be in rapid development, 
whereas the ideas of geology may not. Astrophysics may lose momentum, 
whereas chemistry may pick up speed; physiology may be more active than 
anatomy, or vice-versa. For Toulmin, the rapid change occurs in that field 
whose problems are 'ripe' enough for solution. Scientists face a lot of 
problems but all the problems cannot draw their full attention—many of them 
are 'unripe'. There are periods in the history of science when scientists cannot 
get a satisfactory grip on its problems. It is because its subject matter may be 
so varied and complex that it defies a fully-fledged analysis. An another 
reason may be that the more general concepts needed to introduce some 
intellectual order may still be lacking. Thus the central problems of 
physiology become 'ripe' only after a general system of chemistry had been 
developed. The solution of the outstanding problems may demand 
mathematical methods, instruments, or experimental techniques that do not 
yet exist, and so on. For these reasons a theoretical problem may be 'unripe'. 
An unripe problem thus takes time to be ripe, and then becomes the real 
possibility for new suggestions. Toulmin says, scientists are like farmers. 
They do not waste their energies in unprofitable operations and are careful to 
time their activities to the immediate demands of the task in hand. This is why 
the problems that are readily soluble attract their attention more readily than 
those that are not so. Petti Medawar says that science is 'the art of the 
soluble'.^^ 
According to Toulmin, the rate of the intellectual innovations 
accelerates not only for ripeness of the problems but also for the pattern of 
opportunity and social demand. The protest of Chinese people against western 
medicine paves the way for acupuncture. Sometimes fundamental innovations 
have sprung up from quite surprising sources. The theocratic society of 
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ancient Babylon provided a niche for major achievements in astronomy so 
much so that all subsequent physics and astronomy have been built up on the 
foundation of Babylonian astronomical computation. Sometimes the social 
context inspires the innovations. For example, in nineteenth century France, 
scientific physiology was a by-product of the hospitals, in Germany it was 
supported by higher education.^^ 
Therefore, the conceptual variation is a function of two factors: reasons 
and causes. The reasons constitute the rational process for the evolution of 
intellectual novelties or conceptual variations; and the causes are those various 
social and other factors, such as the intellectual politics of disciplines which 
sometimes override reason. The causes are an important force in shaping the 
accepted intellectual content of a discipline. The reasons correspond to the 
sort of the factors studied by internal history and causes concern the sort of 
factors studied by external history. Thus, an adequate model of a particular 
discipline's course of development is to be understood in the combination of 
both internal and external history.^'' 
However, various extrinsic factors as well as intrinsic ones motivate 
scientific innovations. So there hardly exist authentic sciences. Toulmin holds 
that there are no such broader conditions within which men's reflective 
curiosity will give rise to authentic sciences. There hardly exists critically 
controlled speculation about nature. Taking human history as a whole, heresy-
hunting or intellectual conformism has been the rule. Political and 
ecclesiastical authorities have rarely been happy with the men who scrutinize 
the intellectual foundations of their conceptual inheritance with complete 
critical freedom. Those authorities suffer from an ideological fear that the 
stability of that inheritance might be put at risk. Thus, social factors limit the 
occasions and incentives for intellectual innovations. For Toulmin, sometimes 
extrinsic need and intrinsic promise coincide. Then the effort of the two sides 
is to favor similar lines of research. At another time, the two groups may work 
against each other. Then even the most intellectually promising lines of 
abstract inquiry may be given a low priority. For these factors, intellectual 
innovations in any culture or epoch reflect the combined action of these two 
separate lllters. So. the intellectual innovations can be explained fully neither 
in terms of social nor intellectual considerations alone. 
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At the same time, Toulmin shows that the social factors are necessary 
and the intellectual ones are crucial. If men are given chance to speculate 
freely and critically, they will find some aspects of their experiences, which 
are ripe enough for reflective attention. Thus, social factors sometimes 
provide the content for the intellectual consideration of scientists. Moreover, if 
the institutional, social, or ideological conditions are unfavorable, even the 
most outstanding problems may remain scandalously long unsolved. So 
opportunity and promise are here of equal significance. Given 100 soluble 
problems, scientists will naturally pay attention to those for which there is 
broader support and interest. Yet beyond a certain point they will be weary of 
fruitless inquiries, however useful, tantalizing, or well-financed.^^ In our 
innovations, therefore, the intrinsic direction is primary and the extrinsic one 
is secondary. 
These are the characteristics of the conceptual variations that go on the 
lines of individual variations in biological evolution. 
Intellectual Selection 
According to Toulmin, when we ask why a particular conceptual 
innovation succeeded in winning a place in science, two alternative sides of 
that 'why' present themselves straightway. One side of this 'why' is: what 
considerations would have been advanced by the scientists concerned to 
justify accepting the particular conceptual change they did. On this 
interpretation, the 'why' is a request for reasons, and the reply must be given 
in intellectual, disciplinary terms. Another side of 'why' is: why a particular 
conceptual change took the form it did. Here we must begin interpreting the 
question in a different sense. This question now becomes one that is not about 
the justificatory reasons but about the scientists themselves. Different 
questions may arise regarding the scientists: how did they come to stop using 
such and such concept in the absence of any specific justification for dropping 
it from their repertory?, what causes led them to do so?, did they just forget 
about it?, etc. 
For Toulmin, conceptual change (or intellectual selection) in a highly 
developed natural science occurs in two contrasted wavs. Sometimes it is 
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made knowingly as deliberate steps in problem-solving activity. As science is 
a 'rational enterprise', there is a standing assumption that changes have been 
made for reasons emanating out of intellectually relevant considerations. At 
another time, it happens in ways unrelated to this problem-solving function; it 
occurs as the effect of fashion, prejudice, or inadvertence. In this way, the 
changes have been the effects of (say) prejudice or inadvertence. In short, 
intellectual selection is made in two different ways; rational choice and causal 
effect.^ ^ 
Many conceptual changes within scientific disciplines take place as a 
result of choice. In such cases, Toulmin says that the selection of one 
particular conceptual innovation is justified by showing that it best succeeded 
in resolving an outstanding conceptual problem of the science and led to an 
appreciable increase in 'explanatory power'. In order for this selection to be 
deemed appropriate, there must be general agreement about the character of 
the problem and about the increase of the explanatory power. Thus, the 
selection criteria for judging novelties have to be understood in relation to 
their specific explanatory aims and ideals. The following are among the 
explanatory aims and ideals: to establish the explanatory procedure to cover 
hitherto anomalous phenomena, to make possible the unification of 
explanatory techniques from hitherto separate sciences, to resolve 
inconsistencies between the concepts of a special science and related extra-
scientific concepts. If any innovation achieves one of these aims, scientific 
enterprise makes a 'selection' for it. Conversely, if the advantages of the 
proposed variation are minimal, or are counterbalanced by other 
disadvantages from which current concepts are free, or if its extra-scientific 
consequences would saddle us with new and terrible paradoxes, or if some 
rival innovafion has strikingly greater disciplinary advantages; then scientific 
enterprise will not go in for 'selection' of that variation.^' 
Therefore, all variations cannot become selected and contribute to the 
change through evolutionary process. According to Toulmin, in this regard, 
three things are closely related to the 'selection'. Firstly, evolutions are always 
a matter of comparison. The operative question is never of the form. 'Is this 
concept uniquely 'valid' or 'invalid'?', nor of the form, 'Is this concept 'true' 
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or 'false'?' Instead, the operative form is; Given the current repertory of 
concepts and available variations, would this particular variation improve our 
explanatory power more than its rivals would? To be more 'explanatory' 
means to be 'relevant' more exactly, more precisely, or in greater detail, and 
'applicable' more generally, more extensively, or more unconditionally. 
Secondly, we do not have any formal standard in deciding whether a 
conceptual variation enables us to do a better explanatory job. So the merits of 
conceptual innovations must be characterized by the statements about rival 
theories—specifically by statements about the respective ways in which 
alternative theoretical change can help to fulfill the proper intellectual 
ambitions. Thirdly, conceptual problems and conceptual variants rarely match 
one another exactly. Even when a conceptual change is proposed for solving a 
specific problem, it will have intellectual side-effects. Sometimes those side-
effects are a stronger witness for or against the innovation than its intended 
consequences. For instance, in regularizing the conceptual relations between 
the theories of electricity and magnetism. Maxwell created - almost 
inadvertently—a theory of radiation and radio waves. However, this theory 
embraces not only radiation and radio waves, but also the whole of existing 
physical optics; and this unforeseen by-product of his work testifies more 
convincingly on its behalf than his formal integration of electrical and 
magnefic theory."^ ^ 
For Toulmin, the recognized disciplinary criteria of choice (selection) 
are always muUiple, and sometimes point in opposite direction. So, a proposed 
theoretical change may be highly attractive in one respect, and retrograde in 
another. Criteria of selection are thus informal ones. And these informal 
standards seek to have all explanatory virtues; universally applicable and 
completely coherent, predictively exact and comprehensive, notationally 
convenient, intuitively simple, mathematically elegant and straightforwardly 
computable. He says, which of the virtues scientists must choose between, 
depends on their actual practice. Initially, the Copernican description of the 
planetary orbits was physically more coherent and consistent than any 
description based on Ptolemaic geocentric principles; but it achieves that 
improvement only at the cost of simplicity. Toulmin says that even in a 
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Straightforward situation scientists face a complex kind of accounting in 
selecting between conceptual variations. Any single conceptual innovation 
will normally improve our understanding in certain respects, and impair it in 
others. In this condition, it is up to the scientists concerned to decide when 
that improvement is worthwhile, in terms of a broader set of intellectual 
priorities. And it is therefore vain for us to search for any single index or 
measure which will indicate in all cases whether a conceptual change is to 
count as an improvement or not. Whatever criterion we pick out for analysis, 
there will always be other cases to which it does not apply; and several 
incommensurable considerations will be relevant to any particular choice. For 
him, unlike inductive logicians, our historical analysis treats scientific 
disciplines as comprising informal populations of logically independent 
concepts. Whereas the formal logicians judge the sciences of every epoch in 
the same a historical scale, our down-to-earth analysis demands only that the 
intellectual selections at any time should be adequate at the time.^ ^ Like legal 
practice, the actual practice of science will decide which virtue would be the 
determiner for the intellectual selection of conceptual variations. 
Yet the selective perpetuation of certain conceptual variants can be 
explained in 'rational' terms. The rationality here is as to how the successful 
innovation helped the scientists concerned to achieve their collective goals. 
The scientists working in the same discipline share agreed upon or sufficiently 
agreed upon conceptions of 'explanation'. This is their common disciplinary 
strategy. This strategic consensus determines well-defined selection criteria 
for deciding between conceptual variants. They agree with these criteria 
because they believe that these criteria will fulfill the agreed intellectual goals 
of the science for the time being. Toulmin mentions some other cases that are 
entirely different from them. On the one hand, there are cases that involve 
failures of rationality; on the other hand there are cases which reflect changes 
in the very criteria of rationality. In the first case, conservatism, prejudice, 
lack of professional cohesion, political pressure etc. may frustrate the normal 
procedure of intellectual selection. As a result, the disciplinary merits of some 
new techniques of representation or methods of explanation may for the time 
being be disregarded, despite the fact that they could make themselves 
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evident—if given daylight and fair play."*" In the second case, by contrast, the 
historical development of intellectual disciplines gives rise to an intrinsic 
'cloudiness'. This cloudiness springs directly from strategic disagreements 
between the scientists concerned. Given strategic disagreements, there will no 
longer be well-founded selection criteria on which all professionals in science 
are for the time being sufficiently agreed upon resulting in historical change.^' 
In such a case, where the situation is intrinsically cloudy, scientists are 
obliged to reappraise the goals of theorizing and the standards of the 
judgments also. Toulmin puts the point in political terms saying that at this 
point 'sovereign authority' is under the discussion. There is no such formal 
demonstration that can conform to the accepted pattern as an authoritative 
solution. For, what is in question, is the authority of those very patterns. Such 
a situation has arisen in the recent physics about the status of quantum 
mechanical explanation. The question was : Can we continue to give quantum 
mechanics sovereign intellectual authority in our physical explanation? 
Although among the critics and defenders, it is a very big point of 
disagreement, it shows that this disagreement, then, calls for appeal not to the 
codified rubrics of an established authority, but to the world of'common law'. 
Released from commitment to any codified procedure, the disputants are 
compelled to discuss their disagreements in terms of 'precedents', 
'consequences', and 'public policy'. Now all the solid augments are informal 
and consequential ones. This is a consideration of an essentially historical 
kind. This special problem appeal for a special decision shows quite genuine 
parallel to the judicial problems and decisions arising in constitutional law 
when a 'court of last resort' reinterprets the provisions of a sovereign 
constitution. In this situation, judges are compelled to reanalyze the social 
functions of the law in its application to some novel historical situation. 
Toulmin says that the judges now have to take one step back, and reconsider 
the overall justice of the accepted legal principles and constitutional 
provisions. In the final judicial context, logic thus becomes the servant of 
those fundamental human purposes that are constitutive of the law itself Here 
the theoretical jurisprudence and judicial practice are based on our developing 
understanding of the historical sociology of law. Judicial decisions at this 
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level can no longer be treated as 'right' or 'correct', yet such decisions are 
nonetheless rational for all that. The law should now develop in order to fulfill 
its most general ideals of equity, humanity, and security.'*^ The unity and 
coherence of a scientific discipline does not require that its intellectual 
ambitions should be eternal and unchanging—only that they should maintain a 
sufficient continuity. 
According to Toulmin, on this deepest level, our criteria of conceptual 
choice become 'subjective'. But this subjective judgment is not a matter of 
personal taste, nor stipulating scientific developments to be arbitrary products 
of human idiosyncrasies uncontrolled by external requirements. On the 
contrary, all the judgments represent the outcome of mankind's accumulated 
experiences in dealing with problems raised by the corresponding aspects of 
the 'external' world. These judgments of experience are not any the less 
objective. Each judgment is directed to the same general and objective task of 
suggesting how our intellectual understanding of nature can best be improved. 
And the way, in which nature will actually respond to our attempts at 
understanding her, is something that goes beyond all human tastes. These 
judgments are arrived at not through the accumulation of bare 'facts of 
nature', but rather in the light of all our experiences in the enterprise of 
explaining such facts."*^  
In other words, in such a case, to the extent, the evolution is rational, 
the reasoning consists of 'broader agreements' involving the comparison of 
alternative intellectual strategies, in the light of historical experience and 
precedences. This endows science with the requisite objectivity. This is not 
the objectivity of the empiricists and positivists which involves the matching 
of hypothesis against facts. Rather, the objectivity rests in the fact that our 
conceptual and strategic judgments are exposed to criticism in the light of 
experience. Then there occurs a rational bet between the alternative 
intellectual strategies which involves prospective estimates of the 
consequences expected from them.'''' 
However, Toulmin says that even though a scientific judgment may not 
be subjective, yet it recognizes the full 'relativity' of the concepts and 
standards accepted as authoritative for the time being in different milieus. Ihe 
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actual issues in science may be authentically factual, but scientists in different 
periods and with different backgrounds may well end by tackling them in very 
different ways. Intellectual demands are absolutely identical everywhere, but 
environmental demands are absolutely identical throughout a particular living 
range. This diversity is confined not only to historical epochs or national 
styles, but we may find differences between the different research centers or 
schools, even in the same country at the same time. There are Cambridge 
geneticists and Edinburg geneticists, Columbian operant psychologists and 
Harvard operant psychologists, etc. There may well be substantial differences 
between the explanatory goals of different men working in the same 
discipline. Yet this diversity conforms the unity and continuity of a discipline, 
because the maintenance of a discipline is no more than the maintenance of a 
sufficient degree of collective agreement required for intellectual goals and 
disciplinary ambitions. By the word 'sufficient' is meant sufficient for the 
actual demands of the present situations.'*^ 
7.3 Evolutionary Change and the Problem of Realism 
Intellectual Ideals 
In the last section, we discussed how there occur theoretical variations 
and selections. In this section, we will discuss the 'disciplinary principles'— 
how an intellectual discipline, like an organic species, holds the continuity 
through the individual conceptual variations and intellectual selections. We 
are seeking here the continuing element owing to which an academic 
discipline, say, atomic physics remains atomic physics despite registering 
multiple changes in all other respects. What is atomic physics that has been 
running around from 1890 through its heyday in the 1920s, up to its 
fragmentation into several successor sciences during the 1950s? The 
following discussion will provide us an insight into the question of realism 
with regard to the aim of science. We shall come to realize that science has no 
transcendental aim or superhuman purpose. It is what we think of science or 
make of science that determines the aim of science. 
Stephen Toulmin examines some possible answers to this question. He 
says thai if we define atomic physics in terms of some standard books, then 
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the recognition o f atomic physics' in 1930 would amount to its denial in 1900 
or 1950. For, within this long time, various disciplines have registered 
considerable intradisciplinary diversification as well as polarization. 
Rutherford himself could no longer think about atoms in the way his students 
or grandstudents went about defining or stipulating them. Again we may say 
that atomic physics is some shared commitments of the professionals to the 
proper concerns of the discipline. Although we may define the concepts and 
theories of the discipline in impersonal terms, these concerns are concerns of 
the people. In this way, we may be saying that a group of people with shared 
.commitments to the subject constitutes the element of continuity in atomic 
Physics. If this is not proper answer to the question, what continuing element 
did atomic physics display over the whole period from 1900 to 1950? 
Toulmin says that here we have to seek a continuing element rather than an 
invariant one, because the terminologies, theoretical models, and fundamental 
equations of atomic physics underwent several drastic changes during this 
period. The concepts such as 'electron' and 'nucleus' discussed by Heisenberg 
and Dirac during 1930s are far removed from the ones discussed by Thomson 
and Rutherford during 1900s. Toulmin, in the end, says that the continuing 
element of atomic physics is 'problems' faced by successive generations of 
atomic physicists. Thus the ideas that Bohr advanced to deal with his own 
'problems' about atomic structure are best related to the points left over by his 
teacher Rutherford. Problems that Rutherford left unsolved, posed, in turn, the 
problems on which his won pupils had to work. In this way, the problems, 
around which the successive generations focus their attention despite all the 
changes in their actual concepts and techniques, are linked together as a 
continuous family tree.''^ This continuity can be maintained even in 
serendipitous advancement. For, variations at the organic and the scientific 
levels are not generated in a vacuum or out of nothing; they are imposed on 
existing forms—existing genes on existing ideas—respectively. Serendipitous 
discovery guarantees not only independence in problem-solving, but also a 
continuity. A straightforward case of serendipity occurs when the theory 
yields an unexpected explanation for a known phenomenon or an unexpected 
solution for a known problem. It can be divided into two main classes: one. 
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intending to solve (explain) A, but solving (explaining) B instead and two, 
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intending to solve (explain) A, and solving (explaining) B in addition to A. 
If the same object produces different problems, then these will fall in 
different domains according to the differences between the problems. Any 
particular type of object will fall in biochemistry, for example, in so far as it is 
a topic for corresponding biochemical questions. The same type of object will 
fall within the several different sciences depending on what questions are 
raised about it. The behavior of muscle fiber, for example, can fall within the 
domains of biochemistry, electrophysiology, pathology, and thermodynamics; 
since questions about it can be asked from all the four points of view.^ ^ 
Now the question is as to what is a problem? According to Toulmin, a 
problem is the situation where our current ideas fall short of our intellectual 
ideals. In other words, problems arise where our ideas about the world are at 
variance either with nature or with one another. Problems are recognized by 
locating and specifying the intellectual gap between our current capacities and 
the explanatory ambitions defined by the scientific community's current ideals 
of natural order. Therefore, the conceptual problems emerge from the 
comparison, not of 'oppositions' with observations', but of 'ideas' with 
'experience'. In short, 
Scientific problems = Explanatory Ideals - Current Capacities. 
Therefore, two things are very crucial to understand the evolution of 
science: scientific problems and explanatory ideals. Scientific problems are 
the things for whose solution scientific attempts are set out; and explanatory 
ideals are the goals which all solutions of the problems try to arrive at. The 
aim of science is thus solving of the problems and reaching the intellectual 
ideals of the times. So this aim is essentially not any absolute, unchanging, 
universal one. 
Toulmin also says that scientific problems and explanatory ideals are 
very closely related—both of them are understood in current human 
intellectual capacities. All these are varied in different epochs and cultures and 
among individuals and groups at the same time. These things always exist in 
human thinking and thus ensure continuity. But they themselves are 
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changeable in time. It is true that at every stage scientists' intellectual reach 
exceeds their grasp in some fundamental respect. Ideas of 'completeness' and 
'perfection' are thus unrealizable. Throughout a period, the general 
conception of a 'complete explanation' imposes an intellectual unity on the 
discipline. This conception is called 'model of intelligibility' or 'Ideal of 
Natural Order'. '^^  
Atomic physics is an example as to how the gap between 'explanatory 
ideal' and 'current capacities' produces the problem. When Thomson and 
Rutherford invented atomic physics, their first achievement was not one of 
empirical observation or mathematical calculation, it was one of intellectual 
imagination. They imagined a novel conception that would provide a new 
scope for physical explanations even on the microscopic level, i.e., atomic 
substructure. This explanatory imagination emerges in a way that enlarges 
both the reasonable expectations of physicists and the rational demands by 
which their explanatory ambitions were directed. It follows that scientific 
imagination is a practical thing, because it is directed by the rational demands 
to explain some quite definite and identifiable phenomena. It is not conceived 
as a bare theoretical possibility in an intellectual void. Thomson's and 
Rutherford's intellectual ideal, though radically a new one, other physicists 
could accept this only by a corresponding effort of their imagination. Of 
course, there may well be some other conservative colleagues who would 
think the proposal of electron as a material object is some kind of practical 
joke .^ ' 
Toulmin gives another example. The classical nineteenth century 
theory of matter has taken the ninety odd chemical elements as its ultimate 
level of analysis. At that time, no scientific opportunity existed for enquiring 
as to 'why" sodium vapor (say) should emit radiation in the yellow part of the 
spectrum, rather than elsewhere. The only available way of answering this 
question was: 'God alone knows'. Thomson, Rutherford, and Bohr removed 
this limitation. Their new explanatory ambitions carried the ultimate level of 
analysis below the atomic level. By conceiving of all chemical atoms as 
composed of common sub-atomic particles, they made it conccpluall\ 
possible to treat them either as 'phenomena' or as 'problematic'.'^ 
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However, if any discipline is to be identified, it is done only by 
matching natural phenomena against the intellectual template of the ideals. 
This is why, atomic physics remains atomic physics despite it having 
drastically transformed itself, at least, thrice from 1900 to 1950. The subject 
remains the same and continuous only because its intellectual ambitions for 
the natural phenomena remain the same through all the changes. Two things 
are very important here: experience of natural phenomena and the 
interpretation (intellectual template) of that experience. The first is discussed 
in impersonal terms that makes history of ideas and the second in human 
terms, which makes history of human activities. For Toulmin, in this way 
scientific activity incorporates both the objective and human parts of science. 
Science and its aims involve both their concepts and their men who conceive 
them. Therefore, the notion of discipline and its profession are correlative. 
There cannot be any single ideal about conceptual change applicable 
universally in all sciences at all times. Each effective discipline has had 
specific goals and ideals, which have determined its specific methods and 
structures; and the historical developments are the progressive refinements 
and clarifications of those goals and ideals. This refinement is the central 
activity that creates the occasions for suggesting and adopting new intellectual 
methods, procedures, and structures.^"' 'Thus our cognitive apparatus is itself 
an evolutionary product on the cultural as well as organic level.^ "^  However, 
says Toulmin, we must analyze the rational use of concepts within collective 
intellectual disciplines with an eye on that activity. This is the way how a 
discipline maintains its continuity. The concept transmits from one generation 
to the next by a process of 'enculturation'. This process involves an 
apprenticeship by which certain explanatory skills are transferred from the 
senior generation to the junior. When an apprentice physicist learns the 
concept 'energy', he leans to do three things: (1) to perform the calculations, 
(2) to recognize the particular problems and situations, (3) to identify the 
empirical magnitudes. The intellectual transmit of a scientific discipline thus 
comprises of a particular constellation of explanatory procedures. What makes 
the science genuinely 'rational' is that the apprentice physicist or biologist 
learns not only how to explain phenomena by applying existing concepts, he 
learns also what is involved in criticizing those concepts and thus improving 
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their current content." So the transmission of the concepts and the creation of 
the new ones, aim to reach the intellectual ideals of the times, though there 
always will be the distance between current capacities and intellectual ideals. 
Equilibrium 
We know that scientific enterprise always seeks to reach its intellectual 
ideals. But we see, at the same time, that these intellectual ideals are also 
changeable over time. Then the question generally arises that what it is that is 
sought by the change of intellectual ideals over time. Here Piaget's view is 
very much illuminating. He claims that 'reason not only evolves but reason 
does not change without reason'. According to him, there is some direction or 
directional tendency in evolutionary change. This directional tendency is 
called 'orthogenesis' which works not only in biology but also in epistemic 
development. This orthogenesis is like a 'press' towards an ideal equilibrium 
between organism and environment, and between epistemic subject and 
epistemic object. So this view opposes the notion of randomness and chance, 
and says that evolution is not contingent but directional.^^ Since evolutionary 
change is the process which is essentially different from the theory of 
justification, our hypothesis may be logically unjustified yet we do not arrive 
at it blindly. Our prior expectations and our general world picture yield 
algorithms or heuristics that guide us in explaining given data or in solving 
given problems. This is a very elaborate guiding apparatus.^^ 
Orthogenesis does not fall in teleological fatalism, because unlike 
teleological change this is a teleonomical one. While teleology is goal 
directional change controlling the future, teleonomy does not control the 
future. There is not any causal effect of the future acting on the present. 
According to Piaget, orthogenesis is neither a final cause nor an apriori agent 
directing evolution. So whatever validity orthogenesis has, it has only up to 
the level presently attained so that no future extrapolation is possible—no 
concrete predictions about the future are possible. One can no more predict 
the future evolution of the horse, and one cannot predict what theory of space-
time will next appear. So the future development of cognition is 'open" to all 
possibilities consistent with the constraint that 'reason does not change 
without reason'. But although future development is not predictable, it is 
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retrodictable—it can be rationally reconstructed after the happening of a 
fact.^ ^ Science can allow itself to be swayed only by efficient causes. 
Our intellectual selection from the different variants always seeks to 
make an equilibration between the intellectual ideals and current capacities by 
minimizing the distance between them. So in simple words, the aim of 
scientific evolution is to increase equilibrium. But the epistemic change can 
never provide us with the complete equilibrium—the ultimate picture of the 
reality. Because, there is always a gap between intellectual ideals and the 
current capacities. For this constant gap science becomes perpetually open and 
we will never have the final theory. There is only an increase of equilibrium 
instead of a complete equilibrium.^" Natural selections appear to design for 
maximum efficiency in the given environment, but a cognitive system of 
selection does not allow to appropriate all aspects of the appeirently unlimited 
diversity and complexity of the universe.^' This is so for three reasons: (1) the 
object in itself has an infinite and indefinite number of properties or levels and 
we never know them all, (2) we only know an object by performing operations 
on it and when we do so, we alter the object, and (3) whenever any theory is 
constructed to solve certain problems and to explain certain phenomena, the 
theory itself produces new questions that remain unanswerable by this 
theory." 
The equilibrium is like adaptation. In adapting to one's environment, 
the organism is forced to accommodate itself, to change and modify itself as a 
result of the constraints inherent in the environmental features. At the same 
time, the organism must assimilate the environment into its structures. When 
there is a balance between these two processes of assimilation and 
accommodation, there is adaptation, and a state of equilibrium is, then, 
attained. Equilibrium involves, in an essential way, the role of actions 
(praxis), which constitutes transformation of one state into another. These 
actions are called 'operations'. When an organism has attained the ability to 
perform operations, the organism is better adapted to its environment. Then it 
can be said to be in a better state of equilibrium with it. When some type of 
need arises, there is rupture of equilibrium between organism and 
environment. This state of disequilibrium is motivating the subsequent 
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attempts to restore equilibrium and to satisfy the need of organism. If a 
particular cognitive structure Si has a certain degree of equilibrium, there will 
be a tendency for Si to change into Sj, such that Sj has a greater degree of 
equilibrium. It follows that if Sj is not more equilibrated than Si, there will be 
no change. It will change only because Sj is more equilibrated. Therefore, the 
motive force behind all development is disequilibrium (inconsistency). A 
disequilibrated cognitive structure moves one to action in virtue of its intrinsic 
logical features. 
If the equilibrium has been the aim of science, then evolutionary 
development is the development that occurs not on the world but on the 
organism and epistemic subject. So nature and development of knowledge 
depend on an organism's capacity or disposition. Thus, our knowledge is 
about the organism that lives in the environment than about the world as it 
is.^ ^ 
However, this account of theories clearly is instrumentalistic. That is, 
theories are rules for drawing inferences, and are neither true nor false. They 
are ways of looking at phenomena which work or do not work, or are or are 
not fruitful.^ ^ There is a claim to 'reality' in evolution, but this claim is 
merely a part of the system of ideas, which is acceptable, for the time being, 
at any rate, as 'absolute' and 'pleasing to the mind'.^^ 
To summarise, for Toulmin, science grows by way of evolutionary 
process. The standard of rationality of theory choice is neither static nor 
dynamic. Rather, a standard of rationality too evolves in the process of 
evolution. As opposed to revolution, the evolutionary process entails 
continuity and as opposed to accumulation, it entails both loss and gain. 
However, what is the goal of evolutionary process. Is it truth ? Toulmin holds 
that nothing remains unchangeable in the face of evolution, and the concept of 
truth too undergoes the process of evolution. Therefore, scientific progress as 
conceived by Toulmin is not committed to truth. 
For Toulmin theories are like an organism, disciplines are species 
and the intellectual milieu is like the environment. Then whatever 
evolutionary factors occur with the zoological organism, also occur with a 
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conceptual organism. Variation and selection which are the essential features 
of the structure of evolution are also seen in the conceptual variation and 
selection with the purpose of adaptation with current intellectual environment. 
Scientific disciplines like organic species are evolving historical entities 
rather than eternal beings. Since in evolutionary change a species gets 
increasingly bettewr through its adaptation to the environment, scientific 
change also entails progress through its adaptation to the intellectual milieu of 
the times. So this kind of change entails progress. 
In every historical epoch humans hold some scientific capacities to 
deal with nature. However, when the intellectual ideals or explanatory ideals 
go beyond their capacities, scientists feel problems. It means that problems 
are human. Therefore, the aim of science is also human, as against some 
transcendental truth. Now the question arises as to when is a problem solved ? 
Toulmin says that like zoological organisms, scientists seek to obtain an 
equilibrium between organism and its environment, i.e., with our current 
capacities and the intellectual ideals. This is a kind of struggle for survival, 
suggle for getting equilibrium. Therefore, equilibrium, rather than truth, is the 
aim of science. When an organism has attained the ability to perform 
operations, the organism is better adapted to its environment. Then it can be 
said to be in a better state of equilibrium with it. 
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Chapter - 8 
Critical Evaluation 
In the light of the formulations outlined so far, the following conclusion 
will be defended as the central finding of this thesis : 
•Though science makes progress, this progress does not ensure us with 
the gradual attainment of truth. Such a progress results the increasing ability to 
solve the problems experienced by us with the world". 
The Traditional View of Science 
A comprehensive understanding of scientific progress and the traditional 
problem of realism entails a recapituation of the perspective on science. The 
traditional science was or was deemed and defined to be structured or central 
on method. It was deemed to be produced, directed and controlled by method. 
It was a methodocentric enterprise. The scientific method comprised of the four 
following steps : 
(1) The initial collection of all relevant facts. 
(2) The formulation of generalization that abstracts the common elements 
from the facts collected. 
(3) The deduction of particular consequences from the generalization, and 
(4) The testing of the particular consequences. 
Traditionally, the scientists would go in for the formulation of a 
hypothesis with a view to account for the observed facts. From this general 
hypothesis they would deduce a particular conclusion or an as yet unobserved 
fact. The particular conclusion would then be tested. If the inferred fact is 
observed, the hypothesis would be said to have been confirmed. This view of 
scientific method is called inductivism. Inductive method is so much used in 
science that more often than not it is deemed to be synonymous with or used 
interchangeably with scientific method. 
It is a hard-headed and straightforward account of science. Scientists 
are seen as piling up facts, generalizing them into laws, and again piling up 
more facts step by step in the laboratory with a view to exceedingly widen the 
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net of their generalizations. If you can infer the laws from the accumulated 
facts, you can deduce the facts again from the laws, and the content of the 
laws is nothing but the facts. 
This view of science has been widely popular both in and outside 
academic circles. Following Philip Kitcher we may call this view 'Legend'. It 
depicts scientific change as directed by noble goals, which goals have been 
increasingly successfully realized in the onward march of historical evolution 
of science. One of these noble goals of science has been the attainment of 
truth. Science ultimately aims at discovering the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth about the world, or, at least, it is directed at discovering 
truth of those aspects of nature that impinge most directly upon us. According 
to 'Legend', successive generations of scientists have continuously and 
constantly filled in more and more parts of the 'complete true story of the 
world'. There have been mistakes and false steps here and there but there is 
an overall trend towards the accumulation of truth, or at the very least, 
acceleration towards better and better approximation to truth. 
This view advocates the supremacy of 'Method' in the ongoing march 
of scientific investigations and achievements. It registers the great debt we 
owe to the application of the 'Method' in the onset and upkeep of 
revolutionary scientific researches carried out by countless investigators. The 
'Method' is so almost fool-proof that awakens us to all kinds of actual and 
possible cross while we engage ourselves in scientific research. The progress 
of scientific research is unfailingly backed by the method of science. There 
are objective canons of evaluation of scientific claims. Scientists have been 
tacitly aware of these canons and have applied them in assessing novel or 
controversial ideas. Methodologists should articulate the canons for helping to 
forestall possible misapplications to extend the scope of science into areas 
where human inquiry typically falters. Thus, science is a clearing up of 
rationality in the jungle of muddles, prejudices, and superstitions. Its practice 
is thoroughly informed by reasons both in obtaining truth and in lapsing into 
error. Scientific theories achieved through such a sacred method are glorified 
lo correspond to the reality. And such correspondence is tested by the crucial 
experiment. Ihen scientists bow to whatever new finding exposes their errors. 
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Scientific method thus generates a logic of justification. That is, it provides 
the technique for the objective appraisal of the merits of scientific theories. 
The scientific method also includes a Togic of discovery', which is to say that 
it provides devices to assist the scientists in the discovery of new theories. 
And in the noble pursuit of some of these worthy aims, scientists 
dispassionately and disinterestedly apply their tools and each application of 
which takes us a step nearer to the truth. The succession of theories 
constitutes progress and the achievements of earlier theories are retained in 
later theories. Thus scientific activities are uniformed, unhistorical, 
unprejudiced, neutral and innocent of human hopes and fears. 
The above analysis of science reveals the following aspects of the 
traditional concept of scientific enterprise: 
1. There is a unique method for science, 
2. There is pure observation of facts by scientists, 
3. Inductive generalization is the process of theory-formation, 
4. Scientific knowledge is objective, 
5. 'Crucial experiment' determines theory-choice, 
6. There is justification of a true theory, 
7. Theory corresponds to reality, 
8. Science make progress, 
9. The progress occurs through the accumulation of scientific facts, 
10. The goal of the progress is truth, 
11. The goal will once be attained. 
The Present Understanding 
The contemporary philosophy of science has registered or 
negotiated a paradigm-shift. The epistemology, logic and methodology of 
scientific discourse have almost taken a U-turn, in view of the radical 
accounts of science painstakingly assembled by historians of science. 
Historians of science, concentrating on the actual historical development of 
science, have exposed the methodologically unwarranted and unwarrantable 
quantum jumps taken by scientists at dilTerent points of space and time across 
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the evolution of science. The historical narrative of science assembled by 
various scholars and historians of science does not reveal that science is 
predominantly a method-controlled or method-guided enterprise. It may not 
be, methodologically speaking, a free-for-all. However, the legendary view of 
science is definitely not corroborated by various historical perspectives on 
scientific discourse. The present understanding of science is definitely more 
nuanced and sophisticated in comparison to traditional, ahistorical and 
uniformed view of scientific undertaking. The idea emerged from the analytic 
discussion of five different philosophers of science, leads us to new 
understanding of scientific achievements with regard to correspondence to 
reality, accumulation of facts, rational judgement of theory-choice, etc. Before 
making a critical judgement about these issues, we need to expose the brief 
account of them. 
Popper: According to Karl Popper, a scientific theory can be 
produced from any source; regardless of myth, metaphysics, fairy tale, etc. 
only with the proviso that it must be falsifiable by a prescribed experiment. 
Such a theory is not the product of induction but rather of imaginative 
conjecture. A theory is not produced by abstraction from observations, 
because an observation itself can not operate without a theory. There is 
nothing simply given to us, uninterpreted. Again this conjectural theory 
cannot be verified, but rather falsified. For him, falsifiability is the sole 
criterion of empirical science. A conjectural theory due to its falsifiability 
negotiates various kinds of severe tests, which make the conjectures scientific 
and objective, even though they are originally a product of human 
imagination. The theory is empirical not when it is produced through 
conjecture, but when it is tested by observations. Observations may not 
produce a theory, but they do subject it to severe tests. For Popper, the test of 
a theory is always an attempt to show that the theory is mistaken. This is the 
'trial and error' process of theory test, for through this process scientists trial 
to sort out error. This is also called method of falsification, for in this method 
we try to discover a mistake in a theory with a view to falsify or eliminate it. 
According to this method, every falsifying hypothesis is better than the 
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falsified one. So, the succession of scientific theories results in obvious 
progress. 
However, every falsification means the elimination of mistakes. In 
other words, every falsification results in the decrease in falsity-content of our 
knowledge-claims which logically means the increase in the truth-content. 
Therefore, every succession of scientific change leads us to better 
approximation to truth. But this truth cannot be justified by positive evidence, 
that is to say, shown to be true. This truth is simply a regulative principle, for 
our scientific acfivities are conducted in the hope of getting nearer to truth, 
but actually we just get farther from the falsity rather than approaching truth 
in every step of theory-change. We are condemned to be agnostic with regard 
to truth. For Popper, 'better approximation to truth' is based on the assertion 
that one theory corresponds better to the facts than the other. But there is no 
such a thing as 'degree of truth' (better correspondence). So he maintains 
verisimilitude (truth-likeness) instead of truth in his account of scientific 
discourse. 
Kuhn: According to Kuhn, paradigms are the fundamental scientific 
frameworks within which scientific research operates. A paradigm is a grand 
theory under which normal science registers normal growth or development. 
It includes laws, theories, applications and instrumentations; and also 
provides model as well as foundation for the ongoing practice of science. Men 
whose research is based on a shared paradigm are committed to the same 
rules and standards for scientific practice. A paradigm is a way of looking at 
the world. It signifies broad quasi metaphysical insights or hunches about how 
the phenomena in some domain should be explained. Therefore, all activities 
of normal science are determined by a paradigm. However, at some point of 
time, there emerges or arises some such a critical situation when no 
articulation of the paradigm can assimilate certain anomalous phenomena. If 
the awareness of such anomalies lasts long and consequently penetrates deep, 
the field-situation is seen to be in crisis. In such a situation scientists tend to 
loose their commitment to the older paradigm and try to work out some new 
paradigm which is expected to solve the crisis. Subsequently, the new 
paradigm is taken up by upcoming scientists with revolulionarv fervour or 
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missionary zeal and a new framework for the resolution of scientific problems 
becomes the order of the day. 
However, such a paradigm-shift is so radical that science after the 
revolution becomes absolutely different from which was practiced in pre-
revolutionary times. Therefore, we can not have common denominator to 
make any comparison between the successive paradigms. This is paradigmatic 
incommensurability. In such a situation, the adherents of the new paradigm 
have to reject the achievements registered by the old paradigm. Therefore, for 
Kuhn, such a theory-change does not result in any progress. However, the 
question arises as to on what ground do scientists make their decision about 
theory-choice? Kuhn holds that the theory-change is not propelled by 
considerations of progress. The paradigm-shift is basically inspired by 
psychological reasons. For him, since paradigm is created by human mind 
which is just a vision about the world, it does not aim at discovering truth. Its 
merits are considered only as puzzle-solving competence rather than the 
attainment of truth. 
Lakatos: According to Lakatos, the fundamental unit of scientific 
achievement is not an isolated hypothesis, but rather a research programme 
(RP). The research programme has a heuristics, that is, a powerful problem-
solving machinery that digests anomalies and turns them into positive 
evidence. All RPs have one common characteristic; they all predict novel 
facts - facts which had been undreamt of or contradicted by the previous 
programme. A RP that does not discover novel facts, is a degenerating RP. On 
the other hand, any RP that continues to discover novel facts is a progressive 
RP. If we have two rival research programmes where one is progressive and 
other is degenerating, scientists tend to join the progressive one. This is the 
rationale of scientific revolutions. But this revolution does not occur instantly, 
because, auxiliary hypothesis does explain the anomalies and also at the same 
time, continues to explain some more facts. A RP does not get rejected just 
with the emergence of a crucial experiment showing the counter-evidence. 
Rather ever>' research proramme is possessed of some degree of autonomy 
because of which a RP ignores the counter-evidence. 
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However, since in theory-succession scientists adhere to a 
progressive RP, every revolution results into progress. However, this progress 
does not ensure us with the attainment of or approximity to the truth. For, a 
RP is constructed with the purpose of discovering new facts, when facts do 
not necessarily correspond to reality. For Lakatos, what nature shows about 
the theory is not truth, but consistency. Truth must be consistent, but 
consistency may not be true. 
Laudan: According to Laudan, the fundamental scientific unit is 
scientific research tradition (RT). A research tradition is a grand theory which 
embodies the models of appraisal and evaluation. This is the primary tool for 
understanding. RT provides the specific theories and specific theories touch 
the empirical problems with a view to solve them. If solution of the problem 
is the understanding of 'why the problem is the way it is', it is RT which 
provides all the components of such an understanding. A RT provides a set of 
guidelines for the development of specific theories. Parts of those guidelines 
constitutes an ontology and the models of procedure of research within that 
tradition. 
For Laudan, science is an aim oriented enterprise. This aim is 
problem-solving. Therefore, problem-solving effectiveness is the rationality 
of theory-choice. Here progressiveness will determine rationality rather than 
rationality determining progressiveness. When a research tradition changes 
rationality of theory choice also changes. This amounts to saying that rational 
is progressive and progressive is rational. If any tradition is effective in 
solving the problems, then its rational to accept the theory. However, the 
progressiveness of science does not ensure us with the attainment of truth. 
For. science aims only at problem-solving and problem-solving does not 
entail the truth. The recognition of a problem and its solution are relative to 
the research tradition (milieu). A solution does not mean the truth. 
Toulmin: According to Toulmin, scientific rationality lies neither in 
a single 'logical system' nor in a temporal sequence of such systems, but 
rather in the process of evolution. The process of evolution negotiates history 
or linic and sinuillancously ensures continuity in the development of science. 
Therefore, rationality in the growth of scientific concepts is to be understood 
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in terms of 'process' instead of 'system'. For Toulmin, scientific theories are 
not a 'propositional system', but a 'population of ideas'. A propositional 
system is a complete body of scientific theories constituting a single, coherent 
logical system, which must be accepted or rejected in its entirety. On the other 
hand, conceptual population is something in which we can make radical 
changes piecemeal. There are innovations and selections over periods in 
populations. Thus, it is an organic process. In organic development, an 
individual passes through different stages of life; say. from childhood to 
manhood and so on, but at the same time, the particular individual remains 
one and the same. In the same way 'physics' remains 'physics', although in 
its development there occur many variations and selections in its population 
of theories. However, such an evolutionary change ensures scientific progress. 
For Toulmin, scientific problems are things for whose solution 
scientific attempts are set out. A problem is a situation where our current 
capacities fall short of our intellectual ideals. Intellectual ideals are goals 
which all attempted solutions of the problems try to arrive at. The aim of 
science is thus reaching the intellectual ideals of the time, through solving our 
problems. However, scientific problems and intellectual ideals are conceived 
in current human intellectual capacities. So, scientific progress is human, not 
real. This kind of progress aims at an equilibrium between human intellectual 
need and the nature. It has no commitment to the attainment of truth. 
Critical Comparison 
These philosophers of science develop their views of science from 
an understanding of the past scientific activities. Their understanding of 
science is based on their perusal of the actual history of science. Their success 
in developing a view of science depends solely on the successful explanation 
of historical facts of scientific development. However, it can be reasonably 
asked as to whether they do succeed in their attempts to explain the historical 
facts in their entirety. This question raises the issue of relative merits of their 
views. Therefore, we need to critically compare all these philosophers so as to 
gel a better understanding of their positions regarding scientific progress and 
the problem of realism. 
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Popper Versus Kuhn: Karl R. Popper finds that there are some such 
theories in the history of science which are no less than metaphysical ones. 
Newton's theory of gravitation and Einstein's theory of relativity, for 
example, are among them. If verifiability is the criterion of meaning, these 
theories, due to their metaphysical character, become meaningless 
notwithstanding the fact that these theories have made great contribution to 
the development of science during the last three hundred years. However, this 
is totally unconvincing to say that scientific theories like these are 
meaningless discourse. Popper seeks to establish the meaningfulness of such 
discourse and also to establish a relation of such metaphysical theories with 
truth in some sense or the other. For him, it is also unconvincing to maintain 
that scientific theories do not aim at reality of the world. However, Popper's 
attempt at the accommodation of such metaphysical theories into meaningful 
discourse, made him to face another question as to whether scientific theories 
are objective or not. 
Popper tried to meet all these challenges with his famous theory 
about science - theory offalsifiability. He declared that any kind of discourse 
whether metaphysics or fairy tale etc., could be meaningful scientific 
discourse if and only if they are falsifiable hypotheses. Falsifiability as against 
the positivistic verifiability is the criterion of meaning or criterion of 
scientificit>'. The theory of falsifiability also entails that anybody can 
criticizes a scientific theory with the help of his own falsifying hypothesis. 
However, the falsifying hypothesis must, in its turn, also be falsifiable. He 
also says that through falsification we eliminate falsity-content of a theory, 
which logically means the increase of its truth-content. So science aims at 
truth (if not attainment of truth). If there occurs any falsification, the falsified 
hypothesis is rejected and falsifying one is accepted. Thus, he explains, the 
phenomenon of scientific change or revolufion through his method of 
falsifiability. In our opinion, he has successfully explained the following 
things : 
a. Hypothetical discourse of science is meaningful. 
b. Scicntillc knowledge is objective. 
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c. Science aims at truth. 
d. The theory-choice is rational. 
Thomas Kuhn agrees with Popper and recognizes the fact that 
scientific theories at their foundations are a part of metaphysical discourse. 
Kuhn's paradigm is very akin to Popper's conjectural hypothesis. Kuhn also 
agrees with Popper that scientific change occurs through a revolution. Kuhn's 
paradigm-shift, and Popper's falsification both entail revolution. Their 
recognition of revolution shows that both of them are opposed to cumulative 
theory of scientific progress. 
However, Kuhn as opposed to Popper, discovers sociopsychical 
elements in theory choice. Kuhn forcefully put forward the thesis that a 
theory-choice does not depend upon rational criteria. Such a choice is 
basically dictated by sociopsychical or non-rational and sometimes irrational 
factors. Therefore, a theory-choice cannot be explained on objective grounds. 
A scientific paradigm never aims at truth. The paradigms of science that 
emerge from time to time due to multiple revolutionary factors, are not 
mutually commensurable. The paradigmatic incommensurability is at the 
heart of Kuhnian project. Furthermore, the paradigms at their own place and 
time are neither objective nor rational nor true. Thus, while Popper tries to 
safeguard the objectivity, rationality and truth of scientific discourse and 
theory-choice, Kuhn discovers the sociopsychical, human and communitarian 
roots of scientific enterprise. Both Popper and Kuhn do agree to a certain 
degree with regard to 'revolution', 'hypotheticality, etc. However, regarding 
rationality or incommensurability they become so radically opposite that 
acceptance of one's view amounts to the denial of other's. In our opinion, 
while Popper fails to appreciate the role of sociopsychical elements in theory-
choice, Kuhn's declaration of the entire scientific project being irrational is 
also not convincing. However, Kuhn makes us aware of the following 
significant facts : 
a. There are sociopsychical elements in science. 
b. There is incommensurability problem in science. 
c. Science aims at puzzle-solving, not truth. 
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Lakatos and Popper-Kuhn: Lakatos agrees with Popper that theory 
choice is rational. Popper maintains that if we choose a theory with 'greater 
truth-content and lesser falsity-content' in preference to another theory, our 
theory-choice is rational. Lakatos holds that the theory-choice can be rational. 
However, his criterion of rationality is different from that of Popper. He 
maintains that it is rational to choose a theory with 'progressive problem-
shift' in preference to a theory with 'degenerating problem-shift'. It is 
rational, for Popper, to accept falsifying hypothesis to the rejection of falsified 
hypothesis. It is rational, for Lakatos, to accept a research programme which 
progressively discovers novel facts, to the rejection of the research 
programme which is degenerating in discovering the same. However, 
recognition of rationality by Lakatos goes against Kuhn's position on 
irrationality of science. Lakatos, as opposed to Kuhn, says that scientists 
cannot be irrational. However, Lakatos establishes scientific rationality by 
endorsing 'fact - discovering' as the aim of science. And he says that facts do 
not necessarily entail the truth of the world. So, he agrees with Popper in 
recognizing the rationality of scientific theory-choice. However, this 
admission of the rationality of theory-choice exacts its own cost. Lakatos 
denies the truth of scientific theoretical discourse. In admitting the rationality 
of theory-choice, he is akin to Popper and in rejecting the truth of scientific 
discourse he is in accord with Kuhn. For Lakatos, there is no crucial 
experiment which falsifies a theory and consequently brings about an instant 
revolution. Lakatos, while surveying the evolution of scientific discourse, 
finds that emergence of counter-evidence, has not, historically speaking, 
meant instant rejection of a scientific theory. Scientists can put up an almost 
dogmatic fight in defense of a cherished theory of their's. However, this 
historical dimension of theory-change is missed in the philosophical account 
of science worked out by Popper. Newtonian mechanics was rejected after a 
centur>' or so, despite facing continuous counter-evidence. This is the relative 
autonomy of RP. This steady revolution, as opposed to instant revolution, is 
accepted by Kuhn as well. However, he explains it by recourse to 
psychological decision of a community of scientists. Lakatos does not see any 
role of psychological factors in the process of theory-change. For him. ihcorN-
changc is a rational choice. However, the change may occur slowlv and 
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Steadily within the relative autonomy of RP. Both Kuhn and Lakatos see the 
historical reality that all scientific achievements are not of the same level. So 
Kuhn makes a distinction between extraordinary and normal science, where 
paradigm belongs to extraordinary science. Lakatos also speaks of hard core 
hypotheses and auxiliary ones, where the former gives heuristic to the latter. 
But he, as opposed to Kuhn, does not see both kinds of hypotheses separately, 
but rather as a series of theories producing a research proramme. In addition 
to Popper and Kuhn, Lakatos makes us aware of the following additional 
aspects of the history of science. 
a. A research programme is a relatively autonomous programme. 
b. A scientific revolution is understood retrospectively. 
c. Science aims at facts, not truth (Popper) and not puzzle-solving (Kuhn) 
d. Theories are not isolated, but programmized into an unit. 
Laudan and Kuhn-Lakatos: Like Kuhn, Laudan emphasizes that 
there are ideological elements in science. His 'research tradition' is thus very 
akin to Kuhn's paradigm. Both paradigm and RT contain the ontology and 
methodology which provide the mode of appraisal and guidance for specific 
theories within the paradigm or RT. But there are two vital differences 
between them. Paradigm aims at puzzle-solving, whereas 'research tradition' 
aims at problem-solving. Puzzle is that which must have a solution under the 
shared-paradigm, whereas a problem may not have any solution under the RT. 
However, at this point, Laudan, as against Popper, shifts the aim of science 
from 'truth' to 'problem-solving'. Both Kuhn and Laudan give up 'truth' as 
the aim of science. The second difference between Kuhn and Laudan is that, 
for Kuhn, there is no rational choice between paradigms, whereas RT changes 
through rational decision. For Laudan, problem-solving ability is the rationale 
of theory choice. It is rational to adhere to the theory which has greater 
problem-solving ability. Popper, Lakatos and Laudan, all hold that scientific 
change is rational. Although Lakatos's RP and Laudan's RT both maintain the 
rationality thesis, yet RT is quite different from RP. Whereas. RP is a series of 
both hard-core hypotheses and auxiliary ones. RT is not such a series. 
Speciilc theories are not the constituents of RT. If RT is akin to a paradigm. 
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specific theories, as opposed to Lakatos, make normal science. However, the 
characteristic difference of Laudan from all other philosophers is that for him 
scientific theories are not constructed merely to solve the empirical problems 
of science. The questions pertaining to a world-view, value-system of science 
are also problems of science demanding resolution through the construction of 
a theory. The conceptual problems too are amenable to resolution by recourse 
to construction of a theory. Therefore, he declares that science is problem-
oriented enterprise. When Lakatos says that progressive RP solves all the 
problems solved by an earlier RP and also solves some additional problems, 
he asserts a cumulative process of progress. But Laudan says that there are 
many historical facts indicating that though a latter theory could not solve all 
the problems solved by the earlier one, the later was accepted to the rejection 
of the earlier simply on the basis of its greater problem-solving ability. This is 
explained by Laudan through the concept of'rate of progress', which Lakatos 
fails to recognize. Laudan's view about science give us the following 
additional aspects in the context of history of science : 
a. Science is problem-oriented enterprise, problems may be empirical or 
conceptual. 
b. Scientific progress is non-cumulative. 
c. Progressive is rational, rational is progressive. 
Toulmin and Rationalists-Irrationalists : For Stephen Toulmin, 
science negotiates an all-inclusive change. Change in science includes not 
only scientific theories, but also scientific method, standard of rationality, 
mode of appraisal, concept of truth, etc. Nothing is unchangeable in the 
course of time. At the same time, he also sees that through all changes there is 
a continuity over a period of time. To explain these facts, he developed a view 
of scientific change which we may call evolutionism. For him, rationalists and 
irrationalists both assume that standard of rationality is static. Thus, both the 
camps are equally confused. The standard of rationality negotiates change 
itself Rationality is not static, but dynamic. The rationalists do argue 
rationality into a static mode. The irrationalists do aspire to static rationality 
but cannot find it out. Toulmin holds that reason does not change without 
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reason. He successfully recognizes what is neither seen by rationalists nor 
irrationalists. However, Laudan and Toulmin, both share the insight that 
rationality is immanent to scientific activity. But for Toulmin, as opposed to 
Lakatos and Kuhn scientific theories do not constitute a 'propositional 
system', but a 'population of ideas'. 
If a discipline is like nature (environment), theories in this discipline 
are a population of organisms. These organisms exist and develop in 
accordance with the Darwinian dictum 'survival of the fittest'. Unlike all 
other philosophers, Toulmin recognizes satisfaction of human needs as the 
aim of science and tries to explain equilibrium between man and nature. 
When Lakatos says about progressive-problem shift and Laudan says about 
problem-solving ability, they certainly refer to problems encountered by man. 
They also recognized human needs, but it is Toulmin who laid appropriate 
emphasis upon this theme. It goes against Popper's realist view that science 
aims at truth. For Toulmin, 'concept of truth' also undergoes the process of 
evolution, men accept that notion of truth which fulfils their intellectual 
needs. For him, neither revolution nor accumulation, but evolution is the 
pattern of scientific progress. However, his view of science gives the 
following aspects of science in the context of its historical evolution : 
a. Scientific change is all-inclusive. 
b. Reason does not change without reason. 
c. Rationality is immanent to scientific activity. 
d. Theories are populations of ideas. 
e. Human needs are the aim of science. 
Critical Evaluation of Scientific Progress 
Science, as is traditionally understood, is a progressive enterprise. 
Unlike literary criticism or sociology - science does make progress through all 
of its activities. Every new theory discovers new facts. Successive generations 
of scientists have filled in more and more parts of the complete true story of 
the world. Despite occasional or even frequent mistakes science does inch 
along towards accumulation of truth. This progress is invariably achieved 
through the use ol" "scicntillc method". All scientific claims have to pass 
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through the master of objective rules of evaluation provided by scientific 
method. The scientific practice is thoroughly informed by reason i.e. the 
contribution of each theory to scientific progress is determined by a crucial 
experiment. This approach of science to truth is monitored experimentally and 
methodologically. 
However, our present study of the five philosophers of science leads 
us to doubt the traditional concept of scientific progress. All the five 
philosophers agree that science makes progress. However, they radically 
differ as to the pattern of scientific progress. Firstly, our present 
understanding goes against the concept of cumulative progress. For Popper, 
Kuhn, Laudan and Toulmin, accumulation cannot be deemed to be the pattern 
of progress. They all recognize the historical phenomenon of scientific 
revolution. Revolution, as opposed to accumulafion, rejects the past 
achievements, and thus does not add to the pilling of facts. According to 
Popper's falsificationist account, an earlier theory is falsified or proved false 
by an ongoing revolution. Therefore, there is no question of accepting a false 
theory - scientists simply reject the old and accept the new. In such a 
revolution there is loss as well as gain. Kuhn too is radically against the 
concept of accumulation. For him, paradigms being incommensurable, change 
merely signifies shift of views which does not even mean progress let alone 
cumulative one. Popper accepts progress but denies accumulation, Kuhn 
denies both. For Popper, every falsifying hypothesis has greater truth content, 
though this content is different from earlier theories. In this theory succession 
the later theory is better than the earlier theory. But Kuhn says that we are not 
in a position to claim that defeafing paradigm is better than the defeated one. 
Historical study reveals that in course of time even a defeated theory gets 
victorious and re-established. Heliocentrism is first propounded by 
Aristrascus, and subsequently defeated by Ptolemy. However, it outcompetes 
geocentric hypotheses in the astronomical explorations of Copernicus. Such 
historical facts make Popper's falsificationist account of science untenable. In 
view of the same, we cannot claim one theory to be better than another. For 
Kuhn, there are no logical grounds to claim that the science necessarily makes 
progress. Cclcberalion of scientific progress is more psychological and 
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sociological than logical. In such a methodological field-situation we are in 
very different position to certify the superiority of theory which is the essence 
of progress. 
For Lakatos, progress is cumulative. He says that every successive 
research programme solves the problems solved by the earlier one. However 
it solves some additional problems as well. This view is outright cumulative. 
But this view is challenged by Laudan. He cites examples from the history of 
science when later theories have not solved all the problems which were 
solved by the earlier ones. Even then the later theories were accepted in view 
of their greater problem-solving ability. Ptolemy's theory is more effective in 
navigation than that of Copernicus till date. Toulmin, on the other hand, 
claims that scientific progress is not revolutionary but rather evolutionary 
which ensures the continuity of scientific progress. But it does not seem that 
Toulmin's continuity tantamounts to accumulation of progress. The essence 
of accumulation is that the earlier achievements are preserved by the later 
development, which is not seen in the context of continuity. In evolutionary 
change, a child grows and passes through different stages of life and develops 
to the manhood, yet it is the same man despite all changes. It suggests 
accumulation, but, as a matter of fact, it is continuity. For, the man of 50 years 
does not preserve the characteristics of his childhood. So, it is the continuity 
which is conceived to the exclusion of accumulation. 
One of the critical and crucial issues being debated in the 
contemporary philosophy of science is the question of the sense of progress. 
If scientific problem is not cumulative, how progress makes sense within the 
content of a revolution or theory-change. If scientific progress is not premised 
on accumulation of facts, should it signify the enrichment of scientific theory. 
Then, the question as to how one theory is better or superior to other also 
seems to be almost irresolvable. The question as to how one theory is better 
than the other has been variously responded to by our philosophers. For 
Popper, the successive theory is better because it falsifies the earlier - falsifier 
is better than falsified. For Laudan, the theory with greater problem-solving 
ability is better than that with less ability. For Lakatos. the theory with 
progressive problem-shift is better than that with degenerating problem-shift. 
280 
However, Kuhn here again strikes a discordant note. For him, the successive 
paradigm may become dominant over the earlier one, but dominance does not 
entail superiority. For him, paradigms are neither dominant nor defeated. It is 
the genius of a scientist or a group of scientists that either dominates for a 
certain period of time or is outcompeted at a particular point of time. If a 
group of imaginative scientists become committed to a defeated paradigm, it 
may once again bounce back and be a dominating frame of reference. So, the 
progress does not occur in science as such. It is the community of scientists 
who become dominant or at times get defeated. Such a progress or defeat is 
sociological, not logical. 
Secondly, as our present understanding goes, scientific progress is 
not methodical. In other words, progress occurs not just by applying some 
unique, universal, objective canons which lead scientists step by step towards 
a better position. According to our present understanding, this method-guided 
account of science is untenable. Firstly, there are no pure observational facts 
on which traditional scientific method was deemed to be safely anchored. 
Feyerabend along with other philosophers of science, points out that 
experiences arise together with theoretical assumptions. If we can succeed in 
eliminating the theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject, then we will have 
a person who is completely disoriented and incapable of carrying out the 
simplest actions or observations. Two competent observers do not see the 
same thing while observing the multiple phenomenal features of the universe. 
Seeing is not only having of a visual experience; it is also the way in which 
the visual experience is had. If we see some fact we see that as our theory 
orientates us. All this means that there is no pure observation. If we are to 
make an initial collection of facts to form a theory, we at the same time are to 
have theoretical assumptions to get oriented about facts. This position leads us 
into a vicious circle like "which comes first? - hen or egg ?" 
Contemporaneously the traditional glorified status of scientific method seems 
to be shaken to its foundation. Facts and theories seem to happen 
simultaneously. Facts do not precede theory as was traditionally postulated. 
Traditional account of science assumed a theory or a hypothesis to 
be a function of inductive generalization. However, when we turn to 
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hypotheses involving theoretical statements and terms, our difficulties and 
problems get all the more accentuated. Theoretical terms have no direct 
referent in observation. Then how can we possibly arrive at a hypothesis 
about unseen or unseeable entity ? Popper maintains that such a hypothesis is 
conjectural and produced by our imaginative mind. Kuhn also holds that there 
are discoveries involving a major reorientation in scientific convention 
resulting into a new paradigm. A paradigm is also a human creation. In the 
same token, Lakatos's 'research programme', Laudan's 'research tradition', 
and Toulmin's 'intellectual milieu', etc. all maintain that such theoretical 
discoveries or hypothetical formulations are not a fiinction of inductive 
generalisations but rather creations of human mind. 
In traditional scientific methodology, the role of 'crucial 
experiment' has been deemed decisive, rather all-important. Present 
philosophers of science argue that the 'centrality' of 'crucial experiment' is 
not being corroborated by the historical account of scientific evolution. 
Newtonian mechanics is a great instance in this regard. It was rejected after a 
long gap of a century despite observation of counter-evidence all along. 
Lakatos explains this fact by recourse to 'relative autonomy' of a research 
programme. He denied Popper's methodological falsificationism and 
propound what he termed as sophisticated falsificatioism - a view which 
rejects the role of crucial experiments. He says that crucial experiment may 
indicate the counter-evidence but it can never eventuate the rejection of the 
theory: A theory gets rejected only when it suffers from degenerating 
problem-shift (Lakatos), or if there emerges such a theory which has greater 
problem-solving ability (Laudan). So theory-choice is purposive, not 
backward-looking or methodical. In other words, purpose not method 
indicates the progress in the onward march of scientific change. 
Furthermore, historical research shows that there is no single rule -
however plausible and however firmly grounded in epistemology - that is not 
violated at some times or the other. According to Feyerabend, such violations 
are not accidental events; they are not results of insufficient knowledge or of 
inattention, which might have been avoided. On the contrary, we see that 
these violations are necessary for progress. The Copernican revolution, the 
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rise of modern atonism and quantum theory, the gradual emergence of the 
particle theory of light, etc., occurred because some thinkers either decided 
not to be bound by certain obvious methodological rules, or because they 
unwittingly broke them. What it amounts to is that scientists are not bound to 
obey a certain absolute, unchanging set of rules for scientitlc practice. 
Toulmin's evolutionism about scientific progress also holds the 
same thing. For him, scientific change is all-inclusive; method, mode of 
appraisal, concept of truth, standard of rationality, scientific theories, etc, 
everything changes. For Kuhn, when a paradigm shifts all the rules, methods, 
standards, etc., shift according to the paradigm. Laudan's 'research tradition" 
and Lakatos's 'research programme' hold the same. We continually make 
discoveries in science, and there is thus every reason to suppose that 
methodological shifts or fluctuations should also inform or characterize the 
entire spectrum of scientific programme. In view of the above submissions it 
can safely be concluded that science does continuously register progress. 
However, this progress is neither cumulative nor methodological. It is always 
a function of a creative breakthrough. 
Critical Evaluation of Realism 
The problem of realism is an issue which is logically related to 
scientific progress. If science makes progress, the obvious question arises as 
to what is the goal of this forward motion. The traditional realistic account of 
scientific progress amounts to saying that science, bit by bit, advances 
towards truth of the world. Every theory-change results in a step forward 
towards this noble goal. 
However, before considering the realist claim about scientific 
progress, we need to be sufficiently aware of realism itself. According to 
scientific realism, the unobservable entities that theoretical terms indicate do 
exist. To suppose that a theory is literally true would imply that no further 
anomaly could, in principle, arise from any quarter in this regard. But can anv 
thcor\- really ensure that further anomalies will not arise? Moreover. man\ 
such theories were proved false and rejected by scientists. Realists are ver\ 
nuich aware of these things. So. they modi Tied their position and licid tliai 
scientific theories are typically approximately true and theories that are more 
recent are closer to truth than older theories in the same domain. This view is 
called convergent realism. To be closer to truth, a successive theory should 
presume the theoretical relations and referents of earlier theories and also 
attain some additional measure of truth. But the history of science does not 
accord with this presumed direction of science. For instance, literally no one 
criticized the particle theory of light because it did not preserve the theoretical 
mechanisms of the earlier wave theory. Realists being aware of this also, held 
that up to a certain time a theory may be regarded as true and after a certain 
time the same theory may be regarded as false. This view is called tentative 
realism. The word 'tentative' means holding on; both holding on tightly as 
long as an idea works, and holding on loosely enough to be willing to let it go 
wherever the idea fails to work. There is another position of realists which is 
called constructive realism. According to this view, scientists construct 
theoretical models that tend to be at least partial representations of systems in 
the real world. The primary relationship between models and the world is not 
truth or correspondence or isomorphism but similarity. The terni 
'constructive' emphasizes the fact that models are deliberately created, or 
constructed by scientists. 
However, the shifts of realists from scientific realism through 
convergent realism and tentative realism to constructive realism, indicate that 
truth as the goal of science is not easily a maintainable claim. The attainment 
of truth by successive scientific theories seems also to be an arduous project. 
For example, tentative realism does realize the impact of history and 
constructive realism does appreciate the role of human manipulation in the 
crystallization and formulation of scientific theories. In our opinion, these 
views are ver\' much near to anti-realist position. Given the importance of 
sociological-psychological elements some philosophers of science view 
scientific theories as 'conventions' or 'fictions' leading respectively to 
conventionalist and fictionalist accounts of scientific discourses. According to 
conventionalism, basic assumptions of science are convenient definitions or 
conventions, which can not be validated either by a priori methods or bv 
inductive generalizations from scnsc-expcricncc. Ihey arc products of the free 
284 
activity of mind that are imposed by the scientific mind on our scientific 
schemes. According to tlctionalism. scientific theories are fictions. They read 
like factual accounts, but they are products of the imagination and nothing 
else. They are like the narrative of a novel. The episodes of a novel can be 
coherent, and they may be quite convincing as well. They may have a ring of 
truth, but the fundamental truth about a novel is that the people who figure in 
it are not real people. The most lucid account of the anti-realist position is 
made by instrumentalist philosophers of science. They hold that thinking 
serves human purposes. Thinking is useful, and its utility is its truth. The 
human will is an instrument for realizing human aims. Theories are neither 
true nor false but instead more or less effective instruments in the hands of the 
students of the nature - instruments for predicting natural phenomena or for 
solving the problems that arise from the interrogation of the Nature. This view 
is supported by operationalist doctrine that meaning of a scientific statement 
is its operation or function in the economy of science. There is no meaning of 
scientific discourse in the semantic sense. They are neither true nor false. 
In view of the above considerations with regard to realist-antirealist 
standpoints about scientific discourse, we need to bring out the positions of 
Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan and Toulmin whose views on scientific 
progress and realism are embodied in the present thesis. We need to 
summarize their views on the truth or otherwise of the theories of science. 
Popper, the proponent of the method of falsification maintains that 
scientific theories may be produced from any source whatsoever. It may be 
metaphysics, myth, fairy tale etc. However, when a theory is formulated, we 
need to go in for its Justification. Our quest for justification of the theory may 
not yield us its truth. However, its falsification is possible and we can declare 
a theor\ to be false with the emergence of a single counter-evidence. The 
theory may be true but we cannot verify it. 
Popper says that we seek highly informative theories by recourse to 
the method of trial and error. However, higher the information-content of a 
theory, the lower the probability of its truth. Or we may say the more 
inlbrmati\c the theory, the fallicr it is Irom truth. Then CVLMV successive 
thcor> wliich is more informative than its predecessor is exceedingly farther 
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from truth. So, in scientific progress, in our opinion, we get farther, rather 
than nearer to truth. Popper himself says that we may mistakenly falsify a true 
theory and corroborate a false theory. In this methodological endeavour what 
is our achievement? The net result is that it is impossible to verily the truth of 
scientific theories. 
Realising that truth of scientific proposition is impossible of 
verification. Popper came up with the idea that scientific theories are 
characterized by "truth-likeness" or have 'verisimilitude" to truth. The greater 
the "truth-likeness" of a theory, the better it is. Even, at the highest point of 
scientific progress, the truth in all its glory and majesty will elude us. We will 
have to remain content with "truth-likeness". This position is akin to 
constructive realism which asserts that the relation between models and the 
world is not truth, but similarity. Models are deliberately created by human 
mind to form a picture of reality. And we know that such a constructive 
realism is realism just only due to the fact that scientific theories aim at truth, 
regardless of its attainment. 
Thomas Kuhn, unlike Popper is not at all prepared to accept even 
such a lenient version of realism. He finds scientific enterprise and progress 
deeply interlinked to social and psychological dynamics. For him, theories are 
constructed with the purpose of solving the puzzles. And the solution of the 
puzzles exclusively depends on the skill of the concerning community of 
scientists. A scientific paradigm does not aim to describe the reality of the 
world. After a revolution what we obtain is a new paradigm. Such a new 
paradigm is not dictated by logical or methodological factors. In the final 
analysis, the rejection or acceptance of a paradigm is a dictated by the 
collective but inexplicable wisdom of a scientific community. 
Kuhn holds that the transfer of allegiance from one paradigm to 
another is a conversion-experience that cannot be performed on the basis of a 
method. Any scientist particularly whose productive career has committed 
him to the older tradition can put up a life-long resistance to an upcoming 
paradigm. Like the determination of a religious faith, he can not be accused of 
violating the standards, because there arc no such standards to be violated. In 
this situation, psychological tricks, prejudices, passion, temperament, laith. 
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etc. help us to take the decision. Once converted to the new paradigm the 
competent scientists can explore its possibilities and improve its fortunes 
drastically. Thereafter, more and more scientists -will be inclined to join the 
new paradigmatic bandwagon. However, this process of paradigm-shift 
indicates that fortunes of science are sociologically and psychologically 
oriented and a function of the collective competence of a scientific 
community. This position may be considered to be conventionalism as 
opposed to realism. 
Lakatos, who rationalizes those elements which Kuhn sees as 
sociological-psychological, does not agree to Kuhn's claim that the aim of 
science is socially or communally determined. For him, the aim of a research 
programme is to discover novel facts. Discovering novel facts as the goal of 
science is not social as Kuhn claims. He also asserts that the goal of science is 
not truth either, as Popper claims. For him, science aims at facts, but facts do 
not necessarily entail truth. For him, a theory may clash with a factual 
statement, but it does not necessitate the rejection of the theory. Moreover, a 
theory which is empirically falsified and actually rejected also, may again 
became victorious with its 'progressive problem-shift' in discovering facts. 
This realization about discovering facts points at instrumentalism which 
asserts that scientific theories are instruments for prediction. 
Laudan's view about scientific progress could also be deemed as 
instrumentalism. For him, scientific theories are constructed with the purpose 
of 'problem-solving' and acceptance of a theory depends on its problem-
solving ability. So, theories are instruments for solving the problems that we 
face in doing science. Laudan emphasizes that solution of the problems does 
not entail the truth. For, our problems are designed with our worldview and 
conceptual schemes - the problems are not objective or substantive, but rather 
experiential. Moreover, a solution is also conceived by recourse to the same 
way. Both problems and their solutions are oriented by a research tradition 
which is very akin to Kuhn's paradigm. For Laudan. research traditions 
should not be judged in terms of truth or falsity, for they are historical 
creatures. Since they arc created for solving the problems, Ihcy have merits or 
demerits w ith regard to that purpose. They have no truth-value. 
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However, the historical aspect of science is considered of highest 
import by Toulmin. For him, science undergoes on all-inclusive change where 
neither any particular theory, nor methodology and not even the concept of 
truth either remain intact. Scientific progress occurs not for the sake of truth, 
but the concept of truth too evolves through the process of evolution. Again 
the evolution aims at equilibrium between intellectual ideals and our current 
intellectual capacity. So, science is involved in a struggle for survival, it is not 
oriented to the realization of truth. This view about scientific progress again 
supports instrumental ism, not realism. Theories are not descriptions of the 
real world, but instruments to help us survive. Equilibrium is a human need, 
not a characteristic of truth. 
The above discussion brings out two opposite positions: realism 
which asserts that science, at least, aims at truth, and anti-realism which 
asserts that truth has nothing to do with science; the aim of science being 
producing better and better instruments for 'predictions' of the natural 
phenomena or 'solution' of the upcoming problems. Popper is generally 
considered to be belonging to the realist camp. The anti-realist group is 
adorned by Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan and Toulmin. As already submitted, 
realists deny the role of psychosocial dynamics in the ongoing march of 
science, whereas the antirealists deem the entire scientific enterprise to be 
finally inspired by psychosocial or communitarian factors. 
Popper admits that there is no logic of discovery. For him, a 
discovery is conjectural. It is a recognition of the fact that human creative 
mind actively participates in the process of discovery. However, he denies 
such a participation of human mind in the logic of justification. For him, we 
may not have a logic for discovering a new theory, but once a theory is 
discovered, we are, of course, able to test it through "criticism'. But in our 
opinion, critical activity too is a creative venture and starts and stops at the 
command of our attitudes and dispositions. It is a creative and participator) 
and not a detached and disintelerested assessment of philosophical 
transcndcntalist or objcctivist. When Popper says that sometimes we mav 
mislakcnl) falsify true theory and corroborale a false iheory. he is iiinvitlinglx 
admilling the role of human inind even in the logic ol'justification. 
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The recent developments in the philosophy of science indicate that 
there is no distinction between the context of discovery and the context of 
justification. If Popper admits that there is no logic of discovery, and if there 
is no distinction between the context of discovery and the context of 
justification, then Popper will have to admit that there is no logic of 
justification either. In fact, both parts of scientific activity are oriented by 
human productive mind - neither is free from socio-psychological elements. 
Furthermore, the argument can be buttressed by adding the 
perspectives of biology, genetic epistemology, cognitive psychology, 
sociology and anthropology. If scientists, like other people, are recognized as 
biological entities, who have evolved under selection pressures; if scientists, 
like other people, are cognitive systems with identifiable limitations and 
deficiencies; and if scientists are embedded in complex networks of social 
relationships; then chances for scientists being super-human purveyers of 
objective truth seem decreasingly low. 
Finally, Heidegger's perspective on human condition seems relevant 
in this regard. According to Heideggers' analysis of 'Dasein' a human being 
is 'Being-unto-the-world' or 'Being-there'. All human activities or projects 
are historical, temporal, cultural and linguistic. Man has no trans-historical, 
transcultural and translinguistic vantage point available for the articulation of 
his epistemic, hermeneutic, semantic and methodological concerns of themes. 
He has to be content with historical and cultural meanings and truths. 
Accordingly, Heidegger reinterprets science too as a human activity. 
We think that all these considerations now provide us with more or 
less sufficient ground to declare that scientific activities are not free from 
sociological-psychological elements. The matter has become more serious 
with the discovery of 'historicity of knowledge', which holds that human 
cognition becomes structured by 'time'. With all this awareness, we can 
solemnly declare that science is not a truth-seeking enterprise, and not any 
algorithmic activity either. Science is human activity. Human thinking like 
other human endowments, has an instrumental role. Therefore, a better 
scienlific thcor\ means a theon*' with greater ability to solve the problems \vc 
face w ithin the domain of scientific research. 
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Concluding Remarks 
The following remarks can be made with regard to scientific 
progress and the problem of realism : 
1. Science makes progress in some sense or the other. 
2. Science is not a truth-seeking enterprise. 
3. A better theory means greater ability to solve problems. 
4. There is no universal method for science. 
5. The scientific theories are human products. 
6. The scientific research is not free of ideology. 
7. The science is not algorithmic activities, but creative ones. 
8. There is freedom in scientific research also. 
9. There is no justification but competition of theories. 
These concluding remarks should not be confused by us in any way. 
Here we just want to say that scientific discourse as well as philosophy, art, 
etc. as human products are deemed to fail to construct a true description of the 
reality. So, when we say that 'there is no truth' or 'there is no reality', it 
means just only that there is no truth in scientific discourse (human 
discourse). We could not construct that description which corresponds to 
reality. If we understand by these remarks that there is no reality out there at 
all, it will lead us to the paradox: I think, yet I do not exist. So, there is reality, 
there is truth; but in so far as science is concerned, though it is not in a 
position to attain to that reality, despite its being progressive throughout its 
historical evolution. 
Furthermore, there may not be the universal method of science. 
However, it should not be confused that there is no method necessary for 
science, and therefore we can do whatever we like to do. Rather when we say 
that 'there is no method", it means only that there is no unique, universal and 
unchanging method which is capable of turning the dross of the laboratory 
into the gold of theoretical truth. There are rules for guidance in science, but 
their role is no more than like the role of grammar in language. Sometimes, 
the articulation of grammatical rules and their successful application helps us 
(() proclucc better understanding of lanmiaae-use. Sometime, our lineuistic 
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practice brings out a change in grammatical rules. Likewise, methodological 
articulation helps scientists to get better understanding of science, and new 
scientific discovery brings out innovation in methodology also. 
Furthermore, according to internal realism, the adherents of every 
framework believe that their own framework is true. Even when they abandon 
the previous one, they claim that the present one is true. But the recent 
developments in hermenutics and deconstruction enlighten us that every 
linguistic framework is but our interpretation. Hermeneuticists and 
deconstructionsits emphasise that all frameworks are interpretations and no 
framework can arrogate to itself the right of being a repository of truth. 
Secondly, all frameworks are devoid of any rational justification whatsoever. 
Acceptance or appropriation of such a view takes us one step farther from 
falsificationism. As opposed to verificationism, falsificationism maintains that 
we can not discover truth, but we can discover falsity. However, 
deconstructionists maintain that any justification of either truth or falsity is 
impossible of formulation. There is no transtheoretical or transcultural or 
translinguistic standard of justification. A falsificationist deems truth to be 
unjustifiable and falsity to be amenable to justification. Deconstructionists 
deny the justifiability of both. They hold that we are not in a position to assert 
either the truth or falsity of the fundamental scientific theories. 
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